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3
The purpose of this thesis is to gain insight into the problem of economic 
development in general and of Latin America in particular. Its main inquiry is to 
attem pt an explanation of the process of regional economic development based 
on historical fact. That is, how does one reconcile economic stagnation with the 
presence of a high wage economy.
A chronological sequence of primary and secondary quotes tailors the theme, as 
major evidence for our argument. We do not wish to centre it on the wage 
variable. However, as the usual assumption exists about the lack of information 
on wages, economic evidence of wage differentiation is presented in an effort to 
disprove such an assumption. For this reason, a m isunderstanding of the role of 
wages in economic decline over other alternative or complementary explanations, 
may emerge.
This thesis makes allowances for the exploration of several different ways in 
which imperfections in the labour market influenced wage levels in the NAC 
region. Nevertheless, it is not about alternate or complementary explanations. 
Neither is it about explaining why there was insufficient interregional migration 
within Colombia.
We mention these viewpoints, of course. Likewise, we understand that other 
aspects would enable the reader to better assess the role of wages. Aspects such 
as data on the progress of the particular sectors under consideration —particularly 
on demand, rates of growth, etc. But because they are such vast themes, they 
become more (and are) material for further research. Therefore, they are matters 
that lie well beyond the scope of this thesis.
In sum, this thesis suggests that labour market imperfection be at the centre of an 
economic explanation. Its argument is that imperfections in factor mobility 
—between the NAC region and other parts of the country, and internationally-
meant employers faced a labour shortage in the NAC region. The large-scale 
corporate unit of the banana sector was able to meet the resulting high wages. 
Since it was a large employer, it set wages for the rest of the region. Other 
employers were not, in the end, able to operate profitably at this wage level.
We wrote this thesis to counteract those who overindulged —and continue to do 
so— in the explanation of national economic development in Colombia. It therefore 
seeks to counterbalance the excessive emphasis placed on coffee, in the literature 
on the economic development and economic history of the nation.
This had been studied upon the basis of a particular interior region's successful 
commodity —and sheer negligence— of the particular element of regional diversity. 
The present research and analysis of economic facts show a completely different 
economic scenario.
The thesis attempts to deal with the former by theoretically suggesting an 
orthodox approach. But there is also an effort to assail the latter by showing the 
historical economic facts in straightforward manner, that highlight the existence 
of a high wage economy in the region under scrutiny. This represents an 
economic historical fact that was never mentioned in the discourse of analysis of 
economic development in Colombia.
The content of this work seeks to treat the general view of the process of 
economic development in the NAC region of Colombia, with as much contempt, 
as the failure to research it adequately, has produced in us.
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis is a study in economic development and history of a region in Latin 
America, namely the North Atlantic Coast1 of Colombia. It is based on primary 
and secondary evidence, qualitative as well as quantitative.
Chapter I is designed to discuss a theoretical framework of imperfections. We 
suggest it may provide some reasonable basis to understand what actually 
happened during the economic development of the NAC region. But because of 
the relevance of regional diversity in Colombia, it is a framework that strongly 
features the regional.
The chapter discusses the influence a region's successful coffee economy had on 
contemporary literature on Colombian economic development and history. It 
represents an attempt to relate the lack of research in the economic history of the 
NAC region, with some significant frameworks that have emerged. We point out 
these benefitted from more abundant research in the economic history of the 
interior of Colombia and its coffee economy.
The chapter equally discusses ideas such as 'growth pole' and 'staple growth'. But 
the discussions also link with the notion of 'structural rigidity'. The use of the 
concept of segmentation --as a complementary or alternate theoretical tool— 
reflects this.
It m ay in fact prove difficult to document it —whether in narrow or broad sense— 
and its effects, in a way that is clearly convincing to everyone. But in line with 
true, unprejudiced, academic tradition —worldwide— it should not prove a 
necessary and sufficient reason to feel threatened by it. In fact, we face it head on 
and benefit from it the best we can. Which is why we suggest it has practical 
usefulness in unravelling the complexity of the history of regional economic 
development.
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In Chapter II attention is turned to several matters. It begins by briefly describing 
the economic historical setting for regional economic development in Colombia. 
The purpose here is to introduce the relevance of the selection of the period. We 
then provide some economic historical evidence, on the prevailing level of wages 
in pre turn of the century Colombia.
Chapter III provides information on the banana sector of the NAC region. It 
highlights the importance of understanding the role of the high wage level set by 
its large-scale corporate unit (UFC). This was as an significant element in labour 
market imperfections, because it affected costs of other industries, and contributed 
to stagnation in the region.
In it we introduce some information on (i) the intricacy of the international 
monopoly that was the UFC; (ii) the nature of the labour force in the region; (iii) 
its size; (iii) its organization and the relevance of the strike it generated. After that, 
we provide information on the cultivation of bananas in the region.
Because scholars have surprisingly neglected this, one of our efforts in this thesis 
is to underscore the NAC region's high-wage economy. Given that historical 
studies on the treatment of prices in the NAC region do not exist, in Chapter IV 
we deflate the empirical series on wages to analyse their significance in real terms. 
This is done by comparing and contrasting the evidence between both NAC and 
interior regions. Interior wage levels include non-monetary components.
The revelation that NAC region wage levels were higher in real terms than the 
interior of the nation, should corroborate the first aspect of the paradox 
encountered: the operation of a high-wage economy. The second aspect -that 
simultaneously there was stagnated growth- is complemented by other 
suggestions in Chapters VIII & IX.
Chapter V shows the evidence gathered in this thesis for the first time, on wage 
differentiation in the NAC region and in the interior (albeit in sparser detail). The
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chapter draws the thesis together and focuses a main focal point: wages. It 
chronologically delineates the development of the prevailing level of the 
competitive wage in the NAC region, albeit in nominal terms. It does so 
particularly for the coffee and the cotton industries where a segmentation strategy 
was not introduced.
Chapter VI discusses the number of imperfections that, finally, influenced the cost 
of industries (other than banana) in the region. It begins by briefly underlining the 
possibility that some factors may have accounted for the insufficient flows of 
labour to the NAC region.
Such factors for example, are information imperfections, transportation costs, 
difference in costs of living between regions, non-monetary components of 
income, incomes over yearly cycles and attitudes to risk by peasants with access 
to land who may become landless proleatrians. The chapter stresses that these 
factors are important and are valuable topics for further research. Little evidence 
was found to fully test these important factors and undoubtedly they would 
require many years of unearthing of additional material.
One factor that offered some degree of evidence was that referring to cultural 
attitudes towards waged labour. Within this scope, the chapter notes the character 
of the region's labour force. It suggests that cultural attitudes equally contributed 
to the emergence and persistence of high agricultural wages in the region. This 
is manifested by the degree of elasticity of demand for income and leisure showed 
by the labour force.
The chapter then examines that other factors —such as m arket imperfections, that 
resulted in such labour immobility, that it left employers in the NAC region facing 
labour shortage. Evidence of this is presented. Projects to im port foreign labour 
failed.
The segmentation strategy introduced by the UFC itself is presented as another
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imperfection. The company as a monopsonist, segmented its internal labour force, 
and paid the low wages it could optimally pay. Its monopoly position meant that 
this wage was higher than what a competitive wage in the region would have 
been. We focus dispersion not in the sense that in itself, it shows segmentation, 
rather than the operation of the market. We utilise it as reflecting the strategy of 
segmentation, not subject to supply and demand. This is why we show dispersion, 
heterogeneity and —above all— asymmetry of both coffee and banana wages.
Chapter VII suggests at an early stage, the link between a prevailing high level 
of wages —as an end result of labour market imperfection— and economic 
stagnation. There were many reasons for the decline of cotton exports. But we 
suggest it be plausible that excessive protection in the interior —as well as high 
wages in the NAC region— were impediments. After all they are not mutually 
exclusive. And in the final analysis, we do not have to decide here whether the 
credit for economic stagnation goes to wage pressure or protection. W hat we are 
really studying here are the important effects, because, as far as we know, many 
other things may have been going on that we are still not aware of.
The evidence for the stagnation of cotton textiles is given by the collapse of the 
Obregon factory. The chapters act as the 'liaison' between the idea of 'linkage' in 
economic development and, its antithesis —that of the notion of 'leakage', the 
consequence of imperfections.
We suggest that -com pared to the that of the interior— the NAC region's 
economic growth and development process stagnated, because of the presence of 
a series of imperfections. We equally suggest the result was intra and interregional 
wage differentiation.
Particularly, within the confines of an intraregional differentiated labour market, 
the high wages the banana sector could afford to pay, contributed to the pricing 
out of other sectors in the region —cotton textile production, being the more 
indicative one.
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Chapter VIII & IX cover the fortunes of the cotton textile industry. They contain 
no conclusive evidence that would prove that cotton cultivation and cotton textile 
production failed. They do attempt, however, to record the evidence already 
present that was weakening an industry with potentially high economic linkages. 
They suggest cotton cultivation for export —and textile production for domestic 
consum ption- had a relevant potential for the region's economic development.
It is within this context therefore, that both chapters deal with the argument put 
forward by this thesis. Additionally, the chapters underline the reasoning intended 
at the beginning of this thesis. That is —with sections on the staple itself, its 
production and linkage aspects- this reasoning was induced, alongside guidelines 
implied by the notions of 'growth pole' and 'staple growth'. We have done the 
best we possibly could. And therefore hope that suggestions in these two chapters 
complement the second aspect of the paradox we encountered: that there was 
stagnated growth in the NAC region.
As a final note we would like to exhort the pertinence of the scarcity of data. The 
major shortcomings of this thesis are the unavailability of data that could help 
expound important factors in interregional labour mobility.
The British Vice-Consul Bowles accurately noted in 1915, that in Colombia " 
statistics dealing with subjects of importance in regard to trade continue to be 
largely unavailable. The collection of reliable information affecting trade and the 
general progress of the country is, therefore, attended with great difficulty, and 
statements regarding these subjects are little more than express figures."2 The 
situation is not much better today.
The source material used here consists of British —mainly Foreign Office papers— 
United States —mainly Commerce Department papers— and Colombian —mainly 
Ministries' Papers— origin3.
Although quotations are illustrations, not quintessential proof, the argument is a
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structure around quotations. Therefore, conclusions can only be tentative. The 
proof such as there can be is within the body of evidence, ideas and notions to 
which we refer.
Despite their ultimate usefulness, the limited quantitative findings present 
drawbacks. A major one was the lack of access to large amounts of primary 
economic data. Such was the case for non-monetary elements of income and 
incomes over a yearly cycle. It was equally the case for costs of living in different 
regions for every year of the period under study, and for transportation costs.
Another is that insufficient economic data obstructs the presentation of detailed 
time series and creates uncomfortable discontinuities. Another is that wages only 
matter, relative to productivity; and we found no data on productivity.
Yet another is that most of the wage rates have to be quoted in rather wide 
ranges. If it were assumed that daily wages made rates reflect daily earnings, 
weekly or annual estimates could be constructed. This cannot be achieved given 
the lack of necessary, accurate and consistent data —on both wages and 
employment— in different categories of work throughout the period.
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1. NAC hereinafter.
2. Bowles, H., E., Vice-Consul at Bogota," Colombia. Report for the Years 1909-1913 on the Trade 
of the Consular District of Bogota ", Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series No. 5437, 
(London, 1915), p.6.
3.Britain
(i) Public Records Office: The Records of the Foreign Office, General Correspondence, 1900-1930, 
Foreign Office 371; Board of Trade Files of Dissolved Companies, 1900-1930, Board Trade 31; 
Board of Trade Files of Dissolved Companies Liquidator's Accounts, 1900-1930, Board Trade 34;
(ii) Foreign Office Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual and Miscellaneous Series, 1885-1930;
(iii) Parliamentary Papers - Accounts and Papers, 1874-1930;
(iv) Board of Trade Journal, 1900-1930;
United States
(i) Daily Consular and Trade Reports, 1900-1930;
(ii) Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, 1900-1930;
(iii) Commerce Reports, 1900-1930;
(iv) Supplements to Commerce Reports, 1900-1930;
Colombia
(i) Memorias del Ministro de Industrias, 1900-1930;
(ii) Boletin de Industrias, 1900-1930;
(iii) Memorias del Ministro de Relaciones Exteriores, 1900-1930.
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CHAPTER I
A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF IMPERFECTION
FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND HISTORY
Theoretical Framework
The NAC region grew for a while but then stagnated. Our hypothesis is that this 
was because imperfections in labour mobility between the region and other parts 
of the country (and internationally) meant employers faced labour shortage in the 
region. High wages were the result. But they were m et by the large-scale 
corporate unit (the UFC, the international monopoly and local monopsony) of the 
banana sector and set a prevailing regional level of high wages (by Colombian 
standards) that other employers could not pay.
Imperfections involved national and international factors which lessened labour 
mobility to the NAC region. Imperfections also involved the character of the 
labour force which made it reluctant to become fully integrated in the wage 
economy. They also involved the presence of monopsonistic power of the UFC to 
set a regional price for wages which other employers had to accept. This forced 
other regional economic sectors, namely cotton cultivation and textile production 
to pay a higher wage than the competitive wage would have been, but they were 
internationally competitive so they could not operate profitably and survive.
A key point in this hypothesis of imperfections however, is that there was not a 
unified labour market all over Colombia. Within the UFC as well there was much 
wage differentiation. This was a result of the policy of the company to segment 
its labour force and therefore bring down its own wage costs.
So, in general, the hypothesis suggests that economic stagnation was a result of 
imperfections in the labour market. But to understand this historical fact it m ust 
be inevitably linked with theoretical concepts. In this way, historical evidence such 
as wages and wage differentiation itself may be properly interpreted.
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This evidence explains not just the existence of, but the contrasts between, inter 
and intra-regional staple industries (NAC region banana and cotton; and NAC 
region and interior textile industry). The question of industries on the upsurge 
(NAC region banana and interior textile) at the expense of the decline of another 
(NAC region cotton cultivation for export and cotton textile industry respectively) 
are thus explained by a combination of economic theory and historical evidence.
This indeed attracts model-building. However, economic history need not be 
written (even today) simply to please those of esoteric persuasion. Although there 
is certainly a need for applying tools of economic theory and quantitative 
techniques to the study of economic history, sometimes, as Desai experienced," 
these tools do not necessarily yield any strong conclusions. They point out the 
need for more historical data and cannot be a substitute for them"1.
The economic historical evidence upholding the existence of wage differentiation 
offered here is so straightforward that missing data when found would only serve 
to strengthen the argument. Therefore, no more information is needed that would 
w arrant straight-line interpolation, extrapolation of ratios or econometric 
curve-fitting as there is no need to estimate missing data to carry the argument 
through. There is really " no room for 'algebra over arithmetic'"2.
The approach here is thus not to construct a formal model bu t for the adoption 
of a 'product-mix' of theoretical concepts which interpret economic historical fact 
and help understand the NAC region's economic development. These intertwined 
elements of analysis thereby examine: a).- the predom inant structural rigidity 
affecting the region: the nature of the labour market; and b).- aspects of the nature 
of the product of sectors in the NAC region, having in m ind their potential for 
leakage as well as for linkage. The theoretical framework evolves as a function of 
a variable 'product-mix' of a variety of imperfections in the labour market with the 
ideas of 'growth pole' and 'staple growth' and a digressional 'structuralist' tool 
of analysis.
28
Despite the fact that the 'staple growth' notion considers the labour factor as an 
input as well as the contributions it can make in the establishment of industry 
(linkage) through say, education (training), it does not deal w ith the more relevant 
structural aspect of this factor, namely the nature of the labour market.
The labour market segmentation concept provides one of the elements of analysis 
in understanding why stagnation took place.
The nature of the labour market plays a crucial role because it is where the major 
irregularities, imperfections or disequilibrium took place in the NAC region's 
process of development. It allows scrutiny of a major constraint in the labour 
factor and what emerged was shortage of labour supply. A significant societal 
response also emerges: the character of the labour force and the reluctance to 
blend into the wage economy.
Additionally, in order to understand the full role that the high level of wages 
played in the NAC region's economic development process the 'growth pole' and 
'staple growth' ideas are useful tools of analysis. Theoretically, they provide a 
complementary explanation of stagnation of raw  cotton exports and the decline 
of the cotton textile industry. The usefulness of these ideas is in the sense that the 
nature of the product reveals the specific characteristic of the (primarily outwardly 
oriented) banana staple.
Namely, it intertwines with a major imperfection in the labour market of the 
NAC region which was the presence of monopsony. The banana staple was 
centred upon an international monopoly such as the UFC with a considerable 
degree of monopsony power. The level of wages and more important, the degree 
of segmentation the UFC introduced could only be sustained by such a base.
Comprising one of the imperfections of the labour market the consequences of 
segmentation may have led to economic stagnation. While this sustained level of 
segmentation discouraged the sector which had most potential as a linkage
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industry in the region (the primarily inwardly oriented cotton staple), it relatively 
strengthened the most formidable capitalist institution in the region (the primarily 
outwardly oriented banana staple's corporate unit, the UFC) as well as the interior 
coffee staple's economy.
The operation of both economic and institutional factors, play a crucial part in 
determining patterns of labour market. In relation to the former factor, character 
of the labour force and shortage of labour supply; regarding the latter, the banana 
sector corporate unit's introduction of segmentation as a new system of control 
in the regional labour process.
The evidence provided below, of the existence of different wages for labourers of 
equal efficiency, confirmed a significant imperfection such as the segmentation of 
the labour market of the NAC region. The key to understanding the incidence of 
the labour market, is not merely substitution of monopoly for perfect competition 
—in a neoclassical framework for determining the equilibrium price of labour. One 
has to look additionally, at segmentation.
A perfect labour market in the region there was not. The particularity of the 
situation in the NAC region was not so much the reality of the UFC's 
destructuring and restructuring of the labour force. It was that in restructuring the 
labour market, capitalist hegemony was maintained by setting a wage level that 
was not down to subsistence, but considerably above average.
The NAC region's growth and development process stagnated (compared to that 
of the interior) due to the presence of various imperfections of which one was the 
presence of intra-regional segmentation. Another question would be to ask that 
if there was intra-regional segmentation, why did the cotton textile industry not 
pay a different wage from the banana industry. That is, w hy did segmentation run 
its course within the UFC and not in every sector?
One answer would be linked to the role of monopoly and monopsony. Direct
30
foreign investment supplemented the region's labour factor by homogenising the 
regional economy's scarcely endowed labour resources. However, the instrument 
of homogenisation -setting a high level of wages- required a strong market 
imperfection. This was the presence of a monopoly which eventually also 
consolidated its role of monopsonist, contributing as one of several imperfections 
to the stagnation of the regional economy in the process. The cotton textile 
industry had no monopsony power in its producer market.
The market suitably fitted the nature of the production function of interior coffee 
and NAC region banana, but not NAC region cotton. Market forces eroded the 
NAC region's capacity for development because it was not endowed (as the 
interior was) with a suitable world market technological production function such 
as was showed by interior coffee. If indeed it did, say, as in the case of the banana 
sector, it was under foreign monopoly control which im peded development by the 
absence of creation of economic linkages. This in turn was due to the perpetuation 
of the UFC's strategy of segmentation.
NAC region enterprise such as the cotton textile industry declined and a regional 
factor such as scarce labour was destructured in the long run by the process of 
foreign direct investment. Direct foreign capital formation became an impediment 
for the regional economy's capacity to mobilize. This was so because the former 
could not afford to pay such high wages as the latter and was eventually 
outpriced. The benefits of direct foreign investment on the NAC region's income, 
employment and effective demand levels, proved fictitious. The reason for this 
was that although a high level of wages was set and some employment was 
created, effective demand so generated, could not be met by the NAC region's 
economy.
In the final analysis, the argument may be summarised as follows:
(a) Inter-regional limitations on labour mobility as between the interior and the 
NAC region.
(b) Reluctance of the labour force to integrate with the wage economy.
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(c) i.- Within the NAC region, the UFC of course paid the low wages it could 
optimally pay but its monopoly position in the producer market m eant that this 
wage was higher than what a competitive wage would have been;
ii.- Its monopsony position allowed the UFC to segment its internal labour 
force in outwork etc. and to compel the workers to spend their wages on the UFC 
stores thus restricting local multipliers;
(d) The cotton industry in the NAC region could not successfully segment its 
labour force from seeking high wages. As a competitive industry its power on the 
producer market was zero and hence, its power in the local factor market (labour) 
was limited. Thus, it became a price taker in the labour market, not a price setter.
A complementary explanation was that there was indeed increased competition 
from the interior as transport links improved as well as the relative dynamism of 
coffee and its better resistance to the Depression compared with bananas, for the 
reasons discussed earlier.
National and Regional Development in Colombia
W ithin the discourse of the economic historiography of Colombia, scholars have 
thus far neglected3 the essential characteristic of regional diversity in their 
explanation of 'national' economic development. Indeed Colombian and other 
economic historians have equated the national to the regional level in the study 
of the nation's economic development.
This has created in the interim the anomaly of a uniregional view of the economic 
development of all regions of Colombia based on an excessive stress on the 
relevance of the successful results of the interior's coffee economy. We see this as 
a flaw that needs to be redressed and strive to place emphasis on w hy other 
regions -the NAC region in this case- were not particularly (or less) successful.
A scholar such as Nieto-Arteta4, has used the staple thesis, incorporating some 
of its concepts as an approximation to the Innis interpretation of staple product
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development. He has also used structural rigidities as theoretical concepts to 
explain economic development in Colombia.
Here, we seek to repair the aforementioned irregularity of existent overindulgence 
in the explanation of national economic development in Colombia . This is 
attem pted by using an approach which combines the notion of 'growth pole' and 
the 'staple thesis' with labour market imperfections.
This theoretical framework is a response to other frameworks which emerged as 
the result of the study of the successful commodity (coffee) of the interior region. 
It aspires to counter-balance their excessive emphasis on the bean's economy. A 
short review of these other frameworks follows. However, it is labour market 
segmentation theory which provides a new element that explains regional 
economic development.
We emphasize the importance of regional diversity and suggest a theoretical 
framework based on that particular aspect. Although Hirschman's5 theoretical 
framework of inter-regional imbalances and unbalanced growth is based on 
Colombian regionalism, what is needed is a more elaborate attem pt to draw  up 
a framework concentrating on a particular region.
Export-led growth is necessarily unbalanced growth at least over a considerable 
num ber of years and the history of economic development has been overwhelmed 
by such examples. But historical research in Colombian regional economic 
development demands a different framework.
Both ideas can be fruitfully used in our analysis of the economic development of 
the NAC region. These can be applied to the strong emergent differences in the 
country's regional economic development. One reason for this is that regional 
economic development suggests that regions act as compartments which witness 
commodity but not factor flows between themselves, following the tradition of 
international trade theory6.
Growth Pole Theory
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The 'growth pole' idea is useful for two reasons. First, because by underlining the 
notion of 'linkage' in economic development, it gives full weight to its antithesis: 
that of a parallel co-participant inverse such as the notion of 'leakage' in economic 
development (a valuable theoretical 'alter-ego'). Second, because the notion of 
'linkage' is a major implication of the idea of 'staple growth'. This intertwining of 
both ideas of 'growth pole' and 'staple growth' allows the first element of this thesis' 
theoretical framework to flow in a more balanced way. The polarity of both 
notions of 'linkage' and 'leakage' is essential in this framework. We will stress 
further on in my short discussion on the 'staple thesis', that whilst the notion of 
'linkage' is a strategical element in the framework, the notion of 'leakage' is in fact, 
a tactical one.
Although the essentials of the argument first surfaced with Young7, the 
recognised originator of this theoretical system is Perroux8 with his pioneering 
'pole de croissance' concept for the explanation of economic development. In 
essence, when an industrial 'centre' starts to grow, economies of scale and 
proximity appear, attracting increasing numbers of new factors. The implication 
that economic space is defined by economic relations as a 'field of forces' and the 
idea of 'imbalance' in development suggests that economic space consists of 
'centres' or 'poles' or 'foci'. These are followed by aggregations around nodes 
which, through innovation, spread 'development'. As dom inant nodes control 
objects limited to them, the former connect into 'growth poles'.
Most of the case-studies of the 'growth pole' theory view 'development7 
(sustained or in fluctuant trends) in more aggregate terms. The treatment implies 
Smithian Classicism (that 'development7 presupposes capital accumulation) which 
ends showing characteristics such as the expansion of industries, use of 
technology, production of linkage effects and capacity of sustained 'growth' over 
periods of time that m ust be linked to the general equilibrium theory requiring 
optimal efficiency. This is to say that -by and large- case studies have to do with
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the degree of efficiency certain economies showed and not so much the historical 
process of structural transformation.
'Growth pole' theory has been widely criticised and under constant revision. 
Criticisms have been that 1) it is at a hypothesis, rather than a theory; 2) it is not 
thoroughly explained and that it shows limited support of empirical evidence.
As a policy, in terms of job creation it accomplishes little (especially in the 
long-run) in relation to the extremely high capital investment. And if associated 
w ith the recent upsurge of 'linkage-producing' industrial complexes, 'growth' 
dynamics might not exist because 'growth poles' depend on industrial complexes' 
capacities for generating and transmitting innovations, new interdependencies and 
new industries.
The notion of 'growth pole' however, implies the existence of linkage or leakage 
capabilities which are (at worst) a reasonably realistic testimony to conduciveness 
or not to sustained growth and development over periods of time. Their 
significance will be further expanded in my comments on the 'staple thesis'. It is 
the leakage capabilities in the NAC region which are stressed in this thesis. They 
command an ill-given attention that the historiography of regional development 
in Colombia has afforded.
Staple Thesis
A more detailed survey of the staple thesis is warranted because 'growth pole' 
theory does not really concern itself with say, institutional and technological 
change but only with rapid acceleration of income and industrialization. In terms 
of structural change it views 'growth' more in a complementary sense.
Indeed, it seeks to understand the growth process by inquiring whether or not 
regional exports led to growth in each region. That is, whether they constituted 
an 'engine of g ro w th '9 or not for their regions. The 'vent7 for surplus10 element
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in Smith11 suggests that export expansion is accomplished not only by diversion 
of domestic output away from consumption (i.e., saving) but through involvement 
in the production of underutilized land and labour of subsistence sectors.
W ith the presence of raw  materials or resource-intensive commodities facing large 
dem and in world markets, not requiring elaborate processing and having a value 
to weight ratio high enough to sustain transportation costs (what the term 'staple' 
designates) a dominating economic linkage role was bound to be played.
This idea of the 'export base' largely present in Innis 12, who set the ground for 
(amongst others, Kindleberger13) W atkins'14 'staple thesis' paved the w ay for the 
notion of 'staple growth'. The idea is a useful tool of analysis not just because it 
describes a growth path. It also emphasizes the production function of an export 
sector as the explanation for the growth path of an economy. Moreover, it 
essentially represents an inductive and descriptive (rather than a formal 
mathematical) model which attempts to arrive at comprehensive conclusions from 
economic historical data. Staple growth indeed implies that idle or undiscovered 
resources are brought into use, creating returns to those resources and relating 
consistently with venting a surplus for trade.
The staple thesis originated with Harold Innis' trilogy on export staples of 
Canadian economic history15. These works reflected a basic interest in searching 
for and revealing the effects of staple production on the socio-economic structure. 
Although he " went where the facts led him " their complexity did not allow him 
to encounter generalizations16. Its relevance as a theory has been widely debated 
by a considerable number of scholars and views have ranged from believing it is 
in decline to the stage of reconsideration and restatement17.
A starting point in the thesis is the idea that it is applicable to the phenomenon 
of the 'young region'18, a 'newly settled region'19, or a 'new countryao where staple 
exports constitute what Rostow would refer to as a 'leading sector'21, Perroux, a 
'pole de croissance'22 and Zarka, a 'force motrice'23 of the economy setting the pace
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for economic growth and development. Non-existent or limited domestic markets 
together with favourable factor proportions such as land abundance relative to 
labour and capital are expected to provide the 'new region' phenomenon with a 
comparative advantage in resource extensive exports or staples. This comparative 
advantage of staple or 'exportable commodity'24 development lies in relative 
costs of production including transfer costs25.
One determinant of the staple thesis is the character or nature of the staple which 
implies an emphasis on the commodity. This implies namely : 1).- the tying in of 
one activity with another; and 2).- the way in which a commodity sets a general 
pace, creates new activities and is strengthened or weakened by itself26. Another 
determinant is the technological nature of the production function of the export 
commodity 27. It influences potentialities for further development in newly 
settled regions. These constraints affect the nature of factor migration and 
especially income distribution within a region28.
In defining the degree of substitution of factors and the nature of returns to scale 
at plantation crop and family farm crop level, Baldwin's technological nature of 
the production function (along with his assumptions of demand for goods and 
supply of factors) enables the staple thesis to follow up on : a).- a dem and for 
factors; b).- a demand for intermediate inputs; c).- the possibility for further 
processing; and d).- the distribution of income which further stimulates economic 
development.
This follow-up of (Myrdal's) 'spread effects'29 determines the range of investment 
opportunities in domestic markets depending on the degree of diversification 
around the export base. Income arising from the export sector is spent on other 
sectors. In short, the staple thesis " classifies income flows and adopts the form 
of a disaggregated multiplier-accelerator mechanism"30.
For staple theory, growth is tied in to the export basis success. However, the 
export base not only implies growth. It also m eans decline and change. The
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decline of one staple must be accompanied by the growth of others or a region 
will be 'stranded'31. The disappearance of a light, valuable commodity such as 
fur, for example, in the Canadian St. Lawrence basin, was accompanied by a rise 
in lumber as a staple export. The economy built up in relation to fur and water 
transport shifted to a second product available on a large scale32: lumber.
The major reasons for the decline of a staple suggested by the 'staple thesis' are : 
a).- changes in demand outside the region; b).- exhaustion of a natural resource; 
c).- increasing costs of land and particularly labour relative to those of a 
competing region; and d).- technological innovations that change the relative 
composition of inputs. However, a historical reason for the growth of new exports 
is a major development in transport, not in merely cost-reducing improvements 
in transport which may reenforce dependence on existing exports.
The export base notion of staple theory implies that a region may expand as a 
result of increased demand for its existing staples. This can be due either to an 
increase in income of the market or to a change in taste. Growth will also be 
prom oted by improvements in processing or the transfer cost position of a 
region's staples in relation to competing regions. Historically, in a 'young region' 
the creation of a new export has resulted in an export industry and other 
economic activities33. Increased capital investment in the export industry will go 
towards achieving optimum size of enterprise, increased mechanization of the 
processes and further development of specialized services to the export staple.
As a region's income grows, indigenous savings will tend to 'spill over' into new 
kinds of activities. This movement will be reinforced by the tendency of transfer 
costs to be less significant. The result will be that the export bases of the regions 
will tend to become more diversified, ultimately losing identity as regions. As 
North suggests, long-run factor mobilization will emerge, a w ider dispersion of 
production will appear and finally a more equal per capita income will be 
acquired34.
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This last point draws some attention because, while conventional growth theory 
(namely the Harrod-Domar model) argues that growth depends on the injection 
of an adequate amount of capital and a catholic belief in the reality of the 
propensity to save and the capital-output ratio, an attem pt to move away from 
this view is stressed precisely in that the amount of investment depends, not only 
on total income, but on the distribution of income. This follows Hirschman's 
argum ent in his account of the story of development economics35. However, 
Baldwin had earlier mentioned that there was no reason to assume saving 
propensities would adjust automatically36. And similarly, Watkins suggested that 
the am ount of savings may not matter greatly37.
An element of strategic importance for our theoretical framework is the staple 
thesis' implication of the 'linkage' idea. Recent reconsideration of it suggests that 
if a staple (or staples) generate linkage effects which are adequately exploited, the 
economy eventually grows and diversifies38. Population growth arising from 
natural increase rather than from immigration and per capita income rising 
beyond an 'underdevelopment level'39 give way to diversification. This operates 
through the Hirschmanian analysis of entrepreneurial decision-making and 
expansion of opportunities of domestic markets in order to pave the way for 
domestic production as its threshold is being approached40.
The inducement to domestic investment which results from increased activity of 
the export sector in staple theory follows the traditional two-way linkage effect 
familiar in Hirschman's initial analysis. That is, separation into a 'backward' and 
a 'forward' linkage. The 'staple thesis' contributes another one already recognized 
by Hirschman : the final demand linkage or 'consumption linkage'41. 
Nevertheless, having described the phenomenon as a 'swallowing up ' of imports 
during export-led growth42, he had not characterized it initially as a linkage.
Hirschman's linkage thesis initially assumed sufficiency of entrepreneurial 
motivation. Development was accelerated through investment in projects and 
industries with strong backward and forward effects. Entrepreneurial
39
decision-making was not uniquely determined by 'puli' of incomes and demand, 
bu t responsive to linkages' which were special 'push ' factors from the product 
side. He also presented linkages closely tied to input-output analysis. These latter 
presented an important differentiation from linkage effects he himself admitted43. 
This was namely, that the former was synchronic while the latter needed time to 
unfold.
If there is anything clarifying and stimulating about the debate on the testing of 
the linkage hypothesis, it is the recognition that the more instructive use of the 
'linkage' idea is found in historically and empirically verified case studies which, 
if anything, would be only to the benefit of the staple theory of growth44.
The result of this debate on the testing of the linkage hypothesis has been that a 
more inclusive linkage approach is emphasized within the 'staple thesis'45. It has 
also further qualified the linkage nature of staple theory. A broader definition and 
generalization of the linkage notion appeared. It is one which incorporates new 
subdivisions. One of 'inside' linkages (which imply economic operators engaged 
in activities and pushed to undertake additional activities) and another of 'outside' 
linkages (which imply new activities taken up by foreigners or by the state)46.
The result of the debate on the testing of linkages therefore laid a more 
comprehensive view on the relevance of the notion of 'linkage'. This implied 
further varieties and interactions of linkage effects circumscribing three basic 
concepts: the original or production linkage, the consumption linkage and the 
fiscal linkage. These are the ways in which 'one thing may lead to another'.
The connection is initiated by the original or production linkage which captures 
one aspect: the procurement and elaboration of the staple itself. This is followed 
by the mechanism by which certain industries appear by staple production, e.g., 
the consumption linkage. It is equally followed by the mechanism of state levied 
tax on the staple income stream and its channelling of proceeds into productive 
investment, i.e., the fiscal linkage.
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For the latter linkage to be effective, the ability to tax m ust be combined with the 
ability to invest productively. The most favourable connection or linkage 
constellation' is one in which the staple is simultaneously endowed with strong 
production, consumption and fiscal linkages.
But, this situation is unlikely to occur because 'one kind of linkage is often 
[emphasis added] to be had at the expense of another'47. Which is why the 
tactical element in the theoretical framework has to be the antithesis to the notion 
of 'linkage'. Moreover, this is why the 'staple thesis' is open to several criticisms.
Staple theorists recognize pitfalls in the theory. First, they acknowledge that 
conditions such as the incorporation of scarce factors and the ability to shift 
resources are not typical building blocks of a theory of economic growth. In this 
way the theory derived from them is limited. Therefore, the 'staple thesis' is only 
a theory of a special type of economic growth48. Second, the thesis implies that 
a staple economy, by thriving to achieve a high level of national income, masks 
deficiencies in the structural balance of the economy49.
Third, they concede that there are the dangers of falling into the 'staple trap', e.g., 
that if there is not a mixture of conditions such as a favourable combination of 
external demand, available resources, population base and a level of per capita 
income which allows taking advantages of economies of scale, institutions and 
values, as well as the good fortune of avoiding specialization in the wrong type 
of staple, the staple thesis will not operate50.
Fourth, they grant that there is an exaggerated emphasis on the character of 
staples and the lack of consideration for an element as im portant as the absence 
of economic opportunity51. Fifth, they comply with the view that there is a lack 
of consideration of any particular economic section, once the staple which created 
or supported it, is no longer expanding52. Finally, there is their acceptance that, 
as staples become more capital-intensive53, the idea that borrowed technology 
and staple exports will provide a sufficient impetus to the economy will lose
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credibility. Last but not least, they comply w ith the view that the incidence of 
booms is a feature of growth in staple economies54.
In this sense, the staple thesis cannot argue that it guarantees a consistency in the 
level of sustained growth. In the main however, the 'staple thesis' attempts to show 
how  the particular choice of production functions may affect all sources of 
growth. These include factor supplies. But they also include other residual or 
unexplained differences between contributions to national income growth from 
increased factor supplies (which may include technological progress, education, 
improved management, economies of scale or more efficient resource allocation) 
and income growth.
The criticisms and limitations of the staple thesis stresses the need of discussion 
of its fundamental aspect -the notion of 'linkage'- especially because of its strategic 
role in the formulation of our framework. The notion has basically operational 
weaknesses. It focuses for example, only on the technically possible linkages' 
between quantities of inputs and outputs w ithout considering their economic 
realization, which depend on the costs and prices of both inputs and outputs55. 
The staple thesis' generalization that expansion of agriculture within the rest of 
the economy will take place is therefore questionable56. Moreover, the 
Hirschmanian purely 'dem and' approach to economic development is made 
vulnerable and has been readily criticized.
The close relationship the 'linkage' notion has with the staple thesis offers 
important grounds for critical discussion. Linkages can also act as handicaps and 
create their own operational leakages. The transition from lumber and wooden 
vessels to wheat and iron steamships and railroads (what Hirschman refers to as 
the 'convergence phenomenon'57) was the key to the troubled Canadian economic 
development in the 1850s58.
Whereas lumber and wooden ships had admittedly provided direct contributions 
from the Canadian economic structure (i.e., direct linkage) wheat involved use of
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steamships and importation of iron from Britain (direct leakage). Wooden ships 
and lumber capitalized the advantages of the St. Lawrence river and Canadian 
natural resources, while steam and iron involved imports of coal and capital 
equipment, the shipbuilding industry suffered devastating losses59.
This of course is within the perspective of a 'new  country7 which sacrificed one 
economic activity in favour of another. It eventually led to economic development 
in the long run. But, even if these successful shifts of one primary export to 
another60 exist, it is fully admitted that, for 'peripheral' countries61, contact with 
capitalist 'centres' through export of staples resulted in an impoverished 
populations with exhausted natural resources. It is acknowledged that the failure 
of a country to industrialize was attributable to its relations with another country 
or countries in the international economy62. It is equally granted that within a 
country, some regions developed at the cost of others63.
It is also widely recognized that during the first phase of export expansion in 
'peripheral' countries the effect was not the creation of new industries to satisfy 
consumer demand but the destruction of established handicraft and artisan 
activities as labour was withdrawn from them for staple production and as new 
imports competed successfully against them64.
At this point the 'linkage' notion's antithesis (the notion of 'leakage') within the 
'staple thesis', the 'development-of-underdevelopment thesis'65 and more recently, the 
ill-named (for lack of case-studies that would properly confirm its status as a 
theory) 'dependency theory766 all converge. W hat is really being affirmed is that 
one thing did not lead to another67. At the forefront of criticism of the 'linkage' 
idea therefore, is the contention that its empirical and operational concepts are 
diametrically opposed to the notion of 7leakages' .
The latter notion undermines the former. While the current thought was that 
linkages were 'achievable' on the basis of aforementioned historical and 
comparative studies, they could indeed be neutralized by the leakages' of
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im ported inputs or by the immediate export of intermediate outputs68. A series 
of disadvantages of the linkage approach followed. One was that once an 
intensively linked industry or sector in a country with a highly developed 
economy was moved to a country with a developing economy, linkages would 
not materialise.
Another was that rather than enlarging efforts to 'capture' linkages within a 
country w ith an 'underdeveloped' economy, the result was a mere diffusion of 
different branches of a multinational corporation. Defining enclaves only on the 
basis of material flows however, appeared equally disadvantageous because there 
was omission of dynamic linkages. Nevertheless, the process by which an enclave 
becomes embedded, accepted and adopted by an economy goes literally 
unrecorded in the annals of flow accounting69.
This was bound to be a major linking point in any criticism in the 'capturability' 
of linkages. Which gave way to Hirschman's indictment: the " impact of capitalism 
and imperialism on the periphery has been to extract surplus, and, in the process 
impoverish people, destroy local industry, deplete soil and subsoil and emasculate 
and corrupt local elites"70. This surely takes place when linkages transgress their 
definition only to transmogrify into leakages and act as handicaps.
This is so particularly when a staple is not activating 'forward linkages' due to 
technologically alien endowments which lead to competition of imported goods 
(driving out local industry and handicraft out of existence) rather than to 
'consumption linkages'. In the case of sugar cane or rice, the grower or farmer 
who delivers his crop to the refinery or mill is cut off from further economic 
activities on behalf of his product because of technology which is alien to him. 
Paradoxically, in the case of staples, this suggests that the less these forward 
linkages exist, the better71.
The notion of 'linkage' within the 'staple thesis' directly implies that by the 
operation of the final demand or consumption linkage, the staple theory becomes
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one of capital formation72. One salient aspect which the 'staple thesis' fails to 
explain is in relation to the type of capital formation in countries with developing 
economies. Here, it can be argued that if the wrong type of capital goods is 
imported because of protection and if this importation is encouraged by the 
provision of cheap capital funds and foreign exchange by government policies, the 
potential gain may be reduced into an actual loss73. The result is an annual flow 
of investible resources into capital formation of the wrong type. This may lead to 
continual wastage74.
But wastage is a theoretically useful idea. It is so especially if associated with the 
notion of 'leakage' as a co-participant result of and a digressive form emanating 
from within the 'linkage' notion. The important characteristic is its capacity to 
relate to structural rigidity, which is another element in the theoretical scheme 
being pu t forward here.
That is, a framework that, whilst following a simple strategy of linkage, allows 
from within, the paradox of economic stagnation in the NAC region w ith the 
presence of high wages. But this paradox is only allowed by means of a number 
of labour market imperfections.
These were outlined earlier, but as imperfections significantly included the 
strategy of the UFC to internally segment its labour force, we therefore discuss the 
notion of labour market segmentation.
Labour Market Segmentation: a Digression
The labour market segmentation concept is a digression from neo-Classical 
theoretical framework. It is equally useful for an all round comprehension of 
imperfections in economic development, not just in developing but in developed 
economies as well.
The labour market segmentation concept goes to the core. Labour market
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segmentation does not concern itself with 'optimal efficiency7 of factors or their 
growth. It does not concern itself either with the surface fronts, but pierces into 
the depth of the structure of the factor. By doing so, it indirectly helps analyze 
w hy factors may be optimally efficient or inefficient.
These ideas unquestionably fit into the paradigm which incorporated structural 
rigidities, better known by the seminal label of structuralism. Indeed, Piore has 
confirmed that it was " the core of what might be termed 'structuralist7 paradigm. 
This is the basic paradigm to which Kuhn's theory of scientific revolution belongs. 
A nd we believe it provides the most promising framework within which to build 
an understanding of labour market segmentation"75.
If one thinks for example of the difficulties of contemporary orthodox economic 
theory, surely one of the more testing has been the successful handling of the 
problematic of employment. It is best expressed by Mrs. Robinson when she 
addressed the matter by stating th a t" the first crisis arose from the breakdown of 
a theory which could not account for the level of employment. The second crisis 
arose from a theory that cannot account for the content of employment"76. 
Particularly, the content of employment (and underemployment) seems to appear 
impregnated with extraordinary fragmentation in a wide range of heterogenous 
labour activities which has been labelled 'segmentation' of labour markets.
The concept of labour market segmentation is a general one. However, it is in the 
limelight principally because of the recent emergence of empirical evidence. 
Because of its empirical purposes segmentation has been distinguished from 
stratification. Indeed, Gordon has defined segmentation as a " separate division 
within a stratum. Within any stratum, several different labour market segments 
may coexist, resistant to the forces of conception, suggesting evidence of persistent 
wage differentials and little intersectoral mobility"77.
Furthermore, segmentation, according to Edwards, Reich and Gordon, occurs 
when " the labor market or labor process is divided into separate submarkets or
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subprocesses, or segments, distinguished by different characteristics, behavioral 
rules and working conditions"78. Such, for example is some of the evidence we 
reveal for the NAC region's banana sector large-scale corporate, the UFC.
It is acknowledged today that labour market segmentation surfaced earlier in 19th 
century classical economics' concept of non-competing groups in the labour 
market. By stating that Adam Smith's treatment of wages79 was not 'so complete 
and exhaustive'80, Mill treated the theme in a remarkable way: he referred to 
wage differentials within different jobs. Referring to cases addressed by Smith 
such as goldsmiths and jewellers and their superior wages over others, for 
example, Mill said that the " superiority of reward is not here the consequence of 
competition, but its absence: not a compensation for disadvantages inherent in the 
employment, but an extra advantage"81.
Segmentation was therefore considered the cause of inequality which was 
m aintained through inheritance. Mill put forward this notion when he stated that 
" so complete, indeed, has separation hitherto been, so strongly m arked the line 
of demarcation, between different grades of labourers, as to be almost equivalent 
to an hereditary distinction of caste; each employment being chiefly recruited from 
the children of those already employed in it, or in employments of the same rank 
with it in social estimation, or from the children of persons who, if originally of 
a lower rank, have succeeded in raising themselves by their exertions"82.
Caimes, after identifying sub-markets as " a series of industrial layers, 
superimposed on one another, within each of which the various candidates for 
employment possess a real and effective power of selection"83, historically stated 
that " we are thus compelled to recognise the existence of non-competing 
industrial groups as a feature of our social economy; and this is the fact which we 
desire here to insist upon"84. (Myint has equally emphasised the relevance of 
'non-competing groups as an institutional pattern '85). Marshall, despite 
dismissing Mill for not m aking" any great advance in the theory of wages beyond 
his predecessors, in spite of the care with which he set himself to emphasize the
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distinctly human element in economics"86, did not ignore segmentation87.
In his chapter on industrial training, Marshall states " parents generally bring up 
their children to occupations in their own grade, and therefore the total supply of 
labour in any grade in one generation is in a great measure determined by that 
grade in the preceding generation, yet within the grade itself there is greater 
mobility"88.
The whole idea of a theory of labour market segmentation arose recently in United 
States' economic literature as a major source of dissatisfaction with (not to say 
rebuttal of) neoclassical economic theory's failure to provide acceptable 
explanations for the persistent thorns in the United States economy, such as 
poverty, unemployment, race and sex discrimination.
Classical theory of wages was concerned with determining the aggregate level of 
wages. Neo-classical theory has, however, emphasised the personal distribution 
of income. In the latter, the intersection of the supply and demand curves 
determine wages as well as other commodities. Marginal productivity theory 
underlies the demand side while human capital theory underlies the supply side. 
Labour is demanded because labourers produce goods sold on the market, i.e., 
derived demand which represents the demand curve for labour. Labour is viewed 
in terms of marginal productivity and therefore wages are set in relation to 
productivity. In other words, the labourer is paid his or her worth. Wages paid 
m ust equal the marginal revenue product of labour, provided this situation takes 
place in a competitive market.
On the other hand, hum an capital theory states that wages are determined by 
individuals' investment in formal education or on-the-job training, such factors 
both lead to the acquisition of skills, which assign wages accordingly. 
Nevertheless, the notion of human capital does not necessarily challenge the 
concept that supply and demand determine wages. These may differ for labourers 
having the same hum an capital if the supply and dem and forces for their jobs
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differ.
The neoclassical analytic framework therefore suggests that poverty subsists 
because of lack of marketable skills or the failure of the poor to invest in 
themselves. This is to say, poverty is the end result of market forces and 
individual preferences. But a number of significant variables are beyond the 
control of individuals, such as race, social class, sex and age. The result is that 
different amounts of hum an capital are embodied within different groups of 
labourers. In order to explain wage differentials where jobs and required levels 
of hum an capital are the same, the structure of the industrial and labour markets 
have to be scrutinized.
In short, with the emergence of marginal productivity theory, concepts such as 
compensating differentials, non-competing groups and factor dem and were 
intertwined into a theory of choice and determination of prices and quantities in 
the market.
The main criticism of neo-classical, orthodox or conventional economic theory is 
that because it abstracts economics from power it cannot say much about such 
fundamental problems as the distribution of income and wealth. The theory is 
specifically designed to isolate economics from all other social sciences. Such an 
approach is defended on the grounds that we live in a complex world and that 
only by separating out the different spheres can we achieve anything with our 
analysis. This serves to confuse a methodological requirement with the content of 
the subject. Though it is necessary to make abstractions from the real world, the 
particular abstractions of neo-classical economics mean that a num ber of problems 
cannot be analyzed by an economist working within such a framework. 
Neo-classical economists, for example, cannot explain how two groups with the 
same level of hum an capital have different wage levels.
Michael Piore has recently put forward some observations on this issue. He 
suggests that to explain m arginality," apparently one needs a social theory. And
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most social theories do not combine easily with the conventional paradigm. Much 
the same can be said of institutional "imperfections' as an explanation of labour 
m arket segmentation. The conventional paradigm  has no theory of such 
imperfections. In their face it switches from a positive to a normative mode. It can 
explain behaviour in their absence. And in their presence it prescribes their 
elimination"89.
The orthodox or conventional paradigm, according to Piore, has no " coherent 
theoretical story about where the imperfections came from and how (and indeed 
whether) they could in fact be eliminated. Nor does it have a good theory of how 
the economy behaves when imperfections are present. The lack of such a theory 
moreover, is fundamental. Such imperfections invariably involve cohesive 
institutions, and hence any argument about the imperfections that one wants to 
get rid of would imply something about other cohesive institutions like the family 
and the firm, which are taken as the building blocks of economics and which the 
theory does not - indeed could not - get rid of"90.
Indeed, orthodox economists may argue that neo-classical economics is not a 
theory of economic behaviour but one of optimal resource allocation. This view 
was challenged by the point that optimality is subject to the behaviour of 
economic agents. In essence therefore, an alternative formulation of labour 
markets had to surface.
This led to the emergence of dual labour market theory, where for example, an 
issue such as poverty was analyzed as endogenous rather than exogenous to the 
labour market. As Gordon has explained," economists began to argue that a dual 
market theory could best explain the phenomenon of urban poverty and 
underdevelopment ...; [the theory] arose gradually out of a series of relatively 
informal studies of local labor markets and individual establishments"91. A 
different view of course, would be Blaug's suggestion that, as it were, these " 
quasi-sociological theories of dual or segmented markets undoubtedly poach in 
the territory staked out by human-capital theorists"92.
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Doeringer and Piore are widely recognized as having established a dual market 
theory. As they put it, the central concept of their work is the ” internal labor 
m arket ”, an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which the 
pricing and allocation of labour is governed by a set of administrative rules and 
procedures"93.
This concept challenged orthodox economic theory's concept of the external labour 
market, where pricing, allocation and training decisions were principally directed 
by economic variables. It is remarkable of Mill. Indeed, when he was discussing 
w hat was necessary (according to Adam Smith) to place skilled jobs on the same 
level of advantage as the unskilled, he stated th a t" when the disparity is greater, 
he [Smith] seems to think that it must be explained by apprentice laws, and the 
rules of corporations which restrict admission into m any of the skilled 
employments"94.
The interconnection between both internal and external markets (originally Clark 
Kerr's seminal concept of 'labour balkanization') is notably shown by the 
movement which takes place at job classification and which Kerr calls " ports of 
entry and exit"95. The rest of the jobs available in the internal market are, as 
Doeringer and Piore point o u t ," filled by promotion or transfer of workers who 
have already gained entry. Consequently, these jobs are shielded from the direct 
influences of competitive forces in the external markets"96. Other factors which 
caused internal markets were listed, such as task specificity, on-the-job training 
and 'custom'.
An im portant contribution of Doeringer and Piore's work was their identification 
and incorporation of variables " previously neglected or masked by orthodox 
economic theo ry ... into a more comprehensive approach to labor market analysis 
than that was provided by the competitive labor market model"97. Orthodox 
economic theory approached problems such as structural unemployment, 
technological change, inflation and racial discrimination with its traditional tools. 
But, as Doeringer and Piore put it, " in one way or another each of the issues
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strained the conventional framework and required the introduction of a number 
of institutional or other ad hoc explanations"98.
Doeringer and Piore's concept of the internal market was of major significance. 
According to Loveridge and Mok, they " succeeded in eliminating, whilst not 
destroying the neo-classical theory of the firm"99. Additionally, they are 
remembered for suggesting that the dual market theory approach to labour 
markets revolves around four inter-related hypothesis, namely that (i) it is useful 
to dichotomize the economy into a primary and secondary sector; (ii) that the 
wage and employment mechanisms in the secondary sector are distinct from the 
prim ary sector; (iii) that job mobility between these sectors is sharply limited; (iv) 
and that the secondary sector is marked by under-employment because workers 
who could be trained for skilled jobs are confined to unskilled jobs100.
Despite the fact that what Doeringer and Piore began writing was unquestionably 
associated with " dualism " as a theoretical explanation of economic development 
and non-development, it served as a springboard for the full conceptualization of 
an attem pt for a definitive labour market segmentation theory. Loveridge and 
Mok for example, have suggested that Doeringer and Piore's merit in " 
recognizing the horizontal dimension [local and industrial segmentation] in the 
labour market next to the vertical one [occupational stratification segmentation] 
was the first step towards a new body of theory which had come to be known as 
the theory of segmented labour market"101.
To be sure, just under a decade later Piore joined Berger and began calling social 
and economic segmentation dualism, but as they proceeded they found th a t" the 
significance of dualism is not that a society is divided into two autonomous and 
discontinuous segments, but that a society is divided segmentally and not 
continuously"102. As they pointed out, " the 'dualism ' that was thought to 
characterize underdevelopment becomes a point of similarity rather than a 
distinguishing difference. We thus found ourselves analysing developed and 
developing societies in the same frame of reference and were increasingly struck
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by the similarities between them  [emphasis added]"103.
Of course, much of this has been discussed in the vast literature on dualism, 
marginality and especially, the " informal sector " in " developing economies 
Yet, as Berger and Piore recognized, the "evidence from  both developed and 
developing countries suggests the persistence, not the disappearance o f the 
traditional or informal sector [emphasis added]"104. Indeed, as we shall see in 
a forthcoming chapter, the stagnation produced by the prevailing high level of 
wages set by the banana sector's UFC and the sector's abrupt decline, contributed 
to the initial formation of the informal sector in the NAC region.
Doeringer and Piore conceptualized the role of the firm in bringing together 
existing knowledge of different sources of segmentation in the m arket through the 
very act of creating each sub-market. But even more useful, was Berger and 
Piore's important concept of discontinuities: " they distinguish labour market 
segments which are qualitatively different"105. These qualitative differences 
showed variances in the behavioural characteristics of labourers and managers 
from one segment to another. In this way, economic processes such as wage 
determination or education and training were quite different in different market 
segments could therefore not be encapsulated by a single model of human 
behaviour.
As the distribution of the labour force in the different submarkets arises in a 
non-competitive form through a process described by Thurow based on the 'labour 
queue' (which in turn is determined by background characteristics)106, it has been 
suggested that much the same may be said of labour market segmentation theory. 
It emerges as a " new 'queue' theory: just like neo-classical economists perceived 
workers as standing in a queue according to their marginal productivity, so now 
workers are lined up according to their aptitude for certain m arket segments"107.
In essence, one may say (as Loveridege and Mok do) that labour market 
segmentation theory puts forward the view that the " marginality of work arises,
53
not as the neo-classicist would have us believe, out of essential characteristics of 
either the job or its occupants as evaluated in a free and rational choice, but rather 
from the result of a constrained situation in which preferences are shaped by the 
very nature of the choice open to the worker within that situation ... it is being 
postulated that since the market is segmented by institutional rules, the rules 
themselves will maintain the situation in being until they are changed"108.
Loveridge and Mok also sustain however, that although labour market 
segmentation theory was " by no means a unified body of theory, [but] rather a 
collection of approaches which still lack unity ", it did carry some advantages. 
Segmentation theory, for example, had " undergone influences from many sides, 
although most of its origins can be traced to Marxist and institutional 
theories"109.
Indeed, dual market theory initially posed a challenge which economists had not 
yet begun to meet. And as Gordon has clearly said, " its most important 
hypothesis are explicitly historical; they concern the dynamics and dialectics of 
changes in jobs, people and labour market operations over a period of fifty or 
more years"110. The result was that it became incorporated into a more general 
radical framework. This, as Gordon pointed out was due to the " conviction that 
[its] hypothesis can be generated by radical theory and that radical theory 
provides some important historical foundations for the specific conclusions of dual 
market analysis"111.
The radical approach attempted to incorporate dual labour market theory within 
an historical and ideological framework. Labour market segmentation theory 
therefore became a radical statement of dual market theory. It was Reich, Gordon 
and Edwards who mainly summarized an emerging radical theory of labor market 
segmentation. They indicated th a t" the theory argues that political and economic 
forces within American capitalism have given rise to and perpetuated segmented 
labor markets, and that it is incorrect to view the sources of segmented markets 
as exogenous to the economic system"112.
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Equally important they launched a theoretical definition of labour market 
segmentation as the " historical process whereby political-economic forces 
encourage the division of the labor market into separate submarkets, distinguished 
by different labor market characteristics and behavioral rules"113.
There was now a theoretical base from which to sustain that there was such a 
thing as a segmentation process which produced segmented labour markets as a 
result. Segmented labour markets were perceived, according to Vietorisz and 
Harrison, " not as an aberration within an otherwise harmonious economic and 
social system, but as at least one of the normal modes of operation of a m odem  
industrial market society"114. W hat was more, labour market segmentation was 
now  argued to be " intimately related to the dynamics of monopoly capitalism " 
and arose as well as became " perpetuated because it is functional - that is, it 
facilitates the operation of capitalist institutions"115.
The radical interpretations of labour market segmentation focused on monopoly 
capital as a basic cause of attempted control by management of both factor and 
product markets through a policy of dividing and therefore, not only weakening, 
but ruling the labour force. It has been suggested that as capitalism developed 
and monopolies emerged, there was a restructuring of internal relationships of an 
'internal' labour market and simultaneously, this weakened the bargaining power 
of workers by accentuating the differences between them in various segments of 
the labour force116.
This was fine as far as one envisaged a rationalisation of the structure of the 
United States labour market. However, the observation made by Rubery that the 
main reason for the lack of general applicability of labour market segmentation 
theory arose from the " almost exclusive attention paid to the actions and 
motivations of the capitalists in developing a structured labour market and the 
consequent neglect of the role of worker organisation in the process"117 helped 
to strengthen the theory itself. Labour market segmentation theory now 
recognized the active role of labour organisations in the development of the
55
labour market structure.
The consolidation, as it were, of labour market segmentation theory has of course 
attracted some criticism. In his survey, Cain argues that, whilst criticism of 
orthodox economics is healthy, labour market segmentation theory's " theoretical 
and methodological criticisms of the neo-classical theory are not substantial and 
are often misguided ... [and ]... do not begin to offer a theory of the labor market 
than can replace neoclassical theory, despite various degrees of dissatisfaction 
w ith the empirical corpus of the theory”118.
Indeed, because dual market theory was admittedly not without problems, it 
recently led one of its initiators, Michael Piore, to advance a further suggestion. 
Because (i) social groups and institutions are at the centre of labour market 
segmentation theory; and (ii) within the internal labour market, pricing and 
allocation are not merely market or competitive phenomenon but socially 
determ ined," in order to grasp these social phenom enon... one needs a paradigm 
which recognizes and incorporates 'social as opposed to individual 
phenomena'"119.
Piore therefore addressed the problem within the framework of a paradigm of 
social phenomena. He said that " to ask in this context about the paradigm to 
which notions of labor market segmentation belong is thus to ask a question about 
the relationship between the mode of research and the theory and practice of 
normal economics ... I never considered myself a revolutionary ... but as an 
exponent of labour market segmentation in the community of 'normal economics', 
I can assure you that labor market segmentation does not fit the paradigm"120.
One of the central conclusions after Doeringer and Piore's work and especially of 
Gordon's work theories of poverty and underdevelopment was that up to that 
time economic research had not provided empirical evidence which could " 
ultimately arbitrate the competition among theories of poverty and 
under developm ent... In the face of these problems, we have little recourse but to
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plunge back into empirical research”121. Most certainly, labour market 
segmentation theories proposed by Doeringer and Piore in 1971 and Reich, 
Gordon and Edwards in 1973 led to attempts by researchers to empirically test 
them.
But although these tests, according recently to R eich," on the whole, supported 
the segmentation approach ", some122 of the studies were not " completely 
unambiguous as tests have been hampered by limitations in the available data 
and by theoretical controversies among segmentation writers"123. The 
consequence has been that seemingly the validity of labour market segmentation 
theory still remained a matter of debate and that further empirical research 
appeared necessary.
A first generation of empirical studies tried to test the hypothesis of dual market 
theory, the existence of distinct labour segments and different behavioural 
patterns within these segments. Criticisms led to a refinement of labour market 
segmentation theory. But what was more significant, despite or because of 
criticisms of the first generation of labour market segmentation studies, a second 
generation of both theoretical and empirical efforts in labour market segmentation 
appeared.
The leading ones have been a few. Berger and Piore's work on dualism and 
discontinuities (which we have earlier made reference to), Frank Wilkinson's 
edition of contributions on the dynamics of labour market segmentation and more 
recently, Gordon, Edwards and Reich's epic on the position of labour in the 
United States economy on segmented work and divided workers124 provide 
most of the theoretical weight.
Wilkinson's collection on labour market segmentation made three major 
generalisations. They were (i) that there surfaced a change in its discussion, from 
emphasis on the explanation of " a fairly stable structure of pay and job 
inequalities towards an analysis of dynamic changes in labour market
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structure"125; (ii) the importance of " specific historical experiences and the 
complex interplay of economic and institutional factors"126 in determining its 
patterns; and (iii) t h a t " general tendencies are clearly observable"127 despite the 
variety of its study.
But most important of all, the contributions made to W ilkinson's work on labour 
market segmentation emphasise " the unsuitability of any notion of 
equilibrium"128 for the general objective of arriving at the analytical framework 
which studies labour markets. Furthermore, they consolidate a more realistic 
contemporary academic view based on historical evidence that clearly envisages 
the emergence of a process which structures and destructures the labour market. 
The framework of analysis is not an equilibrium but a dynamic one. It is one 
which, as Wilkinson puts it, " provides a basis for theoretical and practical 
analysis of the structure and evolution of the labour market"129.
Gordon, Edwards and Reich's work on the historical transformation of labour in 
the United States has been considered a most important event not only because 
it established them at the head of radical economics in that country but also 
because it was the culmination of their study of labour market segmentation.
Although considered a theoretical study, their analysis of uneven capitalist 
development (especially the heavy presence of monopoly capitalism) in the United 
States, of the initial proletariatzation, of the homogenization, and the final 
segmentation of labour markets and of the recognition that trade unions 
contributed to the creation of divisions between prim ary and secondary labour 
markets has come to the forefront particularly because of its empirical content.
More important was that they presented an argument about the dynamics of 
labour market segmentation. They equally put forward an approach which made 
quantitative research on labour market segmentation viable. As Reich has recently 
said, this approach draws " from the recent historically-based dynamic theories 
a set of testable quantitative hypotheses and then test these against long-term time
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series data"130.
The most significant characteristic of the second generation theorists has been that 
they have drawn considerably from institutional and historical materials 
employing case studies of particular labour markets and applying theories of 
institutional forces in the capitalist economies. As Reich has put i t " the case-study 
approach permits greater attention to dynamic processes and as a result the 
second generation labor market segmentation theories have become more 
complex"131.
Regarding the first generation of empirical studies it seems that differences among 
segmentation theorists have made the job of testing more difficult. According to 
Reich " it has been uncertain whether industrial structure characteristics of 
individual occupations or the presence of unions provide necessary or sufficient 
conditions for the existence of segmented labour markets and it has been unclear 
how  to allocate individual workers or jobs to the hypothetical labour segments " 
132. So it appears to be that much of the ambiguity in the empirical results of 
some researchers is linked to still unsettled theoretical issues.
The strongest opposition to dual market theory has usually been related to the use 
of participant observer techniques rather than econometric techniques which are 
commonplace in mainstream economics. Indeed, Piore subscribes to the opinion 
that " ... fury, disdain, resentment, sarcasm, and condescension have definitely 
greeted labour market segmentation"133. However, more recently, Lawson has 
suggested th a t" historical research including case studies will usually be at least 
as im portant a part of any analysis as econometric evidence"134.
On these matters one cannot help but be reminded of Phelps-Brown's observation 
th a t " ... we ought to value powers of observation more highly than powers of 
abstraction, and the insight of the historian more than the rigour of the 
mathematician. Our basic need for more observations of actual behaviour should 
make us prize the abilities of those who can gather them - ingenuity in devising
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methods, patience in accumulating facts, curiosity about connections, a keen eye 
for the scientific detail. These abilities are not in fact commonplace; nor are they 
uncreative"135. And Morishima has pointed out that " more im portant [than 
mathematics] [sic] are such things as knowledge and observation of the economic 
system itself and in considerable interest in history and sociology"136. Indeed, he 
further stated th a t" we have now reached a stage where the mathematization of 
economics is excessive"137.
And sure enough, despite the scorn, sufficient merits have emerged in recent 
literature to contend that contributions in the realms of rigour have been made by 
dual m arket theory. Dickens and Lang have recently espoused the conviction that 
i t " led to our test, and the results therefore tend to corroborate the theory ... we 
have shown that the dual market hypothesis can be derived and supported from 
standard data and statistical techniques. It is however, unlikely that standard 
approaches would have uncovered labour m arket duality, a fact that suggests that 
there is a role for other methods in mainstream economics"138. Indeed, they go 
further to emphasize that " our results point out to the value of noneconomic 
techniques for uncovering and understanding labour m arket institutions"139.
Some years earlier, Gordon pointed out that w hat seemed most im portant was to 
" develop a series of historical studies to trace the evolution of various 
(hypothesized) dimensions of stratification and segmentation in local labour 
markets"140. Now, when this has been accomplished, Dickens and Lang argue 
that dual market theorists " have developed very elaborate theories of the origin 
and operation of the market institutions which are rich in historical detail. These 
descriptions are quite remote in many ways from the neo-classical description of 
the labor market"141.
W hat emerges therefore, is that historical research has provided and seems to 
provide the necessary evidence which yields real explanation on complex issues 
such as the dynamics of labour market segmentation. This, in turn has provided 
the main theoretical elements for us to understand the process of economic
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development. Indeed, Gordon thought historical research would, for example, 
eventually provide the " most direct evidence on the validity of the stratification 
hypothesis"142.
The Influence of the Department of Antioquia's Successful Coffee Economy on 
the Testing of Ideas on Colombian Economic Development and History
The preceding survey makes the first three decades of the present century 
markedly stimulating for the analysis of Colombian regional economic 
development. This is not only because the conditions for growth were present 
more than ever at this time than any other. It also invites any attem pt to reveal 
its process throughout the nation. That considerable and reasonable bases for 
regional development were already in operation in different parts of the nation, 
stresses the significance of the period (1900 - 1930).
The strength of regional economic development however, centred round one 
region of the interior of the country, the department of Antioquia. It has been the 
focus of m any studies. Remarkably, its successful coffee economy was channelling 
two thirds of the nation's total earnings during the period this thesis concentrates 
upon. The coffee economy per se has been widely studied of course, particularly 
by Monsalve143, Machado144, Arango145 and more recently Palacios146. It 
becomes compulsory therefore, to mention the substantial links between 
Antioquia's successful coffee economy and the testing of economic and historical 
thought147.
If one purpose here is to attempt to bridge the gap within regional economic 
history, then research should not only be about the process of economic growth 
and development but equally about economic stagnation in other regions such as 
the case of the NAC region in the 20th century, which (after the loss of Panama) 
included the departments of Atlantico, Bolivar and Magdalena. O ur research 
unveils some evidence which contributes to an explanation on how economic
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forces shaped economic stagnation upon the region, at a time when all regions in 
Colombia had a marked potential to keep pace with —at the least— a gradual 
surge in economic development.
There is no single explanation for the process of economic development in the 
NAC region. The search for explanations is complicated by the lack of research 
on the region. We attempt to diminish that insufficiency here. But, the greater 
am ount of literature about the interior's department of Antioquia, predominately 
its relationship with the coffee economy, borders on overindulgence. This may be 
so because such success as coffee had, provided the elements which attracted 
testing of ideas on economic development and history. But coffee's economic 
success overwhelmed scholars' customary reticence precisely because it generated 
considerable increase in academic research towards itself and its region of 
influence (the interior) away from other regions which were less successful.
This successful coffee economy most certainly generated Gonzalez-Casanova's 
patterns of " internal colonialism "148 in Colombia. Havens and Flinn149 have 
confirmed this. Interior region coffee elites controlled high government office and 
unquestionably influenced economic legislation.
According to Delpar, "Costenos [NAC region persons] seemed to be excluded 
from serious consideration for the presidency [of Colombia]"150. Neglected and 
discriminated against by the federal governm ent1S1, with the exception of Rafael 
Nunez, who began a new period of political and economic history in 1884 referred 
to as the 'Regeneration' , "  no 'Costefio' [NAC region person] has been elected for 
the Presidency [of Colombia] since Independence was accomplished ... 
systematically overlooked by the federal government "152.
Consciousness of federal government neglect towards m any regions was bound 
to be evident. Research of other economic activities other than coffee, seems to 
have been equally neglected.
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Despite the attraction the coffee economy of the interior has had towards research, 
it can neither be said that any particularly convincing theoretical framework for 
Colombian regional economic development emerged as a consequence of that 
research. This is illustrated only by briefly discussing four of the more famous 
authors on 'Colombian' economic development and history: Luis Ospina-Vasquez, 
Eduardo Nieto-Arteta and William P. McGreevy's noted views and Everett 
Hagen's discredited one.
First, consider Ospina-Vasquez's acclaimed framework. In his classic work153, he 
pu t forward the idea of the 'zvay-of-being' which characterised the people of the 
departm ent of Antioquia. He suggested that cattle raising, mining and coffee 
cultivation were the activities which provided the basis of capital accumulation 
for further extension of agriculture and the eventual shift to industry in that 
department. Capital formation and 'entrepreneurship' lay at the heart of his 
theory of 'Antioqueno' development.
The resolve to begin manufacturing as a function of purely economic reasons did 
not easily explain this. Thus, he fell back on the explanation of the department of 
Antioquia's entrepreneurs' 'way of being7. In essence, Ospina-Vasquez presents 
the first major effort in putting together highly concentrated researched 
information (particularly on industries and tariffs) since Nieto-Arteta's first 
im portant contribution154 in 1942. Ospina-Vasquez's approach however, failed 
to emphasize that development was taking place in other regions as well.
His work suggests a model either of (i) regional development consistent with an 
aspect of Schumpeter's work (that economic development's basis is 
entrepreneurship155) or of (ii) of the view that development is achieved when 
people want to do so. These factors, albeit not unimportant, are crude and 
marginal elements of analysis which would help explain economic development 
in general, its absence or its potential. It suggests more of an apology say, for a 
Schumpeterian theory of profitability as Furtado"156 has suggested or D.C. 
McClelland's (historical rather than genetic) 'n Achievement' (need for achievement
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-provided the opportunity-)157 than an explanation of the national development 
process. Indeed, McClelland's answer to the question of how  'n Achievement' 
results in more rapid economic development is essentially Schumpeterian: " the 
link is obviously the entrepreneur "158.
Nevertheless, Ospina-Vasquez's work should be observed more from an angle of 
economic historical research as a solid base which has inspired a continuation of 
his thought in that direction. It inspired McGreevy to write his widely criticised 
economic history of the na tion :" ... I carefully read don Luis Ospina- Vasquez's 
book ... and I went searching through those 400 pages, taking into account that I 
am a simple man, a peasant from Ohio, that does not know anything about 
formulating theories, and I thought that there in this book I could find a theory 
that I could use ... And this is found in only some five words in all of [his] book, 
w hat is really his theory of the development of Colombia, and that is, the way of 
being of the antioqueno ... ”159.
Bergquist160 recently analyzed the political implications of the rise of the coffee 
sector in Colombia, placing emphasis on conflicts of elite economic interests. 
Furthermore, as a result of an 'anthropophagic'161 assailment or the 'Inquisition 
tribunal'162 McGreevy's work was subject to, Ospina-Vasquez's 'w ay o f being o f 
the antioqueiio'lemphasis added] is to be interpreted as 'class consciousness'163 
showed by the Colombian bourgeoisie.
Next, for a further step forward in the building of an theoretical framework for 
Colombian economic development, Nieto-Arteta's other major work164 would 
necessarily have to be considered. In it he introduced discerning statements on the 
relationship between the geography of land (tierras de vertiente), land tenure and 
the possibility of regional development. More important however, although he 
argued that coffee provided political normality amongst social groups165, he also 
-albeit lightly- touched upon the significance of the emergence of elite classes from 
the coffee sector in the interior of the country.
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Nieto-Arteta pointed out the crucial political role of coffee in directing 
minifundistas (smallholders) towards conservative politics, creating a multifaceted 
class structure in the party. This led to the coffee industry's great influence over 
the appointment of governmental ministers (which were more im portant than 
presidents). As he put it, coffee produced " ... Ministers of Finance who cannot 
disavow the problems that coffee creates ... In several occasions a Coffee Growers 
Congress has had a more deep and lasting influence than even the National 
Congress ”166.
This in turn constituted the principal element both in the promotion and 
consolidation of the interior coffee region's economic growth and development. 
Nieto-Arteta noted th a t" coffee, director of Colombia, has given political primacy 
to those who produce it and have created the national economy with i t " 167
Nieto-Arteta therefore introduced the relationship between a region's successful 
export commodity (coffee) and changes in the power structure. Additionally, in 
a surprising manner, he appeared to come close to Innis'168 interpretation of 
economic development, with his concerns about the effects of particular types of 
export commodities on the developmental potentials of a region. (For example, 
Nieto-Arteta's interest in the role of gold, tobacco and coffee suggested the 
indictment of (i) the former for only leading to a concentration in the hands of a 
few with the accompanying failure to induce transportation or agriculture; and of 
(ii) the second, for similar concentration patterns in income distribution and lack 
of influence on education169.)
But Nieto-Arteta also provided an apology for coffee by suggesting that it set the 
conditions for regional development which favoured considerable transportation 
input and improvement of the general economic attitude. Despite Nieto-Arteta's 
contributions to the understanding of economic historiography there seems to be 
a failure in them to address specific economic variables such as, for example, 
wage-rates (which were of particular importance to regional development) except 
for saying that they were unknown170.
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McGreevy was therefore bound to concern himself with certain conditions for 
regional development. He saw the need for more exhaustive research on wages 
but stopped pointblank. Initially, with his doctoral thesis, he set himself the task 
to " take many facts of Colombian economic history and several explanations of 
them to consider the formation of a more general theory of Colombian 
development171. (He would describe this effort as 'presum ptuous'172 some time 
later in his book). McGreevy's approach was to " conceptualise the process of 
economic growth in a gestalt form with a manageable phenomenon of rising per 
capita income, continuing technical progress and resource allocation 11173 
considering " dynamic effects of regular population growth as they inhibit the 
maintenance of the level of per capita income until some political changes are 
made "174.
Coming from such a person as McGreevy, " unaware of Colombia's existence 
before 1960 "17S, although his book " sought to correct the weaknesses176 of his 
doctoral thesis, it emerged as a bombshell that shook and took scholars on the 
subject by surprise. There is little doubt that it set a benchmark for debate on the 
economic development and history of Colombia177. Both his works owed 
guidance to Everett Hagen, Charles Kindleberger and Simon Kuznets178.
Much spadework was done by him and factual originality became a major quality 
sufficient enough to motivate academic follow up. He engaged in efficient 
collection of economic data and both his works contained several hypothesis. 
These provided good answers to some questions, such as models of agrarian 
structure and the role of transportation. Upon final analysis, he saw interior coffee 
cultivation operating as a catalyst which would stimulate development. As a crop 
coffee was suited to relatively small-scale farms and as an export crop, it 
indirectly stimulated related investments in private and then public transport, 
education and small-scale, import-substituting manufacture.
The coffee industry really only acquired major importance after the First World 
War. It was United States bankers that assumed leadership in its handling.
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Specifically, during the 1920's, a small num ber of United States companies 
dom inated the bean's export until 1928. It was then that interior coffee elite 
groups sought security against these companies by the creation of the National 
Federation of Coffee Growers which according to (a recent reassessment of his 
views) McGreevy, was the " m echanism ... which replaced ownership and control 
of land as the technique by which a few could realise substantial gains from the 
coffee industry as a whole [by restricting] access of [small estate] producers to the 
m arket by filtering their product and sales through a national organisation 
controlled by the nation's senior leadership "179.
He enhanced the relationship between coffee and elite power structure arguing 
thus t h a t " the Federation National de Cafeteros arose as an instrument of the 
coffee elite to organise the industry. It was the mechanism ... which replaced 
ownership and control of land as the technique by which a few could realise 
substantial gains from the coffee industry as a whole "18°. McGreevy concluded 
his views with a proposal of a population theory of the transition from economic 
decline to economic development, erecting a model of autonomous population 
growth. It suggested that at the beginning, autonomous population increase lead 
to a lower per-capita income (economic decline). Thereafter, w ith the technical and 
natural conditions of production of a specific crop (such as coffee) much influence 
was exerted on the ability of the nation to respond successfully to foreign demand 
patterns. Some of these views are reminiscent of the 'staple thesis' as we will see 
later.
But although McGreevy admitted that the conditions of production were the 
product of conscious acts of specific groups to some extent, he did not give much 
attention to links between economics and politics. Especially, struggles among 
economic groups in conflict, which determine the nature and rate of economic 
development. Indeed, after formulating his model, McGreevy alarmingly 
concluded that " an explanation m ust finally be pushed back to hum an 
motivation: some region developed because the people there wanted to "181.
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This invited Safford's well-known criticism. He pointed out th e " absurdity of the 
conclusion... that the transition towards development finally arrived in Colombia 
because Colombians [some part of them - the Antioquenos] (after 1880) wanted 
it that way. This means that they did not want it before, a claim without a basis. 
This conclusion completely leaves out consideration of the m any obstacles to 
development that Colombians confronted during the XIX Century. Therefore, this 
result is more than a tactlessness "182.
Regions other than the interior (Antioquia) wanted to advance. Mendez pointed 
out the " example of Barranquilla [NAC region], whose growth I think has not 
been studied in a systematic form. The growth of Barranquilla was spectacular. 
From a sandy city, where one su n k ... Barranquilla became in the third and fourth 
decades of this century a city that threatened the predominance of other 
Colombian cities... there was no way of doing things, however they accomplished 
them "183.
Although McGreevy strived to emphasize social and political changes wrought by 
coffee and tried to encompass more than just economic results and causes, he fell 
back on what seems to be an established coffee interpretation of overall national 
development of Colombia. Although he suggested that regional development was 
taking place in regions other than coffee areas, there was no particular interest -let 
alone consistent attempt to analyze them individually. He accomplished the 
enormous task of collecting many facts of the nation's economic history and 
several explanations of them. He failed however, to provide a comprehensive 
explanation of the regional developmental processes. In particular, there is no 
emphasis on the process in the NAC region.
McGreevy aimed to establish a general theory of Colombian development. But this 
is not a sensible way to approach such a complex task. The complexity of the 
economic history of Colombia is precisely its regional diversity. As Dix pointed 
o u t ," Colombia's unusual multifaceted regionalism ... persists and continues to 
have important implications for the country's development184.
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It is certain that the only scholar in the historiography of regional development 
of Colombia who makes any claim of being the harbinger of a theory on the 
whole nation's development is Hagen185. By arguing that derogation in society 
is a source of talent which leads to innovation, reference to McClelland's 'n 
Achievement' is vital for Hagen's model. He studied the formation of entrepreneurs 
and, in Schumpeterian fashion, their role in innovation and economic 
development. He examined the native of the (Antioquia) interior as a case of 
innovators formed by their special relationship with other regional groups in the 
country.
But the basis of his analysis is the discredited theory that the movement into 
industrial activities in Colombia was a result of the enterprise of the people of the 
departm ent of Antioquia. These, in turn, were motivated by 'status deprivation' 
to obtain recognition by achievement. That is, the withdrawal of respect for their 
status in society resulted in regional economic development.
W ithin the Colombian context of his theory, Hagen has already been criticised 
(particularly relating to the Antioqueno case). First, by Lopez Toro186, who 
stressed the advantages the Antioqueno area had over others. Second, by 
Safford187, who argued that economic superiority in the region was prior to the 
times when 'Bogotanos' looked down upon the Antioquefio. Nevertheless, it is 
clear from collected evidence, that other regions were fertile with entrepreneurs 
as well188. Few academics fail to realise that even Hagen himself stated that " 
capable and effective entrepreneurs have arisen in every region of the country
nl89
While the urban centre of Hagen's particular region of interest - Medellin - led in 
the cotton textile industry, beverages and food processing industries started in 
large scale enterprises in other regions. Although the departm ent of Antioquia's 
cotton textile industry was the first, other regions were ahead in the industry with 
regard to output, employment and relatively advanced technology. Furthermore, 
if 'status deprivation' is of any significance, it was probably experienced by other
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peoples of other regions. Industrial leadership was in their hands all over the 
country. In 1915, for example, aggregate information190 on m odem  industry 
showed that the urban centres of Bogota and Barranquilla were not far behind 
Medellin.
Relative population size, quality of communications and other differences 
considered, the nature of the production function of the leading export commodity 
for the interior of Colombia provided a 'lead' for the departm ent of Antioquia. 
Research usually tends to reveal explanations in terms of markets, prices and the 
nature and costs of inputs. In so doing, suggestions of cultural explanations and 
degrees of initiatives virtually diminish in academic stature when used to analyze 
why a particular region advances faster than others.
But this 'lead' does not warrant Ospina-Vasquez and Hagen's implications about 
economic development in all regions. McGreevy, for example, suggested that by 
measures of total employment or perhaps capital investment, differences were not 
that significant. Consequently, it seems unsatisfactory to lay the burden of 
'explaining' a nation's economic development by constructing only a framework 
that enhances development of a particular region's successful commodity.
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CHAPTER II
THE HISTORICAL SETTING FOR REGIONAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT IN COLOMBIA
National Scene Setting 
(i)
To begin with, in order to place this thesis' framework into proper bearing, it 
requires a brief survey of the economic historical setting of Colombian regional 
economic development. This is so because it sketches the general economic 
environment which embraced regions in Colombia during the period of our 
research (1900 to 1930). It also reveals that to acquire a fuller view of 'national' 
economic development, more than one region has to be closely studied.
The nation, at its NAC region was first visited by European ships at the region's 
m ost northern tip -the Guajira peninsula- in 1499. Although certainly important 
Indigenous urban settlements1 existed in the region many years before the 
Spaniards' arrival such as Teyuncf, the lo s t city7 in the Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta, which " is now judged to be 1,500 years old and superior in ecological 
planning to anything built by the Incas, Aztecs or Mayas the region as a whole 
claimed some of the first hispanic urban developments in Colombia. This was so 
with the founding of Santa Maria la Antigua del Darien in 1510, Santa Marta in 
1526 and Cartagena de Indias in 1513. These, located within sight of the coast or 
at short distance from the sea (not withstanding the deficient factor that low 
tropical soil represents) supplied at least one of the less mobile factors of 
production (accessibility to the market). They offered some early potential as an 
almost adequate basis for export crop industries and subsequent export-led 
growth and development.
However, this was not to be as we shall see further on. Although the earliest 
pre-hispanic or pre-Colombian metal trade and industrial mining centre known 
to hispanics in Colombia was Buritaca (in the mountains of the northern part of
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the departm ent of Antioquia, in the interior of the nation) which 'exported' both 
finished items and raw  metal, most of the gold and jewellery was traded 
northwards in Dabeida (at the most south-westerly part of the Sinu area in the 
NAC region). It was here that a community of technologically skilled goldsmiths4 
expanded, on the basis of transforming 'im ported' raw  material, and opened the 
trade route through the Sinu river, supplying the entire NAC region.
There, barter market centres were established and merchants exchanged coastal 
products for Sinu jewellery and ingots of raw  metal from (what today) is the 
departm ent of Antioquia in the interior of the country. The following three 
centuries of Spanish conquest and colonial rule further enhanced urban economic 
developments; the classical example being the seaport of Cartagena.
N ot until the 19th century was its predominance challenged (and for some time 
surpassed) with the rise of another port, Barranquilla5. Both cities were in the 
NAC region. Indeed, import-substitution industrialisation can be said to have 
begun in the NAC region in the late 19th century as then, already ten shoe 
manufacturers in Barranquilla were implementing it6. By the end of the first 
decade of the present century, the NAC region offered as much possibility for 
regional economic development as other areas in Colombia.
The Republic of Colombia was formed on the 17th December, 1819 through the 
influence of the Libertador Simon Bolivar. Thereafter, as Deas has claimed, the " 
num ber of constitutional experiments has been great, and this republic has been 
the scenario for more elections, under more systems, central and federal, direct or 
indirect, hegemonic and proportional, and with major consequences than any of 
the american or european countries that seeked to dispute the title "7.
However, Colombia's independence was marked by a series of violent sodo-dvil 
conflicts. Consequently, economic development suffered serious setbacks and a 
sucdnct pattern of comparative regional unevenness emerged. Civil wars took 
place " at a higher level than local in 1839-1841, 1851, 1854 and 1859-1863,
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disallowing more minor scuffles. Blood penetrated the system, intensifying 
antagonisms and local as well as party loyalties "8. During years 1863 - 1885, the 
" free trade of arms was a matter decreed by the Constitution ... the state forces 
were very scarce ... [therefore] it is not strange that there were more than fifty 
rebellions in these twenty and so years "9.
W hat today are the nations of Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador and Panama 
constituted the Republic of Great Colombia between 1819 and 1822. It is unsettling 
that after eight years, the Republic dismembered into only Colombia and Panama. 
Far more disturbing is the fact that, instrumental to the completion of the process 
of dismemberment, was the rising strategic and economic power of the United 
States and its crucial role in the secession and loss of Panama in 1902. Between 
1830 and 1847 there was little if any economic change for the Republic. After 1847 
and up to 1880, government free-trade policies had negative effects, such as 
decreasing working class incomes10.
Agricultural products such as tobacco, cotton, indigo, quinine and cacao were 
cultivated from earlier years and which required the use of capital, land and 
labour on a reasonably considerable amount. After 1848 there was an expansion 
especially of tobacco exports, a spread of large cattle 'haciendas' and sodo-dvil 
conflict intensified. External forces such as expanding industrial output in the 
developed economies of North Atlantic nations m eant Colombia was among the 
markets this output was seeking an outlet to. With tobacco11 exports the 
openness of the economy increased. The result was an increase in imports and a 
decrease in local artisan industries.
It was not until the early 1850's that a major technological change in 
transportation took place, although it initiated in the early 1820's . Steam 
navigation12 was introduced to the main commerdal artery of the nation, the 
Magdalena river. Railways followed suit13. Both methods of transportation first 
emerged in the NAC region. This opened up links with the developed economies 
of the world where important technological change was taking place.
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The 1850's brought bourgeois reforms mainly favouring landed elites and urban 
m iddle dasses. The tobacco monopoly was shifted to private enterprise. The 
Ambalema (interior) tobacco export industry ended but a high level of 
productivity was maintained. The balance of trade was not unfavourable and it 
seems that economic conditions were reasonably good. Tobacco production in 
Carmen de Bolivar (NAC region) took over from the dedine of Ambalema for 
local consumption.
Some snags were present. One was the emergence of persistent deficits in the 
balance of trade. Another, the failure, due to geographical dispersion, of the 
artisans to organise in a way which would guarantee them more effective 
protective legislation from the domination of governments by merchants. The 
latter, tended to foster imports in excess of export capacity which was generated 
by tobacco and espedally, gold.
Export expansion abruptly ended in the mid 1860's. The nation's economy became 
increasingly dependent on trade and unable to transform itself in face of adverse 
markets. Nevertheless, although agricultural products of higher value (such as 
coffee and indigo) became relatively more important in international trade and the 
extraction of chinchona (quinine bark) was also growing, falling prices in foreign 
markets brought economic depression in 1857. This resulted in suppressed 
economic conditions and downward pressure on prices.
Only in the 1870's did the nation's trade see a substantial revival with increased 
exports of coffee, hides and tagua (vegetable ivory)14. However discouraging, 
tobacco and cotton did not however participate in the export revival. It is true of 
course, that the lack of a specialised natural product compounded the country's 
early economic problems. After 1880 however, 'mild' coffee developed in the 
interior as the nation's leading commodity and characteristic industry of potential 
value.
Coffee was a commodity which was showing considerably more dynamism than
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the remaining staple products. Tobacco in the Ambalema area operated in large 
units. Therefore, the stimulus for complementary development was limited and 
few economic linkages emerged (as surface transportation) that were found later 
in coffee. Tobacco had a high value in relation to its weight. Its largest production 
area was located near the Magdalena river. Coffee on the contrary, had higher 
transportation costs in relation to its value and was located in the mountains 
rather than next to the river.
It is clear that in the 1880's the more farsighted landowners from the department 
of Antioquia identified topography and ample and cheap labour supplies as being 
essential elements in the production of coffee. It is probable that gold however, 
despite its enormous abuse dating from the 'conquista' and the 'colonia' periods, 
remained the nation's most valuable single commodity. In 1885, gold exports 
represented approximately five ninths of the value of estimated exports15. 
Chinchona bark, tobacco, coffee and tropical woods made up the re s t
The first major period of sustained regional development took place in the last 
two decades of the 19th century. For example, there is evidence that in 1891 while 
exports of gold and coffee were considerable, tobacco was being sent to Germany, 
cotton fibre and seed were sent to Europe at relatively good prices and the 
cultivation of bananas was acquiring significance16. Between 1880 and 1899 the 
cultivation of coffee spread to the mid-west of the Magdalena river in the nation's 
interior and to a lesser degree, in the Sierra Nevada de Santa M arta areas in the 
NAC region.
Between 1886 and 1897 the gradual depreciation of Colombian currency in terms 
of gold, stimulated the production of commodities17. Coffee for example, met 
unusually high prices18. In the 1890's in general however, although m oney wages 
seem to have increased with inflation, real wages and labourers' purchasing 
power decreased. The favourable economic conditions enjoyed by Colombia in 
this period were short lived due to the ' War of a Thousand Days' between 1899 and 
1903. Although it was " officially the last civil war suffered by the R epublic... the
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country was subsequently at the borderline of war in m any occasions "19.
This particular war considerably crippled the country. British Acting Vice-Consul 
McDougall noted that " merchants here have withheld importing to a great 
degree, as the premium on gold went up by leaps and bounds from 200 to 1,800 
per cent, and naturally the owners did not know at what price to sell their goods 
so as to secure enough money to enable them to purchase fresh stocks ,l2°.
The rate of exchange on British Gold indeed rose from 240 % in january to 550 % 
in december, 1899 and from the latter, leaped to 1,950 % in december 1900 in 
volatile manner21. In 1899 the " average rate of exchange in first half-year [was] 
252 per cent [sic] [and] in second half-year, 483 per cent ',22. In 1900 it was " ... 
1,045 per cent in the first half-year [sic] [and] 1,648 per cent in the second 
half-year"23. Therefore, according to McDougall, " in 1899 a [American] dollar 
was worth 5 dol. 50 c. paper and £1 sterling, 27 dol. 50 c. paper, whilst in 1900 
American dollars were worth 20 dol. paper and £1 sterling, 97 dol. 50c. paper"24.
In addition to this, United States 'gunboat' diplomacy contributed immensely to 
the accomplishment of the 'secession' of Panama in 1902, the underlying reason 
being acquiring the strategic canal zone. Since the digging began in 1885 by a 
French com pany," the canal, from which hope of economic redemption for the 
nation emerged, stood more like Damocles' spear, for it was already manifest that 
the United States highly desired the Isthmus territory ,,2S.
In general, between 1848 and 1902, the nation as a whole witnessed a period of 
economic decline (extensive empirical quantitative data is limited). After 1902, a 
transition towards economic growth took place until 1930. Compared with earlier 
periods, the years between late 19th century and the beginning of World War I 
was a 'spectacular' one for economic growth.
The long economic decline was reversed and the two events mentioned earlier 
(the turn of the century war and the loss of Panama) were followed by others of
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major significance. These were for example, a 7 % average export quantum 
growth rate as the expansion of coffee exports grew at rates never experienced 
before; the creation of the first textile mill in Medellin, department of Antioquia 
(interior); the successful currency conversion completed by 1910 which resulted 
in clearing up inflated paper currency and re-established the Colombian Peso26 
on par with the US dollar; the passage of tariffs favouring growth in the Medellin 
(Antioquia) textile industry; and of course, the payment by the United States to 
the Colombian government of the US $ 25 million as " indemnity " for the loss of 
Panama.
This indemnity payment and the other monies that came along with it as is 
mentioned further on, led to the renowned " dance of the millions ',27 in the 
1920's, during which time loans and bonds were floated in the New York market 
by the Colombian government. Rippy claims that United States capital 
investments in Colombia " in 1913... amounted to somewhere between $2,000,000 
and $4,000,000. In 1920 they amounted to $30,000,000; at the beginning of 1926 
they were estimated to be $80,000,000; and by the end of 1929 they had reached 
$ 280,000,000 ! "28. The monies promoted some prosperity, bu t the short-sighted 
spending spree they were subject to was accompanied by inflation and corruption. 
To be sure, opportunities were lost for integral regional economic growth and 
development.
These monies were really destined to assist the government in building up 
transportation infrastructure (the whole of it to be supplied by the United States). 
As Stallings pointed out, "as New York became the world's principal financial 
center ... by the mid-1920s ... U.S. banks were out scouring the world for 
prospective customers, often convincing foreign governments to take loans in 
excess of their needs ... At one p o in t... there were twenty representatives of U.S. 
banks in Colombia alone trying to negotiate loans with public and private entities 
[which] ... led the Commercial attache in Bogota to write to the Department of 
Commerce: T think Colombia is going wild on borrowing. She has started too 
many railroads and too many highways, and she has not any idea where she is
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going to get all the money, except that the money is coming in so readily now, 
that she thinks she can borrow ad infinitum'"29.
They were also linked to considerable United States interests in acquiring oil 
concessions, which they did. As Taylor-Parks indicated, the " smell of oil ... 
[made] a settlement [on the loss of Panama] desirable and Colombian friendship 
essential ,,3°.
He added that th e "... desire for a share in the development of Colombian natural 
resources and the need on the part of Colombia for American capital and skill in 
the fulfilment of an acknowledged national destiny seem to have been 
determining factors in the payment of the 25,000,000 "31. Posada later suggested 
th a t" the money was not given to Colombia until the government was ready, by 
means of secret documents, to deliver petroleum and other resources to 
northamerican corporations "32. Senator Watson saw the indem nity payment as 
" an indirect subsidy to the oil interests "33.
During this phase -between 1904 and 1914- contemporary regional development 
took place. Both exports and imports more than doubled. Shipments of hides, 
tobacco, gold, platinum and bananas also performed strongly. Although coffee 
constituted from 40 to 50 per cent of the total value of exports, there was not, as 
yet any intense specialisation in the production of this commodity34. Railway 
transportation networks on the principal routes of trade were constructed. Loans 
were contracted in London - an indication of the nation's improving credit and 
financial capacity. The internal debt, however, seemed to be composed primarily 
of documents issued in recognition of claims, which originated in political 
disturbances, and of bonds representing railroad subventions or construction 
payments.
By 1907 the gold peso (equivalent to one-fifth of a pound Sterling) was adopted 
as a monetary unit. The outstanding paper was given official equivalence at a rate 
of 10,000 to the gold peso35. By 1914 the nation was understood to have been
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monetarily on a relatively sound basis and gold was in circulation for the first 
time since 1870. McQueen claimed th a t" the condition of Colombia in 1914 was, 
on the whole, better than at almost any other time"36. And indeed, estimates of 
the national growth rate of per capita income were placed at 0.5 % per year after 
189537, although the strength of this regional development was located in the 
coffee economy of the interior department of Antioquia.
Between years 1906 and 1913, foreign trade (as the total of exports and imports) 
grew from about 25 to 63 million pesos38. Colombian exports rose from 14.4 
million to 78.1 million between 1910 and 1919, underlining a dominant role of the 
export sector. External debt was less than four million pesos (mainly obligations 
of war) during the period39. Despite credit restrictions, decreases in imports and 
diminishing demand price ranges for export commodities, the early effects of the 
European war were not as severe to the nation as they were to other Latin 
American countries with closer and more dependent European financial and trade 
connections. As customs collections furnished 75 per cent of ordinary revenue, 
treasury revenue was reduced40.
After 1915 the export trade felt the impact of higher prices for commodities and 
increased demand in the United States revived coffee shipments41. This more 
formidable economic climate continued until the United States entered the war in 
1917. By this time Colombia was in the final step of placing itself within reach of 
consistent economic growth. Estimates suggest that the economy was growing 
rather slow ly ," perhaps at an average rate of 0.5 % per year n42 after 1895.
The results of this initial phase were the income generating effects of the export 
expansion, the stimulus to various sectors of the economy, the rapid growth of 
manufacturing output, the drawing of subsistence farmers into active participation 
through the production of coffee, investments into social overhead capital and the 
expansion of the railroad system from 100 kms. in 1909 to 1,500 kms. in 1922.
The next phase and undoubtedly the most crucial for regional development, was
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the period between 1919 and 1929. External as well as internal forces were 
operating in such a way as to create an auspicious economic environment. There 
was a gradual rise in the price of coffee primarily due to Brazilian valorisation 
schemes. Major changes were introduced through institutional reforms, 
particularly in the fiscal and financial system based on proposals by the United 
States Financial Mission to Colombia led by Professor E., W., Kemmerer. The 
creation of a national central bank in charge of all monetary guidelines, and the 
consolidation of national budgeting are evidence of the implementation of such 
proposals. Indeed, for Kemmerer, banks were central, not regional, and in general 
he supported the trend towards strong governments and the economic political 
primacy of capital cities43.
A formidable input of foreign capital in the form of working or investment 
capital, public sector capital loans and private investment followed the nation's 
established financial bill of health guaranteed by the Kemmerer mission . As 
mentioned earlier, the bulk of the public sector capital loans were designed to 
finance the railway transportation system.
This brought with it severe constraints, such as growth of external borrowing and 
debt servicing. These conditions, along with the enormous amount of direct 
foreign investment, increased the dependence of the external sector. Access to 
foreign funds was conditioned by fiscal responsibility. Policies such as the 1927 
reduction of levy were therefore implemented. This led to the allocation of foreign 
exchange earnings to the importation of foodstuffs which could have been 
produced domestically.
But (despite heavy centralisation of economic policy) the most salient 
characteristic of this last economic phase was the unequivocal translucency of the 
weight of the notion of the 'regional' (in contrast to the notion of the 'national') 
in the process of economic development.
It is, after all, during this period that the 'nation' throve with rapid economic
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growth, exceeding that of years 1910 -1919. But, it was not a 'nation' that thrived. 
It was one particular region (the coffee producing interior) that did so. 
Nevertheless, the consolidation of several of the most economically important 
urban areas (and their regions of economic influence) took place. After all, the 
cities of Bogota, Barranquilla and Medellin were undoubtedly implementing the 
transition from agriculture to industry in economic-linkage creating undertakings.
Oi)
Although most data assembled refers to the mid-1920s and should of course be 
looked at with scepticism and caution, some national trends as well as a wider 
view of the Colombian context is perhaps best recently portrayed by Bejarano44.
He has noted for instance that the most notable aspect of the Colombian economy 
around 1920 was the weight of its agricultural structure. It was characterized by 
the diversity of forms of utilization of the soil and the exploitation of the labour 
force45. It was also hampered by low levels of productivity and by nearly nil 
levels of incorporation of technology46.
The agricultural structure was heterogenous with small stretches of cultivated 
territory and only one fourth of the land was under any sort of economic 
utilization. The small portion of economically exploited land was divided in four 
agriculture and living stock activities: (i) the great cattle raising haciendas; (ii) the 
great coffee haciendas ; (iii) modern enterprises in sugar and cattle; and (iv) the 
small coffee and non-coffee plots of the interior47.
There was in addition an embryonic industry centered largely on the textile sector 
of the departm ent of Antioquia and some consumer durables. An equally nascent 
railway development appeared that was useful only for the transport of exported 
coffee. However, it only linked non-coffee production to the market in a tangential 
way48.
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This was undoubtedly a discouraging economic picture in which, save the drive 
deriving from coffee exports, no other factor was perceived that stimulated 
economic transformation49.
There were two complementary processes in the expansion of the interior's small 
plot economy that would make coffee the privileged product of the region: one 
was that coffee adopted itself particularly well to the types of settlements that 
surfaced during Antioqueno colonization.
The other was the expansion of the agricultural frontier carried out by 
colonization. It was part of a more profuse process of expansion supported by the 
occupation of public lands during the second half of the 19th century and 
beginning of the current one. Half of incorporated lands and 65 per cent of the 
coffee areas were handed over before the take-off of the bean's culture50.
Although this fortified the [interior] latifundio (very large land properties), within 
a small but disperse stretch of land, the small plot economy began to prosper. 
Between 1906 and 1932, 216,817 hectares were allotted to the [interior coffee 
provinces] of Antioquia and Caldas, of which 12 % went to colonizers, 47 % to 
individuals with less than a 1,000 hectares and 41 % to large properties. Although 
slight, after 1910 the portions occupied by small producers propped up coffee 
production in the colonized zones51.
Regional economies such as those of 19th Colombia were characterized by low 
levels of income per capita and capital accumulation, scarce linkage with world 
markets, meagre technological incorporation of technology to agricultural activity 
and scarce labour force when compared to the availability of land52.
By the 20th century, coffee constituted the nucleus of the expansion of the internal 
market, not because of what the small plot economy represented, but because 
through the processing, commercialization and transportation of coffee it created 
a network of urban consumers and transport (namely railways) which expanded
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and diversified the market. The railway network for example, expanded from 593 
kilometres in 1898 to 1,571 kilometres in 1922. Of these railways lines, 71.4 % in 
the former and 89 % in the latter year were used for the transport of coffee53.
Between 1910 and 1925 the total cultivated area of the nation increased a 
significant 59 % from 920,000 to 1,471,000 hectares. During the same period, areas 
dedicated to export cultures increased from 139,000 to 395,000 hectares. The 
cultivation of products for urban consumption augmented from 92,000 to 152,000 
hectares while those for rural consumption rose from 680,000 to 925,000 
hectares54.
Urbanization between 1912 and 1925 was not unimportant. Urban population in 
1925 was at 1,560,000 (23.2 % of the total) and already 25.7 % of it was populating 
Medellin, Bogota, Barranquilla and Cali, cities in which -between 1918 and 1925- 
population had grown annually at a rate of 4.4 %. This is in contrast with national 
rates of 2 % for total population, 3.4 % for urban and 1.6 % for rural 
population55.
Between 1925 and 1930 the urban population grew by 24 %, e.g., increasing by
400.000 people in only 5 years. During this period the population of the country's 
four main urban areas grew by 31 %, that is, 127,000 people, a figure not to be 
disregarded for an essentially rural country56.
Public work schemes concentrated mainly in the interior's oriental region 
generated 30,000 jobs and differentiating wages along the way between itself and 
agriculture. Between 1925 and 1928, the country's labour force increased by
140.000 people of which 42.4 % was absorbed by agriculture (especially coffee 
cultivation), 10.8 % by manufacture, 12.2 % by construction, 7.8 % by mining and 
26.4 % by other sectors including government, transport, communications and 
energy 57.
Cattle raising development was also a result of land concessions in considerable
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extension especially in the interior department of Antioquia and in the NAC 
region departments of Bolivar and Magdalena.
Of the concession of 923,743 hectares handed over between 1910 and 1937,273,531 
(29.6 %) went to Bolivar, which showed an average of 1,688 hectares per 
property58. Antioquia received 191,677 (20.75 %) showing an average of 1,453 
hectares per property, while 102,013 hectares (11.1 %) were handed over to 
Magdalena, representing an average of 1,030 hectares per property59.
The assorted conformation of the country's agricultural structure and the scarce 
industrial development caused extremely different forms of utilization of the 
labour.
During the 1920s the labour market's dynamism was m uch more emphasised in 
the interior's western (coffee) zone rather than in its eastern one. In the latter zone 
the only option for m any labourers was to become either arrendatarios (labourers 
receiving small plots of land in exchange for obligatory work) or share-croppers 
on haciendas 60.
Additionally, working relationships had the common characteristic of isolating 
labourers from an already thin labour market because agregados (labourers allowed 
to work a patch of land as part of their wages) were forbidden by police law 
regulations to engage in working activities other than those assigned by the 
hacienda61.
The dependence entirely on arrendatario labour force made it unacceptable for the 
interior haciendas to reduce its labour force. This was especially so when demands 
were placed to allow arrendatarios to cultivate coffee for their own benefit. The loss 
of control of interior haciendas over their labour force was therefore a main bone 
of contention62.
This incidentally raises the question on whether interior arrendatarios were at all
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able to afford to migrate to the NAC region when there was either a legal 
impediment for them to do so or, being deprived of the opportunity to make 
gains on his plot's products, decide to remain as such -at least until 1936, when 
a new law gave them rights of property over their plots63.
The development of Colombian exports was late in arriving. Between 1905 and 
1910 real exports per capita were just those of the colonial period (17th century) 
by 30 % and in comparison with the period 1835-1839 only doubled w hen the first 
efforts were carried out to export tobacco64. Outwardly oriented development 
only began after 1910-1912, when the rise of coffee exports helped consolidate 
exports that had been systematically increasing65.
The country's total growth was propelled by exports -particularly coffee- and by 
foreign debt. This allowed it to surm ount the structural limitations that 
characterized its economy during the period under study here. This was the result 
of expansion of public spending, the greater capacity to im port and the increase 
of internal demand from the greater revenues generated by coffee. These were 
reflected in the industrial, agricultural and transport activities.
Between 1925 and 1929, the per capita annual growth rate of GNP reached a 5.2 
% level, the highest in the history of the country while total GNP grew at 7.7 % 
annually, equally one of the fastest throughout this century66.
For an economy which by 1925 was reaching average income per capita levels of 
US$115 (one of the lowest in Latin America) and for a country where, by the same 
year, 75 % of its 6.7 million people were employed in agricultural activities, these 
figures were not to be spum ed67.
National, departmental and municipal finances enjoyed an ample m argin to begin 
or continue the public investments that the economy was demanding. Public 
spending tripled between 1926 and 1929, per capita public spending increasing 
from US$5.5 to 13.7 during the period. Between 1925 and 1929, public investment
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reached 29.4 % of total national investment, particularly in transport,where it rose 
74.9 % during the same period68.
The possibility of surmounting obstacles in the way of imports absorbed a great 
portion of the country's debt. The import quantum  between 1923 and 1929 grew 
134 % although 49 % of imports were of consumer goods69.
As a closing remark, coffee suited the small plot economy well once it was 
stabilized because it did not require great investments of capital. Additionally, it 
was a durable product and easy to process, so there was no need to invest in 
heavy machinery. Neither was coffee subject to significant economies of scale. 
Although colonization of these lands was not done with the strict purpose of 
founding coffee cultivation areas, it is easily understood why they prospered after 
stable settlement of its first settlers70.
Prevailing Level of Wages in Pre-Turn of the Century Colombia 
(ii)
Several studies on 19th century interior region wage levels in Colombia have been 
done. Cotes71 estimated wages for labourers in Samper72 showed some real 
wages between 1848 and 1892. Bustamante-Roldan73 presented data on interior 
coffee plantation wages. Deas74 also presented data on interior coffee plantation 
wages. Hemberg75 indicated the standard of living of Bogota's working class 
before the second world war. And Rivas76 gave some indication on m id 19th 
century interior tobacco industry wage levels.
Although Urrutia-Montoya showed that for urban (Bogota) government lab o u r" 
[the period] 1863-1884 ... produced a slow increase in nominal wages ... [and] ... 
[the period] 1880-1895 revealed stability for labourers"77 wages as a whole, and 
agricultural wages in particular, had been traditionally low in Colombia.
In a late 19th century report, Bunch stated th a t" the rate of wages is very low and 
should not be raised"78. Particularly for the 1870's, although not specifying
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w hether it was a daily or weekly rate, he equally noted that purchasing power 
am ounted to Os lOd (20 cents) for agricultural labour and 3s (80 cents) for skilled 
labour79.
British Acting Consul Diez also noted in 1871 that in Panama (then part of the 
NAC region), " ... those employed by the Railway Company struck for higher 
wages, requiring 4s per diem instead of 3s 2 d ., their daily pay"80. British sources 
also indicated that in Cartagena in 1874 "... wages given to labourers in the town 
are 3s 2d. per day and in the country Is and food, consisting of rice, plantains, 
maize and occasionally, dried beef’81.
Nevertheless, in the 1880's, St. John noted th a t" the rate of wages, both for skilled 
and unskilled labour, regard being had to the quantity and quality of the work 
produced, is above the average of the last twenty years"82.
Table 1 below shows the different wage rates in the 1880's for different classes 
of skilled labour. According to the data, the simple unweighted average wage rate 
for skilled labour in Colombia in the 1880's was US$ 1.49. Figure 1 shows the 
barchart which illustrates the differences. Table 2 shows wage rates for unskilled 
classes of labour for the same years was distinctly lower. The simple unweighted 
average wage rate for unskilled labour was therefore US$ 0.33 . Figure 2 shows 
the barchart graph which illustrates the data.
Despite St. John's generalisation of above average rates of wages for the twenty 
years preceding the 1880's, ordinary agricultural labour wages dropped 
considerably from the early 1870's to the late 1880's from 20 cents (Os lOd) to 15 
cents - an 25% decrease in United States currency; an equally significant 26.7% in 
pounds Sterling (that is, from £0.04 down to £0.03).
TABLE 1. COLOMBIAN SKILLED LABOUR WAGES: 1880's
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Class of Labour Price/Day (US$)
Bookbinder 0.70
Mason 0.80
Saddler 0.80
Printer 0.80
Painter 1.00
Shoemaker 1.20
Carpenter 1.60
Smith 2.00
Upholsterer 2.00
Watchmaker 4.00
Source: St. John, A., Report on the Trade of Colombia, (London, 1886), p.4.
British Vice-Consul Carr noted that 
in Santa Marta in 1887, " labour at 
present is sufficiently abundant and 
cheap, the wages given to an 
ordinary day labourer being from 60 
c. to 70 c., which represents, at the 
present rate of exchange, about Is 
6d. only"83.
The following year in 1888, Wheeler pointed out th a t" wages, salaries and, as a 
rule, rents remain more or less the same as they were ten years ago"84. If 
Urrutia-Montoya's Bogota government wages are viewed as 'national' wages, this 
would mean therefore, that in 1888 they were slowly on the increase.
TABLE 2. COLOMBIAN UNSKILLED LABOUR WAGES: 1880's
Class of Labourer Price/Day (US$)
Town 0.50
Country (includes food) 0.15
Source: St. John, A., Report on the Trade of Colombia, (London, 1886), p.4.
Wheeler's views on wages however, provided some basis for speculative 
interpretation. Few for example, were as explicit as he was when he indicated 
th a t" the wages of farm labourers on the savanna of Bogota are from 30c. to 40c.
Colombian Skilled Wages -  1880’s 
(All Regions)
Segment of Labour
BookHndar 
M u o n  
8addlar 
Printer 
Painter 
8hoamakar 
Carpanter 
Smith 
Upholaterar 
Watchmakar
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source: SI. John . A.. • Roporl on the  
Treoe o l CMemele \  London, le n o , p. 4.
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a day, equivalent now in English 
money to from 7 l /2 d  to 10dv or 
taking the average, 5s. a week ... in 
the hot country the wages are lower, 
but the requirements are smaller as 
regards clothing, lodging and food, 
is cheaper"85.
As the term 'tierra caliente' is 
arguably used in Colombia by interior people to denote the hot country within the 
interior, if this is what Wheeler referred to, then two interpretations may be 
suggested. First, that Wheeler would be confirming that not all interior wages 
were slowly rising as for example, Urrutia-Montoya's Bogota government wages. 
Second, that he -perhaps inadvertently— revealed early signs of segmentation 
within the interior. Segmentation in this case would be commonplace there, at 
least from the perspective of an upper limit, represented by a simple unweighted 
average of 8.75 d (£0.04).
Assuming (all other things remaining constant) that St. John's 'labourer in town' 
spent the nominal wage differential (relative to the country labourer's wage, 
which was in addition to food) of US$ 0.35 on food, the lower limit would be 
represented by 2.63 d (£0.01).
If Wheeler was making reference to the NAC region (which is definitely 'hot7 
country), it suggests that this would be the preview to the contention that a major 
and significant destructive upsurge from low to high wages took place in the 
region (at least from the turn of the century until the end of the thirty's as we 
shall see further on).
This is in fact what contributed to the region's economic demise. Fals-Borda 
clarified this when he stated that wages " could go from five centavos daily in the 
interior to four pesos monthly on the [NA] coast [and that] (in general, wages
Figure 2
Colombian Unskilled Labour Wages - 1880s
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were much higher in the hot country rather than in the cold)”86. So, Wheeler 
probably referred to interior sections of "hot country7 where wages were indeed 
low, because, only assuming the NAC region labourer worked thirty days per 
month, Fals-Borda's data would suggest the labourer would thus be paid CP$ 0.13 
per day, or just under three times as much as his counterpart in the generally 
'cold7 interior country.
Wheeler provided further insight in another of his reports (equally produced in 
1888). He indicated the occurrence of a definite national decline in wages in a 
very short period of time. He n o ted :" the rates of wages for the different classes 
of workmen and labourers have not materially changed in the last few years"87.
This, by the end of the century was of course worsened by the W ar of a 
Thousand Days7. It left deep rooted indications of its terrible effects on the level 
of wages. For example, United States Consul-General Beaupre stated in 1900:" not 
w ithstanding the great depreciation of the purchasing pow er of Colombian 
currency, salaries and wages have advanced little, if at all"88.
Thus the general rule seems to be that the initiation of the century was very 
much a low-wage one for the nation. Consul-General Beaupre further noted that, 
in 1900," house servants earned [CP]$ 5 to [CP]$ 10 (50 US cents to [US]$ 1) per 
month; labourers from [CP]$ 1 to [CP]$ 1.50 (10 to 15 US cents) per day, and 
clerks in stores in commercial houses from [CP]$ 60 to [CP]$ 100 ($ 6 to $ 10 US 
currency) per month"89. W hat is more significant however, is that these wage 
rates suggest that wage differentiation in an already low-wage interior was 
equally existent at the turn of the century.
The question on how wages in the nation as a whole grew between 1900 and 1930 
is difficult to address. This chapter is a contribution towards an answer. As noted 
earlier on, an economic history of national wages in Colombia is yet to be 
researched and written. Nevertheless, Urrutia-Montoya and Pardo-Parra7s 
contributions to the economic history of regional (namely interior urban private
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and public sector data for Bogota and Medellin) wages do provide an indication 
of the growth of some wages in the interior90 as will be seen further on.
Indeed, Berry and Urrutia-Montoya admit th a t" it is unfortunately impossible to 
elaborate nominal or real wage series for transformation industry labour which 
w ould apply to the whole nation and for relatively long periods of time"91. Data 
collected before 1955, they a d d ," which were frequently of dubious quality, were 
published only for certain regions"92.
As mentioned earlier, despite a general low-wage interior, St. John succinctly 
pointed out that within that region, rural agricultural labour - discounting food 
allowance - could easily double their wages in the 1880's by moving to urban 
areas. According to Urrutia-Montoya, " nominal wages increased at an 
unprecedented rhythm - [Bogota] Manor House labourers' wages moved from 
[CP]$ 1.04 to [CP]$ 2.75 between 1895 and 1901 - undoubtedly due to the 
fundamental reason of inflation provoked by growing National Bank emissions 
[emphasis added]"93.
The exception to the general rule of low wages (particularly the agricultural level) 
ruling at the turn of the century Colombia however, was certainly the coffee 
sector in the interior. It precipitated a momentary sharp upw ard jum p in wages, 
which the layman - yet even the expert economist - would deem absurd.
This 'absurdity7 can only be attributed to the effects of war. Urrutia-Montoya 
suggested that increases in Bogota government labour wages for the period 
1872-1880 and for the year 1895 were probably due to the 1876 and 1895 civil 
wars94. In similar fashion, the " Thousand Days' " civil w ar probably generated 
the same effect for 1903.
This w ar witnessed the exchange rate surpass the limit of Colombian Paper55 $
10,000 per Colombian Gold Peso96 $ 100 and was responsible for " the abolition 
of the forced acceptance of paper money and the fixing of the official exchange 
rate of 10,000 % for the withdrawal of paper money in circulation"97.
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British Vice-Consul Dickson reported this 'absurd' wage in 1903:" wages on coffee 
plantation have risen considerably. The picking is done by women and children 
and is paid by weight. The rate of wages before the war was from [CPP] 20 c. to 
[CPP] 50 c. [11 /2  d. to 4 d.] per arroba (25 lbs.) but this has now risen to 1 dollar 
60 c. at which rate the pickers generally gain about 6 dollars a day, in addition to 
their food. Five to 6 lbs. of coffee, weighed and received from the pickers in the 
cherry only gives 1 lb. after being prepared and dried"98.
According to Urrutia-Montoya, at the least, Bogota government labour wages " 
which started in 1905 at a lower level than that of 1863-1872, showed a slight 
tendency to increase between that date and 1915 ... [ experienced an] abrupt 
increase in 1915-1916 ... [and th u s] ... the period 1917-1930, is as a whole a period 
of increase of wages. [Although there was] a momentary interruption in the 
upw ard trend in 1922 ... from 1923 wages went up without interruption until the 
w orld crisis with its repercussions being manifested in an abrupt fall in wages 
between 1930 and 1932 to the levels of 1920. A slow recovery as of 1932 allows 
that wages in 1939 reach levels of the period before the crisis"99.
Urrutia-Montoya's analysis is confirmed -at least for years 1923 to 1929- by several 
additional views. British Vice-Consul Garnett-Lomax in 1929 ascertained th a t " 
according to one authority, agricultural wages have risen from 30 centavos per 
day in 1923 to a present level of 1 peso 50 centavos. The level of wages paid to 
labour in the national Government public works was increased from an average 
of about 3s. 9d. per day in 1926 to 4s. 9d. per day in 1927"100.
Machado argued that the large capital input unleashed by the United States' 
indemnity payment for Colombia's loss of Panama " produced an increase in 
agricultural wages which at the beginning of this vertigo of millions did not 
surpass an average wage of from 30 to 35 centavos, to situate itself towards 1928 
at $ 1, up to $ 1.50"101.
And although Kepner does not mention levels of wages as high as Gamett-Lomax
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and Machado, he does provide confirmation of an abrupt fall in wages - not 
between 1930 and 1932 - but in 1929 when he noted that interior coffee sector 
wage levels actually declined:" in Colombia at the end of 1929, in spite of the fact 
that 50,000 workers were unemployed, coffee laborers could command 70 and 80 
and more cents a day"102.
Despite Garnett-Lomax, Machado and Kepner's views (as well as 
Urrutia-Montoya's analysis) there is the powerful dissenting view of someone 
who, as the Colombian Federation of Coffee Growers' director (Alejandro Lopez) 
knew w hat the reality of wages was. Lopez, (presumably addressing the matter 
of interior coffee sector wages) noted in 1926-27 th a t" in Colombia, there has been 
something like a million agricultural labourers of the lower class, commonly 
addressed as peons, who are paid a fixed wage according to the level ruling in 
each place, for ten hours of work. Before this period of official activity, they used 
to be paid those ten hours from 20 centavos in some places up  to 50 in 
others"103.
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CHAPTER III
THE UNITED FRUIT COMPANY AND THE CULTIVATION OF BANANA
IN THE NAC REGION
Operational Intricacy of the Monopoly
The most crucial effects labour shortage had were those upon the banana sector. 
This proved to be highly significant because, above all, labour shortage unleashed 
perhaps the single most detrimental economic phenomenon in the region: the 
introduction of the highest regional agricultural wages in the nation.
With the arrival of the banana sector's large-scale corporate production unit, the 
UFC, wages were to be pushed above average levels by banana monopoly 
production, at the end of the first and, especially, by the beginning of the second 
decade of the present century.
Within the context of a labour-shortage economy, the UFC's role as prime deviser 
of economic transformation (through the payment of high wages and introduction 
of segmentation) at the base of the NAC region's economic structure, warrants 
some elaboration especially about the operational intricacy of the international 
banana monopoly.
With the merger in 1899 between fruit merchant Andrew W. Preston's Boston 
Fruit Company (created in 1885) plus its seven subsidiaries of which three 
steamship companies ( America Fruit Company, Buckman Fruit Company and 
Quaker Fruit Com pany) ,  three fruit growing companies in the Caribbean and the 
selling agent in the United States (the Fruit Dispatch Company) and railroad 
builder and international financier Minor C. Keith's interests ( Costa Rican 
Tropical Trading and Transport Company, American Snyder Banana Company 
and British Colombia Land C om pany), the creation of the powerful United Fruit 
Company took place1.
Indeed, the UFC's influence extended much more so when, as Wheeler, Curtis &
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Haight report, it secured a " controlling interest in the stock of the principal 
importers who had not already become associated with the United Fruit 
Company. Thus it purchased a controlling interest in the Bluefields Steamship 
Company, ... the Orr - Laubenheimer Company, ... the Camors - McConnell 
C om pany,... the Thacker Brothers Steamship Company and the Belize Royal Mail 
and Central American Company. In each case the stock held by the United Fruit 
Company was either one-half or one share more than one-half, with the exception 
of certain instances in which the whole, or a great majority, of the stock was 
purchased"2
Additionally, Wheeler et.al. report that " the Camors-Weinburger Banana 
Company became a part of the combination about the year 1899 by a purchase of 
the majority of the stock by the United Fruit Company"3. In short, the UFC, 
according to Kepner and Soothill, through its " monopolistic concessions, the 
domination of transportation facilities, the chartering on ships of lines other than 
its own of space that competitors might use for banana cargo, the control of the 
supply of fruit through banana purchase contracts so arranged that they expire 
at different times, and in other ways, the United Fruit Company drives actual or 
potential competitors to the wall"4.
One major dramatic factor in the UFC's ruthless and avid hunger for the control 
of the market was straightforward manipulation of prices. A way in which 
independent operators were disposed of is described by Wheeler et.al., in this 
w a y :" Jobbers in the vicinity [of Henry Bayer & Co.] were warned that the Fruit 
Dispatch Company, would not tolerate purchases from Bayer. Each time one of 
Bayer's ships arrived, the Fruit Dispatch Company would drop its prices far 
below the margin of profit, and thus compel the sale of the independent fruit at 
a loss, since owing to its perishable character, it was necessary to dispose of it 
w ithout delay. When Bayer and Co. had disposed of its cargo, the Fruit Dispatch 
Company's prices would at once go up to a very high figure, to be held there 
until the next independent cargo arrived"5.
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The result of this according to Wheeler, et.al., was " doing business at a loss for 
the combination as well as for the independent, the large resources of the United 
Fruit Company, and the large profits which it was able to make at places where 
there was no competition, enabled it to push competition with independents to 
an extreme, and to bring about a condition where it was merely a question of 
which side could stand the loss of money longest"6.
The UFC regulated supplies and prices by a technique which since its creation in 
1899 enabled it to have, as Wheeler, et.al., put i t , "... full control of the sales and 
prices of the fruit imported by all corporations named, which comprised 
altogether some 80% to 90% of the importations into the entire country"7.
The technique was to fix prices on its eastern as well as southern divisions which 
would govern sales in the United States market through reports which showed 
" the num ber of cars sold in the particular district from which the report comes 
by the Fruit Dispatch Company during the week, and a similar report as to the 
fruit sold by each independent operator. The reports state w hat jobbers buy of the 
independents , what measures of competition are being adopted to stop 
independent sales, and in general the advice of the various branch managers is 
asked w ith reference to that end"8.
But the technique was more draconian than it w ould seem to appear. Wheeler, 
et.al., explain th a t"... since the existence of the UFC, the Fruit Dispatch Company 
has deliberately destroyed fruit for the avowed purpose of maintaining the market 
price which it desired to establish. This has been done even when the fruit 
destroyed has been in good condition and saleable at a profit, although at a price 
less than that fixed by the Fruit Dispatch Company's pricing committee ... [and] 
... the am ount of fruit to be imported by subsidiary companies has been restricted 
... in order to avoid overstocking the market and preventing the competition 
which ensues from such a condition"9.
As Wheeler, etal. point out, these UFC pricing committees were able to " tell at
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a glance every car of bananas sold by any independent operator throughout the 
entire country and are given elaborate data on which prices for the ensuing week 
are fixed”10.
As a result of this, there were " many instances where jobbers were threatened 
w ith loss of their business if they continued to deal with independent importers, 
and accordingly ... [they] ... have been forced to lose their fruit for lack of a 
purchaser. There have been instances where fruit has been given away by the 
Fruit Dispatch Com pany, in order to prevent the independents from selling what 
they had imported”11.
Indeed Wyle has equally pointed out that ” in 1931, during the depression, for 
instance, it made no shipments of fruit from July to September, and the bananas 
were allowed to spoil in the fields. The quantity of fruit rejected for shipm ent 
because it does not meet specifications also varies from time to time”12.
Illegal (perhaps even criminal) practices such as price-fixing were followed by the 
UFC. Conklin argued that UFC price-fixing was a crime as " an exercise of joint 
economic power through agreement or collusion to raise prices, exclude 
competitors and restrict price competition”13.
Indeed, the UFC was the sole 'economic power' as a monopoly w ith no real need 
to collude: it quite simply raised prices, excluded competitors and very definitely 
restricted competition. Furthermore, Conklin argued this was an offence which is 
" particularly common in industries in which the bulk of output is in the hands 
of a few producers who can easily convene to fix prices, where the dem and for 
the product is price-inelastic, [and] where prices are unstable ...”14. The bulk of 
output was certainly in the UFC's hands and it certainly fixed prices.
However, it is difficult to conclusively prove the net existence of a dem and of 
bananas in the United States and the United Kingdom m arket as being 
price-inelastic. The UFC certainly knew how far to push up prices for their
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consumers. Considerable increases in prices would have inevitably resulted in 
reduction in demand.
The case for instability of prices is another situation and it certainly existed for the 
UFC's fruit. To say the least, grounds for investigating a case in criminality on the 
UFC's price-fixing techniques, existed. Indeed, as Conklin points out, " when 
greater profit can be made through the fixing of prices than through legitimate 
competition and when the risk of legal action is low, favourable conditions for this 
crime exist"15.
All the ingredients (great profits, price-fixing and low legal risks) were there for 
the UFC to qualify for criminality within its own country but it was never 
knowingly tested. It is difficult to imagine the UFC having any obstacles for such 
qualification in a country such as Colombia during the first three decades of this 
century. Recently bruised by the loss of Panama and a disastrous civil war 
(1899-1903), Colombia could only welcome the kind of capital investment the UFC 
could bring regardless (or unaware) of the fact that the net return to its own 
regional economies would be low.
A consequence of the emergence of the UFC was the elimination of competition 
that existed earlier between importers to the largest market for banana producers 
and the definite manipulation of prices. Wheeler et. al. reported how the price of 
bananas w ent u p " considerably since the formation of the United Fruit Company, 
and even in the cases where it sells fruit to jobbers direct, w ithout the intervention 
of the Fruit Dispatch Company, these sales are so safeguarded as to ensure the 
absence of competition with [it] ... In Baltimore, for example, each jobber who 
buys from the United Fruit Company is required to state to w hat point he expects 
to send his fruit and where it is to be sold, and sales which conflict with those of 
the Fruit Dispatch Company are not permitted"16.
Finally, more than regulating, the UFC -as a monopoly- showed a tendency to 
restrict supply. This is clearly pointed out by Kepner and Soothill when they state
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th a t" the fruit monopoly, after having driven off other potential purchasers, does 
not w ant the fruit. Sometimes the hold of a particular ship cannot accommodate 
all the bananas available. Moreover, it is impossible to regulate the supply of 
bananas so that it will accord with the demand of the market at each season of the 
year"17.
The w ay the UFC actually restricted supply came about in a number of ways, 
such as Kepner and Soothill describe :"  when the UFC desires to limit the supply 
of fruit it discards bananas which it has raised or purchased. Occasionally it cuts 
m ature bananas on its own plantations and leaves them to rot in their native 
habitat; again, after purchasing bananas from private planters it abandons them 
at trackside .... ; more frequently it rejects considerable quantities of fruit on 
arrival at the wharf; and at other times it heaves fruit overboard outside of 
northern ports, even though at the time the unemployed may be suffering for lack 
of nourishing food. While sometimes bananas which the company does not desire 
are thus purchased and later junked, more frequently the loss is sustained by the 
banana growers"18.
Therefore, the controlling factors within its consumer market and production 
centre provided the UFC with the necessary financial backbone it needed to afford 
the payment of high wages in the NAC region. As regards the important 
controlling factor of restricted supply mentioned above, a concluding remark may 
be added. This factor influenced the size of the range of the UFC's returned value 
during seasonal market slumps as well as hard times.
As the fruit supply was of such large numbers to be sold at existing prices the 
UFC could, as Kepner and Soothill have put i t , " allow the prices of bananas to 
fall to the advantage of the mass of consumers, or it could keep them up in true 
capitalistic fashion to the advantage of its stockholders by the restriction of the 
supply and the monopolistic dictation of prices"19. The fact that the UFC chose 
the latter option had significant impact in the shaping of its ability to pay high 
wages and overcome the labour shortage constraint.
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Cultivation of Banana in the Region
Banana cultivation was in operation in the Santa Marta district of the NAC region 
of Colombia quite some time before the UFC was able to impose its monopoly 
there. Adams mentioned th a t" bananas were cultivated in this section long before 
Mr. Keith entered the field"20. This seems to be the case. British Vice-Consul 
Dickson in 1903 indicated th a t" banana cultivation in the district of Santa Marta 
was begun in the year 1890, but it was not until the year 1892 that exportation 
commenced from this district"21. And Patino recently indicated that the 
beginnings of the banana industry were at the end of the 19th century"22.
British Minister Stronge confirmed this when some years later he informed that 
" the export trade from Santa Marta is of recent origin and may be said to date 
from 1892. Since then the methods of cultivation have been greatly improved"23. 
However, in 1910, British Consul-General Huckin clearly stated that " banana 
exportation began in 1891 24. Indeed, Wyle indicates th a t " the first shipment of 
bananas from Santa Marta was made on March 21,1891. In these early years of 
the industry the crop went largely to New Orleans"25.
In similar fashion, when in Colombia, Professor Kemmerer (head of the financial 
mission to Colombia bearing his name) was informed that " between 1890 and 
1892 the Santa Marta Railway reached the town of Rio Frio"26. It was " here [that] 
the banana industry began with small shipments to New Orleans by Sanders, 
Phillips, Hoadley & Company; the Tropical Trading Company; etc."27.
Several years earlier however, in 1887, British Vice-Consul Carr reported th a t " 
with the prospect of the railway shortly connecting this locality with the port of 
Santa Martha, considerable interest is being shown in the cultivation of bananas 
for exportation to the United States of America, where there is an ever-increasing 
dem and for the fruit"28. Carr also pointed out the important logistic advantage 
of Santa Marta as " the steamers employed in carrying the bananas will of course 
make this their last port of call"29.
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By 1895, banana exports proper took off. As British Vice-Consul Macgregor has 
reported, Santa M arta 's" exports consist almost entirely of bananas to ports in the 
United States ,,3(). By 1897, British Vice-Consul Carr reported that in the Santa 
Marta area of the NAC reg ion ," the cultivation of bananas for the United States 
markets, after eight years of varying success, is now in w hat may be called a 
prosperous condition, some 17,000 having been paid last year to the planters for 
their fruit"31.
A year later in 1898 British Vice-Consul Carr indicated that " the amount of 
bananas exported during 1898 was somewhat less than in 1897, but this was 
owing to the decrease in the tonnage owing to the Spanish-American War and not 
to diminution in production. The production is continually on the increase and the 
methods of cultivation are being improved, as the business is a remunerative one 
when properly managed"32. And by 1899, the Monthly Bulletin asserted that 
bananas were being " conveyed from Barranquilla in small US steamers to the 
markets of Mobile and New Orleans ... Fifteen firms in Barranquilla ... deal in 
bananas"33. So, at the turn of the century, small to medium scale banana 
production was probably the base of the sector.
As Wyle pointed o u t ," since 1900 the Magdalena Fruit Company [ subsidiary of 
the UFC] has owned and cultivated most of the banana lands in Santa Marta. In 
the early days, the company owned all the banana lands, but gradually private 
owners have developed plantations in the Santa Marta district"34. But the 
upsurge of the banana sector in the NAC region came with the presence of 
powerful investment by the UFC. According to information supplied to Professor 
Kem m erer," in 1901-02 the United Fruit Company succeeded the Tropical Trading 
and Transport Company which was engaged in the purchasing, and transporting 
of fruit to the New Orleans market. It also acquired the interests of the Colombian 
Land Company, consisting of 9811 acres of land ... and of which 1299 acres and 
112 shares were in bananas and pastures respectively"35. It was " here [that] the 
development of the banana industry commenced on a commercial scale"36.
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It was at this point th a t" the Company commenced to develop by planting in a 
small way on its own behalf, and to encourage private owners to plant"37. Of 
course, as we shall see later, the UFC's encouragement to individual growers to 
p lant on their already used lands, while it grew on new lands had crucial 
profit-making objectives. By 1903 banana cultivation in the Santa Marta district of 
the NAC region was well instituted. British Vice-Consul Dickson indicated that 
by that year, there were " about 4,000 acres irrigated and under banana 
cultivation, and the produce requires for its transport to the United States a 
steamer every week"38. The transport of the fruit was, according to Dickson " 
carried on by the Santa Marta Railway Company, a British concern"39. However, 
Dickson also pointed out difficulties in the cultivation of the banana because " 
irrigation costs are costly and generally outside the possibilities of the small 
planters"40.
Already in 1903 the cocoa sector of the region was being pushed aside by the 
banana sector. As British Vice-Consul Dickson pointed out, i t " had little attention 
owing to the higher and quicker profits to be made by the banana cultivation"41.
For the following year of 1904, British Vice-Consul Carr reported that due to the 
" long dry season, cultivation of bananas made irrigation absolutely necessary ... 
six rivers are utilised in this way, and by deep canals their waters are constructed 
to the surface of the land and then, by means of shallow distributing ditches, the 
lands are flooded as often as necessary. Some 10,000 acres of land are under 
irrigation in this way and the acreage is gradually being extended ... the 
cultivation of bananas is increasing steadily and once a week a steamer of the 
Hamburg-American Line is loaded with this product"42.
For the year 1905, British Vice-Consul Carr pointed out that " the cultivation of 
bananas is increasing steadily in the district of Riofrio, distant 30 miles from the 
port, and the output of 1906 promises to be considerably in excess of that of 
1905"43. For the same year US Consular Agent Granger reported t h a t " banana 
planting is being extended ... near Santa Martha. The fruit is excellent, and it is
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expected that this will become one of the important industries of the country".44.
By 1906 British Consul Gillies informed that due to " an increased dem and there 
has been an enormous development during the last few years in banana 
cultivation ... [and ]... the banana enjoys great advantages over other products of 
the country, especially over those of the interior, in that it is more easily cultivated 
and is not burdened with the large freight expenses which makes the export of 
coffee and other export articles produced in the interior so expensive ..."4S.
Gillies noted that "a good deal of land has recently being bought in the 
neighbourhood of Santa Marta for the cultivation of banana, and both native and 
foreign capital is being largely invested in the business... The United States is still 
the largest consumer, but there is now a good market in Europe, and it is 
increasing year by year. The bananas produced in the district are contracted for 
by the United Fruit Company of New York, and are shipped to the port weekly 
... From all accounts the cultivation of the banana is a most lucrative investment 
and the prospects for the future, in view of an ever increasing demand, are 
certainly bright"46.
Indeed, United States Consul Demers asserted in 1906 as well that in the Santa 
Marta district " all the fruit is purchased and exported by the American 
company"47. By 1907 British Minister Stronge reported that the banana export 
trade from Santa Marta " has greatly increased and the fruit commands as high 
price as any in the New York m a rk e t... [and] ... shows the rapid growth of the 
trade. It is expected that the export will reach 2,500,000 bunches at least in 1908, 
and as a large area suitable for cultivation has now been opened up, a further 
increase is expected"48.
In 1908 the cultivation of bananas increased consistently and as British 
Vice-Consul Carr pointed o u t" extensive plantations have been com m enced... [as 
well a s ] ... new irrigation canals ... constructed"49. Carr also estimated production 
of bananas in 1909 would be " at least 50 per cent in excess of the output of
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1908"50. Carr equally stated that " the cultivation of bananas is by far the most 
im portant and remunerative industry and the prosperity of this region is entirely 
dependent upon it"51. Indeed, Carr reported an increase in banana production of 
67,499 for 1909 52. He added that this represented " an increase of 40 per cent, 
and it is estimated that the output in 1910 will be 50 per cent in excess of that of 
last year"53.
However, in the same year of 1909 British Pro-Consul Stevenson reported 
competition had arisen for the Santa Marta area banana production. He indicated 
that the national governm ent" in December 1909, granted a 50-year concession to 
the Consorcio Albingia of Hamburg, with the authority to transfer the same to the 
H am burg Colombien Bananen Actien-Gesellschaft, for the establishment of 
plantations for the growth of bananas for export on an area of about 12,300 acres 
(5,000 hectares) of land on the eastern coast of the Gulf of Uraba"54. But, by 1912, 
United States Consul Manning was confident enough to inform th a t" it said that 
the United Fruit Company and other interests may yet increase the output from 
the Santa Marta plantations by 50 per cent ...',55.
It was in the 20's that the UFC seems to have consolidated its position. Twelve 
years after Manning's confident report, in 1924, the United States Department of 
Commerce was confirming that the banana industry was indeed " practically 
controlled by an American company with headquarters in Santa Marta ... [and] 
... the banana industry being very dependent upon rapid and suitable shipping 
facilities, m ust necessarily be developed by companies with a large amount of 
capital at their disposal"56.
By the year 1926 British cotton expert Pearse was in a position to indicate what 
has to be a major and crucial argument here. That the UFC " has virtually the 
world's banana monopoly. They are most anxiously concerned with the speedy 
handling from plantation to steamer, and under those conditions they can afford 
very high wages for this work"57.
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W hen in 1928 the Colombian Ministry for Industry suggested th a t " the United 
Fruit Company has the de facto monopoly in the banana market, monopoly 
established throughout many years for different factors"58, it was far too late to 
consider the need to curb such leakage creative characteristics of a far too 
efficient, influential and ruthless profit-maker. Previously, the aforementioned 
Ministry had already pointed out one important factor:" the power necessary to 
obligate planters -without telling them- to sign sale contracts of the fruit for long 
periods, generally 5 years"59.
But the real cause of the UFC's monopoly as explained by the said Ministry was 
" the solvency of the industry achieved by the UFC, a company which extended 
its economic net with the approval of those who benefited from it and that, 
having channelled its activities in this way, moved from the straightforward 
industrial precise banana investment loan to procure the general insolvency of 
many non-industrial citizens; and from the well calculated loan for industrial and 
effective needs to the knowingly uncontrollable loan"60.
In his analysis of the banana industry, Kepner poignantly stated th a t" entrenched 
behind monopolistic concessions, holding in the same hand control of 
transportation facilities and banana production, being able to a large extent to 
dictate terms to planters and laborers, having greater income, influence and power 
than many governments, the United Fruit Company is able to amass larger profits 
than it could were it operating under either genuine competition or governmental 
regulation"61.
Rippy also suggested that the UFC " because of its shipping facilities ... has made 
possible a large native banana industry which probably would not otherwise have 
developed, although it is able to purchase the bananas of the native producers at 
virtually its own monopoly price"62. And Kepner & Soothill argue that " at the 
time of its organisation, however, it dictated prices and controlled about 80 per 
cent of the banana imports"63.
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But, before the consolidation of the UFC, Kepner indicated t h a t " no limitation 
was p u t upon the quantity of fruit which each importer could handle, and the 
quantity of fruit thus placed upon the market and natural competition determined 
prices in the United States ',64. Therefore, according to Randall, in the NAC 
region, quite plainly the UFC " enjoyed a marketing monopoly ... on bananas"65. 
As Wyle equally pointed o u t," since the entire marketing mechanism is controlled 
by a single organisation, the supply to consuming markets could be limited 
readily, and the course of banana exports, therefore, did not follow that of other 
agricultural and raw-material products"66.
The real nature of the UFC was its establishment as an agricultural trust in the 
most im portant market, that of the United States. As the German Imperial 
Consulate indicated, the U FC " occupies in more than one way a peculiar position 
among American trusts. While almost all others are active in one field of industry 
and seek to monopolise the manufacture of article, the United Fruit Company is 
an agricultural trust. It is engaged mainly in the production and marketing of a 
natural p ro d u c t, and one too, that belongs to the Tropics -the banana"67.
Randall has also stated that the UFC first entered Colombia by " the acquisition 
of the British - owned Colombia Land Company by Minor C. Keith ... [ who ] ... 
gained control of the Santa Marta Railway, another British enterprise, which had 
been used for sugar transit in the Santa Marta area since the 1880s ... [ and ] ... 
acquired a monopoly on railroad transportation in the Department of Magdalena. 
The Santa Marta Railroad ... [ was ]... almost exclusively for shipping bananas to 
Santa Marta for export"68. The special incentive for the banana industry as 
Kepner points out, was indeed the " desire to monopolise the production, 
transportation and selling of bananas"69.
The Nature of the Region's Labour Force
Part of the NAC region labour force which included subsistence farmers and 
peones was already part of the monetary economy. This was so because they had
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historically evolved within the hacienda system which at least had 
'semi-proletarized' its labour70. A dditionally," at least eleven enclaves from 1850 
to 1929 (without including petroleum)71 in the region did so as well during the 
m id 19th century 72.
The hacienda (which means a "very large land estate")73 system was at the crux 
of whatever cultivation could be accomplished. In the NAC region it was the 
economic mechanism which allowed landlords the appropriation of agrarian 
surplus produced by indigenous communities.
It operated as a 'production unit and effective dominion over the new society'74. 
The basic structure of the hacienda as of the 17th century consisted usually of an 
absentee landlord, a mayordomo (administrator) and his subordinates75.
These consisted of (i) terrajeros, who were given a plot of land to clear and plant 
maize and other staples; and (ii) jornaleros (wage-labourers) who were 'free 
vagabonds' that frequently employed themselves in the cattle business76 who 
were 'positively discriminated' if they were Spanish-stock whites. Indigenous 
ones, who were concertados, received eight-hour day wages plus 'perks' such as 
food, clothing, shoes and housing but within their own reducciones (limited spaces 
not within the hacienda premises)77.
Alongside the hacienda there did exist groups of poor Spanish-stock pobladores. 
Their economic contribution and social function as founders of villages, as colonos 
and as direct creators of wealth, led them to organise minifundio (small shared 
tracts of land) societies (as opposed to latifundios, the private monopoly of land) 
which no doubt offered solidarity, respected collective rights, and motivated 
self-help as well as support amongst families78.
The system generated a cotton cultivation process left first to peones (rural 
labourers) and later to minifundistas (small landowners). Fals-Borda recorded that 
in the 18th cen tury ," cotton was being tried out since the colonial period (there
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were experimental cultivations at the hadenda de Portaca, in front of Mompox, 
in 1784). Its packaging and commerdalisation had been sources of enrichment for 
don Pedro Martinez de Pinillos, the main merchant in the region. It was exported 
by foreigners from Barranquilla to New Orleans for some years as well as from 
Cartagena to the same port by Juan Trucco Lanfranco, which was harvested in his 
farm in Ballestas. Cotton, therefore maintained itself on a small scale during the 
19th century more as a product from the hadenda”79.
The negative consequences induded the necessary control of vast areas of land. 
This deprived labourers of economic alternatives, except subsistence plots within 
the hacienda. The result was to bind labour by means other than money wages 
and to restrict labour's consumption of profits arising from the sale of the 
product.
These peones were part of the consequence of the hacienda system's effect of 
breaking up  of the NAC region's sodal formation. Some were 'colonos 
independientes' (independent colonists) forming groups of 'colonos ntarginales' 
(marginal colonists) characterised by self-suffidency, produce barter and local 
distribution of surplus creation.
Size of the Region's Banana Labour Force
Numbers for the size of the NAC region labour force -in general terms- were not 
conspicuously available in the primary or secondary evidence researched, but 
some figures did emerge. There was however a particular facet of urban and rural 
supply of labour.
Although historically the larger percentage of all regions' labour force was
engaged in primary sector economic activities (57.2 % in 1870,70.1 % in 1925 and
62 % in 1945) 80, the average annual growth rate of twelve major d ties were
significant: 3.8 % for the intercensal period 1905 - 1918 and 3.7 % for 1918 - 1938 
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Regional capitals (such as Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta in the NAC 
region) therefore drew  considerable rural-urban migrants from their region's 
departments. The problem of scarcity of labour was essentially a rural one and 
also a seasonal factor. It is apparent that labour in urban areas such as 
Barranquilla and Santa Marta was reasonably well supplied. United States Consul 
Demers confirmed this in 1906:" plentiful and efficient labour [in the Barranquilla 
industry] seemingly superior to the Jamaican labour is to be obtained"82.
But it was in the beginning of the 20's that the NAC regions' urban industrial 
areas seem to have begun to strip the rural areas of labour. As United States 
Trade Commissioner Bell suggested ," labor is plentiful in Barranquilla, but not 
in the cotton district in the interior of [Department of] Atlantico"83.
Bell understood this crucial phenomenon and perhaps was one of the first to 
envisage the nature of rural-urban migration as the crucial factor for some very 
im portant potential linkage-endowed agricultural sectors.
Therefore, by this time, within a labour shortage economy, urbanisation (not rural 
export sectors) absorbed some important fractions of the region's tight labour 
supply in straightforward competition with the high wage banana sector. As Bell 
pu t it, this was " coming from the outlying districts to the Coast cities being 
attracted by the factory em ploym ent, the better conditions and the better wages 
procured in dock and freight work"84.
There is some evidence of the size of the labour force throughout the first three 
decades of this century. Within the cotton textile industry for example, the 
Aycardi and Company cotton mill in Barranquilla employed " forty girls are 
employed"85.
Although unable to name which one it was, a textile factory in Barranquilla " 
employed 427 people"86, whilst another one " permanently employed 60 women 
and 8 men"87. The former was undoubtedly the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon in
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Barranquilla with a total number of 450 labourers working ten hours daily88. Still 
another textile factory in Cartagena " employed 200 persons"89. There were also 
74 workers at the de la Espriella factory working eight hours per day90. This was 
the same " J.M. de la Espriella cotton and woolen undershirt factory with 100 
employees"91.
Other industries also provided an insight to the general size of the NAC labour 
force. At Cartagena/' there were 48 industrial establishments ... a tannic extract 
plant, under the same ownership with 200 em ployees... [the] M. Emiliani cigarette 
factory with 24 employees ... [the] Colombian Match factory with 60 employees 
... [and] ... [the] Benedetti Hmnos. Bakery with 15 employees92.
De la Espriella Hnos., a shoe factory in Barranquilla, engaged " thirty-five 
employees"93 , while the Colombia Match factory " had sixty employees"94 . 
Harinera Rueta, a flour factory, also engaged " from thirty to thirty-five 
labourers"95, while Fabrica Jabon Pino , a soap factory, " permanently held ten 
labourers for the product processing"96.
But it was within the agricultural sector that figures on the size of the NAC 
labour force was most considerable. Such was its impact that it apparently all but 
stam ped out unemployment at the time. Indeed, according to British Vice-Consul 
Maidment, in 1923, " the industrial conditions in the northern part of the 
departm ent [of Magdalena, in the NAC region] are good. There is practically no 
unemployment"97. Whatever employment was created in the countryside 
emerged from capital-intensive ventures with more advanced technology and 
m anagement methods such as the sugar and especially the banana industries.
The sugar industry had a short life but employed a considerable size of NAC 
labour force. At the Sincerin sugar factory" there (were) 1,300 men engaged in the 
work of installation of the sugar plant and extending the cane plantation "98 and 
eventually the Colombian Sugar Corporation engaged " 5,000 employees"99.
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It is slightly more difficult to establish the exact size of the NAC region labour 
force in the banana sector. Nevertheless, an idea about the labour force figure 
engaged by the UFC can be had if we observe the following secondary source 
data.
Uribe-Uribe, for example, had the opinion that " approximately some fifteen 
thousand labourers worked at the end of 1906 ,,10°. And in 1912, the Colombian 
M inistry of Foreign Relations informed that the " number of labourers in the 
banana region can be calculated at 5,000 "101. Adams indicated as well in 1914 
that in the UFC " most of the 2,500 workers in the banana fields and along the 
irrigation ditches are native Colombians "102. Finally, British cotton expert 
Pearse for example, spoke of " 8,000 labourers employed on the plantation "103.
In 1926 the size of the banana labour force was at least 10,036 rural agricultural 
labourers (excluding the aforementioned 'ganaderia' labourers) in 51 units of the 
four banana sector 'districts' of RioFrio, Sevilla, Tucurrinca and Aracataca.
He further indicated that the UFC had altogether " 70,000 workpeople on their 
payroll "104. Monsalve, in 1927, also commented that the UFC gave work to " 
six thousand labourers, of which 98.55 per 100 are Colombians "10S. For the same 
year however, Rippy indicated that the UFC's " banana plantation in the Santa 
Marta district provide labor for about 18,000 men, of whom  the majority are 
Colombians"106. By 1930 Jones noted that the UFC's " holdings, divided into 
forty farms in several districts, require some 10,000 laborers ... 160 foreigners and 
5,000 head of cattle for draft, beef and milk "107.
With these figures in mind, one can assume therefore that, for the period, a 
considerable amount of the total size of NAC region labour force was drawn by 
the banana sector's UFC. Randall even emphasized that the UFC was " Colombia's 
largest single agricultural employer in 1928 "108.
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Actual Organization of the Banana Labour Force
Although there is not much research as yet which would provide the evidence for 
monopoly capital's ability to divide the NAC region's labour force, there are 
sufficient grounds for arguing that it did weaken and rule the labour force 
through the UFC's practice of outwork, for example, within its segmentation 
process.
Outwork in fact, stands in a similar relationship to direct employment as the 
secondary sector to the primary industrial sector. It provides, as Rubery and 
Wilkinson say, " the capitalist system with a means of increasing flexibility, 
shifting risk and minimising costs"109. Furthermore, outwork suits the 
perspective that " segmentation is both the medium for and the result of the 
struggle for control over the labour process between capital and labour"110.
That the UFC engaged in labour subcontracting in the NAC region is not in 
question. But, there is some qualitative evidence to that effect in one of the 
following chapters. And quantitative evidence is certainly lying about in the NAC 
region waiting to be unearthed. But, labour subcontracting in the region was 
generally associated with the idea of evading official legislation which granted 
labourers a number of fringe benefits. It was therefore more convenient for the 
UFC to declare that officially it had no employees.
Outwork enhances the understanding of segmentation further, that is, with regard 
to the supply of labour. The case of the NAC region is particular. Whereas Rubery 
and Wilkinson argue that outwork provides a " means of mobilising a latent 
reserve supply of labour and utilising a supply of labour at low-wage cost"111, 
the UFC utilized a scarce supply of labour at a high-wage cost because it was in 
a position to afford these high costs.
The increase of wages was not just what the NAC banana labour force organized 
for. It also organized to combat contractual conditions. As Kepner pointed out,
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when the UFC required particular sorts of labour, it gave " contracts not to 
individual workers but to foremen who make their own terms with their men. 
The bulk of farm maintenance and harvesting is performed by workers holding 
individual contracts to do certain specified tasks”112.
So, to the organized labour force, in addition to an increase in wages, appropriate 
handling and application of the legal mechanisms of fringe benefits and hiring 
m ethods were also important. As th e " workers' situation was ambiguous because 
the United [UFC], in order to fraudulently bypass labour laws, would not hire 
personnel directly, but use contractors. In this way, when wage and fringe benefit 
claims arose, the company would declare itself to be detached from the problem 
and the middlemen would not pay either for lack of capital ”113.
Randall's indication that the U FC,"  because of its contract labor system... refused 
to comply with social insurance legislation ”114 further expands the argument. 
The system of labour indeed played a significant role in assigning wages in the 
region. Indeed, the UFC as (i) a monopoly more than able to afford the payment 
of high wages and (ii) a monopsony creating important employment in the region, 
was not thoroughly completing the economic linkage cycle -by means of its wage 
bill- precisely because of its reluctance to comply with the full responsibility of 
making its wage-labour full company employees.
For example, United States Trade Commissioner Bell indicated in 1919 that " 
nearly all labor is performed by a system of piecework; as, for example, so many 
bunches of bananas handled or a certain area of land cleared constitues a day's 
w ork”115. Pearse as well, in 1926, noted that ” all wages are regulated on the 
piecework rate”116. And Wyle also confirmed that by end of the decade, " the 
cutting and loading forces usually work on a piece basis”117. This system 
eventually produced dire consequences which certainly became problematic for 
sections of the labour force in the longrun.
As Rippy explained," the laborer is paid for each bunch of bananas or according
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to the am ount of land cleared. This means that workers migrate from one banana 
plantation to another and are under the control of foremen-contractors. It also 
means that native planters and the United Fruit Company escape direct 
responsibility for the provisions of the Colombian law regarding medical 
attention, sanitary dwellings for labor, and collective and accident insurance ,l118.
Herrera-Soto and Romero-Castaneda indicate similar views, suggesting the system 
implied the contracting o f " personnel based on the custom of arrangement with 
each gang leader. There was no permanent work for the same grower ... the 
verbal agreement to work undergone with a sub-contractor would subject 
collective personality to the will of the mentioned middleman. Eventually, 
labourers joined work through verbal contracts with which there was no proof of 
their right to protection by ruling social laws ... [middlemen] anonymously joined 
producers and the [United Fruit] company and through the system of weekly 
rotation from cultivation to cultivation in order that ruling social legislation [such 
as] Law 57 of 1915 which dealt with work accidents, Laws 37 of 1921 and 32 of 
1922 which dealt with obligatory collective insurance and Laws 78 of 1919 and 21 
of 1920 which dealt with strikes, would not cover them "119.
This system of contracting invited Lopez's criticism th a t " w hat is important to 
signal out is that process of involuntary and unconscious degradation by which 
... labourers through their fixed wage, independent of any result, gang wage and 
gang m anagem ent... "12°.
Indeed, Fonnegra draws attention to what labourer Federico LLanos (who worked 
in the banana industry at the time) sta ted :" none of the workers appeared on the 
payroll, only a hundred or two hundred contractors. This the reason why the 
company appeared to be with such few personnel"121. This view is confirmed by 
Herrera-Soto and Romero-Castaneda who indicate that the UFC " always raised 
the argum ent of lacking payroll workers"122.
Montana-Cuellar has gone further noting that " in 1928, the United Fruit Co.
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obligated workers to sign contracts in which they declared they were not 
company employees in order to evade payment of on-the-job accidents, Sunday 
holiday and collective insurance that was then beginning to rule"123. 
Furthermore, presenting the 1928 labour leader Alberto Castrillon's accounts of 
labour conditions under the UFC, Rippy has written that the UFC required " 
piece-work laborers to sign a statement which declares that they are not the 
employees of the company, thus escaping responsibility for accidents and 
collective insurance ... the company reduces wages in order to compensate itself 
for hospital service"124.
An illustration of this is Fonnegra's quote of UFC worker and political militant 
Guillermo Hernandez : " ... of this wage the company discounted a high 
percentage for the sustainment of hospitals, which provided no service ... "12S.
All these views help consolidate the claim therefore, that the banana sector's 
system of labour and particularly, the control middlemen contractors had over it, 
explain w hy "... the first point of the statement of petitions in 1928 was that the 
company admitted that it had [emphasis added] labourers. The other two 
im portant petitions were increase of wages and formalization, not of individual 
contracts, but of an industry labour contractual agreement, which implied 
recognition of the trade union "126.
The UFC's system of contracting was a reason why there is difficulty and 
complexity in the allocation of a figure for its wage bill. Even if the UFC was 
prepared to disclose its ledger book accounts, there would probably not be 
complete certainty of the exact volume of the labour force employed. While the 
UFC could in fact present a reasonably high wage bill by Colombian wage 
standards. This had no particular structural impact in the NAC region's economic 
development either.
One reason for this was that labour contractual conditions were meaningless. 
Labourers organized and were contracted through individual intermediary labour
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contractors and therefore were not official employees of the company. In this way, 
they drew  no benefits which Colombian Law specified, such as fringe and medical 
benefits . In addition to this, an important percentage of these 'high wages' (as 
was suggested earlier in this chapter) kept wage labourers at a degree of the 
company's mercy because of the reabsorption of some of the wages as debt to the 
company's own merchandise stores.
Indeed, the UFC as (i) a monopoly more than able to afford the payment of high 
wages and (ii) a monopsonist creating important employment in the region, was 
not thoroughly completing the linkage cycle through its wage bill precisely 
because of its reluctance to comply w ith full responsibility of making its 
wage-labour full company employees.
The establishment of a reasonable figure for the UFC's wage bill is difficult to 
assess. This is so because of the imprecise number of employees and their 
accompanying wages throughout the period under study. Additionally, wages 
were so segmented that it would prove yet more difficult to be precise. But, most 
im portant of all, despite the high level of wages to be paid to the labour force it 
did not particularly all accrue to it in the end. Relatively significant portions of 
these high wages undoubtedly most have gone to the labour contractors.
Banana Labour Force's Strike Action for Higher Wages and Better Contractual
Conditions
In the view of some members of the labour force, despite the precedent of banana 
sector high wages, there were instances when these did not seem to be so. This 
resulted in a series of strikes, the first of which took place between 1918 and 1920. 
White points out that they occurred "... in a wave of activity sustained after the 
end of the w ar by a trade revival accompanied by a high rate of inflation ... "127. 
It seems that especially in the NAC region, events were deemed much more 
serious. United States Trade Commissioner Bell felt compelled to write th a t" on 
the Atlantic Coast the misery and discontent among the working classes are said
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to be very great "128.
British Vice-Consul Garnett-Lomax noted that " though the labourers of the 
banana region are probably better paid and cared for than any workers in 
Colombia, they were recently involved in a disastrous strike, which assumed the 
proportions of a local uprising and led to serious rioting, a declaration of martial 
law  and the death of about 200 strikers. This unfortunate affair [is] the worst 
labour outbreak ever known in Colombia Ml29.
The 1918 strikers' movement claimed victory. White suggests it w itnessed"... the 
success of the action in forcing up wages by 20 - 30 %Ml3°. By 1920, it became 
clear that ruling level of wages could probably not continue to be borne. The 
British Foreign Office, for example, noted that there w ere" demands of employees 
asking for further increases in salaries and wages "131.
White considers th a t" during the '20s, price inflation and the related pressure on 
wages began to cut away at the planter's profit margin, though in the early years 
this tendency may have been compensated for by increased dem and from the 
exporting company "132. The situation eased somewhat by 1922. There was a 
breakthrough in the wage bargaining process. British Lieut.-Colonel Rhys-Jenkins 
reported that " wages have considerably increased within the last three years ... 
[and] very few disputes occur and Trade Unions m ay be said to be non-existent 
in this country "133.
Nevertheless, it was in the NAC region that organized action first took place. 
Although the first strikes in Colombia " were not carried out by permanent 
worker organizations ... [and] ... were spontaneous and short-lived ”134, 
significantly," the first strikes in Colombia were among port and transportation 
workers. In 1918, industrial establishments were still small, and the textile mills, 
which employed the largest number of industrial workers, had a predominantly 
female labor force"135.
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Although this may suggest that neither female nor child labour was fertile 
ground for labour organization (which was by and large the labouring dass of 
the interior in most industries), the first labour strike in the interior was led and 
w on by women136. It was nevertheless, the NAC region which led -generally 
speaking- organized labour action. According to Urrutia-M ontoya,"... in the ports 
and river transport, work conditions were less attractive, pay was not high, and 
probably most significantly, the workers had access to the sodalist and anarchist 
ideas that arrived with the foreign crews"137.
The NAC region was in fact the birthplace -in 1921- of the Colombian Socialist 
W orkers138. The latter emphasized that " ... Coastal workers in Colombia have 
always been more receptive to change than the highland [interior] inhabitants, as 
is easily seen from the rapidity with which they adapt foreign vocabulary and 
customs139. This may help to explain why it was in the NAC region that " one 
of the first recorded large-scale strikes in Colombian history was limited to the 
ports of Cartagena, Barranquilla and Santa Marta "14°.
Urrutia-Montoya described how the NAC region developed,
" what seems to be the first large-scale worker protest in Colombian history ... On January 3,1918, 
reports of a strike among water-transport workers in the port of Barranquilla reached Bogota. It was 
reported that the strikers intimidated the workers who did not join the walkout, removed railroad 
rails, and did not allow water to be taken to the port of Puerto Colombia. The envoys of the workers 
and the employers reached an agreement, but the workers did not recognize it. After that, a civic 
guard of 'youths of all social classes' was formed to keep order in the dty, and at one point the army 
had to fire over the heads of the strikers to disperse them. But despite these incidents, when a 
settlement was reached, employers raised daily wages by 50 per cent. The wage gain in Barranquilla was 
a tremendous incentive for port workers elsewhere. On January 8, teamsters and port workers in the 
port of Cartagena went on strike. The movement was organized by the Sodedad de Artesanos y 
Obreros, which was not officially recognized and probably was not a permanent organization. A 
tentative agreement was reached by the employers, but the Sodedad, not satisfied, changed the 
conditions, claimed that employers threatened not to abide by the agreement, and organized a mass 
demonstration which soon deteriorated into a riot. More than a thousand workers overflowed into the 
streets, stores were sacked, and the police were forced to fire on the workers, killing at least two 
persons ... The strike wave spread to Santa Marta, the third Caribbean port. There, the port workers 
walked out in January 11 in sympathy with the employees of the Santa Marta Railway Company 
[property of the UFC]. Almost immediately the strike degenerated into a rio t... As in Barranquilla, the 
workers were successful. They obtained a 25 per cent daily wage increase after four days of strike. By 
January 24, order had been restored along the whole Atlantic Coast but the repercussions of this strike 
wave were to last for some time ... The nation was jolted by the appearance of a violent dass conflict, 
and workers became acquainted with the possibility of obtaining benefits through strike action... Two 
weeks later after that, the banana workers were demanding better conditions from the United Fruit
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Company, but a decade went by before they went on strike in order to force the company to consider 
the same demands ”141.
In 1928 strikes took place again. One reason no doubt, was w hat the United States 
National Conference Board informed. It noted that th e " importation of funds from 
abroad became reflected in higher prices and higher cost of living and created a 
feeling of social unrest in the country"142. The British Foreign Office added that 
at the Barranquilla Railway and Pier C om pany," tallymen in Barranquilla struck 
... asking for wages, 120 dollars monthly"143. But it was the banana export sector 
general strike in the same year that was, as White pointed out, the " culmination 
of the conflicts of the 1920s"144.
According to W hite ," demands from the agricultural labour force -some 25,000 
in 1928- were therefore a particular threat; and when the planation workers began 
to organise in the late '20s, after several years in which wages had stagnated at 
around $ 1, battle was joined "14S.
Abundant literature exists on the aftermath of the 1928 banana sector strike in the 
banana zone city of Cienaga (NAC region), for us to indulge on the subject. W hat 
is important for us to point out here is that a massacre of between 1.4 and 3 
thousand people on that night of the 5th-6th December kept wages up. White 
suggests this was in fact one of the consequences of the 1928 massacre: " for a 
month or so after the massacre, few workers would go back to the plantations, 
and UFCO [UFC] was offering wages above those agreed in the new contract in 
order to draw  in new labour"146. These events seem to suggest the consolidation 
of high wages in the NAC region.
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CHAPTER IV 
NAC REGION'S WAGE LEVELS
The NAC region's high wage economy was parallel to relatively strong 
inflationary effects that emerged at some points during the period. Here, we 
provide an overview of what real wages were in general for the NAC region. In 
a thesis of this nature, where unearthing the empirical basis is an extraordinary 
difficult endeavour, very severe data problems such as discontinuities emerge, as 
we noted earlier in the introduction.
The treatment of prices is in itself no easy task. The only consistent, reasonably 
reliable list of series of food prices available for years 1900 to 1922 is the one 
amazingly unearthed by Pardo-Parra1 from the archives of the Benefidenda de 
Cundinamarca, a long established and respected Colombian charity in Bogota. By 
his own admission, the only doubtful figures are those for 1912 ,1913 and 1914, 
which were taken from military rations. These figures could be filled with the use 
of a cubic function of the three previous and posterior years to that particularly 
smal period of time. But it is really a matter for further research.
Pardo-Parra's food price series are listed in Appendix 23. The price indexes he 
composed from it are listed in Appendix 24. Price indexes in the latter appendix 
are consistent with the former in the following way. He uses the Colombian 
Departamento Administrativo N adonal de Estadistica (DANE) base that is 1923 
= 100 with a food price basket from the Beneficencia of $ 526.74 for that year. In 
this way, for example, the price index for 1922 is [568.15 X I /  526.74] x 100 = 108, 
and so on, for the rest of the years in Appendix 24.
There may appear difficulties in handling the price data in the first decade. And 
at first sight, Pardo-Parra's food prices for years 1900 to 1908 would inevitably 
reveal implausible price indexes. But, it seems plausible to consider, that given the 
effects of the War of a Thousand Days' at the turn of the century —which was the 
result of very high inflation— these food price figures really should not come as
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m uch of a surprise.
Currency depreciated so tremendously that, according to Beaupre2 in 1900, 
foreign exchange ranged from 360 to 1200 per cent. More recently, Bejarano3 has 
noted that in efforts to finance the war, government emissions of over one billion 
pesos took foreign exchange from 412 -at the beginning of the war- to 18,900 per 
cent in October 1902.
Furthermore, if Law 33 of 1903 originally established the gold peso as monetary 
unit, Law 59 of 1905 confirmed it and fixed foreign exchange of paper currency 
at 10,000 per cent. Law 69 of 1909 re-confirmed exchange of notes at the official 
rate of one hundred Colombian paper pesos [CPP$ lOO.oo] for each Colombian 
gold peso [CGP$ 1.00] (see Appendix 25). As Pardo-Parra's price indexes for these 
few years are incorrect, we have adjusted them (see Appendix 24) on this basis.
Even if Pardo-Parra's food price figures for 1900 - 1908 were left unadjusted, we 
do not utilise them in like-to-like comparisons between real NAC region and 
interior wages for those years because the data are unavailable. So we suggest that 
any implausibility in the price indexes for these years w ould probably not affect 
our general line of argumentation.
As the sources we consulted expressed wage costs in nominal terms, wages are 
therefore deflated in the following manner. First, in the absence of a consistent 
food price series for the NAC region we use one price index (Pardo-Parra's with 
our adjustments for the early years) for all regions prior to 1923. Our inferences 
are taken sceptically and cautiously but as there is little else to draw  from, we 
have no recourse but to chose this option. Wages -and for that m atter price 
indexes- for the NAC region have never been studied historically before.
Detailed and laborious analysis would show nominal regional differences would 
persist in the real data during this particular set of years. Some would suggest it 
is obvious that this would hardly be otherwise, since the same price index would
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be used. We suggest therefore, that it is noted that if nominal regional differences 
are expressed in hard currencies (such as the US dollar and the pound sterling) 
rather than in Colombian paper currency, some reassurance can be provided that 
their value could be devoid of inflationary effects.
Second, from 1923 to 1930 wages are deflated by prices using averages of DANE 
urban food price indexes for either the nation, the interior or the NAC region, 
which are established and bona fide conversion factors. However, where the 
origin of wages is made patently clear in the evidence, we deflate accordingly 
with the particular cities DANE food price index.
As the evidence we unearthed (presented further on in Chapters V and VI) is 
expressed in at least three different currencies, we have converted all into 
Colombian Gold Pesos (CGP$'s), in our text only. This is the currency in which 
all the analysis in this chapter is carried out. Currencies in quoted text are left in 
their original denomination, save some exceptions where we have bracketed 
converted CGP$s inside the quote next to the original currency. The exchange 
rates used here are listed in Appendix 25.
Some m ay suggest that non-monetary components of income for waged labour 
were possibly higher in the interior coffee than in NAC region banana industry. 
But, the interior coffee wage levels and the added food ration price equivalent 
which we use in our comparisons are data taken from Palacios4, whose research 
and data are widely respected as well.
As with Pardo-Parra's data, our inferences are made sceptically and cautiously as 
there is little else to draw  from. The equivalent price of a typical food ration 
which Palacio's evidence indicates (and which we have added to his daily coffee 
wages) emerged from his research in Hacienda Jonas.
For years 1900 to 1917/18, this food ration price amounted -on average- to (i) 40 
% for agregados (who were workers allowed to cultivate a patch of land in the
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hacienda as part of their wage) and to (ii) 68 % for chapoleros (coffee harvesters)5. 
For years 1919 - 1930 " those under a 9 - tarro quota (70 kgrs. approximately) 
received a full ration of food, i.e., three meals a day"6.
No evidence of this non-monetary component of income for the NAC region 
emerged in our research. As it stands (without the inclusion of non-monetary 
elements for NAC region wage levels) however, and with the help of Palacio's 
data, our analysis allows us to state that in general, NAC region banana and 
coffee wage levels —with the exclusion of the non-monetary element— were 
actually higher than interior coffee wage levels which do include it.
The claim in this thesis is not meant to appear at times to be that banana wages 
are high and rise over the period and at other times that they are higher than 
other sectors. The evidence unearthed reveals several im portant considerations. 
These are that in general, NAC region agricultural banana real wages were (i) 
high; (ii) higher than other agricultural and urban sector real wages within the 
region; and (iii) higher than interior agricultural and urban sector real wages.
The evidence equally reveals that, although NAC region agricultural banana real 
wages were high in general terms throughout the period, they also experienced 
reasonable volatility, probably because of seasonality and labour shortage. This 
is why it m ight look as if real wages do not actually rise at all over the crucial 
period of 1906-1930.
However it was not violent volatility. The swings of banana real wages show they 
were between a range of $0.78 and $2.35. This is in itself an exceptional high real 
wage range for Colombia at the time. The average level of real wages for banana 
during the period is $1.27 -at least $0.28 over the interior coffee real wage average 
for the same period ( or 22% higher). And the several peaks and lows experienced 
within the period were well within the upper echelons of regional, and indeed 
national levels of real wages. That is, within a generally prevailing high level of 
wages.
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This prevailing level probably stood at the following unweighted averages for 
NAC agricultural real wages: (i) general agriculture 1904 - 1921 : $0.73; (ii) 
cotton cultivation 1905 - 1924 : $0.71; (iii) coffee 1911 - 1930 : $1.05; (iv) banana 
1906 - 1922 : $1.04; (v) banana 1923 - 1930 : $1.45; (vi) banana 1906 - 1930 : $1.23.
The evidence also reveals that there were some exceptional cases, which were by 
no means a trend. Namely (i) the absurdly high interior coffee wages at the turn 
of the century due to the war; (ii) that NAC region coffee real wages in 1914 and 
1916 were higher than banana real wages -probably due to increased shortage of 
labour in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta; and (iii) the interior male textile 
labour high real wages at the end of the third decade.
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Some Views on Real Wages 
This discussion begins with some 19th century views on the m atter and thereafter 
analyze w hat the collected data on wages, expressed in real terms, has to offer.
Some food prices at the end of the 19th century provide an idea of what 
pecuniary amounts people in the nation as a whole had to spend on food. 
Provisions in the early 1870's, for example, were reported by Bunch to be sold at 
certain levels of prices. Table 3 below shows them. If this was the case, 
purchasing power probably could have not gone far. Nevertheless, Bunch 
believed -at the time- th a t" as regards these articles, [they] are nearly as equal 
here [Colombia] as in England"7. It appears then that -at that particular time- 
Colombians in all regions were subject to similar food consumption pricing as 
Britons were.
Colombia's 'general' unskilled labour was probably spending a considerable 
am ount of its wages on food. Certainly, if in 1886 unskilled labourers in the 
country were earning a daily nominal wage of $ 0.22 in addition to their food, 
unskilled town labourers earning a daily nominal wage of $ 0.75 would probably 
have spent a considerable amount of the differential of $ 0.52 (relative to the 
unskilled country labourer's wage) on food. The likelihood of lack of industry and 
therefore little or no consumption of domestic linkage-creating products was 
apparent not just in the interior but in the NAC region as well.
TABLE 3. COLOMBIAN PROVISION PRICES: 1870s 
(CGP$s)
Article Price
Meat per lb. 0.09
Bread 0.05
Butter 033
Rice 0.07
Potatoes 0.02
Salt 0.01
Chicha/botde* 0.05
Native beer 0.12
Sugar/lb. 0.22
Source: Bunch, Robert, Letter to Earl Granville, " Industrial Classes (Foreign Countries) 
", Parliamentary command not converted is Papers. Accounts and Papers. Volume 
LXVin (London, 1871), p. 136; Note: (i) Exchange rates from Appendix 10; (ii) * = 
Chicha was a fermented com drink of the country.
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In 1888, Wheeler argued th a t" it was dear that, practically, not the same price but 
twice as much, has to be paid now for these artides of consumption as in former 
years"8. Whilst real wages in Colombia were not particularly high in general at 
the time working Colombians were thought by some to be better off than working 
English people. (If they were indeed high, it was strictly for reasons of dvil 
warfare).
Wheeler noted to that effect that, " on the whole, they (farm labourers) are 
probably better off than people of the same class in England, espedally as the 
standard of respectability and comfort, and lodgings, is much lower"9.
He also noted the presence of a serious dedine in the purchasing power of money 
when he noted th a t" prices of all necessities of life have risen very considerably; 
so that the conditions of the working dasses, which in ordinary times is fairly 
comfortable, according to their standard of comfort, has now become very 
hard"10. Table 4 11 below shows comparisons of food prices and labourers' 
purchasing power between the interior of Colombia and Canada. W heder 
reproduced it from Colombian government publications. The relevance of the data 
is that it shows how substantially lower that the purchasing power of wages of 
a labourer on the plain of Bogota (in the interior), was compared to that of the 
wages of a labourer of the same dass in Canada.
Furthermore, it indicated the basic comparison between necessary consumer goods 
such as textiles. According to the document, " cheapest and coarsest outfit, 
including clothes, bedclothes, etc., which the poorest working wom an in Colombia 
would generally possess, would cost in Canada 11 dol. 95 c., and could be bought 
by a Canadian washerwoman, earning the average wages, out of the profits of 20 
days' work; though they would be of such a quality as no Canadian woman 
would think of using. In Bogota, the same artides cost 39 dol. 30c"12.
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TABLE 4. COMPARISON OF FOOD PRICES AND PURCHASING POWER 
BETWEEN COLOMBIA AND CANADA: 1888.
Article lbs. Price(Bgta) Price(Cnda) lbs. lbs
Salt 25 125 0.11 42 1363
Bread 1 020 0325 17 200
Beef 1 0.132 68
Potatoes 25 1.00 0.17 65 882
Butter 1 0.50 022 5 35
Rice 1 0.17 0.055 14 109
Eggs doz. 030 0.165 9doz. 54.5doz.
Sugar 1 0.15 0.065 14 109
Flour 25 2.40 0.75 22 214
Beer gal. 1.50 0.40 1.5gls. 15gls.
Candles 1 029 0.11 83 60
Petrol gal. 2.40 020 Igl- 30gls.
Soap 1 0.175 0.055 12 181
Fr/wood cord 1620 5.00 14crgs 140 ergs
Coal 20 027 220crgs.
Chr/coal 20 1.60 1.5crgs.
Blanket pair 8.00 3.50
Calico yd. 0.22 0.04
Source: Republica de Colombia, Gaceta Oficial, (Bogota, 1888); Note: Pr. = price; Qty. 
= quantity; prices are in Canadian dollars; quantities are those which a workman can buy 
with six day's wages on the plains of Bogota at 25 c. per day and in Canada at 1 dol. per 
day.
But the data also gave an indication of what the real value of Colombian 
purchasing power was -at least in the interior. It required " 10 1 /2  months of 
constant labour for a Colombian washerwoman to earn sufficient to pay for them; 
15 months' labour for a woman working in the fields; and more than two years' 
labour for the women who sell charcoal and firewood"13.
A significant disproportion in wages and purchasing power is obvious. Clothes 
were thus 228.9 % higher in price and it took 1,475 % more labouring days for 
a Colombian washer woman, for example, to pay for them than it would her 
Canadian counterpart. And of course, government duties took just under 50 % 
of the price paid.
In general, the data underline not only how dramatically low 'Colombian' 
purchasing power was, but particularly, that of the low-wage interior female 
labour force. In a general sense, this latter 19th century picture of the real value 
of money serves as an eyeopener to the reality of low real wages.
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If we focus particularly on the NAC region during the first two decades of the 
current century, the picture is not so clear. With the exception perhaps of Urrutia 
and Arrubla's set of eleven food prices for the city of Barranquilla14 in 1911, there 
is arguably no quantitative evidence of high food prices for the NAC region for 
the first two decades of the present century.
Nevertheless, there is some qualitative evidence. Statements such as United States 
Consul Guyantis in 1919 that th e " increasing cost of living [is] resulting in many 
strikes and labour difficulties"15 indicate a degree of the impact that high prices 
produced -at least by the end of the second decade.
Another is United States Trade Commissioner Bell's statement in 1921 th a t" the 
cost of living in the district [of Santa Marta was] much higher than anywhere in 
the interior"16 equally draws an adequate picture of what the third decade was 
to show.
Equally, in 1928, United States Dept, of Commerce official Guista, for example, 
noted that " ... it was evident that ... prosperity ... had led to considerable 
inflation"17. During this year as well, Rippy indicated that the " increase in wages 
was largely counter-balanced by the rising cost of living"18.
By the end of the third decade, high prices19 had settled in. In 1929, Guista 
reported that inflation was " continuing to mount"20. But, by now, the full 
consequences of dollar cash inflows from abroad (the United States payment of 
indem nity monies for the appropriation of Panama and subsequent public and 
private loans which followed, as mentioned earlier) were felt by the nation as a 
whole.
Indeed, that same year the National Industrial Conference Board in the United 
States noted the " importation of funds from abroad became reflected in higher 
prices and higher cost of living"21. The Board added that Colombia was " passing 
through a period of business depression and economic readjustment made
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necessary and inevitable by the inflation that characterized the economic life of 
the country in the last few years"22. Commercial transactions in the country, the 
Board said, were in " a state of stagnation ... the value of all securities, 
government bonds, mortgages, industrial and bank shares ... seriously 
depressed"23.
Nevertheless, despite any reduction in real terms by the end of the 1930s, a high 
level of real wages prevailed in the NAC region throughout the period under 
study. Indeed, by 1929, British Consul Gamet-Lomax noted that the NAC region's 
labourers in the banana export sector " enjoyed remarkably high wages and their 
purchasing power [was] steady and relatively large"24.
From the qualitative evidence unearthed this does not appear to be challenged. 
From the quantitative evidence on wages presented in Chapters V  and VI further 
on, a reasoned case can certainly be established.
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Comparison Between NAC Region Agricultural and Urban Wages
The evidence unearthed enables us to establish some comparisons and their 
implications between NAC region rural and urban wage levels throughout the 
period under observation. In order to do so we have deflated all wage levels and 
wage level ranges expressed in CGP$s that emerged in the research. They are 
listed in Appendixes 2 & 3.
The evidence shows there were four levels of corporativeness. One was the 
banana industry which operated mainly as a large scale corporate production unit 
(the UFC). Cotton cultivation, although large globally, was another, mainly 
composed of small-scale, non-corporate production units.
A third level was the cotton textile industry which was -on the contrary- small 
globally, but composed of some small-scale corporate units and one particularly 
formidable large-scale corporate unit (Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon).
Finally, the level embodied by the NAC region's coffee industry operated on a 
large-scale basis. Although in fact, it showed one of the largest productive units 
in the nation25, our case, Hacienda La Dilia Ester26, throughout was basically a 
semi-corporate production unit.
Two additional different minor sectors in the region which operated in small 
scales and production units are also included. Unfortunately no wage evidence 
can be offered for them. Both corozo nut (vegetable ivory) and dividivi (natural 
dyestuff) operated as small (perhaps sometimes medium-scale) and random, 
non-corporate production units. The NAC region was the only one in the country 
to export these goods. The produce was gathered by Indigenous communities or 
self-sufficient peasantry for export merchants. These undoubtedly formed the 
bottom end of the wage scale.
Appendixes 4, 5 & 6 show their performance in the regional economy. Between
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1900 and 1927 France imported an (simple unweighted) average of Fr. 1,109.7 
thousand per year worth of corozo nut. Likewise, and in intermittent years, 
between 1901 and 1925, it imported an (simple unweighted) average of Fr. 318.4 
thousand per year worth of dividivi. Germany imported more than that. Excluding 
years 1915-1920, between 1896 and 1930, it imported US Gold $ 604.6 thousand 
per year worth of the dyestuff. Figures 3, 4 & 5 below show bar chart graphs 
which illustrate this data.
Some traits can be inferred from 
Appendixes 2 & 3. During the early 
half of the first decade for example, 
the level of agricultural wages 
fluctuated between $0.66 and $1.68. By 
the end of the decade, they reached a 
level of at least $1.33.
In general, the evidence unearthed for general agricultural wages suggests that, 
except for the beginning of the second and third decades (years 1910 and 1920), 
when the upper limits of wage ranges were at or above $1.68, the level of wages 
was around the $0.66 point.
The level of wages in cotton cultivation wages in particular, were dramatically 
below the general agriculture level of $0.66 in 1905 and just above it -at $1.01 - in 
1910. In 1924, they were at $0.92 -just under twice the 1921 general agriculture 
level of $0.53. Coffee wage levels experienced a slight fall from a range of ($1.23 - 
$1.41) in 1911 (higher than 1910 cotton wage levels of $1.01) to $0.90 in 1912. 
General agriculture wages went down at least 50 % from a range of ($1.33 - $1.68) 
in 1910 to one of ($0.56 - $0.69) in 1912.
Banana wage levels at $0.69 were well above the other sectors.While just over the 
general agricultural level in 1904 ($0.66) and well over the cotton level in 1905 
($0.19), banana sector wages really showed an upward climb through to the end
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of the first decade: $0.69 in 1906, $0.84 
in 1907, up to $0.87 in 1908, a range of 
(0.78 - 1.21) in 1909 and establishing 
itself well above that upper limit at a 
range of ($1.49 - $1.62) in 1910.
Banana wage levels were at some 
stages more volatile -although not 
violently- than coffee wages. This 
volatility was experienced with wage level rises and falls. 
Rises -as mentioned immediately 
above- were not only experienced 
from 1906 to 1910, but in 1914, 1920,
1925, 1927, 1929 and 1930. Falls were 
experienced in 1912, 1913, 1916, 1919,
1924, 1926 and 1928.
The banana wage levels however, 
were higher than those of coffee 
throughout the period. The exception was in 1914 and 1916 when coffee real 
wages were slightly higher than banana's. This was probably due to increased 
shortage of labour in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.
Coffee wage levels of $0.88 in 1922 were in fact under those for cotton cultivation 
in 1924 which stood at $0.92. But banana levels were higher in 1924 with a level 
of $1.19 despite having fallen from its level the previous year of $1.32.
The highest values (wage range upper limits) for the NAC region's agricultural 
wage levels are reflected by the bar chart graph shown in Figure 6 below.
Traits from formal urban wage level data in Appendixes 7, 8 & 9 suggest that 
dock and railway wage levels oscillated between the high level ranges of ($0.80 -
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$1.58) in 1903, ($1.34 - $1.38) in 1910 
and ($1.31 - $1.41) in 1929.
General unskilled common labour 
wage levels were around the $0.50 
point in 1903 and 1913 and showed 
levels between a lower limit of $0.53 
in 1914 to $1.09 in 1924.
Skilled labour reached very high levels: ($2.05 - $4.11) in 1916 and from $1.14 to 
($1.82 - $2.05) in 1924. Manufacturing industry in general showed high levels of 
wages ($0.55 - $1.36), at least in 1924.
Although the soap industry showed a very wide range of ($0.71 - $4.29) in 1911, 
the shoe and brick industries were not behind: the former showed levels of from 
$0.67 to a range of ($1.05 - $1.97) in 1908, while the latter showed levels below 
$0.47 in 1903. The flour industry showed a reasonably high wage range as well: 
$1 - $1.14.
Additionally, although the urban side of the banana industry was extremely 
segmented showing levels of from $0.12 to $1.22 in 1909, the evidence shows that 
at the beginning of the third decade, it offered levels of between over $0.71 - $1.06 
in 1921.
Finally, the cotton textile industry showed some consistence in wage levels from 
$0.53 - $0.71 in 1908 to $0.27 - $0.71 in 1921. If the highest values (wage range 
upper limits) for the NAC region's urban wages are considered, analysis is 
perhaps better appreciated by the bar chart graph shown in Figure 7.
These traits had the following implications: 1).- within agricultural wage levels, 
those of coffee and banana were, by and large above all others, particularly above 
cotton cultivation wage levels; 2).- banana sector wage levels, particularly in the
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third decade, were well above all other 
sectors and throughout the period 
were on average, 15 % above coffee 
and just over 40 % above cotton. 3).- 
within formal urban industry wage 
levels, aside from very skilled labour 
which showed wage levels well above 
average, manufacturing industry wage 
levels were relatively high, except for 
the cotton textile industry which showed lower levels than the other industries. 
Nevertheless, albeit low (compared to banana industry), the cotton textile industry 
wage levels showed relative consistency between the end of the first decade and 
the beginning of the third.
Furthermore, observing the data contained in Appendixes 2 & 3, all other things 
being equal, we stress several overall points. One is that between years 1904 and 
1933, for the agricultural sectors with medium-scale and semi-corporate 
production units and the export sector with a large-scale corporate production 
unit, agricultural labour wage levels in the NAC region were probably not less 
than $0.66 per day. It can be assumed that during the years for which there are 
data missing, they were not below this figure. The exception was the cotton 
cultivation which showed a lower wage level of $0.19 for 1905.
Another is that for the small (and medium-scale) random non-corporate 
production unit sectors, agricultural labour wage levels were less than $0.66. They 
were probably even lower than the exceptionally low level mentioned 
immediately above for cotton cultivation in 1905, if not existent at all. The reason 
for this was the character of the 'labour' that 'produced' (read gathered) the 
dividivi and corozo nut.
One would like to say more about cotton cultivation, but the data found were so 
scarce that they did not provide a basis for further analysis. From a low wage
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level of $0.19 in 1905, it increased first, to $1.01 in 1910, and then to $0.92 in 1924. 
Com pared to 1905, these meant increases of 81 % and 79 % respectively. Common 
sense suggests deflation was a problem for these high levels of wages and 
increases as well. But this was equally so for real coffee wage levels in the interior 
which included non-monetary elements such as food. And, as will be seen further 
on, real wage levels in 1905 and 1910 for NAC cotton cultivation were above those 
for coffee in the interior.
Second, that in the large-scale but semi-corporate coffee sector daily agricultural 
wage levels (w2) between 1911 and 1930 showed a range close to $0.66 < w4 < 
$2.78.
Third, that in just the large-scale corporate production unit banana export sector, 
agricultural wage levels (w2) between 1906 and 1922 were consistently above 
average and sometimes well above average. The sector showed a range close to 
$0.64 <w2 < $1.56. For the years 1923-1930, the banana sector's wage levels (w3) 
showed a range close to $0.80 <w3 < $2.35.
Furthermore, Appendixes 7, 8 & 9 also show some isolated aspects of the 
performance of formal urban wage levels for which like to like comparisons can 
be made. First, between years 1903-1924, formal urban wage levels (w4) showed 
a range close to $0.47 < w4 < $1.36.
This excludes dock and railway labour wages ($3.1 and $1.58) in the early turn of 
the century (1902-1903) as well as the upper limits of wage ranges for at least one 
example of the urban soap industry labour ($4.29) in 1911, construction labour 
($4.11) in 1916 and for highly skilled labour ($2.05) in 1924.
In 1910,1912 and 1921, general agricultural wage levels were higher than those 
for the cotton textile industry, possibly reflecting the increase set by banana 
cultivation wages. This included coffee, whose level of wages for 1912 and 1921 
were also higher than those for cotton textile industry. And coffee wage levels
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were also higher than those for industry in 1911,1912,1913 and 1921.
Urban manufacturing industry wage levels were probably higher than agricultural 
wage levels for the years for which we have no available evidence to compare 
with, possibly in a bid to compete with the higher wage level set by the banana 
sector. In 1924, for example, -a year in which we can compare- the upper limit of 
the general industry wage level range was higher than the cotton cultivation level.
This suggests an isolated pattern of some sort whereby small formal urban 
footloose manufacturing industry (with the exception of 1924) were maintaining 
lower wage levels than rural at least until the second decade of the century. 
W hether it suffered the effects of the 'pricing-out7 effect of the high level of 
wages set by the banana export sector is difficult to prove w ithout any available 
data to do so, but is within the logical bearing of our argum ent
On the other hand, NAC region urban industry (after reaching an upper limit of 
$2.14 in its 1911 wage level range) was probably desperately attempting to match 
the very high wages the banana export sector set, but failed to do so (falling to 
an upper limit of $0.71 in its 1921 wage range).
It is likely that this influenced the economic development process in two 
significant ways: a) drawing the bottom end of the segmented rural banana 
sector's and otherwise priced-out export sectors' redundant labour force into the 
urban area; and b) eventually, relatively 'informalizing' this labour force 
contingent through the process of gradually lowering the reproduction cost of 
labour as the prospects for survival of the banana sector export economy began 
to dwindle.
The banana export sector probably contributed to the demise of the potential that 
the alternative of cotton cultivation had as provider of the input for the urban 
textile industry. Neither the latter nor especially the former were in a position to 
raise wages further in order to compete with those set by the fruit staple.
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Once wage levels were cut down to appropriate size in the thirties as a response 
not only to mounting inflation and the depression, the shaping of informalization 
of the labour force in the region began to emerge.
Twenty years after the period investigated here this was confirmed. White for 
example, remarked th a t" many of the workers too left, some going to the towns 
in search of work, perhaps ending by swelling the tugurio population of 
Barranquilla. Others stayed, and crowded into the new poor quarters of Santa 
Marta or Cienaga, or squatted on a patch of land in the zone"27.
Fourth, that then, this portion of the urban informal contingent of the labour force 
began to participate as labour for the informal economy as for example, the NAC 
region's contraband trade. This was symmetrical with the absence of consumer 
durable industry -footloose or otherwise- in the banana export sector zone of 
economic influence and the flourishing importance of the banana sector's 
merchandise stores. The bottom end of the labour force, composed of poorly paid 
labour in small and medium-scale, semi and non-corporate export sectors, 
rem ained outside the monetary economy.
Finally, some degree of clearness surfaces in relation to cotton cultivation's wage 
level in the midst of the competition arising between agricultural export sectors. 
Despite the dearth of data and its obvious discontinuities, cotton cultivation wage 
levels do appear to have jumped dramatically from $ 0.19 in 1905 to $ 1.01 in 
1910. Well, it fell to $0.92 in 1924, but it was still up there in the higher echelons 
of the wage levels of the period, at least to suggest that there was an effort to 
compete.
It represented significant increases of 81 % from 1905-1910 and 79 % from 1910 
to 1924. Nevertheless, these wage levels were below banana sector wage levels of 
$1.49 and $1.62 in 1910, and $1.19 in 1924. This price pressure m ust have forced 
general agricultural labour to place wage demands at least at a wage range level 
of $1.33 - $1.68 in 1910. Coffee sector labour in particular demanded a wage range
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level of at least $1.23 - $1.41 in 1911.
It is significant to note that cotton textile industry wage range levels ($0.53 - $0.71 
in 1908) were at approximately the level of some of the banana sector's urban 
wage range levels (at least within the level of cook and ship /cargador/ which 
earned $0.49 and $0.73). NAC region textile industry wage levels surprisingly 
reached an upper limit of $2.14 in 1911. It also seems to have maintained a 
consistent competitive struggle at least until 1921, keeping wage levels oscillating 
between $0.27 and $0.71.
Other things remaining equal -and alternative or complementary important 
explanations aside- the collected evidence seems to suggest that somewhere 
between 1910 and 1912, cotton cultivation for export to the international market 
(not the domestic one) was priced out by banana wage range levels.
The impact set by the banana sector level of wages in the NAC region m ust have 
played -amongst other factors- an important role in diminishing the potential of 
the region's cotton textile industry's growth.
Consequently, it seems that its contribution in the demise of the region's growth 
and development has to be stressed. Generally, the evidence shows a significant 
presence of a relatively strong high-wage economy, either in dramatic bursts or 
in a reasonably consistent (albeit no less abrupt) way.
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Some Comparisons and Contrasts between NAC Region and Interior Real Wages
The following comparisons and contrasts between NAC region and interior wage 
levels and ranges provide confirmation in real terms, not only of intra-regional but 
also inter-regional wage differentiation. The evidence (in nominal terms) follows 
in Chapters V and VI. It is especially confirmed when NAC region agricultural 
wage levels (namely banana and coffee) and interior coffee wages are compared.
The first set of comparisons is within the context of the wage levels and ranges 
which emerged from primary sources for like years. The task of establishing like 
to like comparisons here is hampered by the dearth of data and therefore are 
scarce. Wage levels and ranges for the NAC region collected and detailed in 
Appendixes 2 & 3, are compared with data for the interior in Appendix 10.
First, a comparison between NAC region agricultural wage levels and their 
interior counterparts is considered. The least one can say is that for years where 
like to like comparisons can be established, during 1907, 1911, 1913, 1924, 1926 
and 1930, agricultural daily wage 
levels in the NAC region were higher 
than the interior's. Figure 8 shows the 
barchart graph which illustrates this 
comparison.
Second, the comparison between the 
two region's urban industrial daily 
real wage levels in Appendixes 7, 8, 9 
& 10 is considered. Unfortunately, as 
the wage data that emerged for both regions is not sufficient to be compared on 
a like to like basis, the least negligible like to like comparison suggests that for 
years 1911 and 1921 in the cotton textile industry and for year 1912 in the railway 
category, NAC region urban daily real wages were higher than in the interior.
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Indeed, for the year 1911 in the cotton textile industry, the NAC region's urban 
daily real wage range of ($0.71 - $2.14) was significantly higher than the interior's 
urban daily real wage level of $0.57. Equally, for the year 1921, the NAC region's 
urban daily real wage range of ($0.27 - $0.71) was higher than its counterpart in 
the interior which was of ($0.31- $0.42). Likewise, in the railway category for the 
year 1912, the NAC region's urban 
daily wage level range of ($1.81 - 
$0.92) was higher than the interior's 
level of $0.63. Figure 9 equally shows 
the barchart graph which depicts this 
second comparison.
Thus in general, the collected data 
suggests that at an urban level, at least 
for the period 1902 - 1921, the NAC 
region's available urban wage levels were considerably high in comparison with 
those available for the interior. The comparison for 1911 and 1921 is acceptable for 
these two years but not for the period as a whole.
This is why we turn to a second set of comparisons which is within the context 
of the wage levels and ranges which have emerged from highly respected 
secondary sources. This is likely to provide more transparency in the rendering 
of conclusions about interior agricultural and manufacturing industry real wages.
One such source is Palacios who offers agricultural wage levels in the interior 
coffee sector. Appendix 11 shows the data which is compared with that of 
Appendixes 2 & 3.
From this correlation we can conclude that general agricultural daily real wages 
in the NAC region were notably higher than interior rural (coffee sector) daily real 
wages for years 1904, 1910, 1912, 1920 and 1921. Figure 10 shows the barchart 
graph which illustrates this comparison. Additionally, the NAC region cotton
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cultivation wage level in 1905 at $0.19 
was just above the interior's coffee 
'chapolero' (coffee harvester) wage level 
which stood at $0.18.
One can equally conclude that interior 
rural agricultural (coffee sector) daily 
real wage levels were remarkably 
lower than (i) the NAC region's cotton 
cultivation wage level in 1910; (ii) NAC region coffee sector wage levels at least 
for years 1911,1912,1913,1914,1916,1917,1918, 1920, 1921, 1922, 1927 and 1930; 
and (iii) particularly, NAC region agricultural banana industry wage levels for all 
years from 1906 to 1930 (except for 1926 when the interior coffee sector paid $0.06 
more than NAC region banana sector did). Figures 11 & 12 show the barchart 
graphs which illustrate these comparisons and contrasts respectively.
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Another source we consider is Urrutia-Montoya, whose interior urban 
manufacturing wage levels provide a more comprehensive setting for the period 
with which we are dealing with. Appendix 12 shows the data which is compared 
with data from Appendixes 8 & 9.
One can say that at least for years 
1907, 1908, 1910, 1911 and 1912, NAC 
region manufacturing industry real 
wages were higher than their 
counterparts in the interior. In years 
1921 and 1924, at least the upper limits 
of the NAC wage ranges were 
considerably higher than the interior 
wage levels.
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We can also add that for years 1913,1914, 1915 and 1924 NAC general unskilled
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urban labour real wages were much higher than their counterparts in the interior. 
Figure 13 shows the bar chart which illustrates the contrast between the NAC 
region's lowest and the interior's highest wage rates as well as the comparison 
between the former's and the latter's
highest wage rates. As no NAC urban 
manufacturing data from 1924 
onwards emerged from the sources 
researched we am unable to establish 
comparisons with data existent for the 
interior as listed earlier in Appendixes 
12 & 13.
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From Urrutia-Montoya's figures one
can conclude that for the period 1905 - 1930, interior urban unskilled 
('urbanized' rural peasantry) real wage levels, (w5), showed a range of $0.24 < 
w5 < $0.88 .
Previous NAC region's rural banana sector real wage levels (w6), listed in 
Appendixes 1, 2 & 3) showed a range of $0.69 < w6 < $2.35 for the same period.
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in Appendixes 1, 2 & 3, showed a 
range of $0.66 < w7 < $2.78 for years 
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Clearly, if w5 is correlated with w6 and 
w7, the least that can be said is that in 
real terms, NAC region rural unskilled 
labour wages were higher than even 
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labour wages. Indeed, year by year,
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interior urban manufacturing industry.
Figures 14 & 15 show the bar chart 
graphs which illustrate these contrasts.
For the sake of recapitulation -not 
repetition-, because data on NAC 
region urban banana sector real wage 
levels is scarce, one can only state that 
in general, most of agricultural wage 
levels between years 1906 and 1925 were higher than interior urban 
manufacturing real wage levels.
This was all the more meaningful given the fact that the cost of living for the 
years 1923 to 1930 was higher in the NAC region than in the interior. Average 
food price indexes (see Appendix 24) for the NAC region were consistently above 
those of the interior's. Furthermore, the cost of living in the interior was 
consistently lower than in the nation as a whole.
Because if data collected on real wage 
levels between NAC region rural 
banana sector real wages (Appendix 3) 
is contrasted with all secondary source 
m a t e r i a l  for i n t e r i o r  u rb a n  
manufacturing levels (Appendixes 12,
13 & 14) during these years, this 
shows NAC rural banana sector real 
wage levels were higher than interior 
urban manufacturing real wage levels. Figure 16 shows the bar chart graph which 
illustrates this contrast.
In 1926, only interior cotton textile industry male real wage levels were higher 
($1.22). In 1927, only the banana sector wage level range's upper limit was higher
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($1.85). In 1928, both were at par with a real wage level of $1.42. And in 1929, one 
banana sector real wage level -$1.92- was above the interior cotton textile 
industry male level of $1.66. Finally, in 1930, all banana sector wage level range 
upper limits ($1.94, $1.77 and $2.35) were above the interior's ($1.77).
It is likely that the fact that w 5 < w 6 and < w 7 plausibly supports the case for a 
high-wage economy emerging in the NAC region's rural sector. This would 
eventually cause the slackening of linkage-creative urban industry, that is, 
economic stagnation.
The interior's rural sector emerged less 
scathed with the absence of this 
constraint. From 1910-1912 onwards 
the low-waged interior textile industry 
was able to perform in a more solid 
manner. Through the demise of urban 
footloose industry, the NAC region's 
economic growth probably stagnated.
It plausibly revealed -at this time- the 
paradox mentioned at the outset of this thesis: that economic stagnation took place 
amidst the presence of a high-wage economy.
One important proviso, however, must be made which warrants some elaboration. 
High wages (either equally high, or even higher than in the NAC region) were 
paid to male cotton textile industry labour in the interior in the later years of the 
period considered here. Within the particular context of the interior's low-wage 
economy, this was more the exception rather than the rule.
Our view is that it was particularly exceptional because the main source of labour 
supply in the interior's stronger growth pattern was, above all, provided by 
cheaper female labour.
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There probably is no more established a source than Ospina-Vasquez with whom 
to assert and compare views as well as data. He has certainly emphasized the 
cheapness of interior female labour already. He showed some significant 
industrial interior female nominal wages arranged by him for the conglomerate 
of mill, textile, cigar and cigarette industries of Medellin (in the interior) for the 
period 1916 - 1931. They have been deflated accordingly in Appendix 13.
The data suggest interior female urban industry daily real wage levels, (w8)
showed an (simple unweighted) average range close to $0.31 < w8 < $0.67. If 
Ospina-Vasquez's data are contrasted with the data collected in Appendixes 1 ,2  
& 3 for every single year of the former's figures on interior female urban industry 
daily real wage levels, NAC region banana as well as coffee sector rural daily 
wage levels were very considerably higher.
However, there seems to appear some degree of either confusion or contradiction 
in his figures. At least for 1922 he equally indicates that "... Coltejer [the great 
interior textile complex] paid males wages ranging from $0.50 [real $0.46] to $2.70 
[real $2.50] and females, wages ranging from $0.35 [real $ 0.32] to $0.80 [real 
$0.74]. Rosellon [the other large interior textile factory] in its factory in [the town 
of] Envigado paid its male and female labourers (average wages of) $1 [real $0.93] 
and $0.45 [$0.42] respectively. In the Medellin [factory] (ex-Hernandez) it paid 
$1.30 [real $1.20] and $0.60 [$0.56]. The Compania Colombiana de Tabaco on 
average $1.58 [real $1.46] and $0.91 [real $0.84]. Another factory paid $1.20 [real 
$1.11] and $0.70 [real $0.65]"28.
This means that for 1922 he really offers two different average real wage levels 
for industrial female labour. One implied by the information mentioned 
immediately above at $0.60 and another at $0.40 (see Appendix 13). These last 
figures suggest that just in textiles, the average female wage level was standing 
at $0.50. This is very much in line with the Department of Antioquia's Statistics 
(see Appendix 14) for the 1922 female manufacturing industry weighted average 
wage level of $0.50.
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Another respected source for comparison of data is the Boletin del Ministerio de 
Industrias. The Colombian government indeed published some 'national' wage 
averages and employment figures in the cotton and textile industry29 for the 
years 1926 to 1930 shown in Appendix 15. The data yielded weighted average 
wage levels of $1.30, $0.66 and $0.45 of for male, female and child labour 
respectively for this period of years. The data also show that for the same years 
interior textile male labour wage levels, (w9), were surprisingly above the 
average levels, showing a range close to $1.22 < w9 < $1.71.
Nevertheless, the textile female and minor labour supply was overwhelmingly 
larger than that of male labour. Indeed, for each particular year of this period, the 
female labour force was 97.7 %, 119.3 %, 82.7 %, 97.1 % and 63.9 % respectively 
larger than the male labour force. Taken together, female and m inor textile labour 
force in the interior for the same years was 115.2 %, 147.6 %, 106.6 %, 116.2 % and 
82.8% respectively larger than the male labour force.
It remains a non-sequitur therefore to argue that because a minority of 
particularly textile male labour in the interior earned relatively high wages in the 
last five years of the last decade, the case for an NAC region high-wage economy 
should be dismissed by pointing out a high-wage interior as well. It is not all that 
apparent.
The main explanation seems to be that high interior textile industry male wage 
levels from 1926 onward emerged because of the prevailing predom inant female 
low-waged labour force. Textile male labour in the interior became the top end 
of that wage differentiated interior labour market. It emerged more as an 
exception rather than as the rule. A very minutely differentiated exception 
indeed.
Furthermore, if for the same years of 1926 to 1930, female and minor daily 
nominal average wage levels for the interior textile industry are grouped together, 
a weighted average of $0.64 was the daily real wage level. If compared to the
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lowest wage level the NAC region's banana and coffee sectors showed for those 
years ($0.80 upwards), it was at least 25 % lower. Clearly, the interior cotton 
textile industry, and possibly interior industry in general, had no real pressure 
from intra-regional high-wage economies like the NAC region did. Additionally, 
to a certain extent, it could rely on a principally (and apparently endless) 
low-wage female labour supply.
Particularly useful to our argument as well is the Department of Antioquia's 
statistics30 shown in Appendix 14 (wage levels for the interior in 1922). The 
above data indicate that if there was a low-wage interior, it was peculiarly a 
feminine and child low-wage interior. As Montenegro pointed o u t ," in the three 
textile factories towards 1916, female remuneration was approximately 50 per cent 
less than that of males. In the rest of the factories, differences fluctuate too much, 
but masculine remuneration is markedly superior ,l31.
In the Medellin factories average pay of the female labour force for the " four 
textile factories for which data exist, represented only 41 per cent of that which 
is paid to males 32. Child labour force pay between 1926 and 1932, represented 
" only 33 per cent of the payment to males and 47 per cent of payment to female 
labour force"33.
In order to illustrate one of the factors influencing economic policy in the interior 
for the period 1902 - 1909, Ospina-Vasquez stressed the excess labour supply, 
particularly of women, noting the " ... growing and already considerable 
accumulation of idle hands in the cities, especially of women ,l34.
If indeed there was 'idle labour' there can be little doubt that the excess 
population supply was contributing (through rural-urban migration) to excess 
labour supply in the interior: " [cities] ... had increased by a simple vegetative 
growth, which was perhaps greater in them rather than in the countryside, and 
additionally, there had been a markedly strong tendency towards rural-urban 
migration "35.
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Or that in fact, labour creation was " there for the taking " in a quite 
advantageous manner for the interior industry and its economic growth and 
development: low wages indeed. According to Ospina-Vasquez "... [migration 
towards the c ity ]... in a greater extent was due to the incentive of a different life, 
to the vague hope of bettering their luck, not to the certainty of finding in it better 
paid work than in the countryside ...n36. Furthermore, he said " the first factories 
(especially textiles) were established employing this marginal labour force [idle 
labour, namely females and children], that was content with very low 
remuneration "37.
Ospina-Vasquez summed the situation up  (perhaps inadvertently) by suggesting 
that in the interior, excess population went hand-in-hand with female 
supplementary income in the whole family unit, establishing 'de facto', a 
structural economic conjuncture whereby marginal (female) labour was taken for 
granted in conditions of low wage labour supply.
Indeed, " in some regions, in [the department of] Antioquia especially, the 
situation is worsening due to local overpopulation phenomena. The population 
was becoming very dense in some of the cold lands of little agricultural 
production ... female migration took place generally as part of a family, not as 
loose units ... the eventual wage was received as a supplement to the earnings of 
the family head ...38, the lack of national labour legislation for the nation during 
the first three decades of the century increased the low level of wage bargaining 
existent in the in terior:" exploitation of young female and child labour force, as 
the determinant element of the process of capital accumulation ... occurs heavily, 
if it is taken into consideration that during the first three decades of the XXth 
century no labour legislation existed that would defend the workingman's 
interests "39.
It is reasonable therefore, to acknowledge a stronger and more aggressive 
industrial growth in the low-wage interior because as Montenegro pointed out, 
" based on young female and child labour, the [interior] textile industry as well
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as a greater portion of [interior] Colombian manufacturing industry was born, 
developed and acquired its maturity ... "40.
He also noted that the first (interior) manufacturing enterprises" found a gigantic 
and unexploited potential market in young female and child labour force at the 
beginning of the XXth century ... "41.
A more useful remark yet is the potential and unlimited nature of the female and 
child labour market in the interior. Such was the significance of the interior's low 
wage female labour supply that it was decided to limit a statistical study to the 
female labour force exclusively:"... it is about statistics of labour force employed 
in factories, and even in workshops and other establishments assimilated into 
factories, that was not judged to be inconvenient to limit the study to them ...,42.
Nevertheless, Ospina Vasquez went back on his initial view that excess female 
labour supply was an outstanding factor in the interior's economic progress. 
Although it emerges clearly that the interior was a low-wage economy, an 
important point is that it was mainly an excess female labour low-wage economy.
He argued female labour wages -although low- " [sic] [were] not laughable 
within the remuneration scale of current labour. They were not to be had as 
hunger wages, accepted in a compulsory fashion; they were supplements, 
temporarily accepted "43. He also thought this particular labour force ,f was 
uneconomical, if its productivity is confronted with the rem uneration it received. 
National products, despite low wages, would emerge more expensive than foreign 
ones ...,l44.
Ospina-Vasquez suggested that although" the provision of abundant and not too 
clumsy cheap labour force was an essential part of the structure of the textile 
business, ... the terrifying situations that have m arked the initiation of 
industrialization in other parts -not least in England- were not witnessed ... and 
quickly a situation was arrived at in which industrial wages were relatively high
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... this rapid transition of the cheap and abundant labour phase is perhaps the 
m ost important aspect of the evolution of manufacturing industry in Colombia in 
its recent phase"45.
W ith this in mind, it is not difficult to comprehend why, in the NAC region, with 
a prevailing high level of wages in agriculture, the pricing-out of several other 
economic sectors took place. Where more solid economic linkages could have 
prevailed -namely cotton cultivation and textile production- legally imported 
goods (let alone illegally imported ones) were pricing out even interior produced 
goods. If in the low-wage interior linkage-creating' textile industry wage levels 
were not low enough to compete with foreign produce, how  could one ever 
expect the NAC region's industry to do so?
There was only one way in which the interior economy could survive. Unable to 
compete with foreign products' prices, it further increased its growth at the 
expense of and demise of its internal competition, namely the NAC region.
Therefore, legally imported product consumption would be curtailed, illegally 
imported ones would be discouraged by whatever means, interior low wage 
female labour would become institutionalized guaranteeing employment (or at 
least diminishing unemployment), family unit incomes would be strengthened 
and the best of all worlds would be had.
Paradoxically, intra-regional wage differentiation persisted after the period under 
study. In the late thirties and the early forties higher wages were still existent in 
the NAC region's coffee sector. Wyle indicates for example, that in the interior, 
" according to Tomlinson, who described conditions ... in the Cauca Valley 
[interior of Colombia] ... the workers receive 55 to 60 centavos and a piece of 
panela [native brown sugar] for a day's labor. They are provided with a one-room 
house and are welcome to gather the bananas and plantains that grow on the 
hacienda. They may have a garden and a chicken if they like. At harvestime they 
are paid on a piece-rate basis and receive about 8 centavos for each 3 1 /2  - pound
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basket of coffee they gather"46.
In the NAC region how ever," most of the laborers on the plantations in the Sierra 
Nevada de Santa Marta ... earn from $ 1.00 to $ 1.25 a day, which is well above 
the average for the country"47. There is no evidence available of the non- 
pecuniary element in these wage levels.
At 66 centavos for the interior and 129 centavos for the NAC region, this 
represented -in real terms- a full 49.1 % higher average NAC region wage level. 
This appears to confirm strong wage differences at equal jobs between both 
regions (assuming equal efficiency by labourers in both regions).
Inter-regional wage differentiation therefore persisted throughout the mid-30's 
decade. According to Wyle, " wage rates for hired labor vary greatly from one 
region to another, depending on the supply of workers and the alternative 
opportunities for employment. Some plantations furnish food as part of the 
payment, but this practice is not general. Men usually receive from 20 to 30 
centavos a day more than women workers h48. Table 5 shows this data.
Despite the lowering of banana sector wage levels mentioned earlier, there is 
some significance to be drawn from Wyle's information of the Contraloria's coffee 
workers' daily wage levels, deep into the mid 1930's. It indicated that NAC region 
wage levels (namely male) were well above the interior's and the nation's average. 
In fact, m en's average daily wages in the NAC region (departments of 
Magdalena, Bolivar and Atlantico) were placed at 72 centavos per day, a high 
15 % over men's average for the interior (rest of departments) of 61.2 centavos 
and an 11.8 % over the whole of the nation's average of 63.5 centavos.
Several decades later however, recent research by Herrera-Soto and 
Romero-Castaneda suggest that Colombian minimum wages in 1978 only show 
that " the labourer in the banana zone has not progressed in his economic 
betterment and purchasing power, because only his wage increase relative to 1928
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is of some $ 1.56 and $ 1.11, that is, (at an exchange rate of $41), $63.96 and $45.51 
in Colombian currency"49.
TABLE 5. DAILY WAGES OF COFFEE LABOURERS IN COLOMBIA: 1936
<CGP$'s)
Department Men over 18 Women over 18
Caldas 0.89 059
Antioquia 0.70 0.48
Tolima 0.82 0.47
Cun dinam area 0.60 0.41
Valle 0.91 0.63
Norte de Santander 0.71 0.48
Santander 0.37 0.41
Cauca 0.39 0.44
Huila 0.69 038
Boyaca 0.31 0.21
Narino 0.34 0.21
Magdalena* 0.76 0.42
Bolivar* 0.73 0.49
Atlantico* 0.67 0.38
Source: Table 17 in Wyle, K., H., w The Agriculture of Colombia ", Foreign Agricul­
ture Bulletin, No. 1, October, 1942, United States Department of Agriculture, 
(Washington,1942), p. 44; Note: * denotes the three Departments which compose the 
NAC region.
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CHAPTER V 
WAGE DIFFERENTIATION: THE EVIDENCE
(i) The NAC Region
Most researched evidence discloses that in Colombia there was generally a 
national low agricultural wage level range. This was despite the slowly increasing 
interior urban government wage trend revealed by Urrutia-Montoya. This 
exceptional increasing wage level trend was the result of national government 
artificially raising levels in the 1920s for employment in public works schemes.
It is with this in m ind that we researched and studied the development of any 
pattern that nominal wage differentiation in the NAC region would show. 
Particularly for the crucial period for 'national' development, 1900 - 1930.
We note however, that primary data for 1901 show that NAC region urban 
government wage levels were already relatively high at the turn of the century. 
Whilst a porter, a guard and a concierge at the Finance Secretariat of the 
Department of Magdalena in the d ty  of Santa Marta (NAC region) earned CP$ 20, 
CP$ 30 and CP$ 30 per month respectively, an accountant, an official editor and 
an escribiente, earned CP$ 30, CP$ 50 and CP$ 70, per m onth respectively1.
Railways (which first begun operating in the NAC region of Colombia) also 
showed an initial isolated high wage pattern for the region, separate from that of 
rural agriculture. This was the case for 1902. Railway wages were not necessarily 
abysmally low. The Barranquilla Railway and Pier Company for example, paid 
workmen wages of " 80 cents gold per day"2.
In general however, wage differentiation for labour fared low enough in the NAC 
region at the turn of the century. The cost of common labour was sufficiently low 
to elicit the observation in 1903 that it was " so low that labor-saving machinery 
is not desired in this country"3.
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Table 6 below for example provides a general view of labour wage differentiation 
for that year. It shows the daily wages (without board and lodging) paid in 
Barranquilla in 1903. Figure 17 shows the barchart graph which illustrates the 
data.
By 1904, British Vice-Consul Carr noted that the " average cost of a day's labour 
may be placed at 2s"4. And in 1905, the gathering of the cotton crop in the NAC 
region was carried out by women " who are paid at the rate of about 5 cents for 
every arroba ( 25 lbs.). Each woman gathers in from three to four arrobas per day 
... The highest wage including board amounts to 16 cents (8d) per day"5.
TABLE 6. BARRANQUILLA DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES: 1903
Type of Labour Wage Rate (US$)
Common Laborers 0.30
Common laborers in mills 0.30
Brickmakers 0.30
Laborers engaged in dairy work 0.40
Railroad section men 0.50
Railroad brakemen 0.50
Street-car drivers 0.60
Street-car conductors 0.60
Engineers in steamboats 1.00
Source: Monthly Bulletin of the International Bureau of the American Republics,
Whole No. 123, Volume XV, No. 6, December, 1903, (Washington, 1903), 
pp.1548-1549.
And in 1906, Fawcett, an expert in 
the banana industry, ascertained that 
labour was " cheap averaging 50 c. 
per day, and very good results are 
obtained. These results indeed 
compare favourably with those of 
Costa Rica ... where labour is dear, 
averaging $1.00 a day"6.
In the same year, when according to British official Stronge, government was " 
unpopular at Bogota"7, United States Consul Demers assessed that in the NAC
Figure 17
NAC Region Daily Pay -1903  
(Barranquilla Nominal Wage Rates)
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region labour was " averaging 50 cents per day”8.
In the same year in a brick factory in C artagena," labor [was] paid ranging from 
40 cents to $ 1.20 per diem”9. And in 1908, United States Consul Manning 
indicated th a t" labourers [in the cotton industry ]... principally women and girls 
... [earned] the average wage ... of ... 40 to 50 cents per day”10. Nevertheless, he 
pointed out that men in shoe factories earned " from 80 cents to 1.50 U.S. 
American gold dollar per day ... [and] ... apprentices earned 50 cents per day"11.
It was to be Petre-Loraine who firmly emphasised the point of high wages in the 
NAC region. He noted th a t" labour is spoken of as being very cheap. That may 
be true when comparison is made with prices in European countries, but i t  is 
hardly correct when the comparison is made w ith East Indian or Chinese labour; 
for the daily wages of unskilled labourers in Colombia are nearly double those 
on which the Indian coolie lives in Trinidad, [emphasis added] but only in what 
he considers comfort, but also with a margin which enables him to save"12.
The aforementioned "Colombian" 'nearly double' wages Petre-Loraine referred 
to were primarily NAC region wages. It seems to me therefore that wage-eamers 
in the NAC region retained a high level of pay suddenly, abruptly.
The payment of banana wages was however, relatively higher than that paid for 
similar types of labour in the region. White for example, noted that " such an 
advantage was subject to change. Wages did rise from this period. The low sum 
of 50 c. paid on the banana plantations was already twice as much as the wages 
in the Sierra"13.
The suddenness and abruptness of higher pay slowly but progressively influenced 
the whole NAC region. Upward slopping wage curves m ust have alerted the 
region's other economic sectors. The implications of an uneven process of 
economic development by the presence of a market monopolizer on a world-wide 
scale (and monopsonist) such as the large-scale corporate unit (the UFC) was
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manifest.
Able to meet the high wages resulting from shortage of labour, and since it was 
a large employer, the UFC allowed the banana export sector to be a paramount 
in setting wage patterns for the rest of the region. Indeed, owing to the great 
dem and for field labourers unleashed by the extensive new banana cultivations, 
British Consul Carr directed attention to the fact that the cost of labour increased 
in 1909 from 50 to 80 per cent over that ruling during the first half of the year 
190814.
Primary evidence also shows that in 1909, a labourer in the banana industry 
engaged in 'Desmonte' (clearing hinterland), worked 190 hours at a wage of CPP$ 
8 per hour paid by the UFC15. Assuming an 8 hour working day, wages 
amounted to CPP$ 64 per day.
That same week and year, three men were paid by the UFC CPP$ 2 per cutting 
of a bunch of bananas. Accordingly, efficiency and production in cuttings would 
determine personal earnings. One man cut 3,123 bunches, a second cut 1,978 while 
a third cut 781 bunches16. There is no data available on the am ount of time each 
m an had available for doing his job.
Although all that can be said here is that each m an earned a weighted average 
pay of CPP$ 3,921.33 , this shows a t least tha t the amount o f pay offered by the 
UFC was considerably attractive to some wage labour which showed a degree of 
high productivity.
Other primary evidence includes the time factor. It shows that on the 23rd and 
24th of September, 1909, on a 'round-the-clock' working basis, 163 men from 
'Loading Gangs' moved 48,118 bunches of bananas in 48 hours17.
This suggests 295.2 bunches per man and 6.2 bunches per hour per man were 
moved. Assuming an 8 hour day's work and taking 6.2 bunches per hour as a
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proxy for the amount of bunches previously cut, this suggests that the 
aforementioned three men were cutting 49.6 bunches per day and earning a daily 
wage of CP$ 99.20 .
While cotton cultivation in the rural area of the NAC region was apparently 
unable to cope with the high wages set by the banana sector, its urban 
counterpart, the cotton textile industry seems to have been able to do so. But this 
seems to have been only for a limited amount of time.
Evidence of this emerges from United States special agent Graham-Clark's 
findings on his economic intelligence gathering mission on cotton production in 
the NAC region in 1910. He came to the conclusion that wages were extremely 
high there. The fact he referred to the cotton textile industry in particular sets a 
basis upon which to argue that the industry's capacity to foot a reasonably high 
wage bill existed at least at that particular time.
In spite of inefficiency (making production costs high) wages were in fact higher 
in the NAC region than in the United States. As Graham-Clark pointed out the 
" weaving price paid here shows that inefficient labor costs high ... for it costs ... 
more to make ... [textile] goods in Colombia [Cartagena, NAC region] than in the 
United States18. He equally reported th a t " the spinners are all boys and one boy 
runs one side of 190 spindles, a few running two sides. They are paid by the kilo 
of production and make 35 to 40 cents gold a day ... the weavers are paid 1 1 /4  
cents a yard. Each girl runs two looms and makes about 60 cents a day"19.
So, the NAC region's cotton textile industry was, at the time, not only able to pay 
high wages, but high wages in relation to low productivity. This lag in 
productivity may have been due to inadequate technical progress. Graham-Clark 
in fact claimed th a t1 under present methods the cost of production is higher than 
in Mississippi. The cotton is planted in July and picked in December. Pickers get 
$ 25 Colombian paper per arroba (25.4 lbs.) equivalent to 1 cent gold a pound20.
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Labour conditions and supply in the banana sector of the Santa Marta area in 1910 
were hardly ideal. Thus, wages maintained their high levels. British Vice-Consul 
Marshal reported to that effect that " during the year little has been done to 
improve the labour conditions and a demand greatly in excess of supply has 
raised the labour wage in agricultural and railway work rates of 4s to 5s per day, 
the market being almost exclusively filled from within the country"21. Indeed, 
prim ary data suggest that in the m onth of June, 1910, the UFC paid daily wage 
rates of CPP$ 120 and CPP$ 110 to a foreman and a rural labourer 
respectively"22.
Another NAC region agricultural sector -coffee- and urban industry in general 
continued to bear the rise in an assortment of wages. British Vice-Consul Marshal 
for example, asserted in 1911 that, in the coffee district of Santa Marta " day 
labour rates [were] 3s 6d to 4s"23 and that in a Barranquilla flour factory a " 
labourer earned 70 to 80 cents gold per day"24. In a Barranquilla soap factory, 
pay " fluctuated between 0.50 and 3.0 gold per day"25. Equally, a soap factory 
paid labourers " 70 cents per day"26 whilst a Barranquilla textile factory paid " 
between 0.50 and 1.50 gold per day"27. Yet another Barranquilla textile factory 
" paid an average of 0.40 gold per day"28.
Urban cotton textile industry labour wages paid at German entrepreneur Henry
H. Helm's knitting factory in Barranquilla in 1912, were a n " wage average... [of] 
forty centavos gold daily per labourer"29. Agricultural labour wages for the same 
year however, seem to have been higher. In the banana sector, the UFC paid a 
labourer CPP$ 100 as his daily wage30. The coffee sector wage level (although 
lagging somewhat behind that of the banana sector) was still high. It was even 
higher than the urban cotton textile industry wage level. This is w hat primary 
data from HLDE suggest.
Table 7 below shows that the weighted mean average pay per week for the NAC 
region coffee sector was CPP$ 390.83 (as labour there was paid at CPP$ 16 per 
hour 31. Figure 18 shows the barchart graph which illustrates the data.
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TABLE 7. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY - 1912
X w
1 180
1 256
1 268
4 300
1 320
1 328
1 348
1 358
1 372
3 400
1 414
1 416
1 444
2 468
2 576
1 588
1 600
24 X = 390.83
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Week from 23rd-29th December, 
1912; Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s per week of 5 days.
Wages rates in the NAC region in 
1912 were high. According to Levine 
" in tropical and therefore less 
populous districts where the 
agricultural and pastoral industries 
require more labour, the unskilled 
workman receives higher pay, 
especially if this district is unhealthy.
He added that in the railways, " the 
tropics"33.
Although Kepner argues that in 1913 " fifty cents a day was sufficient to secure 
Colombian workers around Santa Marta34, the banana sector's UFC actually paid 
a labourer CPP$ 100 as a daily35. In 1913, wages in the coffee sector's HLDE 
payments -shown in Table 8 below- were just under banana wage levels.
Figure 18
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Here the rate rises to 50 or 60 centavos32, 
navvy [earned] 70 to 80 centavos in the
TABLE 8. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1913
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w X
3 300
1 340
1 368
4 400
1 436
1 444
1 559
1 568
1 588
1 600
1 608
1 648
I 676
18 X = 463.06
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Week from 30th December, 
1912 to 5th January, 1913; Notes: w  = # of labourers; x = pay in 
CPP$ per week of 5 days.
Figure 19 below shows the barchart 
graph which illustrates the data.
Despite the above, in 1914, urban 
wage rates were not dissimilar from 
rural ones. Whilst an urban area that 
year showed " wages paid factory 
employees [varied] from 0.50 to 1.50 
per day36, the labour force in the 
banana sector was " paid at a good figure, from 60 cents to $ 1 gold per day37. 
The UFC records in fact show that a labourer was paid CPP$ 100 as a daily wage 
that year38.
HLDE records however, show that coffee sector labour became slightly less 
expensive. In fact, HLDE paid labour at CPP$ 15 per hour. Nevertheless, it seems 
that more hours were worked per day. This is why, as Table 9 below shows, the 
weighted mean average pay per week is CPP$ 524.88 (the weighted average daily 
wage rate in the NAC region coffee sector was therefore CPP$ 104.98).
Figure 19
NAC Region Coffee Sector Pay -1913
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TABLE 9. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1914
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X w
1 600
1 500
400
1 450
1 581
1 738
1 637
1 592
1 468
1 712
1 720
16 X = 524.88
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Week from 5th to 1 1 t h  
January 1914. Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s per 
week of 5 days.
Figure 20 shows the barchart graph 
which illustrates the data.
In 1915 United States Consul Guyant 
noted that " the wages paid male 
labourers ... are 0.50 to 1 per day, 
the average being about 0.60. 
Women [received] 0.25 to 0.35 
daily39. And in 1916, the UFC paid 
CPP$ 60 as daily wage rate to labourer40.
Figure 20
NAC Region Coffee Sector Pay -1914
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The coffee sector however, paid a weighted mean average daily wage rate of 
CPP$ 64.62 as Table 10 shows below.
TABLE 10. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1916
184
X w
3 40
1 50
7 70
1 80
1 100
13 X = 64.62
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Week from [illegible] 
to [illegible] 1916; Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s per 
week of 5 days.
Figure 21 shows the barchart graph 
which illustrates the data.
According to United States Agent 
Ewing, skilled construction labour in 
1916, for example, earned from " 1.50 
to 3.0041. In 1917 a rural labourer in 
the banana sector was paid CPP$ 80 
by the UFC42. The coffee sector's 
HLDE (according to Table 11 below) paid labourers a weighted mean average 
daily wage rate of CPP$ 68.22 in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.
TABLE 11. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1917
X w
181 60
223 70
63 80
16 90
13 X = 64.62
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Weeks from 2nd September 
to 30th December 1917; Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s 
per day.
Figure 22 shows the barchart graph which illustrates the data.
Figure?!
NAC Region Coffee Sector Pay -1916
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Although reference was made by United States Trade Commissioner Bell about
cheapness of labour in 1918, this 
suggest a momentary change of 
direction towards participation in the 
monetary economy on the part of 
some members of the Indigenous 
community of the NAC region. Bell 
had reported that it was in the 
Goajira where " cheap labor [was] 
obtainable43. The bottom end of 
intra-regional wage differentiation was at some point, found in this 'sub-region' 
of the NAC.
Despite this very exceptional case of cheapness of labour in the Goajira however, 
the more global content of the NAC region's level of wages remained a high one. 
United States Trade Commissioner Bell, for example, noted in 1918 that the " 
average wage per day for banana labourers [was] 0.80 [0.78 United States 
currency]"44.
Although high indeed, evidence shows banana sector agricultural pay was much 
higher that year. A rural labourer in the banana sector was paid CP$ 2 [CPP$ 200] 
in 1918 by the UFC45, while the coffee sector's HLDE, as Table 12 shows below 
was paying labourers a weighted mean average daily wage rate of CPP$ 69.41 in 
the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta.
TABLE 12. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1918
X w
5 60
9 70
2 80
1 90
13 X = 69.41
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Week of 4th to 13th 
January, 1918; Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s 
per day.
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Figure 23 further below shows the 
barchart graph which illustrates the 
data.
The end of the 1910/s decade 
witnessed some decline in NAC 
region agricultural wages. Fals-Borda 
mentions that in 1919, in the 
Hacienda La Marta Magdalena, 
wage-labourers were " paid an average of 35 centavos cash, daily, without any 
other obligations46. That same year however, a daily average wage of CP$ 0.90 
was paid to a rural labourer by the UFC47. By 1920's the nature of the product 
and inflation had affected wages.
The latter was bound to affect the UFC's expected mark-up. According to White 
the banana export sector was " so subject to market instability and wastage of 
production through rejection of fruit, [that] wage increases were a great threat to 
profits. Moreover, as the average daily wages on Colombian-owned plantations 
was under $ 1, percentage rises demanded were high'48.
This strengthened wage differentiation even more especially at intra-regional level. 
This is implied by White for example, when she noted th a t" during the best part 
of the '20s agricultural wages were kept down to between $ 0.80 and $ 1.20, 
though skilled labour made big gains - from $ 1 to $ 3 or more on the docks and 
railways - in the immediate post-war years"49.
Primary evidence however, shows that, particularly banana sector wages for 
agricultural labour, were higher and that they were making gains as sizable as 
skilled labour wages in docks and railways. Indeed, a rural labourer in the banana 
sector was paid CP$ 1.50 in 1920 by the UFC50.
Figure 23
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In the coffee sector according to HLDE51 records, an average 50 rural labourers
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per day were paid a total of CPP$ 25,640 for six (6) days labour. This amounts to 
an unweighted average daily wage rate of CPP$ 85.47 . This is not far from the 
figure HLDE's foreman revealed in 1984. Mr. Ricardo M arquez Alvarez declared 
th a t" in the 1920's, when my father, Luis Francisco Marquez Uribe, was La Dilia 
Ester's administrator, the daily wage paid to labourers was [CPP] $ 80"52.
Although Pearse noted that in 1921" common labourers in the Caribbean District 
g e t ... an average of 0.60 per day"53 he also noted th a t" in towns ... the average 
is now as high as 1.20 per day for handling cargoes"54. United States Trade 
Commissioner Bell noted, that for 1921, " wages ... averaged 0.80 per day for 
cargoe handling, cartage, and similar occupations and were increased to an 
average of 1.20 per day"55 and that the railway " regular wage [was] 1.20 per day
••56
Nevertheless, banana sector wages still seem to have remained high. For instance, 
a rural labourer in the banana sector was paid CP$ 1.50 in 1921 by the UFC57. 
Albeit in the Barranquilla cotton mills " factory employees [were] paid on a 
piecework basis and eam[ed] an average wage of 30 to 80 cents per day"58, 
wages in the coffee sector rose considerably that year at HLDE. As Table 13 
below shows, HLDE paid labourers a weighted mean average daily wage rate of 
CPP$ 98.24 in 1921.
TABLE 13. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1921
188
X w
51 69.41
68 71.47
50 72.64
67 77.61
66 80.18
78 80.71
42 88.67
70 92.86
43 94.23
57 94.39
78 94.46
67 94.75
38 97.89
37 99.03
75 100.48
42 10057
91 100.84
49 100.98
70 101.20
44 101.45
52 102.39
54 102.96
50 104.40
80 105.10
44 105.63
52 106.92
68 109.29
58 112.07
52 113.23
55 113.89
81 115.11
49 124.49
40 129.60
1918 X = 98.24
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Weeks of 25th December, 1920 
to 15th January, 1921 and 11th to 31st December, 1921; Notes: x = No. of 
labourers; w = pay in CPP$s per day.
Figure 24 below shows the barchart graph which represents the data.
But, while in that same year the UFC59 was paying one of its rural labourers a 
wage rate of CP$ 1.40 per day, the coffee sector's HLDE, as Table 14 below 
shows, was paying its labourers a weighted mean average daily wage rate of 
CPP$ 95.33 in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. Figure 25 further below shows 
the barchart graph which illustrates the data.
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In 1923, British Vice-Consul 
Maidment reported that " wages 
paid are the average for the 
Coast"60. These average wages 
followed the trend a rural labourer 
in the banana sector was paid - CP$
1.50 - during that year by the 
UFC61.
The following year, in 1924, another rural labourer in the banana sector was paid 
CP$ 1.30 by the UFC62. Although common labour pay in the NAC region urban 
areas was slightly lower than in the banana sector, it was slightly higher than in 
cotton cultivation, as the International Cotton Bulletin pointed out in 1924. It 
reported that in " the cotton zones ... the average wage for labour in Colombia is 
[CGP]$ 1.00 per day"63.
TABLE 14. NAC REGION COFFEE SECTOR PAY: 1922
X w
55 64.64
69 71.71
40 72.10
29 75.59
64 90.42
64 91.75
63 94.67
73 96.71
83 102.90
83 108.40
76 111.61
93 120.62
792 X = 95.33
Source: Hacienda La Dilia Ester. Payroll. Weeks from lst-14th January, 
1922; Notes: x = No. of labourers; w  = pay in CPP$s per day.
Skilled labour however, was paid at a higher rate. Table 15 below shows the 
wages that prevailed in 1924 in Cartagena. Figure 26 further below shows the 
barchart graph which represents the data. Wage-rates were operating in significant
Figure 24
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and distinct ways in the regional 
development process. By 1925, rural 
labour was remunerated in the 
banana sector at CP$ 2 [CPP$ 200] 
per day by the UfC64. Not 
surprisingly, in Pearse's view, by 
1926, " wages [in the NAC were] as 
high as in the United States and as 
low as lOd and Is per day in many 
parts of the interior [of Colombia]"65. Primary evidence also suggests that in the 
month of January, 1926, within the banana export sector 123 'cattle-rearing7 (UFC 
'ganaderia' account) rural labourers earned an average payroll wage of CPP$ 
101.08 per day and an actually paid average wage of CPP$ 81.23 per day 66.
TABLE 15. NAC REGION URBAN (CARTAGENA) DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES (CP$'S): 1924
Job Wage Rate
Common labourers 1.20
Gardeners 1.25
Manufacturing industries 0.60 - 150
Carpenters' helpers 1.50
Machinists and mechanics 2.00
Carpenters 2.00 - 2.25
Source: Monthly Labour Review, December, 1926, pp. 147- 148, as quoted 
by Kepner, C., Social Aspects of the Banana Industry, (New York, 1936), 
p.130.
In the same month and year, 
agricultural labourers earned payroll 
wages67 of CPP$ 64.74, CPP$ 84.89,
CPP$ 125.85 and CPP$ 130.07 
respectively, an overall simple 
unweighted average of CPP$ 101.39 
per day. Actual paid wages68 were 
CPP$ 51.38, CPP$ 64.40, CPP$ 101.80 
and CPP$ 101.01 respectively, or, an overall simple unweighted mean average of
NAC Region Urban Daily Pay -1924  
(Cartagena Nominal Wage Rates)
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CPP$ 79.65 .
Primary evidence from the banana sector's UFC equally suggest wages paid in 
January, 1926, were as detailed in Table 16 below.
TABLE 16. BANANA SECTOR NOMINAL DAILY WAGES (CPP$):1926
Type of Work No. of Employees Payroll Pay Actual Pay
1.discharging 67 83.98 80.07
2.wharf department 127 152.60 75.41
3.engineering 134 216.23 117.54
4/picking-up' 61 535.52 524.55
5.1and personnel 64 641.87 623.10
6.1oading 64 1059.41 1027.74
517 Xi = 378.20 Xii = 325.62
Source: United Fruit Company. Private Archives. Santa Marta Division. Payroll Index 
for the month of January, 1926.
Figure 27 shows a barchart graph 
which illustrates the data.
If it is considered that (i) personnel 
working in these different sections 
above were seasonal urban, unskilled 
labour operating within the banana 
export sector, and (ii) that according 
to UFC records, there were four ship collections per year of fruit at port (based 
on cuttings carried on between October - January and February - May69, some 
wage rate weighted averages can be showed.
First, there is the daily payroll pay weighted mean average wage rate of CPP$ 
378.20 on the one particular haul. Second, there is the daily actual (payroll pay 
plus deductions for merchandise store purchases, medical treatment or cash 
advances) pay weighted mean average wage rate of CPP$ 325.62.
NAC Region Banana Sector Pay -1926  
(Daily Nominal Wage Rates)
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Despite the statistical description of the data above, a simple rural labourer in the 
banana sector however, was still being paid CP$ 2 per day in 1926 by the UFC70. 
But, the year 1927 showed considerable difference in regional wages. Indeed, the 
level of wages to be paid at which a contract was being negotiated with several 
hundred workmen from Puerto Rico was reported by the International Cotton 
Bulletin to be " [CP]$ 1.20 (about 4s lOd) per day"71.
Urban labour wage rates in the region's cotton textile industry were not too 
dissimilar. It could be " established that in the factories and workshops that 
operate in the department of Atlantico [NAC region] close to one thousand 
labourers work daily earning maximum salaries of [CP$] 1 and minimum salaries 
of [CP$] 0.50 ... [working] children between 12 and 16 years of age do not reach 
300 ... [and] earn a maximum salary of [CP$] 0.90 and a m inimum salary of [CP$] 
0.55"72.
Table 17 below shows rural labour wage rates in the banana sector in 1927.
TABLE 17. NAC REGION BANANA SECTOR DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES IN CPP$s: 1927
No. of Employees Payroll Pay Actual Pay
51 48.81 39.87
83 58.42 46.85
19 71.67 34.98
96 78.33 5052
117 80.05 70.29
138 84.41 63.02
116 86.86 77.36
71 97.93 90.95
65 103.92 88.31
185 110.48 93.16
101 114.31 10057
59 115.45 106.44
135 138.33 115.42
134 154.62 12157
160 160.62 124.97
148 164.77 108.23
_56 255.04 251.75
1734 X = 117.40 X = 95.25
Source: United Fruit Company. Private Archives. Santa Marta Division. 
Payroll Index forthe month of January, 1927.
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Figure 28 shows the barchart graph 
which illustrates the data. These 
wage rates suggest first, a weighted 
mean average payroll wage rate of 
CPP$ 117.40 per day.
The fact remains however, that still 
in 1927, a rural labourer in the 
banana sector was being paid CP$ 2 per day by the UFC73. On the other hand, 
the coffee sector, according to Monsalve, " was paying male and female 
[labourers] daily wage rates of [CP]$ 1.30 and of [CP]$ 0.75 for children. During 
the rainy season, labour is paid by the hour, at [CP]$ 0.10 and [CP]$ 0.20 per 
hour"74 in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. If labour was paid by piecework 
in the coffee sector, it was done so " at [CP]$ 0.15 to [CP]$ 0.16 per garrafon [Italics 
added] or galon, a measure which is equivalent to 25 pounds of coffee cherries. 
A good [coffee cherry] collector earns a daily wage of from [CP]$ 2.70 to [CP]$ 
3.00 by this system"75.
It was precisely at this time that Pearse claimed that wages on the NAC were " 
injurious to development of the economic life in the country"76. Indeed, Rippy 
has quoted the UFCs annual report to state that the UFC's annual payroll in 
Colombia was " said to amount to some $ 4,000,000 -it was reported as being 
$3,830,462.14 in 1927"77.
Although we have no evidence for NAC coffee sector wages for 1928-30, it is 
probable that they remained at the 1927 levels -if not higher- as the nation 
witnessed a sharp increase in wages in 1928 as a result of foreign private 
investment.
It followed, as mentioned earlier, the United States indemnity payment to 
Colombia for the former's contribution to the latter's loss of its province of
R g if* 2 8
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Panama. In 1928, according to Rippy, " wages more than doubled "78. The NAC 
region banana sector wage levels in 1928 certainly were confirmed to be high.
Table 18 below shows this primary evidence for the banana sector.
TABLE 18. NAC REGION BANANA SECTOR DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES (CPP$s): 1928
No. of Employees Payroll Pay Actual Pay
39 50.10 44.76
78 57.43 51.76
72 96.07 69.40
86 121.16 99.18
195 158.51 115.50
293 268.41 220.83
763 Xi = 174.74 Xii = 139.62
Source: United Fruit Company. Private Archives. Santa Marta Division. 
Payroll Index for the month of January, 1928.
Figure 29 shows the barchart which 
illustrates the data. It suggests an 
weighted mean average payroll pay 
of CPP$ 174.74 per day.
Further evidence indicates that 
agricultural labourers in the banana 
sector in 1929 kept earning relatively 
high wages. Although the lack of observations for payroll pay and missing 
observations on two occasions of the number of labourers involved suggest 
averages and dispersions are not worth estimating, the data in Table 19 below do 
suggest a weighted mean average payroll pay wage rate of CPP$ 106.51 per day 
and a weighted mean average actual pay wage rate of CP$ 90.98 per day. Figure 
30 further below shows the barchart graph which illustrates the data.
Rural labour in the banana sector however, continued to be paid CP$ 2 in 1928
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by the UFC79 as well as in 1929 and 1930 as the UFC records80 show. This is in 
line with Herrera-Soto and Romero-Castaneda's contention that wages fluctuated 
" between $ 1.00 and $ 1.65 gold pesos per day"81, with Greaves' reference to 
wages of " $ 1 to $ 1.50 daily by piecework on the banana plantations ... [whilst 
the] ... average elsewhere [is] 50 cents to $ l"82 and w ith Rollin's reference to 
level of wages in the banana sector: " the highest wages were $ 2 gold per day 
and the lower ones were $ 1.20"83. In fact, British Vice-Consul Gamett-Lomax 
reported that " the workers in this [Santa Marta banana zone] region enjoy 
remarkably high wages ... in the banana zone an average of 6s. 6d. for farm 
work"84.
TABLE 19. NAC REGION BANANA SECTOR DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES (CPP$s): 1929
No. of Employees Payroll Pay Actual Pay
68 58.99 5436
69 n.a. 64.25
n.a. n.a. 7153
401 n.a 78.83
76 149.03 11750
115 n.a. 135.27
39 n.a. 144.10
n.a. n.a. 160.78
144 )Q = 106.51 Xii = 90.98
Source: United Fruit Company. Private Archives. Santa Marta Division. 
Payroll Index for the month of January, 1929.
All this data seems to give some weight to the suggestion that in 1929, according 
to the Colombian Trade Review $ 3,839,642.oo worth of wages were paid by the 
UFC in Colombia85.
Wages related to other UFC activity were also high. Gamett-Lomax confirmed that 
" [UFC owned Santa Marta] railway labour is paid 7s. 6d. to 8s. per day"86 and 
th a t" rates for Stevedore on Board [w ere]... Checkers on board - $ 3.00 per day 
of 8 hours ... Foreman on board - $ 1.85 per day of 8 hours ... [and] Labourers on 
board - $ 1.70 per day of 8 hours"87. This suggests that w hat we pointed out 
earlier is not too unreasonable. The banana sector seems to have been absorbing
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the greater part of the labour force in 
the region and rates of wages appear 
to be higher compared to other 
sectors.
Pearse believed that economic 
progress was being " achieved at 
too rapid a rate as it had upset the 
wages and the cost of living in the 
country"88. At this point however, it should be emphasised again that by the mid 
1920's, investment into public transportation infrastructure reflected the lavish 
public and private credit from which the national and regional Colombian 
governments benefited. This was a result of (i) the United States government's 
indemnity payment for its overwhelming contribution to the nation's loss of 
Panama (as mentioned in an earlier chapter) and (ii) the subsequent confirmation 
by the Kemmerer Financial Mission of Colombia's good bill of financial health.
Therefore, in addition to the existent NAC region high-wage economy, these 
inflows of cash especially resulted in exceptional interior higher waged road 
construction labour. As the United States National Industrial Conference Board 
suggested, " the extremely rapid development of public works, requiring large
borrowings in foreign countries, has affected not only the fiscal position of the
Government, but has also created a serious situation in the interior labor market, 
for in order to obtain a sufficient supply of workers for the completion of the 
various construction projects, wages were increased above the level paid by the 
domestic industries"89. The distortions of this exception in the interior is reflected 
by Deas' comment that in 1922, " a peon's wage employed in public works was 
greater than that of a mayor"90.
But it was unquestionably heavy United States corporate investment such as the 
UFC's, in addition to their ability not just to decide, but to afford the payment 
of higher wages, which eventually negatively affected the NAC region.
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Pearse confirmed this when he stated th a t" on the Coast, where the United States 
corporations have feverishly devoted themselves t o ... bananas, labour is becoming 
so scarce and consequently high in price that the establishment or extension of 
cotton growing in this section or of any other industry that has to compete with 
the world's markets seems impossible"91.
H e noted th a t " cotton picking is paid at a higher rate on the Atlantic Coast of 
Colombia than in Texas .. In addition to the demand for labour by the American 
corporations, the rapid development of road construction has necessitated the 
withdrawal of many farm labourers and the scarcity of labour brought about by 
this road extension has also increased wages"92.
By 1930, despite the prevalent disadvantageous physical conditions in the NAC 
region and serious problems of labour shortage, as will be analyzed in Chapter 
VI, there was still room for some sections of the region's labour force to 
'proletarize' at high premiums and for others to choose the leisure ' alternative. 
Jones noted th a t "... good wages [were] paid by the United Fruit Company"93.
But he also added that there was an " ease of life on the lower slopes [of the 
Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta] where Indians may live without much work"94. 
He was referring of course to monetary remunerated 'work' because, as he also 
ind icated ," most of the labour on the coffee plantations ... make by piece work, 
from $ 1 to $ 1.25 per day, well above the average of $ 0.50 to $ 1.20 per day for 
all Colombia"95.
He equally noted that the UFC's " holdings, divided into forty farms in several 
districts, require some 10,000 laborers who make, by piece work, [receiving wages] 
from $ 1 to $ 1.50 per day, 160 foreigners and 5,000 head of cattle for draft, beef 
and milk "96.
By the end of the 20's - beginning of the 30's - wages in the NAC region were 
higher than elsewhere in Colombia. As White pu t i t , " the effects on the [United
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Fruit] company of wage increases were re-doubled by the new demands resulting 
from the contracted planters. Labour was in relatively short supply in the area, 
and ... wages were higher in the Banana Zone than in other parts of the 
country"97. According to Kepner, " $ 1.50 a day ... was given in the same year 
[1930] by a special commission of the Colombian congress as the average wage 
for banana workers in the Santa Marta district"98. Wyle equally claimed that in 
" 1931 laborers in the banana fields received from 1 to 1.50 pesos a day, which 
was a high wage compared with other wages in Colombia"99.
This was the epitome of banana sector high wages. Such was their effect that by 
1932, the " [wage] rates were reduced to 80 centavos a day and to 60 centavos in 
1 9 3 3 "i°° kepner went further, claiming that by the end of 1933 daily wages " 
were returned to 49 cents"101.
Wyle's figures represent a decline of 46.6 % in NAC region wages in 1932 and a 
60 % in 1933. Kepner's represents an overwhelming 67.3 % decline. Nevertheless, 
White suggests that a reduction to a 60 centavos [CPP$ 60] wage was the UFC's 
response to the Depression's effects on profit and investment that produced " a 
massive cut in wages; in 1931, with unemployment on the plantations estimated 
at up to 80 %, wages went down to 60c., even lower than before the 1928 
strike"102. In the UFC in 1932 she argued, " all wages below $ 100 per month 
were again reduced by 10 %"103.
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(ii) The Interior
It is possible to set aside data on wage rates for the first three decades of the 
century found in the primary sources noted in my introduction. Some interior 
wage differentiation is therefore apparent for years 1888, 1900, 1903,1907, 1909, 
1912,1926 and 1930. Wage differentiation emerges from other sources especially 
for years 1911,1913, and 1927. The figures are reasonably consistent in developing 
a result of a relatively low-wage interior. We discuss findings from 1909 onwards.
In contrast to high NAC region wages, the interior of the country (in the 
departm ent of Antioquia) showed particularly low wages in 1909. A good 
example was in mining. As United States Consul Demers pointed out: " mine 
labourers ... [were] paid from 25 cents to 50 cents per day "104. In the year 1911 
a beer factory in Medellin, department of Antioquia, payed a " peon's daily wage 
of forty "105.
In the same year, Levine reported th a t" the population is numerous, employees 
find all the hands they require and wages are low. This is the case of the 
temperate and healthy districts such as the famous valley of Pereira, and in the 
high fertile districts like the plain of Bogota and in the valley of RioNegro in [the 
departm ent of] Antioquia. In these districts the wages of the ordinary m an does 
not exceed 35 to 40 centavos [gold]. In the departments of Boyaca and 
Cundinamarca, with their great haciendas ... the workman receives a wage 
apparently smaller "106.
The exception in the interior, Levine pointed out, was the railway navvy who 
earned from " 50 to 60 centavos [gold] in the colder districts"107 and urbanized 
peasantry in the nation's capital:" an unskilled workman earns in Bogota 60 to 70 
centavos [gold] for labour which in the country is worth less ,l108.
Wages were so low in the interior that Restrepo, although not really mentioning 
relevant quantitative data, was in no doubt in 1919 that, everyone in the labour
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force -particularly in the coffee-producing interior- was subject to very low wages. 
He stated: " another very valuable natural circumstance, of which the coffee 
industry and all the rest in Colombia enjoy, is the cheapness of the labour force. 
The indigenous, black or white poor have to work in haciendas from 'sun to sun' 
for miserable wages"109.
He did not m ind profit-making. W hat concerned him was greediness and 
selfishness in labour rem uneration:"... it is not other's property that pains us, that 
is, the fabulous profits of entrepreneurs. W hat pains us is the injustice exercised 
upon the worker, factor of that creation of wealth, when his labour is stingyly 
paid and he is depressed, from a social and moral point of view ,,n0.
By 1927, adult male wages in the interior were as follows: " [for the department 
of] Cauca, 1000 labourers earn daily wages of from [CGP$] 0.20 to [CGP$] 1... [for 
the departm ent of] Tolima, 600 labourers earn an average daily wage of [CGP$] 
0.60 ... [for the department of] Cundinamarca, labourers employed in industrial 
establishments earn from [CGP$] 0.35 to [CGP$] 1.50 per day Hlu.
This suggests wage differentiation of average daily wage rates of CGP$ 0.60 for 
Cauca and Tolima, and CGP$ 0.925, or an overall average for the interior of CGP$ 
0.71 for adult male interior daily wages.
For minors, wages were " [for the department of] Cauca ... from [CGP$] 0.20 to 
[CGP$] 0.60 per day112 or an overall minors' average daily wage of CGP$ 0.40. 
And for 'women and children' wages w e re " [for the departm ent of] N arino ... the 
average daily wage is [CGP$] 0.35 ... [and in the city of] Bogota it fluctuates 
between [CGP$] 0.30 and [CGP$] 0.60"113 or an overall 'women and children' 
daily wage average of CGP$ 0.45.
Specifically, in the coffee areas of the interior, according to M onsalve," during the 
harvest, daily wages including food, are from CGP$ 0.40 for men; CGP$ 0.20 to 
CGP$ 0.30 for women and CGP$ 0.10 to CGP$ 0.20 for children. The above data
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on interior nominal wages is illustrated by the bar chart graphs in Figures 31 & 
32 below.
Three main points emerge when 
wage ranges and their limits are 
assessed. First, that for years 1900 to 
1913, interior rural nominal daily 
wage rates, which we define as w10, 
showed a range close to CGP$ 0.01 
< w10 < CGP$ 0.375).
For years 1900 - 1912, interior urban 
nominal daily wage rates, which we define as wn, showed a range close to CGP$ 
0.17 < wn < CGP$ 0.55.
Second, that for years 1924 - 1927, interior agricultural nominal wage rates, 
oscillated from a relatively high level of CGP$ 1.00 in 1924 down to one of CGP$
0.454 in 1926. Wage rates however, leaped again in 1927 to levels of CGP$ 0.71 for 
male labourers, CGP$ 0.45 for female labourers and particularly, to a relatively 
high level for children of CGP$ 0.40.
For years 1921 - 1928, interior urban 
daily nominal wage rates oscillated 
from a relatively low wage range 
level of CGP$ (0.35 - 0.47) in 1921 up 
to wage levels in 1927 /  1928 of 
CGP$ 1.71/ CGP$1.69 for males, 
CGP$ 0.75/ CGP$ 0.73 for females 
and CGP$ 0.50 for children 
respectively.
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The main implication of the movements of these wage and wage range level is
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that interior urban wages were higher than agricultural ones. At the turn of the 
century (1900) interior general agricultural nominal wages were between CP$ 1 
and CP$ 1.50. A relatively high wage rate of CGP$ 0.655 was paid in the interior 
coffee sector in 1903. But these were exceptional cases, as they were due to an 
inflation-ridden war. If anything, they were higher than urban domestic 
household labour, which in 1900 was between CP$ 0.17 and CP$ 0.33.
Nevertheless, by the beginning of the second decade (year 1911) urban wages 
levels were higher (CGP$ 0.40) than agricultural wage range levels (CGP$ 0.15 - 
CGP$ 0.35) suggest. Indeed, the second and third decade re-enforce this 
behaviour. The urban wage rate for 1912 at CGP$ 0.55 and the wage range levels 
for 1921 at (CGP$ 0.35 - CGP$ 0.47) were higher than agricultural wage range 
levels for years 1913-1926 which were placed at CGP$ 0.375 in 1913 and at CGP$ 
0.454 in 1926. This was despite the rather exceptional fact that in 1924 agricultural 
wages were over twice as high as urban ones (CGP$1.00).
Third, that for years 1926-1930, interior urban nominal wage rates were higher 
than their rural counterparts. Indeed, urban wages for 1927 /  1928 were at levels 
of CGP$ 1.71 /  CGP$ 1.69 for male, CGP$ 0.75 /  CGP$ 0.73 for females and CGP$ 
0.50 for children, whereas, agricultural wages were at levels of CGP$ 0.71 for 
males, CGP$ 0.45 for females and CGP$ 0.40 for children. The coffee sector in 
particular showed wage ranges from CGP$(0.10 - 0.20) to CGP$(0.20 - 0.40) in 
1927 and a wage level of CGP$ 0.85 for 1930.
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CHAPTER VI
LABOUR MARKET IMPERFECTIONS IN THE NAC REGION
(i) Imperfections in the National and International Factor M arket
The foremost influence that factor market imperfections in the NAC region had 
over labour mobility was expressly to decrease it. Before discussing them it is 
useful to have in mind that economic growth1 or output of goods and services 
per head of the population depends on natural resources available and on human 
behaviour.
Differences in human behaviour therefore influence economic growth. One 
proximate cause of growth is the effort to economize. One way this effort shows 
itself is in mobility. According to Lewis, if the effort to economize is not made, 
"either because the desire does not exist or because either custom or institutions 
discourage its expression, then economic growth will not occur."2
In discussing the marketability of labour, and because economic growth involves 
change, it is necessary that labour should be mobile. If societies rely on market 
processes, they will dismiss labour surplus. Equally, enterprises that want labour, 
will bid for it by offering wages.
Labour is mobile only as far as it is dependent on wage em ploym ent As it is hard 
to get labour where it needs land to satisfy everybody's requirements, one 
condition of economic growth is the creation of a landless class.
Creation of landless lands in the NAC region originated from the hacienda system 
which deprived peasants of such a factor. But the separation of people from the 
land generates protest against their conversion into members of the proletariat in 
a compulsory way.
Constraints to labour mobility surfaced from the hacienda system of ownership
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of the land and by institutions that tied people to particular occupations (as 
jornaleros) and to employers (hacendados) such as class differentiation. Other 
institutions such as the extended family system or generous social security 
provisions existed which deprived the individual of the incentive to seek 
remunerative employment.
Although perhaps it may not be entirely convincing, some discussion of unearthed 
evidence of failures of projects to bring in foreign labour is presented here. Of all 
the material researched, this is unfortunately all that emerged. We can only say 
that undoubtedly further research needs to be done on this matter.
After all, the basis of migrant labour from abroad (or from the interior of 
Colombia for that matter) could not have been easy. A worker m ay have had to 
consider more than the monetary cost of moving to the NAC. N ot only may he 
or she have been reluctant to leave familiar scenes and friends and associates and 
begin a new life in a very different region. He or she may still have been more 
reluctant to forfeit possibly more satisfactory non pecuniary elements of income. 
Equally, reluctance may have existed to move to a different region or country 
especially one with different customs.
The monetary cost of learning a new job or moving to a different place is an 
investment of capital. The investment probably was too high for interior people. 
But did the state provide investment? Did the state provide free training? Did it 
pay labourers' fares when moving to jobs in another region or country? Was 
emigration (overseas or regional) subsidized by the state? These questions are not 
unimportant, but are obviously material for further research.
Usually investment of capital m ust be made by the labourer himself. He will not 
make it unless he believes that the improvement in his future earnings will repay 
him with interest. Some labourers may not have had the necessary capital. Others 
may have considered that even the probability of repaym ent plus interest as say, 
increased wages for the rest of their working lives, was not sufficient to
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compensate than for the sacrifice of the capital sum. And the prospect of increased 
earnings would probably have tempted a younger worker more than an older one.
Precisely, the most immediate relevance of population trends is connected with 
the age composition of the population rather than its total numbers. Adequate 
mobility of labour is a necessary condition, for example, if there is to be success 
of an employment policy that aims high. But at the time, there appears to have 
been no such policy in Colombia.
The ageing of the labour force actually helps mobility. So, if indeed the interior 
and reasonably cost-effective overseas population did not show mobility to the 
NAC region, it seems that they did not show signs of ageing.
Changes in demand and in technical knowledge are constantly taking place and 
providing incentives through the price mechanism for labour to move between 
occupations and industries. Perhaps as interior people were dependent on a staple 
industry such as coffee, which expanded its production in the twenties, meant 
they felt no need to move3.
This expansion was based on traditional methods of cultivation of an extensive 
nature, with low technology. But costs of production were kept low, as most 
peasant producers maintained a standard of living which bordered on subsistence 
level4.
Moreover, according to Palacios, " it is purely academic to advise the small 
growers of Cauca, Narino, or Santander [all interior] that instead of [cultivating] 
coffee, they migrate to the cities or change their type of planting: coffee, due to 
its secure market, and to the topographic characteristics of the land on which it 
is cultivated, does not have a high opportunity cost, social or private; rather it 
produces a relatively fair income for the peasant. Perhaps the same can be said 
of coffee cultivation in many individual comarcas (districts) of zones elsewhere, 
more densely planted with coffee."5
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The impact of accelerated economic growth was felt but at specific regional 
centres. These were, for example, the interior coffee producing areas, the banana 
plantations along the Magdalena in the NAC region and the oilfields of Santander 
[interior].
Our argum ent implies that there was insufficient interregional migration within 
Colombia. However, much of the evidence that surfaced from the wide range of 
sources investigated only have to do with cultural differences. This may not be 
entirely plausible and undoubtedly, it would clarify matteRS more if these sources 
consulted had provided any evidence on information imperfections, costs of 
transportation and differences of cost of living between regions. It is a major snag 
that they did not and further research is welcome here.
The problem of information imperfections really boils down to this: labourers 
search for wage offers, and employers search for wage demands, until the 
expected marginal return equals the marginal cost of the search6. The information 
a labourer has on the labour market is capital. It is produced at the cost of the 
search and it yields a higher wage rate than on average would be received in its 
absence.
The return from investment on information consists in a more efficient allocation 
of the labour force. The better informed the labour market is, the closer each 
labourer's marginal product is to its maximum. The function of information is 
therefore to prevent fewer efficient employers from obtaining labour and 
inefficient labourers from obtaining the better jobs. The labour markets display the 
same characteristics. However, their analysis is complicated further by the lack of 
homogeneity of labourers. To a lesser extent, the non-wage conditions of 
employment, complicate matters more. We find it difficult to believe interior 
labourers were ill-informed about high wages offered by the NAC region's UFC. 
This is more so the case because of the UFC's efforts to recruit labour in the 
interior rather than abroad, as can be seen further on.
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Concerning transportation costs, it is certain that the key to development 
throughout history has been transport. The burden of the interior coffee 
producers, where wages were relatively cheap7, was unquestionably that of 
transport costs. It is not too farfetched therefore to assume transport costs were 
equal burdens to interior labourers wishing to go north - at the time, the land of 
"yellow gold."
Regarding the difference in cost of living between regions, the best possible way 
of establishing them is through serious research on food-prices, as Pardo-Parra did 
in Bogota. This no doubt represents a most mammoth task. Certainly the 
government indexes in Appendix 24 show that from 1923 to 1930, the cost of 
living was higher in general in the NAC region rather than in the interior of 
Colombia.
But we should have in mind that already Palacios has pointed out early on his 
book that with th e " succession of agricultural export cycles of short and medium- 
term duration . . .  a certain internal mobility of resources within the Colombian 
economy"8 existed. But he very clearly stresses that "interregional migration of 
labour was more restricted."9 Not unimportant is the fact that, as mentioned in 
Chapter II, labourers in some interior regions were forcibly isolated by an already 
feeble labour market, forbidden by police law regulations to engage in working 
activities other than their own hacienda.
Palacios went further to the point by specifying th a t" in each of the three regions 
which developed coffee production ... that is ... (Santanderes), ... (Boyaca - 
Cundinamarca - Tolima) [all interior provinces], labour supply remained elastic 
except during times of conflict."10
This suggests there was great labour mobility, yes, but within the interior. The rise 
of occupational mobility of the labour force —as a result of the expansion of the 
internal markets— had essentially geographical characteristics11. This is to say, it 
had regional characteristics.
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The adjustment between industries and occupations may have been eased by an 
expanding population attached to different levels of productivity, costs of 
transport and agricultural techniques.
W hat is suggested here is that the theme of interregional labour mobility that 
affected the NAC region is difficult to address in this thesis. The lack of studies 
and data about the topic is one reason. However, although they may not entirely 
account for the insufficient flows of labour to the NAC, some aspects of academic 
interest are worth discussing as a possibility. They should help to clarify the 
argum ent that there was insufficient interregional migration from the interior of 
Colombia to the NAC region. These aspects are epitomised by factors mentioned 
above such as information imperfections, costs of transportation, and differences 
in costs of living between regions.
One m ust also consider the argument that non-monetary components of income 
(which were possibly higher in coffee than in bananas) m ust be taken into account 
—in addition to simple money wages in interior coffee, and NAC region bananas. 
In an earlier chapter we included these non-pecuniary elements in interior coffee 
real wages and found them still to be lower than NAC region banana real wages 
w ithout the inclusion of these elements.
Similarly, arguments which suggest that attitudes to risk on the part of peasants 
w ith some access to land who are faced with the choice of becoming landless 
proletarians in banana cultivation and incomes over yearly cycles (to allow for 
different seasons in coffee and bananas) should equally be considered.
No evidence on attitudes to risk emerged throughout our research, but we can 
present some minor discussion on seasonality of employment and income over a 
yearly cycle. After all, analysing labour markets implies looking at the 
money-value of labour (for the labour-value of money as the unit of account). This 
is w hy we presented the fundamental evidence of high wages in a previous 
chapter.
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It could be argued that these high wages are not only partially explained by 
factors to be discussed subsequently such as a constraint (scarcity of labour) and 
societal response (character of the labour force), but by the further rise in wages 
created by a labour shortage that higher wages initially induced.
Thus, it could be suggested that the UFC used its position to raise wages 
"artificially high." That is to say, that it could be argued that the presence of 
monopoly in the region produced even higher wage levels - above the high ones 
already ruling in an economy distorted by labour shortage. Exploring this is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.
Scarcity of labour will be discussed further on, but there was a good market 
reason to explain the behaviour of wages. This was in particular, seasonality of, 
and the perishable nature of the fruit. Undoubtedly, the seasonality and fragility 
of perishable foodstuffs, such as the banana fruit, required rapid and consistent 
work and handling. Therefore, because of these factors, an upw ard trend of wages 
became an economic reality for the NAC banana sector.
White has indeed asserted that " the dock and rail workers came to be a 
specialised workforce for the UFCO, the great part of their work being dependent 
on the orders for the banana boats. The dockers had to load the delicate banana 
stems without damage or bruising, and loading gangs employed under contract 
by United Fruit worked with the trains picking up the bunches of fruit from the 
plantation stations for transport to the quayside."12
Kepner noted that "these were not average wages but potential returns to fast 
workers, that relatively high wages are paid to attract laborers to new 
developments, and that some of these tasks . . .  are performed by highly skilled 
itinerant workers who travel from place to place and thus are unemployed during 
a considerable part of the year . . . Much employment in banana districts is 
in term itten t... fruit is not cut every day."13
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It is at this point that the nature of the product emerges as an additional 
explanation for high wages. The seasonal and perishable nature of the banana as 
a foodstuff, called for immediate action once vessels arrived for loading. 
Therefore, wages had to be attractively above average.
United States Trade Commissioner Bell for example, indicated that "banana 
handling . . .  [ was ] . . .  costly on account of the perishable quality of the fruit 
and the necessity of careful and rapid transport to steamers."14
In similar fashion, Pearse confirmed the crucial link between seasonality, 
perishability and high wages. He explained that " because when bananas are 
ripening and a steamer is waiting to be loaded there m ust be plenty of workers 
w ho perform their task quickly, otherwise severe losses are incurred and for that 
reason, high wages are paid. This has spoilt the population."15
Cultural attitudes about waged labour may be another reason (of which perhaps 
more evidence is available) of why there was insufficient interregional migration 
from the interior of Colombia to the NAC region.
Several views deal with elements such as climate, unwillingness to work, race and 
the interrelationship of them, as was seemingly the trend in academic thought at 
the time (and perhaps today). But in essence, the cultural attitudes of the people 
of the NAC region about waged labour are fairly well represented.
To begin with, we note what United States Agent Ewings' view was on the 
matter. He deemed th a t" as a rule, the character of the labour in the Coast cities 
is not satisfactory for construction work, since the men cannot always be 
depended upon. The climate has an adverse effect on their energy and their
disposition to perform day or task w o rk  and the efficiency of labour of all
classes is low."16
This remark supported United States Trade Commissioner Bell's caveat that "
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labour is abundant in the cold country and scarce in the hot; laborers in the cold 
country are strong, energetic, sober and obedient; in the hot country, they are not 
so satisfactory."17 We consider this significant because it suggests early 
rationalisation such as the incidence of obedience upon efficiency of labour and 
therefore growth and development.
The NAC region invited severe misinterpretation of the nature of economic 
activity. Witness only Bell's observation that "cattle rearing . . .  seem to appeal 
very much to the people on the Atlantic Coast; it is evidently an occupation 
requiring very little hard work, and work which need not be performed at 
absolutely fixed periods. It seems to be work for lazy people."18
In reality, the business of cattle rearing was, according to Fals-Borda, the " [sic] 
the most productive of all, an economic benefit from a co-fratemal formula [of 
relations between indigenous, black and white NAC region people]."19 He 
emphasised that "cattle wealth . . . would have not been possible without the 
[NAC region's] poor gente morena [brown people or Mestizos]."20
The "natural and ecological rhythm conditioned social and economic development 
a n d ... the common people [of the NAC region] —black and Indigenous above all- 
-without external aid created the necessary technique that converted the 
spontaneous movements of herds of cattle into an ordered and productive system 
[existent today]. Unfortunately the wealth produced was almost all for the 'whites' 
of other parts."21
Fals-Borda equally analyzed how the "[sic] [NAC region] indigenous peasant 
developed [mutual] interest coalitions with the dominant groups with the purpose 
of carrying forward economic production tasks of m utual benefit . . .  as a form 
of symbioses."22
These "symbiotic coalitions were experimented specially in the management of 
imported elements such as cattle and the organisation of herds and estates . . .
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where criollo [Italics added] whites, indigenous and black [NAC region people] 
succeeded in inventing together a fundamental institution: the hacienda'™
Cattle rearing was therefore not 'work for lazy people' bu t for people contributing 
techniques that improved methods so well that indeed, after several centuries, 
gave the impression of laziness'. As Fals-Borda pointed out, the "Spaniards had 
no knowledge of herding cattle from one place to another . . . ;  they know how 
to conduct sheep . .  . but here [in the NAC region] they would have drowned 
trying to do their first embalse. This is no simple matter. You m ust know how and 
experience and knowing your environment do count."24
Another example is British cotton expert Pearse's opinion of the NAC's labour 
force: " for if we begin to generalise from what we see at the Coast (and 
unfortunately most travellers do not enter any further, and form their opinions 
from what they have seen at the Coast) we shall obtain a very erroneous picture 
( . . . )  the population consisting mostly of black people of African origin, 
indolent or even lazy, towns are backward; whilst in the interior we see the real 
Colombia ( . . . )  with white population, much more industrious and enterprising 
than at the Coast."25
Coming from such an serious analyst of economic conditions, Pearse's appraisal 
reflects what should -by any standards- now be a discredited and inadequate 
colonial interpretation of development. Surely this is so because today's 
interpretation is diametrically different.
As Kalmanovitz n o ted ," laziness' is the attitude of perm anent sabotage that the 
arrendatario develops concerning the appropriation of his surplus labour. If 
laziness still exists when the peasant is the owner of all his labour, it is because 
the tropic allows him to reproduce subsistence with very little work and a very 
low level of needs . . . which makes the landowners or capitalists gnash their 
teeth when this human type refuses to become waged labour."26
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Halperin-Donghi also wrote that "complaints about the invincible laziness of the 
hispanoamerican peasant . . .  are evidence of an insoluble problem: that peasant 
is tried to be made a sort of hybrid that has the advantages of the m odem  
proletariat (rapidity, efficiency due not only to generic will to work but also from 
a rational attitude towards labouring) and those of the traditional rural labourer 
in Latin America (scarce demands of wages and other rewards, mansedumbre 
[docility] to accept a discipline that -insufficiently rationalised itself- includes vast 
margins of arbitrariness."27
It m ust be pointed out however, that the obvious contradiction implied in 
colour-cum-class differentiation in labour efficiency. This for example is implied 
in Whitbeck's appraisal: " In the tropics, white men as a rule, avoid physical 
exertion or take it only mildly. They find it more agreeable to have work done by 
the coloured peoples and thus have established a dependence upon them. It is 
neither fashionable nor agreeable in the tropical highlands to do manual labour 
if one is white and the fashion has long since spread into the highlands as well. 
The joy of physical strength and ability to achieve which are possessed by people 
of middle latitudes react favourably upon them. Ambition and aspiration are 
nourished and under some conditions, a virility of race and will to advance are 
maintained."28
This appears not to have been so to Vergara y Velasco, who believed that "great 
is the race that with such small numbers occupied such vast territory in a real and 
material way, and was in such a vigorous way, that its Mestizos, centuries later, 
do not show even the slightest sign of atavism towards the Indigenous race, and 
in the country but only the tongue of Castillo is spoken, and with considerable 
purity. The Colombian mountain people are pure white race, and what a race! 
Formed in battle with a land that demands titans for its domination, asks no one 
favours when it comes to resistance for work and some doses of intelligence, and 
fortunately, immense for the Fatherland, is and shall be Latin race."29
Nevertheless, the NAC region's labour force was, largely, more diversely mixed.
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This played a significant role in its character. As Fals-Borda has suggested, "we 
m ay say that in the [North Atlantic] Coastal reg ion ... the 'cosmic race', triethnical, 
has set in, that of which the great Mexican thinker Jose Vasconcelos spoke of."30 
It is possible that the economic development process was stinted in the NAC 
region because the ordinary people of the region had deeply embedded 
convictions of their preferences. They seem to have displayed a more acute 
political understanding of what it meant to be a factor of production and how best 
to make the most of it.
By contrast, interior people were seen in quite a dissimilar way. Restrepo was 
perceptive about these regional differences and the way it affected wage levels. 
He believed that the interior's labouring classes," if it was true that their energy 
and dexterity are poor, it derives from precisely the same condition into which 
their reduced wage oppresses them."31
A native of the interior himself, he was disgusted with the 'aberration' and 
'inhum anity' of so low pay in the coffee and mining interior: " one m ust react 
against all these aberrations that are so inhuman, are also bad economically. Free 
and well-remunerated work is the only one that can be an efficient cooperator of 
positive industries."32
W hat is not considered of course, is the general ethos that has historically 
manifested itself with the NAC region's population as a whole. Fals-Borda best 
reminds us of this when he explained that "a rhythm  of work and a personal 
conception of time and space developed in our culture that did not allow the 
flourishing of the lordships nor the rapid development of m odem  capitalism . .  
. these attitudes are related to the [NA] Coastal people's tendency towards 
neglect or apathy, with indiscipline, informality and non-commitance, with a sense 
of hum our and an allergy towards the military . . . such a realistic, isolating, 
self-reliable adaptation implies the recognition of the half fatalistic incidence of 
environmental factors that go much further than hum an force and control . . . 
Here in the [NA] Coast the watch is not the Lord and does not govern the budget,
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and no strict Teutonic rigour can be applied although things are accomplished 
when it is less expected (or wanted)."33
The NAC region's labour force did have many of these characteristics. Indeed, 
Fals-Borda suggested they "express themselves in the 'dejar0, [letting it be], that 
is, in allowing that things are accomplished a little by inertia before firm and 
personal committal with them ... its prototype, the 'dejao ', [he or she who lets it 
be] at first sight appears irresponsible, uncommitted, uninterested or incapable 
. . . but the 'dejao' carefully observes and weighs the possibilities of his [her] 
possible action and withholds the necessary accumulated energy to act at the 
appropriate moment, which may arrive with the unexpected force of a hurricane 
. . . ;  the 'dejao' may attribute an economic cause (scarce resources) to his attitude, 
bu t this does not appear to be a fundamental one. It occurs in this way both 
among the rich as the poor."34
But surely, much more important than this ethos described above, was the fact 
that the process of full proletarisation in the NAC region was rather late in 
arriving. As Fals-Borda pointed out, "regarding the formation of the rural 
proletariat in the [NA] Coast, this is recent (trade union organisations do not 
appear here until the beginning of the XXth century and m odem  capitalist 
agriculture only broke through in the 50's decade) ...,".35
Nevertheless, things were slightly different in the NAC region from the interior. 
Despite the possible negative aspects of the 'dejao' character, positive ones 
surfaced. One aspect is the price at which they were prepared to release their 
labour. As Restrepo said, "now, by ... the Coast, things are not going in such a 
way. These labourers will not allow it. You have to pay them, treat them well and 
have them contented."36
This surely was the crux of the matter. As Fals-Borda noted, "what are we 
Costenos [NAC region people] really like? W hat is Costenidad [NAC region 
identity] ? ... the [NAC] Costeno leams to tolerate his superior, not to pu t up with
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him."37
United States Trade Commissioner Bell, United States Consul Demers and British 
Officer Bunch agreed on this point. Demers stressed that "in the interior . . .  the 
labouring class of people [are] easy to manage and very respectful of 
foreigners."38 Bell went further by adding that, as opposed to labour in the hot 
country [NAC region], "laborers in the cold country are ... obedient."39
But it was no doubt Bunch, who years before, firmly stated la  grande difference' 
:"  the lower classes in the interior are ... very ignoran t... submissive ... unspoiled 
by democracy ... On the Coast ... the lower classes are much much more 
dangerous. They assert their fancied equalitylevwph&sis added]..."40.
Pearse clearly appreciated that labour in the interior (as opposed to labour in the 
NAC region) was more servile, obedient and was prepared to labour for low 
wages instead of enjoying their scale of preference including leisure.
He was therefore adamant in emphasising th a t " in the interior [of Colombia] ... 
people are more preferable specimens of human nature than on the Coast"41. In 
fact, his curious developmental moral logic prescribed that " because in the 
interior the wages are much lower, the people lead a more frugal life, are working 
better and in general are more preferable ... than on the Coast"42.
Furthermore, Parrish reported that the interior peon had " many useful and 
admirable qualities. He is industrious, submissive, unambitious, long/suffering; 
in fact, constitutes an ideal labouring class, barring a certain lack of individual 
initiative and energy"43. In the " city of Barranquilla [however], you will find 
them [peons] occupying minor positions of responsibility, as bookeepers, cashiers, 
foremen, small shopkeepers and the like"44.
W hether or not the NAC's labour force was coloured, discoloured, black, brown 
or white, disliked or liked hills, were or were not productive and efficient in
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certain climates, took or did not take easily to organisation, were or were not 
individualistic, preferred or did not prefer to work for themselves, preferred 
independence to dependence, formed or did not form an appropriate supply of 
labour for rural export sector production, the fact of the matter remains by and 
large, that they were not rejecting wage labour.
They were either (i) just not bothered at all really, with any efforts of converting 
them  from self-sufficient individuals with scales of preference including leisure, 
into fully and complete dependent rural wage labour proletariat in many of the 
export sectors, or (ii) if already proletarized, only prepared to further that position 
at above average wages.
This is to say, that they were prepared to accept participation in the monetary 
economy (as opposed to the interior people) at considerable expense from 
capitalistic venture. This expense was represented by significantly high wages for 
the standards of the region, and more important, for the nation's agricultural 
export sectors.
This is what only the presence of a monopsony such as the UFC in the 
enclave-economy-oriented banana sector could do. Having guaranteed capital 
inputs world-wide to spend on shipping and marketing expenses, and guaranteed 
w orld market prices showing the considerable mark-up the UFC was in an unique 
position to meet the high level of wages that labour shortage in the NAC region 
and the reluctance of its labour force to form part of its wage economy had set to 
afford meeting and paying high wages.
In the very particular case of the NAC region's agricultural export sectors, scarcity 
of labour was strongly accompanied by choice of preferences of life including 
leisure. Those who chose to participate in the monetary economy as members of 
the region's labour force, certainly chose well.
Labour shortage and the character of the labour force in the NAC region went
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hand in hand. When wages were cost-effective (i.e., high, as in the case of the 
banana sector) leisure-wise to the NAC region's labour force, its scarcity was 
aggravated in the rest of the region's economy, possibly in a directly proportional 
way.
If we contrast some qualitative evidence which deal with the cultural attitudes of 
NAC region and interior people about wage labour, the economic impact of them 
on regional development may be further understood. The former's attitudes seem 
to have been much more reprehensible than the tatter's, where substantially lower 
wages prevailed and where the labour force's scale of preferences —as well as the 
price they set for their time and effort— was at a much lower level.
There were failures of projects to bring in foreign labour into the NAC region but 
the evidence on this important factor, as those listed at the beginning of the 
section, is unavailable. Whether or not the contingents of labourers from the NAC 
region were black or white, of African, Indigenous or European origin, lazy or 
hard workers, coming from hot or from cold countries, riotous or obedient, more 
or less preferable specimens of the hum an nature, living in tiny banana leaf huts 
or not, it seems quite simply, that imported labourers were just not up to their 
jobs.
In any case, this is what British Vice-Consul Marshal believed when he 
commented in 1912, that in the NAC reg ion" British West Indian labour has made 
no headway, and is a poor competitor with the native element and that of the 
Dutch Islands"45.
There were short sparks of immigration of labour just after the W ar of a 
Thousand Days' were inconsequential. It probably only attracted attention to 
domestic racists such as the one mentioned by the British Foreign Office: " Don 
Carlos Uribe [possibly an interior Colombian] has often half-jokingly remarked 
that it was a pity a million or so of our unemployed [British] miners, etc. did not 
come here: they were of the white race which Colombia does want to attract"46.
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That aside, it seems reasonable to suggest that experiments of importation of 
labour never worked for the NAC region. It is unsatisfactory therefore, to adopt 
the view th a t " immigration is needed, not because there is any real scarcity of 
labour but because foreigners will teach people to be workers'47. This was not 
the case in the NAC region.
Rural labour wage rates in the cotton cultivating areas of the NAC region were 
at such a high level that immigrant labour was being enticed. Indeed, the level of 
wages to be paid at which a contract was being negotiated with several hundred 
workmen from Puerto Rico was reported by the International Cotton Bulletin to 
be " [CP]$ 1.20 (about 4s lOd) per day'48.
Immigration of labour was never really a solution. In 1869 due to demand for 
labour for cocoa and tobacco in the NAC region department of Magdalena, the 
'Compania de Imigracion' (founded in Santa Marta) sought to acquire from the 
regulation of Colombian Law aiding immigration to the nation with th e " promise 
of great profit of charging commission for each labourer brought to 
businessmen"49.
In 1871, for example, it was certainly not recommended at all for the English by 
British agent Bunch, who maintained that he could not " conscientiously 
recommend the English emigrant of the working class, either peasant, mechanic 
or artisan to settle here at present"50.
Nevertheless, Bunch did recommend the NAC region's most suited coffee areas. 
Indeed, he added in his report that " there was a fine and healthy region near 
Santa Marta on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada, close to the sea, and possessing 
many advantages"51.
Bunch also dissuaded emigration of Europeans to Colombia by suggesting th a t" 
there is really no field for European emigration to this country ... because life, 
although cheap, would not be very agreeable to the em igran t... [and ]... he m ust
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learn a new language, in the next he must change all his habits ,.."52. There was 
apparently also the additional of the " traditional Spanish jealousy of 
foreigners"53.
However, it was suggested that emigration to the NAC region was —by all means 
and accounts- not to be had. Bunch clearly stated in 1875 th a t " as regards the 
question of European immigration to Colombia, I can only report w hat I have 
stated in former reports. On the Coast it would be madness, on account of the 
climate if for no other reason"54.
There was immigration of labour in the last years of the 19th century to what was 
then of course, part of the NAC region - Panama. In 1897 " two batches of 
labourers were imported, the first from Sierra Leone, the second from Jamaica. 
The latter has given satisfaction, as is invariably the case where Jamaican labour 
has been employed upon the [Panama] canal, whilst the former was a most 
unfortunate and costly experiment, since nearly the whole of the Sierra Leonese 
were prostrated with Beri-Beri ,.."55.
Colombians themselves were not overenthusiastic about European immigration. 
In 1901 Vergara y Velasco praised Colombian labour and was hopeful th a t1 until 
now it has not been spoilt by immigration and if it is true that we need it with 
urgency, the Lord wanting, we should never know it if it is to present itself as in 
American countries, the Argentine, for example"56.
With the war, scarcity of labour rapidly became a problem. The difficulty for 
obtaining labour for coffee production in the NAC region's Santa Marta area led 
not to a pattern of immigration but to experiments in 1900,1902 and 1903 in the 
introduction of West Indian labour. British Consul Jesurun indicated in 1900 that 
" in the month of October last year 60 labourers were engaged and shipped to 
work in a coffee plantation at Santa Martha, Colombia"57.
Jesurun also emphasised th a t" more were required, but men seemed afraid and
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kept aloof fearing that at any time the Colombian government or the 
revolutionists would press them into service"58.
According to British Vice-Consul Gillies, how ever," the result [of experiments in 
immigration of labour] was not satisfactory"59. A year later, British Vice-Consul 
Carr reported that although " some attempt at immigration from the West Indian 
Islands is made in a desultory way, the labour problem is yet far from being 
solved"60.
At the time, as Petre-Loraine pointed out, it was felt th a t" so far, no serious effort 
has been made to overcome the labour difficulty by the encouragement of 
immigration"61. He believed the best solution to the problem was not necessarily 
immigration. As he saw it, " if peace is really assured, the population should 
increase rapidly in a country of such vast agricultural resources. But it is hardly 
possible that the question of the shortage of labour should be solved by 
immigration"62.
The banana sector ended the experiment of importation of W est Indian labour in 
1905. According to British Consul Carr this resulted from W est Indian labourers 
" having proved unsatisfactory and costly"63. Indeed, Adams, referring to the 
Santa Marta district, remarked in 1914 th a t" here is one place in the tropics where 
the Jamaican negro does not dominate the labor fie ld ... most [native Colombians] 
have been attracted here ... by a certainty of good wages. They are an excellent 
class of workmen, strong and active and of good habits"64.
Colombians attracted by the banana sector wages were mainly from within the 
NAC region. The HLDE foreman, Mr. Marquez Alvarez remembered that " 
personnel engaged in the zona [banana zone of the Santa Marta district] was 
brought from Maria La Baja [department of Bolivar in the NAC region]. Coffee 
labour for the Haciendas Maria Teresa and La Victoria [Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta] originated in this order: Mamatoco, Bonda and Gaira [department of 
Magdalena in the NAC region]"65.
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The banana sector also resisted immigration some time after. One reason for the 
resistance may have been the interior's dem and for its contribution to the NAC 
region's banana sector labour input. In fact in 1921, Taylor, the UFC's manager, 
declared that the press " publish news transmitted by correspondents in this d ty , 
relative criticism to the United Fruit Co. for having replaced Colombian 
employees by black Jamaicans and Northamerican citizens imported recently. This 
constitutes more than an inaccuracy, a lie, for, much to the contrary, the company, 
investing enormous sums in transport and food, has brought in the last four 
months nearly 1000 [interior people such as] Santandereanos, Cundinamarqueses, 
Boyacences, [and] Antioquenos for agricultural labour in its farms, moved by the 
anxious necessities of these Colombians from the interior of the Republic. I rectify 
this for the conservation of [your] prestige [in your] newspapers [and so that you 
may] w arn correspondents [that they] place more careful scruples on the 
transmission of news"66.
It was further informed th a t " during 1924 the United Fruit Company extended 
the banana plantations. This gave rise to a considerable am ount of employment 
of a temporary nature. This was supplied from workers from other departments, 
who have now returned, leaving labour conditions practically norm al;... there is 
very little prospect for ... immigrants, because they do not understand the 
language, and it is difficult for them to adapt themselves to local customs and the 
Colombian laws"67. If the fact that there was some supply of labour from other 
departments was substantially true, then to that extent, intra-regional wage 
differentiation as well as the UFC's strategy of segmentation would have been 
reduced momentarily.
But although temporary employment from other departments may have 
materialised, it was only so for a very short period of tim e ." Cachaco era raro el que 
llegaba a laborar [sic] [it was rare for an interior person to arrive as labour] [in the 
NAC region] " said Marquez Alvarez68.
This suggests that any reductions in intra-regional wage differentiation and the
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UFC's segmentation strategy which could took place, would be true but to a very 
exceptional and limited extent -a stretch of time in 1924. So, although (still, by the 
late 1920's) labour shortage continued to attract immigration, it did not actually 
mobilise in the amount of numbers that would reduce inter-regional wage 
differentiation.
The NAC region's cotton district appears to have attracted immigration. As the 
International Cotton Bulletin reported in 1927," in view of the scarcity of labour 
and with the object of encouraging the immigration of agricultural workers, 
houses will be provided on certain conditions for immigrants"69.
But in the end, if immigration needed to be encouraged, it had to be of rather a 
different nature than waged labour. As the International Cotton Bulletin pointed 
o u t," hitherto, the government has not encouraged immigration other than small 
capitalists. Special attention will be given now to granting of suitable lands to 
settlers. The present laws provide for a free grant of 62 acres"70. It seems to me 
that the NAC region was never in a position to overturn its labour shortage 
economy with immigration solutions which would eventually have cut the 
dramatic upsurge in wage trends (by Colombian standards).
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(ii) Reluctance o f NAC Residents to Join the Monetary Economy
Another imperfection in the labour market of the NAC region was the reluctance 
of its residents to become fully integrated to the region's wage economy. This was 
linked to the character of the region's labour force. As a societal value it 
influences economic development and growth. The NAC region's labour force 
reluctance to be drawn into the wage economy was reflected in the high level of 
wages set by the UFC.
Economic analysis of labour supply is based on the observation that, given the 
fixed amount of time in a certain period, a person's decision to supply labour is 
in simultaneous fashion a decision to demand leisure time for self. This suggests 
that the supply of labour may be analyzed in the same way as the demand for 
leisure. Consequently, any price change has two distinct effects on the quantity 
demanded: an income and a substitution effect.
Within the context of demand for leisure (i.e., the supply of labour) the income 
effect of higher wages implies an increase in the demand for goods including 
leisure, and probably leads most labourers to want to work less. The substitution 
effect of higher wages however, implies that labourers are 'purchasing' their own 
leisure time giving up their hourly wage. In this way, the wage rate is the 'price' 
of leisure. When the wage rate rises, leisure therefore becomes dearer relative to 
other commodities that the labourer may want to buy. Therefore, a wage increase 
would induce labourers to buy more leisure time and more goods. The 
substitution effect of higher wages probably leads most labourers to want to work 
more. In terms of the market as a whole, therefore, higher wages could lead to a 
larger or a smaller quantity of labour supplied.
What we suggest here is that, despite the fact that some portion of the scarce 
labour force present in the NAC region had undoubtedly showed signs of an 
elastic demand for leisure, paradoxically, the banana export sector's wage policy 
revealed that (at least in this particular sector) a substitution effect of higher
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wages outweighed the income effect. A higher level of wages did not lead the 
greater part of the region's labour force towards an incentive of less rather than 
more work. Neither did the level of high wages lead to an assumption that all the 
region's labour force enjoyed a perfectly inelastic demand for income.
W ith the foregoing suggestion in perspective and within the context of the NAC 
region's labour shortage economy, whatever aggregate am ount of labour supply 
that existed was composed mainly of (i) those who, like the Goajiro, had some 
contact with the monetary economy as seasonal 'pseudo' waged labour (in the 
sense that they were gatherers of produce in exchange for very little cash or 
necessary goods such as tools) but were not necessarily part of a labour force per 
se; (ii) those who like the Kogi had or desired no participation as waged labour 
bu t equally bartered for cash and goods; and (iii) those already proletarized and 
part of the monetary economy such as 1.- subsistence farmers or minifundistas 
a n d /o r  peons within the hacienda system and 2.- relatively small numbers of very 
acculturated Indigenous communities such as the Sanka and Ika which " lived 
under the influence of catholic missionaries and w ith daily contact with 
Colombians"71 or the Kankuama, which nearly totally absorbed the Colombian 
mestizo population"72.
The first two components of the NAC region's labour force were Indigenous 
communities that either marginally formed (the Goajiro) or did not form (the 
Kogi) part of the labour supply for export sector areas of economic exploitation 
which would consider them an obvious source for such supply. In the region's 
minor export sectors such as dividivi, tagua /  corozo nut (gathered in the tropical 
forests) and coffee (picked high up in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta), one 
could appreciate that the natural labour force to be utilised was the Goajiro for the 
first two and the itinerant Sanka, Ika or Kankuama for the latter. We suggest that 
this labour force section's demand schedule for income was probably near to 
perfectly inelastic.
However, one must have in m ind the fact that the widespread belief at the time
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that Indigenous communities would not join the monetary economy as integrated 
waged labour because they lacked the capacity to appreciate the purchasing 
power of money. It follows therefore that they had to be persuaded to acquire 
wage-earning habits. Once persuasion was accomplished, the caveat was the 
suggestion that an income effect would take place. That is, that high wages should 
not be paid because they would entice the labour force to work less. It is likely 
that this was the case for the Goajiro, perhaps to a lesser extent for the itinerant 
Sanka, Ika or Kankuama. And it would be astonishing if it were the case for the 
Kogi.
The Goajiros"... could undoubtedly be civilized into useful laborers for the benefit 
of their civilizers ...',73 as Eder remarked. In more than one way they showed 
some desire to establish contact with the monetary economy as wage-labourers. 
Peck for example, noted that the " Indians [Goajiro]... are practically independent. 
They gather forest products such as tagua nuts [vegetable ivory] breed useful 
horses and do some trading at the port of RioHacha in [the department of] 
Magdalena"74. Indeed, the Goajiro was " exclusively responsible for its [dividivi] 
collection ... [and] ... they barter with the civilised merchants for rum, maize, 
panela [brown sugar blocks] and textiles"75.
Nevertheless, the Goajiro's contact with the monetary economy was ill-fated. As 
Reclus emphasised in the m id nineteenth century, " le commerce tel qu'il est 
compris aujourd'hui saura-t-il en echange de leur paix, leur donner autre chose 
q'une servitude deguisee, la misere et les joies sauvages puisees dans l'eau-de-vie 
? Trop souvent deja le beau mot de civilisation a servi de pretexte a 
1'extermination plus ou moins rapides de tribus entieres "76.
The Goajiro were, as Wollaston pointed out, " a very vigorous and warlike 
people77. Despite the negative consequences of contacting the monetary economy, 
they were and remain today fiercely independent and proud of their life-style 
preferences. This helps understand why they did not substantially form part of 
the labour supply for the high-waged banana sector.
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So, as mentioned earlier, the Goajiro would contact the monetary economy as 
seasonal 'pseudo' waged labour only to the extent that it served some purpose in 
the consolidation of their immediate barter needs, which satisfied the use-value 
of the commodities exchanged. They were therefore not necessarily subject to 
show either an income or a substitution effect particularly because wages paid for 
dividivi and tagua / corozo gathering were sufficiently low so as not to warrant 
either effect.
In light of several negative effects embodied (disruption of societal structure) in 
the contact with the monetary economy produced for the Goajiro and their 
short-term barter attitude towards wages, it should come as no surprise that the 
very high wages offered by the banana sector would ever dent the nature of their 
attitude and character.
The Kogi in the Sierra Nevada behaved in even stricter fashion. Although they 
composed a relevant source of labour supply in the Sierra Nevada coffee sector, 
they never chose to become part of the monetary economy as waged labour. They 
had no need to. There was certainly neither " usury nor economic uncertainty"78 
in their life-style although they did barter with " mestizos of nearby villages"79.
United States Trade Commissioner Bell refers to these Indigenous people as 
Arahuaco 80. This is the way the first Spanish chroniclers first addressed them 
" at the beginning of the XVIIth century ... [a name] somewhat obscure but 
probably derived from the name of a certain region in the septentrional ridges"81. 
Perhaps the real reason the Spaniards addressed the Kogi as Arahuaco had 
something more palatable about it: that the word Arhuaco was said to mean 'oro 
escondido' (hidden gold) 82, a most sought after commodity. It was certainly 
Tudden' because, as has been suggested very recently, the true significance of 
gold was not as a measure of personal wealth but for its divine generational 
powers, its standing for a superior celestial world visited by entranced shamans 
(priests), its fertility and its possession of an almost magical transforming 
power83.
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These communities did indeed display gold and very probably took heed in 
hiding whatever the Spaniards did not lay their hand upon. W ith the new value 
attributed to gold by these new arrivals, it seems logical that selling labour was 
was not in their interest. This could have been the reason why, as Bell confirmed, 
" the region [Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta] of the mountains inhabited by these 
Indians is well suited for coffee growing up to an elevation of 10,000 ft., but these 
Indians [Kogi] do not form a supply of labour, which is the factor that has 
determined the slow development of the coffee industry in the Sierra Nevada"84.
As a part of the region's labour force the Kogi were simply not quite so prepared 
to abandon the scale of preferences which constituted its standard of living (of 
which one m ust include leisure) rewarded by their subsistence economy in order 
to enter the monetary economy and therefore be abruptly rurally proletarized. The 
Kogi d id not need to 'integrate' the monetary economy. Even Eder stated: their " 
wants [monetary economy consumption] are few"85.
As Reichel-Dolmatoff recently w ro te ," w hat benefit would they [the Kogi obtain 
from such integration ? W hat could we teach them ? Amongst the Kogi there is 
no criminality nor delinquency, in our sense; there is no drug abuse nor political 
violence. There is no prostitution nor usury nor economic instability. Their 
religion is profoundly consoling; their philosophy of life positive, affirmative of 
the challenge constituted by existence. W hat do we expect to teach them T"86.
Consequently, any wages offered by any economic sector for which there would 
exist willingness and desire to substantially upgrade the latter section's 
wage-labour status, had to be cost-effective to it. Minor sectors such as tagua / 
corozo nut, dividivi and undoubtedly coffee in the NAC region, did not satisfy 
these conditions. Rather, the contrary effect was to result. At least qualitative 
evidence suggests that the banana export sector did break ground in this respect.
The fragments of labour force for the minor sectors (Goajiro, Sanka, Ika or 
Kankuama) probably showed demand schedules for money which tended to
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remain inelastic. By the same token demand schedules for leisure tended to 
remain elastic. We suggest that in the case of the banana sector, the opposite took 
place. That is, its part of the labour force undoubtedly showed that its demand 
schedule for money became elastic while their demand schedule for leisure seems 
to have become inelastic.
The failure of the NAC region's coffee sector to decrease its labour costs probably 
had much to do with the Kogi's  scale of preferences in their lifestyles. This ruled 
out the need to gather coffee berries in the Sierra for whatever the level of wages 
being offered. We suggest the dominant factor was the preference for leisure. 
Some might have argued that at the time, the desire was for work for no wage 
whatsoever. Indeed, analysing reasonably similar world-wide economic situations 
at the time, Greaves suggested what is indeed the case in the NAC region. She 
wrote that " not the rashest proponent of the theory of native insensibility to 
monetary inducement has said that given the opportunity the native cannot spend 
money. W hat is claimed is that they will not earn it”87.
In the case of the banana sector, the 'proletarized' category of the labour force that 
it attracted appeared prepared to continue to be wage labourers but only at above 
average wage rates. It was not just because of the profitable release of their labour 
at the prevailing high price that this particular grouping of the labour force 
engaged in wage labour. It was also related to the scale of preference. US Trade 
Commissioner Bell for example, pointed out how the NAC labour force was fairly 
confident and decisive in their choice preference for the type of labour they were 
prepared to engage in. He believed that in the banana zone of the NAC region, 
" the men are good at machete work and cutting and handling bananas, but do 
not like heavy labor, such as track work or ditch digging for irrigation, etc.”88.
This portion of the labour force seems to have believed that the banana sector's 
wages were profitable at the prevailing price of sacrificing whatever their previous 
subsistence or hacienda /  enclave economy rewarded them in leisure time. Because 
there certainly was little else apparently taking place (other than paying a very
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high 'price' for leisure) when leisure time arrived in the banana sector. As Kepner 
pointed o u t ," leisure time in banana regions is a great void"89.
This w ould seem to confirm why the substitution effect offset the income effect 
of higher wages in this particular segment of the NAC region's labour force 
working in the banana sector. Leisure time was not only a void, but a very 
expensive one. It seems to us that those segments which did not formerly join the 
banana sector labour force, such as the Goajiro, Sanka, Ika, Kankuama and especially 
the Kogi, were simply not interested in becoming waged labour. In fact, Kepner 
indicated that " comparatively few full - blooded Indians are employed in the 
banana industry; those who take part in it occasionally are itinerant workers"90.
Of course, some would be more prepared to dismiss the independently minded 
decision making of the several classes of the labour force which was available to 
the existent export sectors in the NAC region. But at the same time, serious 
academic opinion could only diminish the stature of such views. Consider for that 
matter, Greaves' opinion regarding British tropical colonisation, that " what is 
condemned as laziness or dislike of work on the part of the native has often been 
in essentials a reluctance to expend a large amount of effort upon inefficient and 
poorly remunerated forms of labour"91.
(iii) The Element o f M onopsony Presence
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Labour market imperfections in the NAC region included the monopsonistic 
power of a single large employer —the UFC— to set a regional price for wages, 
which --we suggest-- other employers had no economic alternative but to accept.
As a monopsony the UFC supplemented the region's labour factor by 
homogenizing the regional economy's scarcely endowed labour resources. The 
instrument of homogenization was the high wage it met and the prevailing high 
level it set. This in itself was a strong market imperfection.
Circumstances regarding availability of labour apparently were not adverse for 
the banana export sector in the early years. British Consul Carr indicated that in 
1905 " field labourers for the lowland cultivations have been more plentiful, now 
that banana plantations have been worked to better advantage than at any time 
during the past five years"92.
But sooner, rather than later, Carr's views changed : " the demand for labour is 
greatly in excess of the supply and but for this scarcity the development of 
banana cultivation would proceed more rapidly. Up to the present only natives 
have been employed in this work, but unless labourers can be brought from the 
interior in sufficient numbers to supply the demand, employers will be forced to 
bring men from the West Indian Islands which they are unwilling to do, as 
previous attempts in this direction have not given satisfactory results"93.
Only the small-scale non-corporate production units of the banana sector 
remained a viable investment and attracted whatever labour was available in 
reasonable numbers. These would eventually be absorbed by a large-scale 
monopsonist corporate monopoly such as the UFC. According to Petre-Loraine " 
... hours of labour have been curtailed. The necessary result has been the 
abandonment of the more valuable kinds of cultivation, requiring more labour, 
in favour ... of banana growing. The want of labour operates adversely to the
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development of cotton and coffee growing, as well as that of sugar"94.
No doubt, the banana sector faced some particularly difficult moments due to 
scarcity of labour. In a report (written on the 21st of December, 1918 but 
published on the 20th March, 1919) United States Trade Commissioner Bell 
estimated th a t" the lack of tonnage during the war for the movement of bananas 
caused many workers to emigrate to Cuba to work in the cane fields and sugar 
mills. During the past two years 3,000 men have left the district. It would at this 
time be impossible to secure as much as 500 men to labour on any new 
project"95.
Surprisingly however, in another report (written on the 21st December 1918 but 
published on the 26th March 1919) Bell claimed that there was " sufficient labour 
in the district for all of the plantations now bearing, including those of the United 
Fruit Co. when these are being cut"96.
However, the setting of high wages by the international monopoly took center 
stage in the drama of economic detriment to the region, the UFC's additional role 
as a monopsony further aggravated the problem because it increased labour 
scarcity.
The existence of a labour shortage in the NAC region seems to have been 
perpetuated by the fact that the available labour was strongly absorbed by the 
high-waged banana sector. As the Colombian Ministry for Industry pu t it in 1932, 
" it is not possible to find labourers there [Santa Marta banana area] for work 
other than the cultivation of the banana. In earlier days banana wages did not 
allow the successful undertaking of any different job and labourers do not 
understand anything different from their disciplines in the yellow industry. When 
there is no export, they feel they are out of work, that they are really without 
work, although next to them they find a coffee grower or a cattle raiser looking 
for hands for their tasks"97.
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Despite the exhausting case for scarcity of labour there would seem to be some 
degree of contradiction in the general sense. It reflects a particular facet of urban 
and rural supply of labour.
Although historically the larger percentage of all regions' labour force was 
engaged in primary sector economic activities (57.2 % in 1870,70.1 % in 1925 and 
62 % in 1945)98, the average annual growth rate of twelve major cities were 
significant: 3.8 % for the intercensal period 1905 - 1918 and 3.7 % for 1918 -1938
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Regional capitals (such as Barranquilla, Cartagena and Santa Marta in the NAC 
region) therefore drew considerable rural-urban migrants from their region's 
departments. The problem of scarcity of labour was essentially a rural one and 
also a seasonal factor. It is apparent that labour in urban areas such as 
Barranquilla and Santa Marta was reasonably well supplied. United States Consul 
Demers confirmed this in 1906:" plentiful and efficient labour [in the Barranquilla 
industry] seemingly superior to the Jamaican labour is to be obtained"100.
But it was in the beginning of the 20's that the NAC regions' urban industrial 
areas seem to have begun to strip the rural areas of labour. As United States 
Trade Commissioner Bell suggested," labor is plentiful in Barranquilla, but not 
in the cotton district in the interior of [Department of] Atlantico"101. Bell 
understood this crucial phenomenon and perhaps was one of the first to envisage 
the nature of rural-urban migration as the factor which aggravated scarcity of 
labour in the countryside for some very important potential linkage-endowed 
agricultural sectors.
Therefore, by this time, within a labour shortage economy, urbanisation (not rural 
export sectors) absorbed some important fractions of the region's tight labour 
supply in straightforward competition with the high wage banana sector. As Bell 
put it, this was " coming from the outlying districts to the Coast cities being 
attracted by the factory em ploym ent, the better conditions and the better wages
procured in dock and freightwork"102.
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If labour was always scarce in the NAC region, then cotton cultivation and the 
textile industry could have been used to high wages, but the monopsonistic 
presence of the banana sector helped increase labour scarcity, wages and therefore 
outpriced both cotton cultivation and textile production.
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(iv) Labour Shortage
All the previous discussion on the reduction of mobility of labour by a series of 
imperfections, meant employers in the NAC region faced labour shortage. Scarcity 
of labour is understood in the sense that the demand for labour at the ruling 
money wage exceeds the available supply.
W hen there is labour shortage, employers have an incentive to raise wages. 
Assuming perfect labour mobility full employment would be reached. Employers 
could increase their profits if they could employ more labourers even at a higher 
wage.
More labourers would only be had by drawing them away from other employers. 
Luring labour away from other employers at a higher wage following the dictates 
of self-interest, amounts to bidding up money wages. Which is why the 
previously mentioned imperfections affected the regional wage-level basically by 
w ay of increasing it.
Scholars writing on Colombian historiography have failed to point out a major 
aspect of regional economic development: the availability of labour supply. Here, 
we argue that, at least in the NAC region there was labour shortage. With the 
exception of the south-western part of the Colombian interior (the Gran Tolima 
province) the NAC region showed the lowest percentage distribution of 
population in Colombia for years 1870, 1905, 1912, 1918, 1928 and 1938 
respectively103. The region therefore represented 12.2 %, 10.5 %, 13.4 %, 15.1 % 
and 15.8 % of the nation's population104.
From a qualitative point of view, the evidence for labour shortage, although not 
copious, is reasonably convincing. For practical purposes we have chosen to 
emphasise it chronologically, beginning with the 1870's, when sugar cultivations 
in the region near Cartagena were amongst the first to be mentioned as victims 
of the labour constraint. British sources pointed out then that the " climate and
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rich soil are peculiarly adapted to the growth of the sugar cane. The chief 
difficulty hitherto to its cultivation to any extent has been the scarcity of 
labour"105. British Acting Consul Diez also reported and confirmed that in the 
NAC region " there is surely a scarcity of labour"106.
In the 1890's, British Vice-Consul MacGregor indicated th a t" the great obstacles 
to all kinds of enterprises consists in the w ant of native skilled labour which is an 
article that cannot be improvised"107.
Labour shortage also affected steamboat transportation and its economic cargoes' 
handling. According to MacGregor, the need for labour was for m any years " a 
great difficulty in the steamboat business on the river Magdalena ... until about 
ten years ago [1880's]. The companies engaged in this business were entirely 
dependent on foreign skilled labour"108.
Despite this, by the m id 1890's, there was some degree of normalisation of the 
need for labour. As MacGregor pointed out, the steamboat companies as a " 
precaution of training native apprentices in their workshops and on board their 
boats ... are at the present time tolerably independent of foreign skilled 
workers"109.
Sparsely populated areas hinder the development of their economies. As British 
Vice-Consul MacGregor put it, as a result o f " the scarcity of population which is 
barely sufficient to produce the agricultural articles (and not all of them) necessary 
for the sustenance of life, and to attend to the coffee planting, mining, and other 
industries"110, manufactures generally did not appear to be profitable. Indeed, 
this factor impediment to the region's economic development led to suggestions 
that labour should be imported to the region. Importation of labour however, as 
we shall see further on in this chapter, was never a solution for labour shortage 
in the NAC region.
Labour scarcity had been commonplace nationally and particularly in the NAC
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region since the 1870's. Civil war further aggravated the shortage of labour. By the 
end of 1899, internal national political feuds gave rise to conflict. British 
Consul-General Huckin claimed th a t" a fresh revolt broke out, which developed 
into perhaps the most disastrous civil war Colombia has ever suffered. The 
revolution lasted until June, 1903, and it is said that these three years cost the 
country something like 200,000 lives"111.
This W ar of a Thousand Days' (1899-1903) proved to worsen the state of labour 
supply for the nation. In general, Villegas and Yunis described h o w " population 
centres remain nearly deserted and many of its inhabitants reduced to 
misery”112. They added that in the NAC region " flourishing population centres 
in other times such as Magangue, have lost its commerce and gone back to a 
primitive state"113. The region contained the principal seaports and was therefore 
severely shaken. As Villegas and Yunis pointed out, " export products (especially 
hides and coffee) piled up for years at the ports unable to leave for their 
markets"114.
The war proved to be fatal for overall economic progress. The w ar reduced the 
working population, further enhanced the gravity of scarcity of labour, and 
diminished purchasing power as wages were showing very little progress at the 
time. Revolution, as United States Consul-General Beaupre noted, " ... wrought 
havoc with substantial interests of the country; fortunes ... disappeared in the 
engulfing calamity; importing houses that a year ago were rich and strong today 
would find it impossible to liquidate; foreign exchange... ranged from 360 to 1200 
per cent, and selling importing goods for currency so enormously depreciated 
could result in nothing but disaster"115.
It was equally clear that the revolutionary war " more than decimated the 
able-bodied population"116. It was therefore bound to have affected the Santa 
Marta area of the NAC region. According to Petre-Loraine," the great check on 
the rising prosperity of Santa Marta is to be found in the w ant of population"117. 
He estimated the area's casualties, as " quite 10 % of the able-bodied population
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of the district [Santa Marta] was destroyed in the revolution and even before this 
there was a deficiency of labour"118.
In general, of course, the effects of the W ar were national and opinions during 
and a few years after the chaos tended to lay the blame for any lack of economic 
progress on the violent actions. Vergara y Velasco asserted in 1901 t h a t " in a 
nutshell, from the industrial point of view all, or nearly, is to be accomplished, 
and nevertheless, all industry possible in the tropics are possible in Colombia in 
specially advantageous conditions. The balance, in this aspect, is nil ... W hat is 
therefore the cause for such backwardness ? The civil wars."119.
British Minister Barrett in 1906 was convinced, that " were it not for the many 
civil wars that have drained their lifeblood and exhausted their energies, they 
[Colombians] would be one of the richest peoples in the world"120. By 1907 
however, US Consul Demers reported it was " very gratifying to be able to state 
that, after the five years of financial crisis and the national difficulties and 
universal commercial standstill that followed the close of her last civil war, 
Colombia is now entering into a new era of commercial and economic 
developm ent... Peace is well established in the country and confidence has once 
more been restored"121.
None other than Petre-Loraine summed up the situation more clearly:"  Much as 
Colombia has suffered from civil war waged for the gratification of personal 
ambitions, never really for the affirmation of principles or the establishment of 
forms of government essential to the body of the people, its recuperative powers, 
due to its enormous natural resources, have served, even in the short intervals of 
tranquillity, to rehabilitate it to a great extent, only to be hurled back into the 
abyss by the next revolution. So matters have gone on for nearly a century, with 
the result that the country is, in many ways, as Mexico was in 1876, very much 
when it was visited ,in the first quarter of the 19th century, by Humboldt, 
Mollien, Cochrane, Hamilton and others"122. He also added that " no radical 
change can be expected in the immediate future, if ever"123.
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As a consequence of shortage of labour, a sharp rise was experienced in the 
dem and for labour and its price due to the emergence of shorter working days. 
For example, in 1904, British Vice-Consul Carr reported th a t" demand for labour 
increased"124. The result was th a t" not only is the nominal cost of a day's work 
high, but it is made yet higher by the fact that the num ber of working hours has 
been curtailed, so that more than seven hours a day can hardly be counted 
upon"125. The price of labour was to reach even higher levels, especially in ... 
and due to the banana sector.
Scarcity of labour affected " in a most injurious manner the progress of other 
industries and the general welfare of the country"126. Labour shortage 
undoubtedly affected production in the NAC region. British Consul Gillies for 
example, reported t h a t " one of the most important problems ... to solve sooner 
or later is that of labour, the scarcity of which is being seriously felt by those 
interested in agriculture, mines and railways, in fact directly or indirectly it affects 
all classes of the community. For this reason no substantial development in 
agriculture can take place until this defect is remedied"127.
First, labour shortage affected the coffee sector. British Vice-Consul Carr indicated 
in 1905 that despite the quality of the coffee bean and the excellent land and 
suitable altitude of the Santa Marta area, the reason why the coffee industry was 
not being extended more rapidly there was " scarcity of labour"128.
Petre-Loraine confirmed this v iew :" there is, however a considerable opening for 
coffee-growing on the slopes of the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta ... for 1904;... 
the industry is steadily progressing, with excellent results as regards the quality 
of the produce. Here ... labour is a great difficulty"129.
In 1906, British Vice-Consul Carr emphasised the fact that " the cultivation of 
coffee in the Santa Marta slope of the Sierra Nevada is not being extended much, 
owing to the difficulty in getting suitable labour for that work [and that the] Coast 
natives appear to have a dislike of living in the hills, and while a sufficient
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num ber can be obtained for the cultivations of the plantations when the crop 
season comes on it is impossible to secure pickers in sufficient number to harvest 
the berries quickly and consequently a considerable portion of the crop is lost or 
damaged by being left too long on the trees. The solution of this problem has yet 
to be found"130.
The NAC region's coffee sector was relatively more affected than the interior's by 
this problem. First, as a result of the decimation of the labour supply during the 
w ar and secondly, by the effects of the banana export sector's high wages. The 
condition of the coffee trade at the outbreak of the revolution, on the 18th October 
1899, was that the NAC region's coffee sector was in as appropriate a position as 
that of the interior. Coffee production nationally witnessed a considerable upsurge 
in the 1880's and early 1890's due to the rise in world prices. However, prices 
plummeted dramatically after 1896. By 1899 prices, according to Berquist, 
averaged " half the level maintained during the first half of the decade"131.
Indeed, Berquist suggested that the origins of both economic and political crisis 
faced by the Colombian national government in 1899 " lay ultimately in the 
changes wrought in Colombia by the rise of the coffee export economy ... each 
crisis influenced and intensified the other, creating a problem that was much 
greater than the sum of its separate parts ... generating the conditions which led 
to, seemingly and inevitably, to civil war"132.
Unquestionably, it was not profitable for the interior's coffee trade to engage in 
the endeavour. Diminishing transport costs accrued more to the NAC region's 
(Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta) coffee. A United States Monthly Bulletin's report 
stated for example, that " marketing the crop ... costs about 4 cents per pound to 
put coffee in New York, including commissions, etc. and as the costs of
production on the estates can not be reduced to less than 4 cents ....  coffee
growing in Colombia is not a paying business with the rate below 8 cents per 
pound in New York. The high cost of putting coffee in New York is chiefly due 
to the poor means of transport to the Coast"133.
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British Consul Dickson confirmed the view that with the exception of "... a few 
coffee estates near the Magdalena River, the general opinion which I have been 
able to elicit is that it is not a paying business to grow coffee in Colombia with 
the price below 4d. per pound in New York”134.
In the years before the war, the well reputed Colombian coffee was produced in 
moderate quantities. Since supply was limited, the price w ent up, and, as a result, 
coffee was overplanted throughout the country135. In fact, Dickson believed " this 
would replace the quina [quinine] industry"136. He also reported that monies 
were to b e " advanced;... credits... given to many who were desirous of enlarging 
their plantations; and ... [that] coffee was very often sold before it was 
produced”137.
But one predominant factor was not taken sufficiently into consideration. This, 
according to Dickson was ” the limited amount of labour available”138. As he 
pointed out, labourers were ” eagerly sought after and w ith competing prices they 
rushed from one plantation to another”139. Furthermore, the Monthly Bulletin 
reported th a t " it was quite difficult to secure adequate labor"140.
The result was, as British Consul Dickson noted, that ” a large number of coffee 
plantations have been abandoned, in the whole or in part, because the available 
capital, estimated for three years expenses was all spent in the first year owing to 
the unforeseen rise in wages caused by the rush"141. Indeed, the rush contributed 
to the creation of a momentary upwards push in the interior's coffee sector wages. 
But this rise in interior wages was never comparable to the more persistent NAC 
region's wage-push effect, which arose as a result of banana sector's high wages.
In addition to this, capital was sp e n t" before the returns from the crop planted 
had begun to come in”142. Even more significant, the w ar brought to an end the 
spree of coffee growing, and the effect on labour was strongly detrimental. During 
the ” first months of the war, work continued in an intermittent way, but as the 
disaster spread, the employment of male labour became im possible... labour was
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then scarce, but from the limited account m ust now be deducted the considerable 
number of labourers who perished during the war"143.
Second, labour shortage affected the cotton sector. Cotton cultivation in the NAC 
region certainly suffered from the same burden as coffee did. British Vice-Consul 
Gillies was in no doubt that labour shortage was the " one factor which seriously 
hinders the development of the cultivation of this article"144.
According to British Consul Carr in 1904," suitable labour however, being scarce 
and expensive, it does not seem probable under these conditions that the [cotton] 
will prove sufficiently remunerative to warrant its continuance"145. This was true 
substantially, perhaps with the exception of the year 1907, when United States 
Consul Demers maintained that there were " thousands of good farm hands, who 
are today almost idle and could be hired from 40 to 60 cents per day"146.
During the first quarter of the century it was frequently stated that labour was 
abundant in all parts of Colombia. The NAC region's cotton however, was the 
exception to this observation. As United States Consul Hazeltine put it, " ... 
numerous enterprises have been retarded or stopped due to the lack of labour. 
For instance, experiments have proven that the departm ent of Bolivar [NAC 
region] produce an exceptional grade of cotton quite similar to South Sea Island 
cotton. But it was discovered that a lack of community labour rendered the 
enterprise impracticable if not impossible"147.
Labour shortages persisted for the NAC region's cotton sector throughout the 
years. Blake Modica indicated that " scarcity of labour is one of the greatest 
difficulties to be overcome in developing the country"148. He pointed out that 
although the cotton industry was affected by " conditions abroad in 1915 and no 
cotton was exported to Europe"149, the "lack of labour retarded development of 
commercial probabilities of the product"150.
For the NAC region's cotton cultivation, labour shortage was such that even by
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the 1930's, according to Jones, " labour is scarce ... [and] ... expensive"151. Jones 
equally highlighted that labour shortage contributed to the NAC region's 
difficulties in the consolidation of some economic linkages between cotton 
cultivation and textile production, in contrast with interior regions. He pointed out 
to that effect th a t" these mixed [NAC region] cottons ... internally compete with 
cotton from regions [in the interior] having as good physical conditions and a 
better labour supply"152.
Third, labour shortage affected minor sectors in the NAC region. There was 
indeed a labour input bottleneck present. This led British Consul Carr to report 
that with th e " cost of labour remaining the same, many sugar cane planters have 
been obliged either to abandon their plantations or turn their cultivations into 
bananas or pastures"153. Carr also pointed out that the " increased cost of labour 
has made the [tobacco] industry unremunerative so that it has now  become quite 
insignificant"154.
The dire effects of the shortage of labour upon minor sectors in the region were 
also confirmed by United States Trade Commissioner Bell. He accounted for those 
such as (i) balsam of copaiba, placing no doubt that its production " could be 
greatly increased if the labour situation were better"155; (ii) corozo, which was " 
easily gathered in great abundance over a wide area but the trouble is the lack of 
labour"156; (iii) coconuts, of which he said th a t " it can not be predicted that the 
production of coconuts will increase ... [and] labour is too scarce, even though 
conditions are good"157 and; (iv) rubber, of which its " industry ... suffers from 
lack of labour"158.
Labour scarcity, therefore, was either increased or aggravated in other sectors such 
as cotton cultivation and coffee - not to say, the minor sectors such as those 
mentioned immediately above- by the banana sector's high wages.
Monsalve for example, pointed out that " the work in the Santa Marta banana 
region generates great competition to the coffee industry and that explains why
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there is a shortage of labour for the collection of the bean and the high wage, due 
to which, a coffee cultivator in the coffee zone of the Sierra Nevada de Santa 
Marta, at a few kilometres from the seaport, compensates in wages what he saves 
in transport [costs]. Labourers prefer the banana region because work there is 
constant and because, due to this, they obtain an equal or superior 
remuneration"159.
Labour scarcity and high UFC wages continued to handicap the development of 
the NAC region's coffee sector as Jones has pointed out. He indicated that 
although the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta area possessed " admirable physical 
conditions in a good location near the sea ... it suffers from a shortage of labor 
resulting from sparse population in the hills ... [and] ... good wages paid by the 
United Fruit Company"160.
Labour shortage in the end resulted in high wages which the UFC was able to 
meet. Given the small population contained in a large geographical area, the 
imperfections present in the labour market and the resulting labour shortage, real 
and significant obstacles to export sector production in the NAC region.
Labour shortage -a constraint in labour as a factor of production- badly affected 
employers other than banana industry in the NAC region. And immigration does 
not seem to have been a solution to the problem of labour scarcity in the NAC 
region.
(v) UFC: Intra-Regional Large Scale Corporate Segmentation
As seen in Chapter V, wage differentiation was widespread in the nation as a 
whole. Because of the reasonable weight of the evidence found, we elaborate here 
in some detail this other imperfection in the NAC labour market: the UFC's 
strategy to internally segment its labour force. It was accomplished in a way in 
which it could produce a number of non-competitive (segmented) internal labour
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markets within the company.
Imperfection is not just a shortcoming or a transgression of the orthodox economic 
model. It is a major frailty. It is not just a blemish, but an inadequacy. And, 
because the framework of analysis is not an equilibrium bu t a dynamic one, 
orthodox economic theory is unable —for example— to adequately explain 
dispersion of wages across labourers.
Therefore, before proceeding to reveal the UFC's implementation of a 
segmentation strategy, we suggest a very brief economic analysis of dispersion of 
wages -particularly in the banana sector- will not go amiss. It is possible that some 
m ay not find it obvious why the fact of dispersion in itself indicates segmentation, 
rather that the operation of the market. But we are not suggesting that here.
Segmentation in the narrow sense —which is how it is used in this thesis— is a 
strategy. And like the UFC's practice of outwork —to illustrate an example which 
is a mean of increasing flexibility, shifting risk and reducing costs— segmentation 
is a market imperfection. And as such, it is neither supplied nor demanded within 
the normal operation of the market as labour —as a commodity is. We suggest and 
hope this clarifies the logic of our argumemt.
Moreover, competitive theory of the labour market predicts the equilibrium wage 
rate for a given occupation in a given area should be uniform across firms, for 
labourers of a given quality. But the indication of surveys has frequently been the 
existence of dispersion of wage rates. It follows therefore, that some dispersion of 
wages, is a normal feature of all labour forces in the broader sense, reflecting (not 
indicating) segmentation.
Dispersion reflects different skills, scarcities of types of labour and different types 
of efforts. And this is why we suggest, that in order to form some estimate of the 
nature of the dispersion of wages within the NAC region, we show (as in Tables 
20 & 21, further below) some averages and measures of dispersion for the coffee
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and banana sectors. These reveal (especially for banana) large rather than small 
heterogeneity.
After all, the dispersion of wages of the UFC, for example, would be large as they 
reflected differences in the quality of the labourers or their jobs, or cover several 
segments of its internal market. Dispersion would have been smaller insofar as 
intra-UFC segmentation would be eliminated.
In the narrow sense, we suggest dispersion is clarified even further, if it features 
conclusive asymmetry, as in the analysis that follows. Which —if we may say so— 
links the logic of our argument more closely with the available data. We equally 
suggest it is likely to link up with the specific empirically testable proposition, 
that there was complete —rather than fragmentary— asymmetry in wage levels in 
the coffee and banana sectors.
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TABLE 20: NAC COFFEE SECTOR WAGE ASYMMETRY, HETEROGENEITY & DISPERSION
1912 1913 1914 1916 1917 1918 1921 1922
Weighted Mean Average^ 3.9 4.6
Weighted Average Wage Rate * 0.8 0.9 1.05 0.7 0.7 0.7 1 1
Standard Deviation 1.1 1.3 1.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 02
Dispersion large large large large avrg. avrg. large large
Coefficient of Variation 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2
Heterogeneity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Median Wage Rate* 3.9 4.2 4.8 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.01 1.0
Modal Wage Rate* 3.0 4.0 4.0 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.0 1.2
Lower Quartile* 3.0 3.7 4.0 050 0.60 0.60 0.93 0.90
Upper Quartile* 4.6 5.9 6.2 0.70 0.70 0.70 1.1 1.1
Asymmetry yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Coefficient of Skewness 0.4 0.3 05 0.02 0.7 0.9 -03 -03
Coefficient of Kurtosis -0.4 -1.4 -13 -13 0.2 1.1 -02 -0.9
Notes: (i) Pay in CGP$s per week; (*) Pay in CGP$s per day.
Observations of wage rates from the NAC region coffee and banana sector suggest 
asymmetry in their distribution and heterogeneity in their patterns. This is likely 
to link with dynamic as opposed to static equilibrium. The degree of spread or 
dispersion that the standard deviations of these wage rates display and the 
accompanying heterogeneity that variation coefficients yield are large enough to 
stress the magnitude of wage differentiation in the labour market.
At any rate, the results of the analysis seem to suggest that it is only these 
economic sectors that highlight a structure of wage differentiation in the NAC 
region. But it was in the NAC region with the presence of its banana sector 
large-scale corporate production unit, the UFC, where the impact of segmentation 
was intensely experienced.
Segmentation is a fairly precise and narrow concept. It is one type of labour
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market imperfection but cannot be used synonymously with labour market 
imperfection. Segmentation of the internal labour market was the result of the 
TABLE 21: NAC BANANA SECTOR WAGE ASYMMETRY, HETEROGENEITY & DISPERSION
1926p 1926. 1927p 1927. 1928p 1928.
Weighted Average Wage Rate* 3.78 3.26 1.17 0.95 1.75 1.40
Standard Deviation* 3.16 3.34 0.42 0.39 0.81 0.68
Dispersion large large large large large large
Coefficient of Variation 0.8348 1.0244 0.3615 0.4039 0.4633 0.4850
Heterogeneity yes yes yes yes yes yes
Median Wage Rate* 2.16 1.16 1.11 0.93 1.59 1.16
Modal Wage Rate* 2.16 1.18 1.11 0.93 2.68 2.20
Lower Quartile* 1.53 0.80 0.84 0.70 1.21 0.99
Upper Quartile* 5.36 5.25 1.55 1.15 2.68 2.20
Asymmetry yes yes yes yes yes yes
Coefficient of Skewness 1.1069 1.0549 0.9571 1.8753 -0.0240 0.1581
Coefficient of Kurtosis -0.0477 -0.3032 -1.3891 6.4012 -1.4652 -15907
Notes: (*) Pay in CGP$s per day; p = payroll pay; a = actual pay; (payroll and deductions for 
merchandise purchases, medical treatment or cash advances).
UFC's corporate strategy to treat different categories of workers differently. It 
resulted in different recruitment processes, different patterns of job mobility 
within the firm, and different forms of payment.
Here we are not attempting to demonstrate labour market segmentation by a firm. 
Demonstration of segmentation within a firm would have to proceed through an 
institutional analysis. It would have to show how different types of workers were 
recruited into the firm by different processes.
It would equally have to show how they were then treated quite differently in 
terms of the factors affecting their wages and employment conditions. It would 
also have to show how they would have different career paths within the firm.
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We do not attempt here, to demonstrate internal labour market segmentation in 
this manner because this is not the vital part of this thesis' argum ent W hat it does 
attem pt is to emphasise the importance of this type of imperfection, by revealing 
evidence of the UFC's segmentation strategy.
Nvertheless, if the reason the UFC introduced segmentation within its labour force 
was to reduce overall labour costs, why else would it opt for labour market 
segmentation as a strategy to control the labour force? All we can suggest —with 
the utmost possible care and caution— is that, if this was really so, then the net 
effect of the UFC's introduction of the strategy within its operations, seems to 
have been to lower its wage costs.
We equally suggest that because the UFC was a prom inent m onopsony, its 
position allowed it to segment its internal labour force and, in effect, pay the low 
wages it could optim ally pay.
But the UFC was equally a conspicuous m onopoly in the producer market. And 
it is this position which explains why its wage was higher than w hat a 
competitive wage offered by other employers w ould have been in the NAC 
region.
Segmentation was therefore a type of imperfection which affected the regional 
wage level by being instrumental as a corporate strategy in lowering labour costs, 
which, because of the corporation's monopoly position became recast into high 
ones, relative to other employers in the region.
In general, constraints on factor mobility might well be sufficient to explain higher 
wages in the NAC region. But we suggest the above rationalization as a way to 
better understand the link between the use of the grandiose theoretical concept 
of labour market segmentation and specific empirically-testable propositions. That 
is to say, that —by means of its imperfection— the prevailing level of wages a 
monopoly established, was influential with other factors, to generate economic
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stagnation.
At least to some degree, orthodox economic theory can explain labour market 
imperfections in factor mobility. But invoking a different theory or concept, such 
as labour market segmentation, should enrich it. After all, ideas are not mutually 
exclusive, and whatever merit our logic has, it is the overall im portant effects 
observed, that matters.
One could bear in mind here, that leisure preference among the already scarce 
NAC region labour supply, was economically significant. Breaking it meant 
affording the payment of high wages and yet remaining —not only competitive, 
but with a leisurely7 mark-up. It appears to us rather clearly, that the UFC 
qualified on these counts.
As general corporate policy however, it seems that UFC did pay the low wages 
it could optimally pay. Witness how determination of wages rested considerably 
with officials in each tropical division, who said that because they were " urged 
to keep down costs, they [did] not tend to pay higher wages than necessary to 
ensure adequate and efficient labor"161.
Again, w ith enormous care and caution, we suggest it seems plausible that it was 
necessary for the UFC to pay high wages in the NAC region. That is to say, 
without this affecting its wage bill —which for its 'monopolist7 and 'monopsonist7 
budget, was low. By contrast, it seems to have helped the corporation maintain 
high profits. This is not to say that our argument is simply to state that the UFC 
caused higher wages in the NAC region while lowering its own wage bill. As a 
matter of general harmonized policy. No. We only suggest that it paid high wages 
because it had to. There was shortage. But at the same time, because of its 
corporate segmentation policy to reduce labour costs, it would appear logical that 
its wage bill went down, not up.
For the UFC, according to White, " agricultural labour costs were a smaller
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proportion of total investment in the a rea ;... low wages (even if they were high 
relatively to average Colombian wages) did enable UFCO to keep down the price 
to local planters as well as boosting profits on its own produce. Low labour costs 
-the only item of UFCO expenditure which it was impossible to conceal from 
Colombian eyes- also made it easier for the company to keep down transfer prices 
on its own produce, an easy operation for UFCO with its ownership of transport 
and distribution concerns"162.
In reference to the UFC's wage policy in Costa Rica, Kepner pointed out th a t" the 
wages paid by the United Fruit Company before the economic crisis were low in 
comparison to wages paid in temperate regions, but were high to agricultural 
laborers elsewhere in Central America163". Policy was centralised in the UFC, so 
this seems to have been the same case for its NAC region branch.
As Edwards has pointed out, " in theory, labour markets could be segmented 
because buyers with great market power (monopsonists) can achieve a more 
profitable overall settlem ent... In this case, segmentation can be explained as an 
attempt to lower the overall price (wage) that the buyer has to pay"164.
This seems likely to be the case with the UFC. Its monopsonistic feature allowed 
it to segment. Its monopolistic feature m eant it set a high rather than a low 
prevailing level of wages. With its introduction of controlled segmentation -a 
market imperfection- the banana export sector contributed to the decline of 
economic growth and development in the NAC region.
By means of its large-scale corporate operation (the UFC), the sector achieved 
what seemingly has been neglected by economic historians. This was the 
introduction in the early 1900's of a new system of control in the regional labour 
process, consolidating corresponding regional labour m arket structures in its 
economic area of influence.
Historical economic evidence on the way the implementation of a segmentation
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strategy by the UFC manifested itself is recorded here. As Gordon, Edwards and 
Reich have explained, in the early 1900's, United States corporations' "corporate 
managers began to organize job tasks more systematically in order to perm it more 
control, greater differentiation among workers' tasks and greater fragmentation 
of informal work groups"165.
We suggest it is likely that this managerial system of control of the labour process 
not only structured the NAC regional labour market initially, but destructured it 
in the long run. The consequences were the negative effects of a high-wage 
economy: pricing out other sectors by restructuring relatively high wages, which 
in turn, destructured the regional labour market.
When analyzed within the context of the NAC region's economy, what seems to 
emerge from this system of control, is that destructure of the labour market took 
place with the struggle between large and small potential economic sectors of the 
NAC region. The effort was to maintain a wage high enough to retain labour 
within each economic sector until it was not possible to be competitive with the 
banana sector's UFC wage levels.
The first dynamic effect of this process is the question of the element of hum an 
capital. Some initial practical analysis would be likely to suggest that there was 
a presence of straightforward differentiation due to experience on the job and 
fragmented informal work segmentation. That is, at least different wages for 
certain specific categories of workers. As there is no evidence on efficiency rates, 
we assume equal efficiency on different jobs.
The second effect of the process is whether different categories of work were 
sufficiently controlled, differentiated and segmentated. Appendixes 19 & 20 show 
that this was likely to be so within the wage rate range of CP$ 0.33 and CP$ 3, 
eight different categories of work -most in the informal category. This is also 
likely to establish that large-scale corporate investment implemented detailed 
wage segmentation strategy.
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The grounds upon which we argue that differentiation and segmentation were 
implemented, exist. There were, according to Kepner, " about 260"166 different 
categories within the UFC. Differentiation was present within and across 
occupations. The labour force was made up of 'workers of different 
categories"167.
Although it would be ideal to compare wages for some categories of workers as 
well as jobs outside the banana sector in order to see if the sector's wages were 
too high, there is enormous difficulty in doing so.
This is because of the dearth of similar data within other economic sectors. There 
is also great difficulty in establishing like with like comparisons across sectors for 
the same reason. We are able only to present data that illustrates a segmentation 
strategy by the UFC for years 1909, 1922 and 1926.
It was in the base, at primary wage day labour level, that systematic segmentation 
made its grinding effect felt. Figures indicate that by 1909 segmentation was not 
only considerable but reasonably significant to play an important role in 
delineating the economic development process of the NAC region.
Differentiation by categories was of 'urbanised' unskilled peasantry, segmented 
in the internal labour market as 'cargadores', 'arrumadores', 'empleados' and 'mozos'. 
'Cargadores' and 'arrumadores', who constituted part of the 'picking-up' gangs, 
earned considerably high wages.
For example, 76 'cargadores' earned a basic CPP$ 60 per day and up to CPP$ 419 
for 'round-the-clock' work on two vessels on the 23rd and 24th (inclusive) of 
September of that year.
On the same days and year168, 16 'arrumadores^ earned a basic CPP$ 90 per day 
and up  to CPP$ 599 for 'round-the-clock' work. A further 74 'cargadores' and 12 
'arrumadores', which formed part of loading gangs', earned the same basic wages
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as mentioned above, and up to CPP$ 472 and CPP$ 944 respectively, for the same 
days of the same year169.
No doubt seasonality and fragility of the product were good market reasons for 
pushing wages up. Thus, disproportionality in urban prim ary wages of 
'arrumadores' and 'cargadores' probably illustrated the nature of the product and 
a monopoly /  monopsonist's production function.
But segmentation seems to have been at the center of it. Primary data170 show 
in a rather straightforward manner that in 1909, the banana sector through the 
UFC, paid a daily nominal wage of CPP$ 10 to a mail clerk, CPP$ 13 /  20 
messengers, CPP$ 40 to a cook, CPP$ 50 to a servant, CPP$ 57 to a stableman, 
CPP$ 67 to a foreman on shore, CPP$ 75 to a checker on board, CPP$ 80 to a 
telephone clerk, CPP$ 83 to an agent, CPP$ 90 to a porter and CPP$ 100 to an 
office boy.
This reflected a segmentated pattern in the labour force. The differences, for 
example at both ends of this particular scale of wages, warrants emphasising the 
dramatic difference in wages between the mail clerk and the office boy.
One speculative figure for 1909 as well is that of a rural daily wage of a /cutter/ 
of CPP$ 99.20. This was significantly higher than the urban daily wage of a 
foreman on shore at CPP$ 67 per day. It was just CPP$ 0.80 under the urban 
office boy's daily wage of CPP$ 100 but nevertheless, the 'cutter's wage was high.
This appears to be so if the daily wages earned mentioned above of CPP$ 419 /  
CPP$ 472 and CPP$ 599 /  CPP$ 944 for 'cargadores' and 'arrumadores' are seen 
within the perspective of the conditions under which the UFC operated.
Further below, several tables show the primary evidence which reveal the UFC's 
implementation of its segmentation strategy. They are followed by graphs which 
illustrate the data.
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Table 22 shows data for 1909. The data suggest a weighted mean average wage 
rate of CPP$ 2.58 per day. Figure 33 shows the barchart graph.
The banana sector's UFC continued to pay different wages to personnel holding 
different jobs. In 1922 for example, assuming an 8 hour working day, as Table 23 
shows, it paid checkers, rectificadores, cargadores, forklift operators, machinerymen 
and arrumadores weighted mean average daily wages of CPP$ 55, CPP$ 64, 
CPP$ 65.99, CPP$ 69.06, CPP$ 70.13 and CPP$ 90.58 respectively. Figure 34 shows 
the barchart graph.
Table 24 equally shows the same primary evidence for 1922 but by wage 
differentiated quantities of personnel. The data suggest a significantly high 
weighted mean average wage rate of CP$ 7.96 per day. Figure 35 shows the 
barchart graph.
Finally, Table 25 shows primary evidence for 1926 with data suggesting a 
weighted mean average wage rate of CPP$ 2.52 per day. Figure 36 shows the 
barchart graph.
In the final analysis, we can say three things. First, Table 25 shows consolidated 
figures from evidence in Appendix 19 & 20 by wage differentiated quantities of 
personnel.
Second, Table 26 shows a much tighter frequency distribution established from 
a sample of just the 542 employees which are within the wage rate range 
mentioned immediately above. These wage rates generated a weighted mean 
average wage rate of CP$ 1.74 . Figure 37 shows the barchart graph which 
i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  d a t a  w e  h a v e  m e n t i o n e d .
Table 27 details these categories individually as well as their corresponding 
averages and dispersions. Within the degree of spread or dispersion that the 
standard deviations of these wage rates display, and given the accompanying
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heterogeneity that variation coefficients yield, the results are quite significant. 
Because there is simply no basic symmetry.
Third, in relation to all the 542 employees, 448 or 82.7 % were an aggregate 
segment. Within it three sub-segments emerged as is shown in Table 28 below 
and graphically illustrated in Figure 38.
TABLE 22. LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA EXPORT SECTOR 
DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES (CP$'S): 1909
Wage Rate No. of Personnel
0.10 1
0.13 1
0.20 1
0.40 1
0.50 1
0.57 1
0.67 1
0.75 1
0.80 1
0.83 1
0.90 1
1.00 1
1.06 1
1.13 1
1.27 1
1.33
1.39 1
1.67 1
2.00
2.08
2.33 1
2.67 1
2.78 1
2.81 1
2.92 1
3.06 1
3.33 1
4.00 1
4.16 1
4.17 1
5.33 1
5.83 1
6.00 1
7.50 1
8.67 1
13.87 1
X = 2.58 43
Source: Appendix 7.
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If only sub-segment A  of this aggregate or category is considered however, it can 
be observed that further segmentation emerged. Of the 256 employees in the 
sub-segment, 46.5% was made up of helpers or labourers. They constituted the 
greater part of the sub-segment. Labourers alone represented 28.5 % (the largest 
percentage) of the sub-segment. But, most significant of all, 70 labourers -27.3 % 
of the sub-segment- were earning a daily wage rate of CP$ 1.50 . This was a very 
high wage indeed.
TABLE 23. BANANA SECTOR SHIP LOADING PERSONNEL DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES (CPP$'s): FEBRUARY 1922
Arrumadores Machinerymen Cargadores
No. $/hr. $/8 hrs. No. $/hr. $/8 hrs. No. $/hr. $/8 hrs.
21 5.89 47.12 4 4.43 35.44 121 3.93 31.44
19 8.85 70.80 3 6.90 55.20 119 5.90 47.22
19 15.40 123.2 4 11.27 90 178 10.27 82.16
20 15.50 124.0 4 12.00 96 161 11.00 88.00
79 X = 90.58 15 X = 70.13 579 X = 65.99
Forklift Operators Watchmen Desarrumadores
No. $[hr. $18 hrs. No. $/hr. $18 hrs. No. $lhr. $18 hrs.
12 3.93 31.44 2 1.75 14 12 0.60 4.8
12 5.94 47.52 2 2.88 23.04 12 0.80 6.4
16 10.35 82.80 2 4.88 39.04 16 0.80 6.4
16 12.50 100 2 5.13 41.04 14 0.80 6.4
56 X = 69.06 8 X = 29.28 54 X = 6.04
Checkers Rectificadores
No. $[hr. $18 hrs. No. $[hr. $/8 hrs.
1 4 32 1 40
2 40 1 6 48
3 7 56 3 9 72
2 10 80 1 10 80
8 X = 55 6 X = 64
Source: United Fruit Company. Extracto[s] de Cuentas. Payroll para el 
Embarque No. 2.374, S/S " Reventazon ", Embarque No. 2.375, S/S 
" Motagua ",Embarque No. 2.376, S/S " Esparta",[y] Embarque No. 2.77 S/S 
" Matapan ". Semana que termina el 18 de Febrero de 1922.
TABLE 24. LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA EXPORT 
SECTOR LOADING GANGS' DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES: 1922
Wage Rate (CP$'s) No. of Personnel
0.60 12
0.80 42
1.75 2
2.00 3
2.88 2
3.93 121
3.96 12
4.00 1
4.43 3
4.88 2
5.00 3
5.13 2
5.50 15
5.89 21
5.90 119
5.94 12
6.00 1
6.90 3
7.00 2
8.85 19
9.00 3
10.00 3
10.27 178
10.35 16
11.00 161
11.27 4
12.00 4
12.50 16
15.40 19
15.50 20
X = 7.96 821
Source: United Fruit Company. Extracto[s] de Cuentas. Payroll para el 
Embarque No. 2.374, S/S " Reventazon ", Embarque No. 2.375, S/S 
" Motagua ", Embarque No. 2.376, S/S " Esparta ", [y] Embarque No. 2.77 
S/S " Matapan ". Semana que termina el 18 de Febrero de 1922.
TABLE 25. LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA EXPORT SECTOR'S 
SAMPLE 667 EMPLOYEES DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES:1926
(CP$'s)
Wage Rate No. o f Personnel Wage Rate No. of Personnel
0.33 5 3.25 5
0.40 1 3.33 11
0.50 26 3.50 14
0.67 14 3.66 1
0.75 6 3.67 3
0.83 26 3.75 3
1.00 28 3.83 16
1.17 12 3.97 1
1.20 1 4.00 7
1.25 7 4.17 7
1.33 7 4.50 2
1.40 1 4.67 3
1.50 108 4.83 1
1.60 5 5.00 7
1.66 4 5.33 2
1.67 15 5.50 2
1.70 1 5.67 2
1.75 45 5.83 6
1.80 1 6.23 1
1.83 4 6.25 1
2.00 79 6.67 1
2.16 3 7.07 1
2.17 7 750 3
2.20 1 8.00 1
2.25 19 8.33 1
2.33 8 9.17 1
2.50 33 10.00 3
2.67 13 11.67 3
2.75 19 12.50 1
2.80 1 13.89 2
2.83 8 16.67 3
2.93 1 18.06 1
3.00 33 18.83 1
3.16 1 20.83 1
3.17 1 41.67 1
X = 2.52 667
Source: Appendixes 19 & 20
TABLE 26. LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA EXPORT SECTOR'S 
SAMPLE 542 EMPLOYEES DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES:1926
(CP$'s)
Wage Rate No. of Personnel
033
0.40 1
0.50 26
0.67 14
0.75 6
0.83 26
1.00 28
1.17 12
1.20 1
1.25 7
1.33 7
1.40 1
1.50 108
1.60
1.66 4
1.67 15
1.70 1
1.75 45
1.80 1
1.83 4
2.00 79
2.16 3
2.17 7
2.20 1
2.25 19
2.33 8
2.50 33
2.67 13
2.75 19
2.80 1
2.83 8
2.93 1
3.00 33
X = 1.74 542
Source: Appendixes 19 & 20
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TABLE 27. AVERAGES AND DISPERSION OF LARGE-SCALE 
CORPORATE WAGES: 1926 
(CP$'S)
average daily rate 
mode mean
standard
deviation
maid 2.50 2.16 659
laundress 0.67 0.78 0.60
clerk 2.50 2.01 2.63
servant 0.50 0.80 1.44
orderly 0.83 1.13 1.98
cook 0.83 1.11 1.06
helper 1.50 1.83 454
labourer 150 156 9.90
Source: Appendixes 19 & 20
TABLE 28. OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF LARGE-SCALE 
CORPORATE WAGE EARNERS: 1926
Occupational
Group
No. of 
Personnel
% of all 542 
Quoted Employees
A:
maids, laundresses, 
servants, clerks, orderlies, 
cooks, helpers or labourers 256 57.1
B:
helpers or labourers 119 26.6
C:
labourers 73 16.3
Source: Appendix 9
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In the final analysis, this chapter suggests that imperfections in the national and 
international factor markets served to reduce labour mobility to the NAC region. 
The various imperfections affected wage levels in different ways. We suggest it 
is plausible that these constraints on factor mobility could help explain the higher 
level of wages in the NAC region.
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CHAPTER VII
THE LINK BETWEEN HIGH WAGES AND STAGNATION
(i) H igh Wages, Low Linkages
The link between high wages and stagnation in the NAC region is difficult to 
prove, because of of the dearth of hard quantitative primary data. It goes without 
saying that common sense is needed in the discussion of such data. Especially in 
the difficulties that ensued in the handling of the price data we have collected for 
the first decade of our study. And even if the increase in real wages in cotton 
cultivation in the NAC in 1905-1910 may be explained by deflation.
If wages in the cotton cultivation sector of the NAC region's economy were part 
and parcel of a long-term contractual relationship between a company and the 
region's labour force, it would make sense to say that high cotton wages in the 
region were only due to deflation.
But here is an economic history case where only smallholders in a labour shortage 
environment, grow cotton profitably for the domestic, not the international 
market. Barely affording the running wage rates, and without handing out long­
term contracts to whatever field labourer they could get their hands on.
We therefore suggest common sense be equally injected into the discussion of our 
qualitative evidence. Our suggestion is that the link with hard data between high 
wages and stagnation is relative to the eye of the beholder. We suggest the link 
is unquestionably made with our qualitative evidence. We suggest the logic of the 
argument defensible by the general views of commentators throughout the period 
—not just this thesis' author— that the wage variable was an extraordinary one.
Some pieces of data are indeed hard to reconcile - le t  alone digest. And there is 
certainly work to be done. But whether it be wage pressure, excessive protection 
or any other one that may emerge in the future, we do not believe they are
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mutually exclusive. But we do not have to decide that in this thesis' logic. W hat 
matters is the important effects.
Other things may well have being going on. We set forward initially, to reasearch 
the wage variable. We unearthed amazing —albeit incomplete— data. We 
encountered the wage variable head on. We argued its main overall tendencies as 
best we could.
Despite existent deflation, we suggest there is no logic in the region growing in 
general, during the period, with such enormous costs. Therefore, our first part of 
the argument is that there is no evidence that high wages brought acceptable 
linkages to the regional economy.
According to Pearson1, the linkage or leakage capabilities of an economy suggest 
that initial investment result in second types of indirect gains for an economy. Be 
it of national or regional nature, this should be so, provided there is a consistent 
pattern of relationships, i.e. linkages. These gains have normally been assumed to 
be positive. However, Hirschman2 has suggested that their economic benefits or 
costs may indeed turn linkages into leakages. This leads us to suggest that aspects 
in the NAC region that should have promoted linkage were, in the end, conducive 
to leakage. Such seems to be the case regarding imperfections found in the 
region's labour market.
The notion of 'linkage' —and its antithesis, the notion of 7leakage'— initially has 
industrialisation —or the lack of it— in mind. Both notions subscribe 
-nevertheless- to items such as those mentioned immediately above. We suggest 
they strongly influence primary production. This is compatible with the staple 
thesis. Indeed, one thing may or may not lead to another. The evidence in this 
thesis seems to suggest that there be the potential for sustained 'linkage' to take 
place. This operated through the influential requirements of both the banana or 
cotton staples. 'Leakage', nevertheless, seems to have reflected true reality.
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Backward linkages, for example, deal with input expenditures. This helps to assess 
the importance of the supply, expansion or stagnation of inputs. The 
backward-linked industry in the NAC region that had the potential to provide 
increasing returns was probably cotton. The result, however, seems to be that 
immobility of labour became a sufficiently scarce regional factor. This in turn, 
aggravated the cost of establishing a consistent, long-term linkage.
There is evidence that the banana sector brought the staple itself into commercial 
use. It created returns as high levels of wages. However, these were not conducive 
to economic development. We suggest the explanation be that the effective 
dem and these wages represented, were absorbed by company stores, or by labour 
contractors. Some of it went in those two directions. We assume the rest went into 
the 'residual' (leisure). It did not -how ever— vent a surplus for trade for the NAC 
region. While the export of the fruit did create significant employment, it also 
created havoc in the end by releasing the basis for underemployment and 
informality.
The banana sector paid high wages. Such a payment of wages should have had 
consumption or final demand linkages. If compared w ith each factor's likely 
income from alternate linkage' employment —i.e. the cotton sector— this seems 
plausible. The net incremental factor income —equal to the net gain calculated for 
the banana sector's direct contribution to regional income— would enable those 
who received factor payments, to show larger expenditure patterns. If data on 
such net incremental income were available, with estimates of the propensity to 
purchase goods and services, it would be more feasible to answer the question 
about whether additional (or only) final demand created by the banana sector 
produced the necessary stimulus to create or expand an industry, endowed with 
sufficient linkage. It is difficult - i f  not im possible- to get such data.
While there is no evidence that the fruit induced higher rates of domestic savings, 
there is some evidence that some degrees of wages were recycled to the sector's 
large-scale corporate unit, the UFC. This was accomplished by the purchase of
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goods from its merchandise stores. In this way, the staple was not establishing 
linkages with other sectors of the region's economy. It seems that rather the 
opposite happened. That is, leakages were created producing obstacles —such as 
we have suggested- the posibility of the pricing out of cotton. We suggest this 
could have contributed to economic stagnation.
High wages probably created sufficient margins to save. The extent of and 
directions of savings —however— are unknown. W hat is known only suggests that 
not much went into regional industrial linkage-creating activities —or warranted 
economic growth. If the evidence is clear that the UFC paid high wages, what 
were the demand consequences of this high wage?
On one hand, regularly, an outlet for this high purchasing power m ust have been 
leisure. Pearse seems to have been strongly convinced that "the high wages which 
the work people along the Coast were receiving at the present time, due to 
Americanisation of the district, induce these ignorant people to riotous living, 
which of course adds further to weakening their constitutions, leading frequently 
to consumption."3
Setting aside ignorance and unorthodox living, what was consumption really like? 
Pearse reflects some degree of confusion or m isunderstanding... or perhaps both. 
Initially, he observed th a t" wages are paid fortnightly, and of course there is a 
good deal of drinking on the days following pay-day "... [and] ... owing to their 
few needs in their house which consist largely of huts from banana leaves, they 
have too much money to spend on drinking and riotous living."4 Thereafter, he 
seems to have found the way the high purchasing power of these NAC region 
consumers —" who live in thatched huts5"— was earned and disposed of, not 
particularly enhancing. That is, that they " spent their easily earned money on 
whisky, brandy, and motor-cars ."6
Confusion arises on the underestimation of people's knowledge of taste and 
quality in consumption goods (be they necessary or otherwise). This is at least a
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proof of penetration into the monetary economy, once the level of income is 
favourable. It seems to us that if consumers prefer leisure ' to other economic 
options —and this is not appreciated— misunderstanding surfaces. The point is not 
how  easily income is earned. It is what preference surfaces in its disposal.
Pearse however, was not as straightforward as say, Roemer, when the latter 
suggested (50 years later) possible consumption linkage created by waged labour 
of Peru's fish export sector. Roemer was not being flippant when he said th a t " 
still, there is a consensus, which may not mean much, that consumption patterns 
in towns like Chimbote and Tambo de Mora run toward wine and women. The 
one industry that inevitably seems to thrive in good fishing season is one that 
never enters the input-output tables of the world, unless it m ight be buried deeply 
under 'services'.
Although North 's phrase, 'residentiary industry7, seems singularly appropriate to 
this service, it is not the sort of consumption linkage he or any of the staple 
theorists had in m ind (or at least in print). Moreover, the brothels may be the 
source of unsuspected leakage from the economy. It is alleged, and on this the 
author has no personal knowledge, that most of the prostitutes have been 
imported from neighbouring countries and even further afield. If so, then to the 
extent they are savers, they will probably remit their incomes home, to the 
detriment of Peru's balance on current account."7
It is impossible as of yet to be economically precise about patterns of expenditure 
in the NAC region. Similar channels to those mentioned above about Peru, existed 
at the time in the region's highly waged banana export sector. It is for example, 
commonplace in this particular region to hear the aged speak amusingly about, 
particularly, a 'residentiary services' industry emerging, especially due to hard 
purchasing power of high wages the banana export sector's labour force had at 
its disposal.
Colombian economist Dr. Riveira Avendafvo reminisced, for example, t h a t " on
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Saturdays, according to the shipment the labour force would be paid about [CP$] 
200 per week. Ten per cent would be spent on interest on ‘culebras' [debts], five 
percent of the 'culebra' [itself] spent mostly on parranda [partying]. At 4 P.M. they 
[the labourers] would go drinking about twenty beers each and spend [CP] $ 2 
per session [with a woman], three sessions per night. Each [labourer] had three 
mistresses. Each mistress cost him [CP] 50 centavos per day. They would dance 
la cumbiamba [NAC regional folk dance] with lit bank notes instead of candles"8.
Equally, Mr. M&rquez Alvarez -former worker at HLDE and present foreman of 
Hacienda La Maria Teresa in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta- explained that 
" in the 1920s, a coffee labourer earning [CP] $ 80 per day spent about [CP] $ 25 
on food. The rest [CP$ 55] [was spent] on ron [rum], parranda [partying] [and] putas 
[whores]. Una puta de calidad [a first quality whore] cost [CP] 50 centavos all night 
... that is, from dusk untill dawn9. Serious academic research on these particulars 
seems to command little if any interest whatsoever.
At any rate, Pearse's analysis does invite the consideration of several relevant 
points, namely, (i) that regardless of subjective moral values of whether or not 
income was earned easily or with difficulty, it is an economic historical fact that 
purchasing power rose significantly in the NAC region above that existing in the 
interior; (ii) that accepting the right of the income earner to spend his or her pay 
on whatever he or she fancies, it is apparent that leisure took priority over 
consumer durable consumption; and (iii) that in the case of motor-car, whisky and 
brandy consumption and indeed, in Roemer and North's 'residentiary services' 
(luxury and leisure) consumption, it certainly did not help the region's 
developmental linkage-creating multiplier effect. It probably did so —however— 
for the region's importers, as well as for the regional economies of Scotland, 
France and the United States.
On the other hand, high purchasing power meant expenditure on UFC 
merchandise stores. The system of handing scrips to labourers by the UFC 
undoubtedly became a consumption pattern as well. As Herrera-Soto and
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Romero-Castaneda have pointed o u t," the system of half-monthly pay, alongside 
w ith scrips for the acquisition of prime necessity goods from [company] 
merchandise stores was introduced"10. Rippy confirms this when he comments 
that the UFC's labour force " had a portion of their wages advanced in the form 
of scrip which could be exchanged for commodities at the commissaries of the 
company or at the stores of the banana zone"11.
Although this has not been mentioned here due to lack of evidence, it seems to 
have contributed to the social unrest and eventual strike in the banana zone 
according to Ramirez del Valle. He has recently written that, "as the [UFC's] 
payment to its workers was carried out by a system of scrips, it also converted 
itself into a merchant when it would sell in its store merchandise brought from 
the United States. Therefore it not only harm ed its own employees bu t the zone's 
population as well. Thus, that 6th of December of 1928, the labourer's strike 
became an uprising of the population"12.
Indeed, the UFC invested relatively important sums in this particular trade. As 
US Trade Commisioner Bell has indicated," with the exception of the local trade 
in native foodstuffs and ample supplies of cotton dry goods, the large $ 80,000 
stock carried by the merchandise department of the United Fruit Company and 
one small stock of hardware of about $ 4,000 are the only stocks of goods in Santa 
Marta"13.
In fact, the UFC merchandise store emerged as one which the region could very 
well not do without. Wilson sustained the " company bought, stored and 
distributed tens of thousands of needed articles such as motor parts, paints, tiles, 
nails, screws, bolts, nuts, farm tools, riggings, ropes, cables, coffins [Emphasis 
added], stores and furniture; o f which a fu ll lis t w ould literally run to hundreds 
o f closely printed pages [Emphasis added]"14.
And Rippy pointed out " much of the clothing, food, and other supplies 
consumed by the laborers is regularly brought into the region by the company,
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which is naturally interested in having cargoes for its vessels as they return from 
foreign fruit markets. The company stores can usually sell supplies more cheaply 
than they can be bought from the local native merchants, who are often compelled 
to, owing to lack of a better source of supply, to purchase their wares from the 
United Fruit itself "15.
This seems to represent reabsorbption —or recycling— of a portion of the wage 
paid by the UFC to its labourers. There would undoubtedly be some reason to 
expect transfer pricing in the accounting of bulk buying at a probable discount in 
the United States. Goods at the merchandise stores in the NAC region could then 
be sold at some sort of profit, that could be hidden, when routed into some 
different account.
Kepner and Soothill seem to share share this view when they indicate that " 
besides purchasing goods on commissary orders, fruit company laborers, as well 
as higher employees, buy much for cash. Many articles are requisitioned from the 
commissiries for the use of the company. Although the latter may include 
one-third or more of the total goods carried, these requisitioned articles appear to 
be charged to the company at cost; the profit which the the stores are expected to 
make m ust therefore be obtained on the goods sold to the workers and to the 
general public"16.
This especially meant a further ingredient to a lesser return value to the NAC 
region; another leakage, small as it m ay have been. By the use of the scrip, the 
wage earner was constantly recycling some portion of his wage or obliged to do 
so, if in debt to the company's merchandise store.
As Kepner and Soothill mentioned, the " sometimes advantageous but frequently 
disastrous system of instalment buying17 the UFC pu t into practice, eventually 
m e a n t" constant debt for many who engage in it, and it involves the surrender 
of the purchased commodity when the payments can no longer be made"18.
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Members of the labour force were also seemingly forced to trade their scrips for 
hard currency. As Rippy's quote of labour leader Alberto Castrillon's illustrates, 
" a part of his wage is in scrip which the needy laborer m ust sell at a reduced 
price"19.
Rippy further ellaborates on this matter indicating th a t" a group of unscrupulous 
money-changers sprang up who often bought the scrip at a discount of 25 per 
cent just as they do in some southern cotton mill towns in the United States"20.
Fonnegra's quote of then labour and political leader Carlos Arias illustrates 
Rippy's asertions above:" based on foremen and contractors' reports, the United 
paid ajusteros an advance on their pay, a sort of loan, always in scrips. The 
agiotistas would acquire the scrips, but would discount 20 or 30 per cent of its 
value; and as each fortnight the company deduced the loans, the wage was 
reduced to a few pesos"21.
It would not seem misleading therefore, to conclude that the demand 
consequences of high wages in the NAC region were unorthodox living and the 
UFC's merchandise stores.
North22, who incorporated the 'export base' idea into a formal and descriptive 
model suggested that economic development is induced by greater external 
demand for locally produced forestry, mineral and especially agricultural sectors. 
In this way, an industry of a region within a nation would generate extra local 
income which in turn would generate demand for regionally produced goods and 
services thereby creating a cumulative process. Cotton cultivation had a real 
long-term potential to carry out this function. The generation of extra local income 
from cotton was certainly existent, especially if one is reminded that considerable 
production was in hands of small growers.
Mention was made earlier of the existence of industry producing goods and 
services in the urban centres of Barranquilla and Cartagena, which were 
responding to some degree of effective demand. Although a perfectly cumulative
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process was not thoroughly established, the potential was there. The processing 
of cotton into textiles took place but the fibre's export was unable to compete in 
international markets. Cotton cultivation thus became a domestic rather than an 
export industry. It therefore represented potential for greater value added, 
improved infrastructure and the accomplishment of external economies. But a 
series of labour market imperfections seem to have been impediments.
Here, the idea of 'staple growth' raises useful issues. For example, the question 
of the importance of examining the nature of any resource base. This either 
influenced, had the potential to influence, or having had the possibility to 
influence the NAC region's economic development, encountered severe obstacles.
The idea of the 'export base' indeed demands that more explanatory variables are 
introduced than just static comparative advantage. Natural resources are less 
versatile, homogeneous and mobile regionally than say, capital or labour23. 
Regions differ in quantity and quality (resource content or composition and 
location proximity) and therefore production functions are not the same. 
Additionally, resources may be renewable. In the former case, regional availability 
is influenced by a wide range of topographical, climatical and vegetational 
conditions. In the latter, industrial location on the international scale together with 
politics of international strategic commerce are required explanatory variables24.
Cotton and banana cultivation in the NAC region were different altogether. And 
in turn, the two were different from successful coffee cultivation in the interior. 
The three provided different stimuli, according to the technological characteristics 
of their production. The technical relationship between physical inputs of factors 
and resultant physical output influenced the extent of secondary changes 
elsewhere in their respective regional economies beyond just primary increase in 
export output.
As Montenegro pointed out, one of the " important characteristics of the interior's 
small plot coffee economy was its resistance to to crisis periods, especially falling
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international coffee prices because the small plot's character as a basic unit of 
production allowed prices to decline significantly... because labourers' livelihood 
still depended greatly on their owned plot-produced subsistence food products
••25
But, the nature of the product was different in the NAC region. The cultivating 
conditions and technical specifications of cotton were different from coffee. Coffee 
had no immediate industrial transformation upgrading levels as cotton had with 
textiles. Therefore the importance as an industrial processing solution as yam  
imports had, bore no equivalent in the coffee business. Furthermore, regarding 
NAC region in particular, cultivators of raw  cotton were unable to meet domestic 
textile industry demand certainly because of the inheritance of hacienda system 
structural rigidities such as " ruling relations of production, rent and 
sharecropping "26, made the supplies of raw  cotton " very inelastic in the short 
term ‘,27.
The interior coffee cultivation had an impact —undoubtedly— on the NAC region's 
economy. But the significance was commercial rather than productive. The 
productive characteristics of coffee were of very low significance in the NAC 
region anyway, not least because of labour shortage and the predominance of 
high wages, but because of great concentration of property and production28.
The degree of processing should have determined more or less similar external 
economies in interior coffee cultivation as in the NAC region's banana and cotton 
cultivation. They were undoubtedly at some point during the period spreading 
some technical knowledge, training some labour, demonstrating some new 
production techniques and acquiring some 'residual' skills whether organisational 
or supervisory. However, the expansion of the NAC region's cotton sector 
involved simple methods already in use in subsistence agriculture. Any potential 
stimulus to the region's development was theoretically greater there than growth 
in the banana sector which implied not only the introduction of new skills, but 
new organisational control systems and especially productive utilisation of a
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constrained factor (labour supply) of production through the ability to influence 
the level of wages.
The nature of the production function of the export sector determines income 
distribution and in turn, the pattern of demand and the impact on local 
employment, as Nieto-Arteta's model of gold, tobacco and coffee suggested. 
Different factor combinations also affect the distribution of income to the extent 
that relative shares of profits, wages, interest and rent will vary according to the 
labour or capital intensity of the export production and the nature of its 
organisation, whether it be plantation agriculture, peasant farming or mining.
But, although the relative share of profits and its relationship to capital intensity 
would provide illuminating findings for the NAC region's banana sector's 
corporate unit (the UFC), i t  is the level o f wages i t  set, their relationship to the 
scarce labour supply, its character and the nature o f a segmented labour market, 
which seems to have been paramount in the region's development process.
Moreover, the internal income distribution of the banana sector favoured an 
isolated group. Its effective demand seems to show a propensity to consume 
goods imported by the UFC, not domestic goods produced in the region. It seems 
therefore, that the resulting distribution of income was not effective in raising 
demand for locally produced products. The result would seem to be the contrary. 
That is, if one considers that those locally produced products had been responding 
initially to the effective demand created by the interior coffee cultivation. Before 
banana cultivation emerged with any strength.
To the extent that cotton cultivation and its up-grading level of processing - the 
textile industry - was perhaps the most labour-intensive potential industry in the 
NAC region --before the banana sector consolidated itself— it would have 
probably made a stronger long-term impact on employment in the region. But the 
banana sector's corporate unit (the UFC) was a world monopoly, subject to 
economies of scale in its production. This implied large capital requirements and
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vast profit mark-ups which it had. Hence, extra-regional or foreign financing led 
to an outward flow of profits instead of providing income for the region's 
reinvestment. That is, returned value29 tended to be low and foreign factors30 
high.
Furthermore, the banana industry, being a foreign investment, differed in its 
degree of flow of foreign exchange fluctuations and in revenue earned and 
retained locally by the cotton staple. Repercussions on the regional economy by 
the banana sector's level of wages made the maintenance of steady employment 
in the cotton sector difficult because of disturbing effects on real income.
These aforementioned characteristics of the banana export sector facilitated its 
implementation of a level of wages such that it weakened cotton cultivation's 
integrative process in terms of any potential stimulus the latter may have shown 
for the region. Staples such as the interior's coffee and the NAC region's banana 
emerged with some relevance, for reasons of adaptation to resource endowment 
and to market opportunities at the time when the staple became established.
But one thing is clear which was not before. While the level of wages allowed 
coffee to sustain growth and development in the interior, it did not allow banana 
to do so for the NAC region (although it did for its corporate unit, the UFC). It 
is within this context that the notion of 'staple growth' is featured. That is, that 
in our analysis of regional development, the study of the nature of the production 
function was useful for our theoretical framework of imperfection .
Discussion of issues such as the above, towards which the idea of 'staple growth' 
readily contributes, lead to a caveat. Although the nature of the technology of an 
industry, i.e., the production function, is w hat should enable a process of dem and 
for factors, for initial processing, for intermediate outputs, for further processing 
and for distribution of income, constraints appeared unavoidable. These were a 
series of imperfections in national and international factor markets of the NAC 
region, while market opportunities in a specific time coincided with the interior
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region's suitable endowment with a 'favoured' commodity such as coffee. The 
subsequent reduction of labour mobility created labour shortage which resulted 
in a higher level of wages.
We suggest that differences in wage levels (both within and outside the NAC 
region) and operating profitability within these levels, seem to have determined 
whether or not there was an upsurge or a decline and stagnation in the regional 
economy. This for example, took place although railways (which were first present 
in the NAC region) do not appear to show equalisation of wages between the 
interior and the NAC region.
(ii) Decline and Stagnation
The second part of our argument is the suggestion that the link between high 
wages and stagnation is plausible, if seen within the framework of the decline of 
cotton cultivation, and the collpase of the textile industry.
The issue of intra and inter-regional difference in wages is related with cotton 
cultivation and cotton textile industry stagnation. This seems to be so because 
cotton in the NAC region suddenly found itself competing with agricultural as 
well as urban wage levels set by the banana industry which it does not appear to 
have been able to meet.
Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, agricultural wages in the NAC region were 
higher than in the interior. Perhaps the only one with any authority on the subject 
who manifested this view and analysed the export of cotton along these lines was 
w ithout any question, the British General Secretary of the International Federation 
of Master Cotton Spinners' and Manufacturers' Associations in Manchester, Amo 
S. Pearse. This is why his most perceptive views are accentuated.
Pearse insisted that the economic progress that had been achieved in Colombia 
during the end of the 1920s " upset to an appreciable extent the whole of the
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wages and the cost of living in the country "31 . But reference to this was made 
particularly " in connection with the banana plantations 1,32 in the NAC region, 
where an United States corporation (the UFC) had " feverishly devoted [itself] to 
... bananas, [that] labour [became] so scarce and consequently high in price that 
the establishment or extension of cotton growing in this section or of any other 
industry that has to compete with the world's markets 1,33 did not seem possible.
Despite praise for the UFC's organisation, his indictment of its consequences were 
severe: " the Banana Company, which undoubtedly is excellently organised, 
whilst bringing wealth into the country is indirectly responsible for the 
uneconomic wages and attendant evils to the population which have spread over 
the whole of the North of the country m34.
But, in " addition to the demand for labour by the American corporations, the 
rapid development of road construction ... necessitated the withdrawal of many 
farm labourers and the scarcity of labour brought about by this road extension has 
also increased wages ',35. As mentioned in an earlier in chapter, the exceptionally 
rapid development of national public works seriously affected the labour market 
increasing wages above levels paid by domestic industry36.
Wages were so high in the NAC region, that Pearse was adam ant to establish 
their relationship with inmorality. He said the " rise in the common labourers' 
wages has had the effect that these people, who live in thatched huts, spend their 
easily-earned money on whisky, brandy [and] motor-cars "37. But high wages 
were also " accompanying immorality ',38. The impact of high wages in the NAC 
region was such th a t " in this part of the country the birth rate of illegitimate 
children last year reached 89 per cent of all births "39, and that this " riotous 
living of the people undermines their health "40.
Prospects for cotton cultivation for e x p o rt" as a whole along the Atlantic coast, 
owing to the high wages and the inferiority of the quality of labour, as compared 
to America, would not be able to prosper if it were to offer its cotton abroad "41.
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They would be good in conditions such as those in " some parts of the United 
States [where] a labourer is paid less and produces much more ,42.
Pearse indicated th a t " even at the present panic prices there are many parts of 
Colombia which could compete successfully with the United States "43. He 
emphasised Colombia's interior low-wage areas, pointing out that " cotton 
prospects in the [department of] Valle del Cauca are brilliant, in Boyaca and 
Santander, good ',44. This was especially so in the latter " two up-country 
departments, as wages there are still reasonable we look forward to good results
••45
Cotton picking was paid at a " higher rate on the Atlantic coast of Colombia than 
in Texas ',46. And the " cost of living in very inferior hotels on the coast of 
Colombia [was] almost as high as in first-class hotels in New York and certainly 
higher than in the centre of Texas ... ',47.
Therefore, in these "parts o f Colombia where good cotton cannot be produced a t 
less than 15 cents per lb. lint (71/2 d) delivered in Europe, i t  w ill not be worth  
your while to start the cotton-growing industry[Emphasis added]"48. This was 
higher than the market price per pound of cotton —between 1900 and 1915— in 
both the New York and New Orleans markets 49.
Departments such as " Magdalena and Atlantico [NAC region] would have to 
work hard to make any profit on their cotton as there you have an American level 
o f wages and get less value for them than in the United States[Emphasis added] 
... 1,50. Wages on the NAC region had reached such an extreme that Pearse 
considered i t " injurious to the development of the economic life of the country 
"51. This state of affairs was " bound to impede the development of cotton 
growing "52. With that level of wages the country would not be expected to " 
compete efficiently with other countries in no matter w hat produce it may be ',53.
Wages o f " one to two dollars are not the exception on the [North Atlantic] coast
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and cotton cannot stand so high a charge ,l54. This was m uch more so, if, as he 
told his fellow members in his report to the International Cotton Federation, that 
" in the banana zone a man can easily earn 3 dollars per day of about 6 hours ',55, 
or US$ 0.50 per hour.
This was a higher wage per hour than selected and all occupations of both sexes 
in the cotton goods manufacturing industry of the United States between 1910 and 
1930! Indeed, average earnings per hour in the said US industry ranged from US$ 
0.140 in 1910, to US$ 0.325 in 1930 — US$ 0.480 in 1920, being the highest wage 
per hour in those two decades 56.
A rise in banana sector wages was therefore, a rise in NAC region wages. If it did 
not eventually price cotton out domestically— i t  certainly made i t  uncompetitive 
in the the international markets.
The great bulk of cotton cultivation came from this region. A nd is indeed what 
happened. It would be only in other parts of Colombia which had  not yet been 
" spoilt by American high wages, such as the [interior departments of] Cauca 
Valley, Antioquia, Boyaca and Santander [where] cotton growing could be made 
a commercial success "57. He eventually expected wages to " revert to a more 
reasonable basis. Meanwhile, the Atlantic Coast Departments [would] be able to 
continue to supply the mills situated in this region, as there is an im port duty on 
American cotton h58.
He was adam ant to state that if cotton was being cultivated for export, he 
considered it his " duty to warn Colombia not to extend cotton growing in any 
parts where the cost of production (including farmer's profit) per pound lint is 
above 6d. "59. Only when wages in the NAC region would " come down to a 
reasonable economic level, even these sections should turn out much larger 
quantities [of raw  cotton] than they do at present ',60.
This suggests an outcome which does not seem far-fetched. Indeed the NAC
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region's export of raw  cotton would eventually stagnate. And cultivation of the 
fibre would not even be sufficient for domestic consumption, its deficit being 
covered by imports. Following the relationship established with raw  cotton's 
stagnation as an export sector, the issue of the inter-regional difference in wages 
is related hitherforth, with the cotton textile industry's eventual decline into 
stagnation.
Perhaps, if we could obtain the marginal product per labourer in the NAC region 
cotton fields, price series could be established and compared w ith those abroad - 
-say, the United States' southern cotton producing areas— for the period and 
actually be able to link —without any doubt— high wages to economic stagnation 
in the region. But we do not know how many labourers worked the fields per 
year. Niether do we know how m any pounds of cotton these labourers collected 
per year. These of course are matters for further research.
We could also try and build conclusions on assumptions. After all the rule of 
thumb of assumptions is how the data that is available can be used to enlarge our 
horizons of knowledge. Again, the marginal product of cotton labourers in 
southern United States for the period, could be used as a proxy, to argue that 
economic stagnation could have been possible in the NAC region, due to precisely 
high wages. Another assumption could be exclusive labour mobility between the 
NAC region's agricultural sector and its textile manufacturing. These are equally 
matters for further research.
Despite claiming the most important and single largest textile company (Fabrica 
de Tejidos Obregon de Barranquilla) in Colombia until the beginning of the 
thirties61, the NAC region's cotton textile industry eventually lagged behind its 
interior (namely the department of Antioquia) counterpart which in fact, outgrew 
it62. Brew has argued this before, indicating in 1975 that the " textile industry of 
Medellin [department of Antioquia] began to develop later, in 1907, but in a few 
decades became much more im portant than that of the Coast ',63. He implied 
therefore, the overall decline of the cotton textile industry in the latter region.
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But, interior textile factories did emerge after 1892 and before 1907, such as the 
Empresa de Tejidos de Bello (1902) in the department of Antioquia and the 
Empresa de Tejidos de Samaca (1904) in the department of Boyaca64.
So, as there could be some misapprehension about labour costs in the NAC 
region, the important role it played in the decline and stagnation of its cotton 
textile industry in contrast to growth of the interior's could be diminished. 
Consider for example, the gathering of the fibre. In 1905 it was reported to be " 
paid at the rate of about 5 cents for every arroba (25 lbs.) ... the highest wage 
including board am ounting] to 16 cents (8 d.) per day ',65.
The latter was in itself a reasonably average rural wage at the beginning of the 
1900s. Nevertheless, the point has been made within this context that despite 
being localised far from the interior coffee market (which generated sufficient 
purchasing power to satisfy textile demand through imports), the NAC region had 
easier access to its raw  materials. Brew, for example, emphasised that the region 
experienced few logistic problems in the transportation of heavy machinery and 
therefore " the Atlantic [Coast region's cotton textile] factories were able to stand 
up"66.
More stimulating, however, was his argument that the NAC region's cotton textile 
industry had the ability to remain in such a position " because wages were cheap 
"67. It would appear initially that the NAC region's cotton textile industry took 
off reasonably well and maintained itself due to a low-wage economy. 
Transportation costs were bound to be higher in the interior at the time due to a 
difficult topography. But the question to be addressed -the timing and explanation 
for the demise of the NAC region's cotton textile industry- is not in the least 
mentioned. It is of course answered by the setting of a high wage level in the 
region by the UFC.
Interior region local-market idiosyncrasies, the high risk long-term credits 
conceded by foreign commission houses, the increase in transport costs from the
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NAC region to the interior, exchange rate fluctuations following devaluation after 
1899, the tariffs imposed on imported articles especially after 1903, and the havoc 
w rought by the "War of a Thousand Days" (1899-1902) on the Department of 
Santander's textile industry68 are all factors which m ay have influenced the 
upsurge of the department of Antioquia's textile industry.
But simply to argue (as Brew did) that the real cost of wage labour was a majour 
additional cost for the interior (Antioquia) textile industry69 dangerously 
promotes an erroneous idea that the high-wage economy which afflicted the NAC 
region engendered similar effects in the interior. This needs to be viewed in a 
clearer and more cautious context. His interpretation that the real cost of wages 
" increased production costs of Colombian industries between a 50 and 100 
percent over their foreign competitors "70 is a misleading one.
Graham-Clarke (the source upon which Brew based his argument) did make his 
conclusion in a 'national' rather than in a 'regional' sense by stating th a t" it costs 
50 to 100 per cent more to make these plain goods in Co lombia [Emphasis added] 
than in the United States "71. However, in order to make a conclusion which was 
to be applied nationally, clearly, he used specific NAC regional evidence. It is 
plain that the wages paid in 1910 which Graham-Clarke quoted were exclusively 
in Cartagena and not in Medellin or Samaca (interior).
His prices of wages for spinners and weavers were mentioned by us in an earlier 
chapter, but his emphasis on NAC region location was clear:" the weaving price 
here knows that inefficient labor costs high, for similar goods in the United States 
a weaver would run 8 looms and be paid less than 1 /3  of a cent a yard, and still 
each one makes a great deal more per day than the Cartagena[Emphasis added] 
weaver ',72. In order to prove that the interior textile industry's production costs 
were between 50 and 100 percent over foreign competition, Brew would have had 
to show the evidence. He did not as it was evidence from NAC region textile 
industry.
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Nevertheless, one could speculate on Brew's argument that " lack of ability to 
operate the textile machinery 1,73 was a reason for a higher " real cost of wage 
labour 1,74 for the interior's cotton textile industry. This could be done by giving 
him the benefit of the doubt (despite lack of evidence) on the grounds that the 
interior had good supplies of low-waged labour. As, according to Clark, in 
analysing textile production " the same fact emerges -low-waged countries 
employed more workers per machine "75, one could assume that the interior 
increased its real cost of labour by employing more of it per machine.
Additionally, inefficiency -not inability, as Brew suggested- could have also 
relatively increased the interior textile industry's real wages. This could be 
envisaged, as efficiency is a better word, because as Clark n o tes ," skill connotes 
a learned ability, and ... workers in different countries performed differently not 
just because they were trained differently or had different levels of experience in 
the textile industry "76.
Indeed, Clark has illustrated how " the efficiency of workers was very closely 
connected to the local real wage rate. Better-paid workers were more efficient, 
though it is of course not obvious what is cause and w hat is effect ',77. As the 
interior was definitely adequately supplied with low-waged labour, poorly paid 
labour would have been inefficient enough so as to increase manning. 
Overmanning would have increased the wage bill and therefore the interior cotton 
textile industry's production costs.
This of course is a speculative argument. In the case of the NAC region it was n o t 
There, evidence illustrated the paradoxal situation o f inefficiency alongside high 
wages. First, efficiency in the NAC region's cotton textile industry did not 
correspond closely to the local real wage-rate. Better-paid workers were 
accompanied by less -not more- efficiency. Fact indeed ruled that the number of 
looms run varied from Cartagena to United States weavers78 by a factor of 4:1. 
This is to say, that in 1910 each Cartagena weaver tended four times less 
equipment than its United States counterpart. These differences in labour
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efficiency were quite significant
Second, equally significant were differences in wages. This is perhaps highlighted 
by illustrating relative differences between Japan and the NAC region wages. 
Whilst the Japanese labourer (displaying in 1913 a spindle efficiency of 90 per 
cent79) ran 190 ring spindles, with $ 0.80 as his average weekly  wagefemphasis 
added]80, as mentioned in Chapter V, Cartagena spinners, running " one side of 
190 spindles, a few running two sides, [would] make 35 to 40 cents gold a 
day [emphasis added]"81. That is, the wages earned by the NAC region labourer 
was about 2.5 times as much per week as that of his Japanese counterpart. So, 
despite inefficiency, wage-rates were conspicuously high. Surely, this was due to 
labour scarcity and the resulting high level of wages which affected the region.
In 1910 it cost 50-100 per cent more to make textiles in the NAC region -not in the 
interior. Furthermore, it was not at the initiation of either the NAC (Cartagena) 
region's cotton textile industry at the end of the 19th century (or turn of the 20th 
century) or of the interior's (Medellin). Wages only matter i f  they are high relative 
to labour productivity . But although productivity relatives for the interior cotton 
textile industry are not available as they are for the NAC region, given the 
scarcity of labour and the banana sector's capacity to set high wages, it is likely 
that the same percentage applied to the difference in the real cost of wages 
between the NAC region and the interior.
This is to say, that at the outset of the second decade of the 20th century, cotton 
textile industry wages in the NAC region probably had double an intervention 
price limit than did the interior ones. This most significant and crucial factor 
constituted one major contributor to the decline of its cotton textile industry. It is 
at this point when it began. Indeed, by 1930 Jones informed that the development 
of " certain industries such as the textile activities at Barranquilla ... has been 
possible because of the large immediate markets ... 1,82 but that continued 
progress of the industry was " blocked by a climate discouraging factory labour
••83
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The climate was of uncompetitive wages for the cotton textile industry in the 
NAC region. It was under these circumstances that Pearse believed " no 
manufacturing industry in Colombia ... can hope to aspire under present wage 
conditions to embark on the export trade. The manufacture of cotton and other 
goods succeeds solely on account of high protective duties ',84.
Eventually the interior witnessed an upsurge in wages in the 1930s and 40s that, 
w ith a more consistent purchasing power fuelled by a more solid coffee sector. 
Despite the " absolute lack of statistics on industry prior to 1934 "85/ Zalamea 
indicated in 1941 that one of the most decisive factors that had " most direct and 
immediate influence on industrial development in Colombia was the increase in 
agricultural and urban wages ',86. But he was only confirming how low wages 
had been in reality at the centre of Colombian industrial development, e.g., the 
interior of the country.
Neither tariff protection nor the increase in communications would have been 
enough to create the industrial development in Colombia that he was attempting 
to analyse87. The fundamental basis was the " purchasing power of the 
Colombian people. The most rigorous customs duties and a 30,000-mile network 
of highways could not have created national industry while farm wages were 15 
centavos and other wages were 35 centavos per day as they were some fifteen 
years ago [e.g., 1926] m88. Zalamea further stated th a t " five million agricultural 
workers with a daily wage of 15 centavos and two million urban workers with 
daily wages of 40 centavos were economically not far removed from a tribe of 
cave dwellers who had to limit their commercial activity to the exchange of a 
basket of potatoes [interior, not NAC region staple food] for a pound of salt or a 
bundle of faggots for a pair of sandals ',89.
Small wonder therefore, that Zalamea claimed that " the comparison of such 
[present higher] wages with those paid in Colombia prior to 1930 is sufficient to 
give a clear understanding of one of the determining causes of the country's 
industrial progress. This readjustment of wages ... began to benefit national
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industries from which Colombian workers could then purchase ... other 
commodities "90.
Indeed, by the late 1930s the economic conditions in Colombia -especially in the 
interior- " began to change ... the readjustment that followed the application of 
such a criterion brought about an increase in farm wages to 70 centavos a day, 
and wages in industry reached new levels that ranged, as of December 1939, from 
88 centavos in paper and cardboard factories, 1.02 pesos in soap factories, and 1.03 
pesos in chemical industries to 1.81 pesos in metal construction, 1.87 in 
waterworks, and electrical plants, 1.89 in mining, 1.93 in graphic arts, 2.11 in 
beverage manufacture and 2.16 in tobacco and leather industries "91.
But if the real argument of this thesis is that imperfections in factor mobility 
m eant employers faced labour shortage in NAC resulting in high wages that UFC 
was able to meet and set. Then, as a prevailing high level of wages for the rest of 
the region, why did not these same imperfections (which obviuosly existed before 
the UFC appeared in the scene) result in higher wages before the UFC appeared 
? At least the commentators of the time -which were quoted in earlier chapters- 
very clearly state that resulting wages may be categorized as cheap labour when 
it really is not. These were the wages from the Sierra, nearly double those of the 
Caribbean Coolie.
In the final analysis, labour scarcity in the NAC region m eant there was little 
incentive for labour supply attracted by banana sector wages to go to other 
sectors, as for instance, to cotton cultivation. According to Pearse, the UFC " 
steadily increased the pay to attract people, but other industries, for instance 
cotton growing, cannot afford the same rate of pay, as it has to face the same 
competition from other countries where wages are lower"92.
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CHAPTER VIII
STAGNATION OF RAW COTTON CULTIVATION FOR EXPORT
As seen earlier, Chapter V revealed evidence on wage differentiation, particularly, 
prevailing high wage levels. But it is also relevant that the interior industry 
benefitted from natural protection, which the NAC region did not. It is equally 
relevant that deflation suggests justification of massive rises in real wages in 
cotton between 1905 and 1910. But —as we stressed earlier- none of these items 
of anlalysis are mutually exclusive. Which is why we suggest it seems plausible 
that some of the evidence found exposed instances, when the raw  cotton export 
sector and the cotton textile industry, were priced out by the high level of wages, 
set and met by the UFC.
Although the logic of our argument suggests that wage costs play a significant 
role in economic growth or stagnation, complementary explanations have to be 
considered. Rationalisations or solutions to the problematic of stagnation in this 
particular case are several, but particularly, increased competition from the 
interior of Colombia, as transport links improved was an important reason. 
Another was the relative dynamism of coffee and its better resistence to the 1930s 
depression if compared to the way in which bananas withstood the blow.
The UFC's segmentation of its labour force was also an imperfection in the labour 
market. It seems to have reduced the UFC's wage bill below w hat it would have 
been yet its monopoly position denoted the wage was higher than w hat the raw 
cotton export and cotton textile industry's wage could be. So, inducement of the 
strategy of segmentation as a significant imperfection operated as an important 
catalist for the decline of the cotton industry. In the long rim  it was unable to 
operate profitably at the wage level set by the UFC.
Regional economic stagnation is exemplified therefore by the decline (i) of raw 
cotton as an export sector during the period under study (1900 to 1930); and (ii) 
of the cotton textile industry -particularly in the thirties- illustrated (as will be
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mentioned further on) by the ceasing of activities of the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon. 
The latter was especially so in contrast with the upsurge of the low waged interior 
textile industry.
One w ay we do this is by emphasising one major aspect of the notion of 'leakage': 
high wages -a direct result of imperfection as structural rigidity- as a cause of 
economic stagnation. This is no more and no less a part of the antithesis of the 
notion of 'linkage'. We therefore start off by linking up in a brief discussion, the 
decline of cotton cultivation for export and the cotton textile industry, with the 
issue of intra and inter-regional difference in wages which was pointed out in 
earlier chapters.
The other way we underline our framework of imperfections is by stressing the 
importance that the nature of a product (or its technological production function) 
had. This is done by analysing two economic alternatives for the NAC region's 
cotton by building upon chronological evidence.
First, we consider the alternative of raw cotton cultivation and ginning for export. 
The potential for economic linkage is exemplified by evidence that provides 
positive accomplishments. But, the portrayal of conspicuous deficiencies in both 
the nature of the product and its technological production function -the other 
aspects of the notion of 'leakage'- complement the preceding explanation of 
economic stagnation of raw  cotton as an export sector.
Second, notwithstanding the pricing out effect of high urban wages (the structural 
rigidity aspect of the notion of 'leakage'), we consider the alternative of spinning 
and weaving for domestic consumption. For the output of cotton textiles to have 
taken place in the NAC region, one would have to know whether or not the 
region's industry used local raw material to satisfy domestic demand for cloth.
Domestic economic linkage meant production of cotton textile for domestic 
consumption. However, there need be no link between the export of raw  cotton
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and textile output for domestic consumption. If there was a deficit of domestic 
raw  material or the wrong variety of it for domestic consumption (enough to 
generate imports) there is a need to know what varieties were cultivated and the 
type of quality of the cloth demanded domestically. It is also the reason for which 
a brief look is given to the question of whether government subsidy changed the 
variety of cotton grown to make it suitable for domestic textile production or 
whether the latter used superior variety for inferior quality cloth.
W ithin the context of this thesis' framework a recapitulation of our theoretical 
framework of imperfection is made. The notion of 'leakage' is one we stress as it 
is one which particularly reflects the reality of the economic development process 
in the NAC region. Specifically, we emphasise the fact that it embodies both 
structural rigidity and the nature of the product. This embodiment of the concept 
of imperfections with the idea of the 'staple thesis' is intertw ined by the antithesis 
of the notion of 'linkage'.
The first economic alternative in relation to cotton that the NAC region faced, was 
its cultivation and ginning for export Raw cotton (as a cultivated and exported 
crop) was not significant in the Colombian economy during the end of the 19th 
or the beginning of the 20th centuries, but within its limited export volume 
showed dramatic volatility. Surprisingly, the highest export figure up  to 1930 for 
the fibre was that of 1870 with " 7,350 quintals [1,620,381 lbs. or 736,537 kgrs.] " 
being exported in that year1 according to British sources in 1875.
The export figure for 1874 although dropping heavily (approximately 84 per cent) 
fared well when compared with exported output for m any years up  to 1930 as 
Table 29 shows below.
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TABLE 29:
COLOMBIAN COTTON EXPORTS: 1870-1929
Quantity 
(000’s Kgrs.)
Value
(000’s CGP’s)
1870 736.5
1874 264.6 -
1876 - 41.1
1884 - 1.9
1887 109.0 1.7
1897 145.0 0.9
1908 12.5 1.8
1909 451.0 27.2
1914 533.6 -
1916 7.4 2.2
1917 433.5 158.8
1919 5.7 1.6
1922 429.9 130.4
1923 93.3 60.0
1924 64.0 28.7
1925 29.6 1.0
1926 12.5 2.5
1927 201.7 97.5
1928 136.7 53.5
1929 2.0 0.1
Sources: (i) Figures for 1870 and 1874 from British Parliamentary Papers, Accounts and Papers, Vol. LXXVI, (London, 1875), p. 1125; (ii) for 1876 and 1884 from 
SL John, A., " Report on the Trade of the United States of Colombia ", British Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular Reports on Trade and Finance, Annual Series 
No. 53, (London, 1886), p.3; (iii) for 1887 from Wheeler, M., " Report on the Trade of Colombia for the Year 1888 ", British Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular 
Reports, Annual Series No. 456, (London, 1889), p .19; (iv) for 1897 from MacGregor, E., " Report for the Year 1897 for the Trade of Panama ", British Foreign 1888", 
British Foreign Office, Diplomatic and Consular Reports, Annual Series No. 2088, (London, 1898), p.18; (v) for 1908-1909, 1916, 1917, 1919, 1922-1929, from " 
Exportacion de Algodon de Colombia, 1908-1929 ", Republica de Colombia. Deparlamento de Contraloria. Seccion 3A - Estadistica General. Cotnercio Exterior de 
Colombia, Ano de 1929, Volumen XXVIII, (Bogota, 1931), p.38; (vi) for 1914, from The Cotton Growing Countries, The International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, 
(London, 1926), p.37; (vii) 1916,1917 and 1919 figures from the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, The Cotton Growing .... Op. Cit., p.37, and 1924-1926 
figures from Gamett-Lomax, J., Economic Conditions of Colombia, (London, 1929), p. 47. are approximately . Notes: (i) quantity is in '000s of lcgrs. whereas value 
is ’000s of CGPS (Colombian Gold Pesos); both are rounded off to the nearest thousand; (ii) 1 Cental = 100 lbs.; (iii) years 1900-1907, 1910-1913, 1915, 1918 and 
1920-1921 are not available; (iv) for the base of the index numbers, the method is the same used by the statistics section of the Republica de Colombia’s Departamento 
de Contraloria for cottonseed exports as noted in Table 31. That is, with the exclusion of the figure for 1914 from die International Institute of Agriculture in Rome, 
an average of die five preceding years was taken.
Figure 39, shows the bar chart graph 
which illustrates the data in the table.
Indeed, the same British sources
revealed that " shipments are limited 
to the supplies obtained in the 
neighbouring districts [NAC region].
In the past year only a little over 1,200 
quintals [264,552 lbs. or 120,250 kgrs.] was exported "2.
Figuf* 39
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Thereafter, exports seemed to languish towards the end of the century. St. John's 
view confirmed this condition. In 1886 he commented th a t" the cultivation of the 
cotton plant has been well-nigh abandoned. In 1876 the value of cotton exported 
was 200,000 dol. [ 41,093]; [and] in 1884 the am ount exported was 9,422 dol. [ 
1,936] "3.
Nevertheless, exports showed signs of gaining some initiative in the 1890s. British 
Agent MacGregor indicated that in 1895, some ginned cotton was indeed being 
exported. This cotton originated in the urban area of economic influence within 
the departm ent of Bolivar and possibly from the departm ent of Magdalena [both 
in the NAC reg ion]" from Barranquilla ... the value in 1895 amounted to $ 8,362 
[ 1,718] ... there were some 1,790 bales of about 450 lbs. each [805,000 lbs. or 
366,136 kgrs., thus its value here comes out at about 5c. American gold per lb. "4.
But the initiative dwindled. Two years later MacGregor pointed out that in 1897, 
" there was a falling-off in the export of cotton as compared with the year 
previous, of 709 bales [approximately 319,050 lbs. or 145,023 kgrs.], valued at $ 
4,349 [ 894]; the number of bales shipped from Barranquilla does not represent the 
entire crop as a relatively considerable quantity is worked up  in the cotton 
factories at Carthagena ... besides, which a certain am ount is also expected from 
this latter place to Europe "5.
Table 30 further below shows that despite problems, imports in 1900 of raw  
cotton and linters by the United Kingdom from Colombia were 600,000 lbs. 
(272,700 kgs). Imports however, dropped approximately 77 % to 140,000 lbs. 
(63,600 kgrs) in 1903. But British Vice-Consul Gillies reported in 1904 th a t" a large 
quantity could be exported annually if it were more extensively cultivated "6.
Indeed Table 30 (which displays imports by the United Kingdom) shows that
370,000 lbs. (168,200 kgrs.) were imported by the United Kingdom in 1904. 
Nevertheless, by 1906, imports by the United Kingdom had dropped 
approximately 93 percent (relative to 1900) to 40,000 lbs. (18,200 kgrs.). Nearly all
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raw  cotton was being " exported to France "7, according to British Vice-Consul 
Gillies. Figure 40 shows the bar chart graph illustrating the data.
The urge to make cotton a leading export crop, however, was evident. Some, such 
as United States Commerce Department official Pepper, believed this was 
impossible: " ... this will take years and possibly will require colonisation since 
labor is not abundant; ... there is no possibility that for a great many years the 
cotton itself will be manufactured in quantities to supply the domestic demand 
"8. Others, such as the British Minister at Bogota, emphasised this by reporting 
that for 1907 " the export of cotton is quite insignificant It was.
Imports picked up  shyly to 150,000 lbs. (68,200 kgrs) that year. It also shows that 
although the United Kingdom maintained an approximate modest import average 
of 95,000 lbs. (43,181 kgrs) per year from 1908 to 1912, levels dropped to just 
about naught in 1913. Table 29 equally showed that year 1909 had the highest 
national cotton export figure in the first three decades of this century: 451,000 
kgrs. Efforts were made " to increase the cultivation, and both soil and climate 
over a large area of the country are believed to be suitable "10.
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TABLE 30:
UNITED KINGDOM COTTON RAW AND LINTERS 
IMPORTS FROM COLOMBIA: 1900 - 1928
quantity index value index
1900 6.0 100 12.0 100
1901 5.1 85 19.0 158
1902 4.5 75 8.6 72
1903 1.4 23 3.4 28
1904 3.7 62 10.5 88
1905 0.7 12 1.7 14
1906 0.4 7 1.1 9
1907 1.5 25 4.5 38
1908 0.4 7 1.3 11
1909 1.0 17 2.2 18
1911 1.6 27 4.2 35
1912 1.2 20 3.0 25
1913 0.006 00.1 0.03 00.3
1914 0.3 5 0.8 7
1920 4.2 70 42.0 350
1921 5.3 88 24.0 200
1922 3.4 57 17.7 148
1924 1.5 25 8.3 69
1925 0.4 7 2.3 19
1927 4.4 73 18.2 152
1928 2.6 43 12.0 100
Sources: (i) figures for years 1900 to 1914 are taken from Parliamentary Papers (Accounts and Papers). British and Foreign Trade and Commerce: the A nnual Statement 
of the Trade of the United Kingdom with Foreign Countries and British Possessions, Volumes LXXXVI, XCVUI, LXDC, LXX, XC, XCI, LXXDt, LXXX- Supplement, 
LXXVm, CXVI, CXVn-Supplement., CXIV, LXXXB, LXXXffl-Supplement., LXXXTO, CQ, Oll-Supplement., CHI, LXXXD, LXXXffl-Supplement, LXXXffl, 
LXXVni; Notes: (i) quantity is in ’000s of Centals, whereas value is '000s o f ’s sterling; both are rounded off to the nearest thousand; (ii) 1 Cental = 100 lbs.; (iii) 
years 1910, 1915-1919, 1923, 1926 and 1929-1930 are not available; (iv) index numbers, 1900=100; (v) values of imports are c i .f  (from the source itself), i.e., they 
are taken to be the prices which an importer would give for the goods on a purchase in the open market if the goods were delivered to him at the port of importation, 
freight, insurance, commission and all other costs, charges, and expenses incidental to the purchase and delivery at the port having being paid.
In 1907, United States Consul Demers 
indicated that cotton cultivation was 
only " principally for the export trade; 
at least I see no possibility of its being 
followed by inherent manufacturing 
industrie "ll. As production picked 
up strongly in the first half of the 
second decade this century, some 
stimulus for the export of cotton was 
felt. This generated some degree of optimism. Exported cotton went principally 
to France12.
Colombian Cotton Imports by U.K. 
(1900- 1928)
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According to British Vice-Consul Bowles " unfortunately no official figures are 
available regarding the production of cotton in the Republic "13 for 1914. 
Nevertheless, he suggested that a b o u t" 3,000,000 kilos of raw  cotton, including 
dirt and seed [were] exported to Europe ,,w. The International Institute of 
Agriculture in Rome reported 533,600 kgrs.15 as total national cotton exports for 
that year. According to United States Consul Blake-Modica, the cotton cultivation 
industry was affected by conditions abroad in 1915 and no cotton was exported 
to Europe ”16. As Table 29 showed, exports crashed to 7,400 kgrs. in 1916, only 
to lift up  to 433,500 kgrs. in 1917.
Even in the later years of the 1920s prospects for consolidation of cotton export 
were enthusiastic. Given the fact that the United States su p p lied " the world with 
almost 60 % of the raw  material, but due to the devastation of the boll-weevil the 
yield per acre has been very much reduced ... Colombia could make up part of 
the loss "17. Additionally in the United S tates," land has a higher value than here 
and the yield per acre is less than in Colombia "18. Table 30 shows that 
compared to practically a full stop in 1913, imports from the United Kingdom for 
example, increased dramatically to 420,000 lbs. or 190,900 kgrs. in 1920 reaching 
the highest import figure from Colombia of 530,000 lbs. or 240,900 kgrs. in 1921, 
since 1900.
Table 29 also showed that the year 1922 had a reasonably high national export 
figure of 429,900 kgrs. United Kingdom imports were 340,000 lbs. or 154,500 kgrs. 
British Lieutenant Rhys-Jenkins however, reported th a t" a small quantity of cotton 
has been exported to Spain and the United States ”19. Equally, although cotton 
fibre was exported " in small quantities to ... G erm any... dirty and badly ginned 
m ateria l... found no important market "20.
Exports in the following years showed a strong decline. The Pan American 
Bulletin pointed out in 1924 th a t" Colombia does not export cotton "21. By 1926, 
the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome stressed the stagnation of 
exports:" Colombia does not export cotton regularly n22. Indeed, Table 30 shows
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United Kingdom imports dropped to 40,000 lbs. or 18,200 kgrs. in 1925. Whilst 
that took place Table 29 showed national exports plummeted to 12,500 kgrs. in 
1926.
Exports recovered in 1927. The United Kingdom imports figure of 440,000 lbs. or
200,000 kgrs. Table 29 showed the national statistic was 201,700 kgrs. The data in 
Table 30 however, seems to represent all Colombian exports.
The drop in national exports was quickly revealed the following year at 136,700 
kgrs. - 118,200 kgrs. represented by United Kingdom imports. Table 29 showed 
that in 1929 exports crashed at 2,000 kgrs. It also showed that, except for 1870, in 
the first two decades of the 20th century exports following a cycle of more or less 
5 years, were above the aforementioned late 19th century figures in years 1909, 
1914, 1917 and 1922. They were 451, 533.6, 433.5 and 429.9 thousand kgrs. 
respectively.
The explanation of export decline and stagnation as well as steady increase in 
imports was explained by British Consul Garnett as being due " chiefly [to] the 
rapid growth of the textile manufacturing industry in Colombia m23. The 
domestic cotton textile industry was indeed there for both interior and NAC 
regions, but the latter would eventually loose out to the interior.
The relative upsurge in raw  cotton production which took place in the first half 
of the second decade of the present century also stimulated the emergence of the 
cottonseed oil industry as an economic linkage with some potential. Initially, as 
Sarta has asserted ," cottonseed was thrown away into the Magdalena river m24. 
Thereafter, cottonseed ceased to be disposed of as waste. Rivera, ex-employee of 
Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon explained," cottonseed was thrown away until it was 
begun to be processed in the oil factories. It was sold at $ 20.oo per ton to the 
'La Insuperable' factory ,,2S.
It was in Barranquilla where most of the oil factories were located26. The
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industry seems to have been established in 1906. Machinery was set up " for the 
extraction of oil from cottonseed ',27. By 1924, it was indicated th a t " until a few 
years ago the cottonseed was used only for sowing, but now oil is extracted from 
it m28.
Nevertheless cottonseed as well as cotton-waste were alternatively exported. 
British Consul Gillies reported in 1907 that " cottonseed is chiefly exported to 
Liverpool u29 or as United States Consul Manning pointed out, " exported 
principally to England ,,3°. And by 1918, it was estimated that cotton-waste was 
imported by the United States in " bales weighing 50-200 lbs ... the import duty, 
according to Colombian custom tariff is $ 0.053 per Kilo, levied on the gross 
weight ”31.
As an offshoot of cotton cultivation and export however, the tatter's decline and 
stagnation signalled cottonseed's as well. Table 31 below shows this. Figure 41 
shows the bar chart chart which illustrates the data in the table. Table 31 displays 
index numbers for cottonseed exports. These show that decline and stagnation of 
the seed export emerged at the turn of the third decade of the century.
Two elements (and some corollaries) played important roles in the direction 
thatthe economic alternative of cotton cultivation and ginning for export took. 
Both elements were within the nature of the product. The first one was the scale 
of agricultural exploitation. The second was the technical quality of the raw 
material for international competition.
The scale of agricultural exploitation was small. Consequently, this revealed 
several constraints which affected the economic process, one of which was labour 
shortage. It seriously affected cotton cultivation because of its effect on rural 
wages. These were made worse of course, with the imposition of even higher 
wages by the banana sector, as pointed out earlier. MacGregor commented that 
" the great obstacle to all these kinds of enterprises consists in the w ant of native 
skilled labour which is an article that cannot be improvised "32.
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TABLE 31:
COLOMBIAN COTTONSEED EXPORTS 
(Index Nos.)
Year Quantity Value
1919 100 100
1922 219 231
1923 214 301
1924 116 265
1925 218 255
1926 165 140
1927 220 279
1928 124 170
1929 95 105
1930 138 146
1931 9 10
1932 0 0
Source: Republica de Colombia. Departamento de Contraloria. Seccion Estadistica General. Ano de 1932. Comercio Exterior, Volumen XXXV, (Bogota, 1934), p. 286; 
Note: For the base of the indexes, an average of the five preceding years was taken by Republic of Colombia’s statistic section o f the Departamento de Contraloria. 
It excluded the quantity and value figures for 1914 provided by the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome which appear in Table 29 above.
Although Pearse pointed out that 
cotton did " not need as much labour 
h33 as coffee, the labour factor was 
generally one which not only led to 
higher production costs but to 
u n s a t i s f a c t o r y  m e t h o d s  of 
cultivation34. As Gillies pointed out, 
scarcity of labour was the " one factor 
w hich  seriously  h inders  the 
development of the cultivation of this article n35. In addition to this, as labourers 
in the NAC region were " not adapted to cotton picking "36, shortage of labour 
was aggravated.
Colombian Cottonseed Exports 
(1919- 1932)
Valu*lnd«x (1019 -  100)
lllfl
Years
Saxes Rapubtca cU Colombia Dapi do 
ComraioM. Voi XXXV. (Bopeta 1«M). 
p2M
Pearse also contended that cotton was a " very suitable crop for the small farmer, 
because after six or seven months from the time of sowing he can gather his crop 
and receive cash, which is very different from coffee, because in that case during
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the first four years nothing but expenses are incurred "37. Nevertheless, the 
repercussion small scale farming had on the NAC region's cotton cultivation 
potential was probably more harmful than would be envisaged. The reason for 
this is that small farming had to be viewed within the perspective of the historical 
consequences of the haciendii38.
Indeed, this is why Demers indicated that there were " no regular cotton planters 
in Colombia who thoroughly understand its cultivation. The crops are raised by 
an infinite number of 'peottes ' ,l39. It was these people who at the turn of the 
20th century benefited, as Demers indicated, from the fact th a t" invariably, most 
m oney is advanced to them by Barranquilla exporters on the security of their 
crops, for which they are paid on the spot from 75 cents to $1 per arroba (25 
pounds) ,,4°.
By the beginning of the second decade of the present century, small farmers and 
renters took over cotton cultivation from peones. Eventually some became small 
landowners. According to US Consul Demers they " own their small pieces of 
land or are squatters on Government lands "41. The " various attempts ... made 
to introduce m odem  methods of cultivation and to establish large plantations " 
met with little success42.
United States Commissioner Bell also confirmed that M most of the cotton is 
grown on small farms by individual owners or renters u43. Likewise, in 1924, the 
International Cotton Bulletin advised that " till to-day cotton cultivation in 
Colombia has been carried out only by small farmers on a very reduced scale in 
each case " 44. Thomson also reported in 1925 th a t" cotton is the most important 
agricultural product of the Magdalena Valley near Barranquilla, and is grown on 
small farms by individual owners or renters "45.
Likewise, in 1926 the Colombian Trade Review informed that there were " no 
large plantations as there are no people devoted entirely to the cultivation of this 
fibre. The crop is gathered by numerous small farmers "46. Indeed, this
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continued to be the case well into the mid 1930s when the International Institute 
of Agriculture in Rome reported th a t" the crop is grown by small proprietors ,l47.
Finally, despite it been alleged that the owners of the largest textile factory in the 
nation were supposedly equally " owners of extensive cotton farms in the Coast 
m48, the factory was heavily dependent on these small farmers for raw  cotton. 
Don Pedro Obregon (one of the Obregon brothers who owned the Fabrica) stated, 
" demand for cotton at the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon was greater than supply 
and therefore the Fabrica invested in its own cotton growing in order to make 
dem and and production adequate "49. But, as he put it, " the Fabrica's cotton 
growing was more an experimental farm of 200 hectares [494.2 acres] in the 
village of Remolino [department of Atlantico], where in fact the irrigation pum p 
still exists today ,,5°.
He said "in those days, the Fabrica depended on suppliers of cotton up  to 80 %. 
Cotton was in the hands of individuals who had a maximum of two hectares 
[4.942 acres]. There was never large-scale cultivation of cotton. W hen spinning 
began, it was still the small producer who was the direct supplier of the raw  
material. In the exceptional case of the large supplier he was not the producer, but 
only a large intermediary that channelled large supplies and sold the lot to several 
gin mills, one of which was part of Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon'61.
In essence, cotton was for these small suppliers " little more than a catch crop ,,S2. 
The cotton they had was " a few trees mixed with their other crops ,63 such as 
" cassava, maize and leguminous [ones] ,64. A major characteristic present 
amongst these small farmers was capital constraint. The International Cotton 
Bulletin emphasised th a t" no capital at all has been invested for cotton cultivation 
purposes "55. And the Colombian Trade Review emphasised that " there is no 
doubt that, if capital were employed to develop the cotton industry very 
remunerative results would be attained ,66.
Small scale cultivation of cotton therefore meant staggering output of smaller
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quantities at uncompetitive higher prices. But there were experimental efforts 
made which would probably lead to large-scale cultivation. The inhibiting factor 
which emerged for that particular type of enterprise was not just the that the 
interested party was the powerful banana sector's UFC, bu t the lack of the 
appropriate variety for large plantation schemes for export
Indeed , British Consul Carr indicated in 1904 that in the department of 
Magdalena the UFC was " conducting an experimental farm on a small scale in 
this district, and the plants are looking fine and healthy, abundantly covered with 
buds, promising a good crop "57. Petre-Loraine confirmed this when he indicated 
that " ... experiments are being tried by the United Fruit Company in 
cotton-growing [in the Santa Marta area] with promising results, as far as the 
plants are concerned h58.
He further added that " ... the American United Fruit Co. is carrying on 
experiments in cotton-growing near Santa M arta ... [but]... complaints have been 
made of native cotton being too short in the staple; ... there is probably a 
possibility of improving this by imported varieties. The manufacture of cotton 
goods is in a most rudimentary state ... "59. The experiments carrried out during 
the same year seem to have turned out to be a disappointment. British Consul 
Carr reported in 1905 that experiments were " not sufficiently satisfactory to 
w arrant the cultivation of cotton on a large scale consequently nothing further 
has been done in connection with this industry "60.
The small scale aspect of cotton cultivation had clear consequences. Cultivation 
techniques of the fibre suffered which in turn rendered the final product 
inadequate for export. This should explain why from the early 1900s " the price 
obtained for the few thousand bales exported has been so low "6l. Additionally, 
the higher level of rural wages later on destabilized a potential position from 
which cotton, as a staple, could help disperse income distribution in a more 
consistent manner. It discouraged small farmers to engage already scarce labour.
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The small farmer, for example, could see no particular economic incentive in 
engaging the skilled cotton picker (whose wages he could not afford) who would 
gather an extremely delicate product in the appropriate conditions which would 
meet international standards. Treating cotton carelessly, just as a catch crop, 
inevitably resulted in inadequate cultivation standards. Likewise, the large 
supplier (middleman merchant but not producer) appeared to disregard these 
aspects.
This disregard for standards exposed crucial deficiencies in cultivation criteria 
such as what type of seed or tree to use, and in techniques such as planting and 
picking. Yet more important was that the fixing of varieties of cotton which was 
something not done in the country. This was an extremely laborious endeavour 
which required a technical preparation that was never fully mastered by the small 
cultivator.
This inevitably resulted in mixed varieties of cotton. It was the cleanliness of the 
product and low or no mixing of varieties what world markets guaranteed higher 
prices for. Not complying with these standards was indeed a disastrous way to 
compete internationally. Additionally, although government support was 
marginal, its initial schemes for imported seed of superior variety for the export 
of cotton proved counterproductive.
In relation to the anomaly of cultivation criteria, an important issue was the 
question of whether the cotton tree should be (in the NAC region) perennial or 
annual. This is certainly a significant item within the overall difficulties 
encountered when staples are studied by considering their technological 
production function. Perennial cotton had the best fibre and produced harvests 
as long as the tree lasted but produced low yields. Annual cotton was of an 
inferior quality, produced one harvest per year but high yields.
Cotton in the NAC region was indeed considered as perennial. Along th e " Coast 
... the perennial kind is grown, which lasts three or four years, gives one crop per
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year, or two where the rainfall is propitious "62. The international cotton mission 
to Colom bia" found some excellent cotton... in the department of Atlantico [with] 
nothing but perennial cotton ... grown ... almost all ... very strong. ’,63. The 
perennial plant would " grow for an indefinite num ber of years, subject to 
diseases and old age n64.
This was attributable to " its natural characteristics and to the absence of frost in 
the country m65. Perennial cotton in the NAC region had " certain advantages in 
districts where labour is scarce and dear or where the ground is hilly and difficult 
to cultivate, but the fact that tree cottons encourage insect pests, providing good 
hiding-places for them, and that careful picking is difficult, should be sufficient 
reason for cultivating in preference the annual cotton wherever the conditions 
perm it it ',66.
In the first year of growth the perennial plant was " similar to the American 
variety in respect to its main stem and branches, and attained a height of about 
four or five feet. The leaves [fell] off annually, due to the dryness of the season. 
In succeeding years, if left to nature, the plant form[ed] a dense bush, increasing 
in height and in girth but never forming a tree insofar as the main stem [did] not 
materially thicken annually "67.
The height could reach " fifteen feet and the bush attains a diameter of two to 
three yards. Under cultivation the plant is pruned back after the picking season 
to within nine or twelve inches of the ground, and although during succeeding 
years the bush will increase in height and in girth, these will seldom exceed ten 
feet and four feet respectively ,l68.
Cultivation of cotton essentially showed a consistent trend of primitive cultivation 
techniques which also became a characteristic part of the NAC region's cotton 
production function. According to Don Pedro Obregon, " the way cotton was 
harvested was shameful "69. As British Acting Vice-Consul McDougall indicated, 
cotton was being " collected by men on donkeys and mules and brought to the
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outskirts of the cities, where runners meet the cargoes and bargain for their 
masters in the stores "70. Planting techniques were equally inadequate. British 
Vice-Consul Gillies argued in 1904 that despite soil fertility" no serious attempt 
has been made to cultivate it properly; the seed is simply thrown on the ground 
in anything but a systematic manner and the soil is so fertile that a good crop is 
invariably assured n71.
Cotton growers did not take much " care about the preliminary soil preparations 
before sowing the seed; they are content with just a light cleaning of the land 
before sowing n72. Planting took place during the " first few days of the rainfall 
months, usually about April, and the plant grows and reaches its normal size with 
very little attention until the gathering of the crop ten months a fte r1,73. Although 
it was " much better to plant the cotton again after the crop was collected, when 
the old plants should be rooted up and burnt, the growers in Colombia prefer to 
keep up the same plantation for several consecutive years "74. Only until 1926 
was it reported th a t" annual replanting takes place in Colombia ',75.
By 1925 Thomson was stating that primitive cultivation techniques were still used: 
" at present it is planted without any real preparation of the soil, and weeds are 
chopped out with the 'machete' "76. But cotton cultivation in the interior (Bogota 
area) was in even a worse state. Despite the suitability of its soil cultivation was 
" undertaken in a very insignificant way, the soil is decidedly suitable for it, the 
cotton plant growing wild in the interior ',77.
Faulty techniques brought adverse opinions, such as that of United States Agent 
Pepper. He believed that cotton w a s"... one of those crops which is in its infancy 
"78. He insisted that only " until quite recently nothing like systematic and 
scientific cultivation has been attempted ’,79. Bell further voiced a critical opinion 
suggesting that cultivation techniques were really not ideal: " although a 
considerable area has been planted from time to time, little progress has been 
made in real cultivation of this important crop. At present, the cotton is planted 
w ithout any previous preparation of the soil, with the exception of the cutting
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down and burning of the bush. Weeds are chopped out with machetes. During 
the first three years corn is planted between the rows of cotton plants "80.
Some cultivation techniques were adequate and suggest aspects clearly related to 
the nature of the NAC region's cotton production function. One was the method 
of pruning by cutting and burning, whereby a perennial plant was transformed 
into an annual one. Once perennial cotton was sowed, it lasted for "many years 
w ithout need of resowing; but as after the gathering of the cotton the tree is 
generally cut and burned, this being equal to a complete pruning, it can be 
thereby considered as annual, the whole of the new grown tree being only one 
year old"81.
Experience in the region apparently showed some advantages were obtained by 
it. Trees grew only to a "limited height, permitting the easy gathering of the 
cotton; the length of the fibres increases and some become more delicate and fine 
and as branches are far more numerous the harvest is m uch more abundant than 
when the tree is left untouched"82. This was counterproductive. Trees of " 
perennial cotton [were up to] 20 ft. in length ’,83 which was " too long ... [and ] 
should be pruned at the moment when the first flower buds appear [in order to 
obtain a larger quantity of bolls and make it easier for the pickers to collect the 
cotton "84.
This affected cleanliness and hindered the final product for export. At the turn of 
the century picking techniques were going in the right direction w ith the NAC 
region's cotton presented forlorn of foreign substances85. But eventually picking 
deteriorated and did not become an accomplished technique. The International 
Cotton Bulletin, for example sustained in 1926 that the " most primitive methods 
of picking exist"86. Pearse also noted th a t " in many plantations ... picking was 
too long delayed, with the result that much cotton had fallen to the ground, to be 
left there for good or to be gathered with sand and other impurities ',87. The 
same Bulletin also confirmed that "branches in most cases are cut off and allowed 
to remain on the sandy soil for a week before the cotton is picked"88.
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Picking was careless89. Pearse indicated th a t ," not even in India is this work so 
carelessly done as in the Departament Atlantico, on the coast of Colombia "90. 
Men w ould cut trees down " before picking time, leaving only a small piece of 
bark connecting the branches with the trunk " 91. They w ould then be left in that 
m anner " from a week to a month before the cotton was collected " The " bolls 
that had not opened at the time of cutting the branches burst open very soon 
owing to the absence of sap, and thus a large quantity of soft unripe fibre is 
produced which is collected with ripe and over-ripe fibres "93.
The cotton capsules would then contain " nothing but weak or even dead fibres 
... mixed amongst those of the ripe cotton, whose value is a most serious loss to 
the owners of the farms "94. The ordeal of watching how  " cotton falls on the 
ground and how much of it is permanently lost "95, led Pearse to state this was 
a " real shame ... indeed a sacrilege. The Lord gives you the natural wealth, the 
cotton grows during seven months, and after all about one-fifth of the crop is lost 
for want of application "96.
The lack of concern for picking techniques (which brought in more cotton pods 
and less fibre per weight) was therefore a problem except in some cases when 
fibre amounts were high. Both the United States Monthly Bulletin and the British 
Board of Trade claimed in 1905 th a t" taking a general average, every 100 pounds 
gathered contains 60 parts pod and 40 cotton fibre. In some cases, the proportion 
of cotton fibre amounts to as high as 55 % "97.
Another serious cultivation fault was fraudulent trading practices. For example, 
" stones, water, etc., [were] often placed in the bales for the fraudulent purpose 
of increasing weight "98. The practice was heavily criticised by Pearse during his 
visit to the NAC region. He recommended the severe punishm ent o f " the frauds 
which are actually being perpetrated by placing inside the bales stones or other 
heavy materials, or by watering the cotton with the same object in view of 
increasing its weight. These kinds of frauds we have personally witnessed in our 
visits to some ginning factories on the Coast. In order that such frauds may be
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easily discovered the owners of ginning factories should require for the exercise 
of their work a licence, and if they omit to notify such frauds or commit them 
themselves their licence should be w ithdrawn This was bound to affect 
exports.
There was no classification of cotton. An initial serious mistake became a chain 
of m any in relation to international markets. Cotton buyers did not " make any 
difference in price for quality [with] all cottons regarded alike "10°. It did n o t " 
m atter ... whether it is clean or dirty "101. One reason was that " whilst cotton 
cultivation can be carried on very little primary outlay "102 by the small farmer, 
speculation hindered the industry. In the department of Atlantico alone there 
were " about 500 speculative buyers for a small crop of about 450,000 arrobas 
of 25 lbs. each ”103.
There was no price differentiation for the cultivator whatsoever. No premiums 
were paid to the cultivator who tended his cotton well and picked it clean, 
obtaining the same price as that one " who does not bother about his field and 
delivers a ... dirty lot of cotton "104. No penalties were imposed on those 
cultivators who delivered unclean cotton105. The result was that " neither the 
gins nor the opening machines in the cotton mill can get rid of these foreign 
substances [and] is the reason why all Colombian cloths show a large quantity of 
black and brown spots "106. As Pearse pointed out, " such cotton cannot 
effectualy compete with the growth from other countries "107.
Some of the NAC region's cotton however, met high cleanliness standards. 
According to the International Cotton Bulletin," it is on the Atlantic coast, on the 
Guajira, where the best staple and grade are produced; the seed cotton is being 
delivered to the ginneries absolutely free from trash "108. The Pan American 
Bulletin confirmed th a t" on the Goajira, where the best type of cotton is produced 
... the bolls being delivered to the ginner absolutely free from trash, ginning well 
and supplying a more regular staple "109. Defects in the fibre such as the fact 
that the " staple does not run even and the cotton is trashy and gin cut "no did
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not help. Despite the cotton be ing" trashy, nippy and badly g inned" defects were 
expected to be overcome because the cotton was " strong, silky and of good 
ginning quality "m .
These deficiencies in cultivation techniques were reflected in the final stages of 
raw  cotton cultivation for export purposes such as picking and ginning. A 
technique like picking for example, would entirely devalue the final product. As 
MacGregor pointed out in 1895, with " carelessness in picking, [cotton] becomes 
impregnated w ith sand and dry leaves ... the small particles of foreign substances 
are quite visible "m . Mills could not do away with foreign substances that 
impregnated the manufactured drill. This, of course, greatly diminished its value, 
ginned cotton reflecting poor quality.
Likewise, a technique such as ginning, despite achieving some progress at the turn 
of the century showed poorly throughout the years. As British Acting Vice-Consul 
McDougall suggested in 1901, cotton was now " carefully cleaned by machinery, 
prepared and packed in pressed bales in one of the two establishments existing 
in this city [Barranquilla]. "113. By 1904 quality seems to have improved. Gillies 
pointed out that new ginners w e re" turning out much clearer cotton than the old 
gins ,,1M. He also indicated that th a t" two new establishments (in Barranquilla) 
for ginning and packing cotton have recently been erected here ”115.
By 1907 however, Pepper indicated th a t" the ginning [was] very poor "116. There 
were only " five gins in this city (Barranquilla) all American ... that ... were 
discarded ones in the States dumped over here "117. Likewise, there was only " 
one cotton mill, a small one, in this consular district (Barranquilla), the 
underwear factory of A., A., Aycardi and Company of this d ty  Ml18. The mill's 
total equipment consisted o f " one spinning machine, 15 looms and thirty sewing 
machines "119. Employment creation was reasonable and production seems to 
have been stimulated. Some " forty girls [were] employed and production [was] 
36 dozen undervests per day "12°.
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Poor ginning seems to have continued, probably making ginned cotton even less 
competitive for export. In 1908, unginned cotton (produced principally in the 
departm ent of Bolivar) was paid by factories at a price o f " 2 and a half to 4 cents 
per pound delivered "121. This made the ” cost about 12 cents American gold 
per pound for the ginned cotton 1,122. The weak competitiveness of poorly 
ginned cotton continued apparently until the end of the second decade of this 
century.
According to Wakefield (manager of a cotton mill in Colombia) cotton fibre was 
exported " in small quantities to America and to Germany but the dirty and 
badly ginned material has found no important market "123. But this was " 
greatly improved since 1918-1919 and if roller gins were introduced to take the 
place of saw gins the improvement would be more pronounced, in a more even 
staple and a cleaner production "124.
Despite the aforementioned factors, constraints and deficiencies cotton cultivation 
in the NAC showed one major relevance: it was the major source of supply of raw 
material in the country. Provided the necessary improvements in the cultivation 
of the fibre, output (being the region's asset) could very well be expanded and 
therefore consolidate an important export sector. Indeed, it was both NAC region 
departments of Magdalena and Bolivar that were recognised as the geographical 
areas of relevant cotton production. British Vice-Consul Gillies, for example, 
pointed out in 1904 that it was in this region where " the production of cotton 
is practically limited to 1,125.
There were no statistics on cotton acreage sown, but in 1905, it was reported that 
just for the departments of Magdalena and Bolivar [NAC region], it was estimated 
that there were " about 3,000,000 acres adapted to raising cotton "126. But 
estimates for later years proved that although the potential for adaptation was 
extensive, reality proved different.
For years 1909-10 as well as for 1913-14 for example, estimates for the area of
329
cotton cultivation in Colombia were of an " average [of] ... 11,416 [acres] "127. It 
was reported in 1915, that " the areas under cultivation [were] 11,240 acres "128. 
However, British Consul Sullivan recorded that the " total area under cultivation 
[was] of 45,000 hectares "129.
For year 1917 and 1918 they were " 19,000 [and] 24,000 acres "130 respectively. 
Sullivan equally reported that there were " some 90,000 hectares " in 1923131. 
And a Kemmerer Papers' report (circa 1925) alleged that " there are 
approximately 15,000 hectares of cultivated cotton land in Colombia "132. Table 
32 below shows the relative change of these estimates. They indicate an upsurge 
in increase up to the beginning of the 1920s only to plummet by the mid 1920s. 
Figure 42 shows the bar chart graph of which illustrate these estimates.
TABLE 32:
ESTIMATED COLOMBIAN COTTON ACREAGE
000’s Index #'s: 1909=100
1909-10 11.4 100
1913-14 11.4 100
1915 14.7 128
1917 19.0 166
1918 24.0 210
1923 36.4 319
1925 6.1 53
Sources: This chapter’s text; Notes: (i) 1 hectare = 2.471 acres; (ii) acreage values for years are 11.4, 114,14.7, 19.0, 24.0, 36.4 A  6.1 thousand acres; (iii) year 1915 
is an unweighted average of two sources with values being 11.2 & 18.2 thousand acres; values for years 1915,1923 A  1925 are originally 45,90 & 15 thousand hectares.
Despite the fact that acreage of cotton 
sown was not vast, peaked until the 
mid 1920s and then diminished, the 
NAC region was arguably the largest 
raw material supplier. Approximately 
" two-thirds of the entire production 
[was] obtained around Barranquilla 
and [was] sold in this city "133. This 
66% of national production in 1918 was the lower floor of NAC cotton production.
Fguf*42
Colombian Cotton Estimated Acreage 
(1909- 1925)
VakMlndM (191*10-100)
Yeare
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By 1924 it was widely accepted that the NAC region produced the greatest 
proportion of Colombian cotton. This is a view repeated in several contemporary 
journals such as The International Cotton Bulletin, L'Avenir Textile, The Bulletin 
of the Pan American Union, as well as by British Consul Sullivan and The 
International Institute of Agriculture in Rome. Thus, " seventy-five per cent of 
Colombia's cotton is grown on the Atlantic coast ... the whole of this district 
including the Departments of Atlantico, Magdalena and a portion of [the 
departm ent of] Bolivar ... "134.
Additionally, in 1925, both United States Consul Stafford and the International 
Cotton Bulletin informed that " these districts produce 90 % of the total 
Colombian crop "135. The Colombian Trade Review in London claimed that 
production of department of Atlantico cotton for 1926 in the NAC had decreased 
(although this probably excluded the departments Guajira and Bolivar): " at 
present, the district near Barranquilla provides about 70 per cent of the cotton 
grown in Colombia "136.
Finally, the International Institute of Agriculture in Rome disclosed that the 
districts of Cartagena and Barranquilla were " reported to produce about 90 per 
cent of the total crop "137. By the thirties, the International Cotton Bulletin noted 
th a t" cotton production in the cotton district of northern Colombia is located in 
the Departments of Atlantico, Magdalena and Bolivar and the main centre for 
trade is Barranquilla. Not less than 75 % of the cotton grown in Colombia is raised 
in this district "138.
For the limited acreage NAC region cotton accounted for, output was 
considerable. In 1905 British Vice-Consul Gillies observed that production was " 
very much below that of last year "139. Two years later United States Consul 
Demers noted th a t " reports which I have from various growers show the last 
crop around Barranquilla to have been 4,310 bales of 140 pounds each with
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10,168 sacks of cotton seed of 132 pounds each. This is an increase of more than 
200 % over the crop of 1906 "140. This led Demers to emphasise th a t" all of this 
means encouragement to the growers. This new impetus given to the natural 
resources of this country should also interest other manufacturers, as it will 
eventually mean more prosperity and a higher purchasing power, followed by 
more general demand "141.
The government made great efforts in 1907 to encourage developments in cotton 
cultivation throughout the country. Demers recorded that the encouragement was 
directed especially towards " the Atlantic Coast, where the soil is well adapted to 
that branch of agriculture "142. He added that the crop in 1907 " has been 
beyond expectation; everybody in the vicinity is now bent on growing cotton 
"143. As Demers put it, central government had now " pu t its shoulder to the 
wheel by establishing an agronomical station ... for the purpose of 
experimentation on the different varieties of cotton "144.
But, most crucial and important of all, a bounty " of $ 1 gold, per quintal (110 
pounds) [was] decreed on all native cotton ginned and baled for export until 
October 1st, 1910 "145. This subsidy was at the time equivalent to " one third of 
the price which the farmers have been getting for their products "146. To the 
farmers, this meant in 1907 a rise of " 33 % and cannot help giving the industry 
a tremendous boom "147.
Planters who followed the advice of using freely distributed imported seeds were 
"amply rewarded by the high prices obtained for their raw  material "148. Cotton 
cultivation became larger and more widely extended than ever before. This, 
together with high prices, meant that " the increasing demand for the native 
product has encouraged others to engage in the industry "149.
United States Special Agent Wilson noted in 1914 that production of long fibre 
cotton in the large NAC region cultivations was " probably being not more than
4,000 bales a year "150 (about 1,912,000 lbs. per year). However, British Consul
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Bowles indicated that raw cotton was produced " in small quantities throughout 
several departments, b u t ... it is probable, however, that the am ounts... consumed 
in the spinning mills, together with that exported from Barranquilla, represent in 
some measure the total production "1S1.
In 1915, the cotton " crops were estimated at 7,596,605 pounds of seed cotton ... 
[being] during that year comparatively small Hl52. British Consul Sullivan 
reported the crop to be " considered a poor one approximated to 3,446,000 kgs. 
"153. The differences emerged due to different acreage figures provided by each 
source. But cotton production during the second half of the second decade 
consolidated itself. It was " the most important agricultural product of the 
Magdalena Valley near Barranquilla "154.
It was estimated in 1917 a t " 2,200,000 pounds and it [was] thought that [it] has 
increased since then "155. There were no statistics on cotton crops, bu t estimates 
of crop returns returns for 1917 and 1918 were " 6,000 and 5,500 bales (1 bale = 
500 pounds) 1,156 respectively. During 1918, " the ginners of Barranquilla, 
representing eight saw gins reported a receipt of 223,000 arrobas (12.5 kilos per 
arroba) equal to 1,847,175 lbs. of lint and 4,310,000 lbs. of seed "157.
Production in 1919 was " 256,000 arrobas equal to 2,200,000 lbs. of lint and
4,928,000 lbs. of seed "158. It was estimated th a t " from the increased planting in 
1919 ... the production for 1920 [would] double "159. Prices for 1919 were 
reported by the International High Commission as " high; ... total production 
[being] sold without trouble"160. Colombian cotton was selling in L iverpool" for 
$ 0.24 per pound "161. Local mills were " competing successfully with foreign 
mills and offer higher prices than in the United States, although the former have 
not improved the quantity or appearance of the cloth manufactured. However, 
the material is strong, wears well and is well-liked in the country "162.
Nevertheless, during 1920, due to " low prices ... m any cotton growers have not 
replanted their area "163. Despite offering higher prices than corresponding prices
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in the United States, Trade Commissioner Bell indicated that cotton mills both in 
the NAC region (Barranquilla) and the interior (Medellin) were finding i t " ... 
impossible to obtain a sufficient supply of raw  cotton and to obtain cotton that 
is clean for ginning Hl64. Cotton mills both in the NAC region as well as in the 
interior were not able to meet demand by this time. This occurred although " 
they ... offered all sorts of inducements to planters to grow i t Ml65.
A reason for this deficit in production was the nature of the product itself. Output 
diminished because the cotton plants began to " produce cotton from 7 to 12 
months after sowing depending on the temperature "166. The tree was " sown in 
April or August, according to rains and local conditions;... picking [took] place 
during the months of March and April. An average cotton plant [would therefore 
have] a life of six to seven years ... after [which] date the plant [was] rooted up 
and new seeds sown "167. Furthermore, replanting was not thought necessary.
Indeed, both United States Trade Commissioner Bell168 in 1921 and Thomson, 
of the Royal Society169, in 1925 agreed with the proposition that replanting was 
not necessary for five years. Bell suggested however, that small efforts in 
production techniques later resulted in some increase in output contradicted his 
foregoing view that even high prices were not solving production deficits.
In effect, in 1921 " one thousand pounds per hectare [were] produced the first 
year, 2,000 the second, and an equal amount the third "17°. As a start was made 
with the introduction of " irrigation and tractors "171, the 1924-1925 crop of " the 
Cartagena and Barranquilla districts was estimated at about 3,585 thousand 
pounds, as compared with 1,836 thousand pounds in 1923-1924 "172.
Production in 1915 was comparatively small. During the period from 1915 up to 
1923, it was significant. Both the International Institute Institute of Agriculture in 
Rome and the the International Cotton Bulletin, as well as the Pan American 
Bulletin in 1924, agreed that the " area under cultivation has more than doubled, 
the demand having increased rapidly with the erection of new  factories. Today,
the production may be well estimated over 16,000,000 lbs. "173.
334
British Vice-Consul Lee also estimated in 1924 that the total cotton production in 
the NAC region (departments of Atlantico & Magdalena) did not exceed "250,000 
arrobas this year, it being calculated that there are approximately 8,500 hectares 
under cultivation"174. The following year, United States Consul Stafford reported 
that the 1924-25 crop of the "Cartagena and Barranquilla districts of Colombia 
was estimated at the height of the picking season to be about 7,500 bales of 478 
lbs. compared with 3,840 bales for the same districts last year"175.
The NAC region continued to be the main raw  material supplier well into the 
early and mid-Thirties. In 1930, the International Cotton Bulletin claimed th a t" the 
cotton crop ... for the Barranquilla district is estimated at 8,750,000 pounds of 
seed cotton, according to local growers of which 1 /3  went to local mills, the rest 
being shipped to mills in the other districts of Colombia "176. And in 1931 it 
claimed that " the cotton crop in the coastal section of Barranquilla consular 
district was harvested in February, and was reported to be about 750 metric tons 
(one metric ton equals about 4.6 bales of 478 lbs.) of ginned cotton. The crop 
[was] considered very poor "177.
Production "reached 2,060 metric tons of 2,205 lbs. each"178, in 1932 and was 
estimated "at 1,280 tons"179 in 1933 and "at about 1,200 tons"180 in 1934 
according to the International Cotton Bulletin. However production was placed 
"at 1,600 metric tons"181 by one of the principal cotton consumers. The small 
crop was "ascribed to the severe winter"182. For 1935, it was reported that the 
"departments of Atlantico, Magdalena and Bolivar [NAC region] produced 1,200 
tons. Consumption was approximately 3,000 tons in excess of production"183.
A larger degree of the evidence shown above represents national aggregates. 
Regional disaggregation of production for the NAC region is difficult to estimate. 
However, as we saw earlier in this chapter there are some significant indications 
of approximate percentages that can attributed to the NAC region's production
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estimates. These have been applied in calculations which appear in Appendix . 
Discontinuities that may appear in it may be a result of innacuracies in the 
unearthed evidence despite the reliability of British and United States sources.
Table 33 below shows index numbers for the region's production. Figure 43 
shows the bar chart graph which illustrates the data.
TABLE 33:
NAC REGION COTTON PRODUCTION INDEXES 
1906 - 1931
year Index (1931=100)
1906 12
1907 24
1909/10 105
1915 303
1917 104
1918 123
1919 83
1920 167
1922 109
1923 253
1924 282
1926 387
1927 217
1928 217
1929 217
1930 159
1931 100
Source: Appendix 21 & 22
The index numbers of production 
estimates show that despite obstacles 
and perhaps insignificant production 
figures (if compared internationally) 
cotton relatively grew in a sustained 
manner from very little output indeed 
in the early years of the century to its 
peak in the mid 1920s -particularly 
1926. Thereafter, although declining, output was maintaining at least higher levels
NAC Region Cotton Production Indexes 
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through to the end of the twenties than through the second decade of the century 
(with the exception of 1915). More important, raw  cotton, despite deficiencies in 
cultivation criteria and techniques as well as reduced acreage, was therefore not 
only available but supplied in its largest quantities by the NAC region.
Figures for the fibre's yields however, performed better. United States Special 
Agent Wilson noted that yields of large plantations in the NAC region were of 
an " average of about 333 lbs. of lint per acre "184, or 151.5 kgrs. per acre. 
According to 1915 production and acreage figures provided by British Consul 
Sullivan185 (and mentioned earlier here), yields were of 76.6 kgrs. per hectare (or 
30.9 kgrs. per acre). In 1920 it was estimated that the " average yield per acre 
[was] 240 pounds of cotton lint "186, e.g., 109.1 kgrs. per acre.
The practice by 1922 was th a t " an average of only 3,000 or 4,000 plants to the 
acre [would] be planted, the rows between [still] being utilised for other crops 
"187. Yields per acre varied " with the season, the district or the soil and with 
successive years growth "188, in the delta of the Magdalena (river) crops had 
yielded " the first year after sowing, 100 lbs., second year 135 lbs., third year 200 
lbs. of lint cotton per acre "189, or, 45.5, 61.4 and 90.9 kgrs. per acre. In a good 
season these " weights would be considerably increased and it is estimated that 
300 lbs. of lint per acre could be obtained in the third year ,,19°. That is, 136.4 
kgrs. per acre.
British Consul Sullivan reported in 1923 that in Colombia " the estimated yield 
had risen to 7,3000,000 kgs. derived from some 90,000 hectares "191. This was 
more or less an annual estimated yield of 81 kgs. per hectare or 32.8 kgrs. per 
acre. The International Institute of Agriculture in Rome on the other hand, 
maintained that in 1924," the average yield of seed cotton per acre is about 700 
pounds, which is equivalent to about 210 pounds of l i n t Ml92 or 95.5 kgrs. per 
acre.
Lee193 however, reported yields in 1924 which were 29.4 arrobas per hectare 
(810.2 lbs. per hectare), roughly 149 kgrs. per acre194. Lee added that the 
potential was twice as high: " production of 60 to 70 arrobas per hectare can
337
readily be produced with irrigation "195. Nevertheless, the International Cotton 
Bulletin reported that for 1924" the average yield of cotton per hectare is 750 kilos 
1,196 or 303.5 kgrs. per acre.
However, for the same year Vice-Consul Lee estimated that approximate yield for 
ginned cotton was of 44.1 kgrs. per acre. Indeed, he indicated that there were '* 
approximately 1,500 trees of seed cotton per hectare and the average production 
per tree is 1 /2  lb., which gives 30 arrobas per hectare of seed cotton or 240 lbs. 
of ginned cotton. This latter figure is approximate only as figures as low as 14 
arrobas and as high as 65 arrobas per hectare are recorded, all depending on the 
amount of rain between the months of April and October "197.
A Kemmerer Papers' report (circa 1925) alleged th a t" up  to 10,000 cotton plants 
can be grown on a hectare of ground. The average production is figured at 750 
kilos per hectare. Sixteen plants produce approximately one kilo of clean fibre 
"198, that is, a yield of 303.5 kgrs. per acre. But in general, it was estimated in the 
m id 1920s that yields were about 262.8 kgrs. per acre, computed on the following 
basis: " a pound of cleaned cotton [was] at the rate of 1 lb to each seven trees; the 
total production from an hectare (10,000 trees) [being] 1,428 lb s .; the estimate 
[would] vary considerably according to localities and circumstances "199.
Finally, it was recorded for 1926 that yields were " about 250 lbs. per acre ,,20° 
or about 113.6 kgrs. per acre. Table 34 below shows index numbers which 
provide some indication of the yearly relative change in yields, showing peaks at 
the beginning and through the mid 1920s. Figure 44 shows the bar chart graph 
illustrating the data. Yields were " higher than other countries where scientific 
cultivation has been adopted ,l201.
It would be expected that albeit good yields, reduced acreage accompanied by 
staggering output would result in relative loss for cotton suppliers. Especially in 
light of high cultivation costs (other than wages). They were certainly higher in 
the NAC region than in the United States. Graham-Clarke estimated that it was
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TABLE 34:
ESTIMATED COTTON YIELDS PER ACRE 
(000’S KGRS.)
year amount Index Nos. (1915 = 100)
1914 151.5 490
1915 30.9 100
1920 109.1 353
1922 65.9 213
1923 32.8 106
1924 182.7 591
1925 303.5 982
1926 113.6 368
Source: Chapter 8; Notes: (i) 1922 value is unweighted arithmetic mean of 45.5, 614 & 90.9; (ii) 1924 value is unweighted arithmetic mean of 95.5, 149 and 303.5
" under the present methods ... higher 
than it would be in Mississippi "202.
Both Peck and a Kemmerer Papers 
report indicated that there was " an 
expense per hectare of $ 50 "203 or $
20.23 per acre. Wakefield confirms this 
when he calculated that " cultivating 
will cost per year about 20 dollars 65 
cents per acre "204.
But this am ount" also covered the cultivating of the yucca and Indian corn grown 
on the same ground side by side with the cotton "205. Two years later, with the 
inclusion of (apparently) ginning and transport costs, in 1924, the cost of 
cultivation was estimated by the International Cotton Bulletin206 to be about $ 
167.50 per acre. This included ploughing an acre at $ 15.00, nine pounds of seed 
costing $ 0.50, thirty two working days of cultivation worth $ 32.00, seventy 
working days gathering crop worth$ 70.00, and pressing and baling, cleaning, 
removing wool and freight to next market costing $ 50.00.
By 1926, Pearse informed that in the interior's department of Cauca " one of the 
large farmers showed us his calculations of the cost of raising his cotton from 
which we convinced ourselves that over the last two years it had been below 5d. 
per pound on the plantation "207. This was roughly under $ 25 per acre (cheap
F»gur« 44
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by NAC region standards).
Yet, paradoxically, it seems cotton cultivation in the region was relatively 
profitable at least in the mid 1920s. The Kemmerer Papers' report advised th a t" 
returns are sometimes as high as $ 300.oo to the hectare, on the basis of 25 cents 
per pound for ginned cotton "208. Peck confirmed this ascertaining that they " 
may be $ 300 "209. The Kemmerer report added th a t " cotton ... is usually sown 
in conjunction with corn and tobacco. The returns from the latter two take care 
of the cost of growing, so that the cotton is really all profit "21°.
The indication is therefore that cotton was all profit, at least at $ 101.18 to the 
acre211. This seems to have been the case as indeed, in 1926, the Colombian 
Trade Review informed that " the Society of Agriculturists reports that, in 
accordance with data obtained from different parts of the country, the profit per 
acre obtained by the small planter is between $ 50 and $ 100 per annum "212. 
This mid 1920s profit certainly coincides with peak output figures for the same 
years seen earlier in Table 30.
It would probably be unwise however, to ascertain any direct relationship 
between one variable and the other. By 1934, although profit figures were not 
available, cotton cultivators were being paid import prices. Indeed, according to 
the International Cotton Bulletin, " local manufacturers have decided to pay 
growers the equivalent of the cost of imported American cotton -that is, c.i.f. 
cost plus custom charges "213.
W hatever profitability there was for cotton cultivators originated in production 
for domestic consumption rather than for export. The crucial reason that emerged 
for this was the 'variety7 or quality of the product. International cotton standards 
imply a complex set of measures. But, in general those approved by the United 
States Department of Agriculture, the Liverpool Cotton Association, the 
Manchester Cotton Association, the Syndical du  Commerce des Cottons du  Havre 
and the English Federation of Master Cotton Spinners Associations in the 1920s 
were straightforward.
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M ature cotton fibre displayed the all important characteristic of a peculiar torsion 
which seemed to be an acquired property. It was not present in wild cotton but 
increased with careful cultivation techniques. The number of windings or turnings 
was very variable and in general and approximate terms, inversely proportional 
to the fibre's diameter214.
First, cotton was classified in the international market according to length. 
According to Clark, the " price of cotton increased with the fibre length, and 
though yam  of a given fineness could be produced with cottons of various fibre 
lengths, the yarn was weaker if cheaper cotton was used "21S. Lengths were 
classified as long (fibre length over 1.34 in.) medium (fibre length between 1.10 
and 1.34 in.) and short (fibre length between 0.87 and 1.10 in.) staples216.
Second, cotton was classified according to quality. Each of the classes of fibre 
lengths was subdivided into standards, according to mayor or minor grades of 
product cleanliness such as: Type 1 (Superior), Type 3 (Good), Type 5 (Medium), 
Type 7 (Regular) and Type 9 (Inferior)217.
The principal long staple cotton varieties were the Sea Island, the different 
Egyptian classes and the upgraded American Upland classes. The main medium 
staples were the ordinary classes of American Upland, while the acknowledged 
short staple was represented by the cotton varieties from India218.
Sea Island cotton, embodying the greatest torsion, was the finest cotton variety 
and used by the textile industry for the spinning of the finest and best threads. 
American Upland was mainly utilised by the Lancashire textile industry for the 
production of medium quality threads. For its conditions, Egyptian cottons were 
preferable for the manufacture of first quality cloth which had to show a soft and 
shinny finish. Indian cottons were, in their greater part short and coarse219.
In the last quarter of the 19th century, it seems the quality of cotton in the NAC 
region was not acceptable. In 1875 for example, British sources revealed that the 
" quality produced is gradually falling off ,,22°. But this was due to the fact that 
for " several years no fresh lands have been put into cultivation 1,221
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However, in a specific area of the NAC region (the Goajira department) the finer 
cotton was produced which was similar to Sea Island cotton. In 1895, according 
to MacGregor, cotton there w a s " of good quality resembling the Egyptian cotton. 
In fact, the original seed introduced here in the early sixties was Egyptian "22Z. 
Indeed, it was on the Goajira " where the best type of cotton is produced, both for 
staple and grade m223.
The longest staples of Colombian cotton would " pull 1 1 /4  to 1 5/16 inches and 
the lowest sample will not come short of 1 1/16 to 1 1 /8  inches ,l224. Therefore, 
Guajira (in the NAC region) cotton pulled and fe l t" similar to Sea Island cotton; 
it is clean, creamy, soft and lustrous ,,22S.
Next in quality to the Goajira cotton, was the " staple grown on the delta at the 
m outh of the Magdalena, especially in the vicinity of Remolino [department of 
Atlantico, NAC region]. This [was] shorter in staple, 1 3/16 to 1 1 /4  inches and 
somewhat harsher, but it is a good and regular cotton ,l226.
In fact, the quality of the region's fibre appears to have been acknowledged as an 
established one, positively competing (price-wise) above the well appraised Sea 
Island cotton in 1905. This presumably encouraged the maintenance of acceptable 
quality. United States Consular Agent Granger stated th a t" in the departments of 
Magdalena and Bolivar [NAC region], cotton-growing is an established industry 
and is being rapidly extended ... cotton whose staple is so long as to bring higher 
prices in Manchester, when picked clean, than the Sea-Island cotton h227.
Additionally, United States Special Agent Wilson n o ted " some cotton of long fibre 
is raised in scattered patches, the total probably being not more than 4,000 bales 
a year ... large plantations lie along the Magdalena river between Barranquilla 
and Calamar [NAC region] and produce on average of about 333 lbs. of lint per 
acre ,,22S. In fact, United States Special Agent Graham-Clarke described the fibre 
in these areas as " a long-staple cotton 1 and 1 /4  to 1 and 3 /8  inches ,t229.
Such was the acceptability of the quality that in 1910 English entrepreneurs were 
attracted by the promising possibilities of the region's fibre. They were equally
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interested in the experiments that had proved that the departm ent of Bolivar 
could produce an exceptional grade of cotton quite similar to the South Sea Island 
cotton. They therefore planned to invest in the area. US Consul Haseltine reported 
th a t" about five years ago, a Liverpool group of cotton dealers obtained options 
in vast tracts of suitable cotton land in this department. Natural conditions 
seemed favourable to the pro ject... ,,23°.
The quality of the region's cotton also attracted Germans. In 1913, for example, 
they reported that " a characteristic of Colombian cotton is its relatively long 
staple, which is similar to Egyptian cotton. Along the Coast, where most of the 
cotton will apparently be planted, this variety is generally known by the name of 
the 'Sabanilla' cotton; it is also frequently referred to as 'Semilla negra'. It is very 
usual along the Coast to bend over the stock some 1 to 2 feet above the soil about 
a fortnight to a month before the harvest, so that the plant leans over and yet 
draws sufficient sap ... ',231.
Therefore, in general, it seems clear that quality of NAC region raw  cotton was 
of reasonably acceptable standards. This, of course, was not enough. Cleanliness 
standards were as equal basis of judgement as quality by international markets. 
As we saw earlier in the chapter, deficient cultivation techniques such as picking, 
resulted in unacceptable levels of cleanliness.
However, a more catastrophic blow to acceptability of the region's cotton 
internationally was the deficient cultivation criteria of mixing varieties to the 
extent of practically making the region's only asset (given low cleanliness 
standards) of very acceptable medium to long staples, largely irrelevant.
Cotton grown in most of the country was of the Tajarito' variety. It was the " 
only type of short fibre in Colombia [growing] spontaneously in all warm  zones, 
producing abundant crops almost permanently since it flowers continuously [and] 
has great resistance ”232. It withstood the " heat as well as diseases and insects. 
Its fibre [was] smooth and brilliant, of a white colour, and generally well accepted 
in the spinning factories ',233. Thus, cotton output " varied greatly in the length 
of the fibre owing to the varying conditions under which it [was] grown n234.
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Pearse complained he found " unfortunately, in every field in Colombia, along 
with 1 inch and 1 1 /8  in. cotton fibres of 3 /4  in. and consequently the value of 
the whole lot is less than what it would be if all the fibres were short, but of 
uniform length ',235. It did n o t" matter what grade or w hat length of fibre ... nor 
whether it [was] ... mixed with other kinds or not ',236. The cultivator who 
delivered an unmixed lot of cotton was paid the same price as that who delivered 
a mixed one237. As Graham-Clarke indicated, " besides the regular cotton the 
mill mixes in some wild-tree cotton of about the same staple ,,23S. This defective 
quality of the staple resulted in a " lumpy and irregular 1,239 yarn.
Upon his return to Manchester, Pearse strongly believed that mixing had to be 
dealt with if better export possibilities were to be envisioned. He sta ted :" we have 
great pleasure in stating without flattery of any kind that we have been surprised 
to f in d ... some varieties of cotton very much superior to those produced generally 
in the United States, but unfortunately, those fined qualities are mixed with 
inferior ones ,,24°.
Therefore the first need was to " select the fine kinds and to eliminate the inferior 
ones "241. To prove what he said about the value of the superior qualities of 
Colombian cotton, Pearse suggested it was enough to mention that he had " 
estimated on the basis of American middling the following premium for the best 
cottons: ... Remolino [department of Atlantico in the NAC region] ... 5d. = 10 c. 
per/lb . on American middling "242.
British Consul Garnett and Pearse's opinion was th a t" if the the inter-mixture of 
short and long staple cotton were prevented so that the majority of the crop, 
which is long staple, could be sold abroad at the price it should demand, namely 
2d. or 3d. a lb. more than 'middling American 7 /8  ' n243. Pearse went further 
contending that some staples gained even more premiums than this one244.
Therefore, despite the good quality of the cotton, intermixture was diminishing 
its value. The International Cotton Bulletin noted that " in the Atlantico 
Department the Mission has found some excellent cotton, unfortunately very 
mixed . . . "245. The established mixing of cotton varieties led Pearse to declare for
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example, that, after his mission to Colombia, he had " made it quite clear that if 
Colombia wishes to embark on the exportation of cotton, she m ust cease 
cultivating a cotton conglomeration and m ust confine herself to one variety for 
each zone "246.
Unmixed NAC region cotton such as that from Remolino had the potential to 
compete adequately. However, when subjected to deficient cultivation criteria and 
techniques as well as lack of fixation of cotton varieties, quality suffered. As 
United States Consular Agent Granger indicated, the mixed cotton produced was 
therefore " not of the best quality ... it is not thoroughly cleaned and consequently 
secures a lower price in the European market "247. Furthermore, Pearse indicated 
th a t" probably the cotton mills of Colombia, which are the only buyers of these 
cottons, are paying more for them [intermixed varieties] than they would do for 
similar qualities in the world's markets "248.
Cotton varieties were directly linked to the type of seed planted. This leads us to 
a major consideration of the wisdom of government subsidy for imported seed. 
Initially, in 1907 it was reported that large quantities of seed were imported from 
Peru and being distributed free throughout the country to " whomsoever will 
plant them "249. By 1909 seeds were being furnished " gratis to agriculturists, the 
latter having been urged to engage to a greater or lesser extent in the raising of 
cotton for consumption in the home market "2S0.
Cultivators were mistaken regarding the question of seed. Pearse commented that 
" [when] every cultivator began cotton growing desired to obtain the longest 
fibre. He dreams of Sea Island, Egyptian or Peruvian cotton ,,2S1. This was a " 
serious error, because the plants which produce such long fibres generally require 
one or two months' more time before they mature the bolls than the somewhat 
shorter cottons, and therefore they are exposed for a longer period to the 
vicissitudes of the weather and to insect pests "252. Nevertheless, government 
supported vast imports of American seed (probably upgraded American Upland) 
from the " Mississippi .. the fibre of this cotton [resembling] that of the 
Sea-Island, often measuring from 1 1 /2  to 1 3 /8  inches in length ',253.
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This produced two important paradoxical results. First, high quality seed yielding 
superior fibre was being imported which, whilst at the same time b e in g " too fine 
for local mills n254, was diminished internationally in use value due to mixing. 
Therefore, the export potential was seriously affected. Second, as low domestic 
purchasing power in domestic markets demanded coarse drills, the NAC region's 
cotton cultivation based on imported American seed was the wrong input (high 
quality seed yielding superior type cotton) for the type of product (coarse drills) 
demanded. Demand was for low, not high quality cloth. As United States 
Commissioner Bell put it, the region's cotton was " very fine and of long staple 
and for this reason is not well liked by native spinners, since they manufacture 
only rough and cheap grades of cloth "255.
Pearse emphasised that it had to be considered that domestically, there was an " 
easy market for 28 mm. [1.10 in.] cotton, which is more or less predom inant in 
your country, whilst there are only very few mills in the world which can use the 
long cotton of the Sea Island type n256. Domestic cotton was " bread-and-butter 
cotton, which will always find a ready sale, provided it is grown without a 
mixture of the very short staples ,,2S7. As Wakefield claimed in 1922, domestic 
cotton was " easy to spin, produces a much stronger yam  than uplands American 
and if picked clean the waste in opening and carding is less than usual in 
spinning middling inch staple American n258.
Native seed would have been much more appropriate for domestic consumption 
of domestically produced textiles. Indeed, it was the opinion of experts that " 
planters would do much better to plant the native varieties which are of long 
staple, of high tensile strength and much less subject to damage by insects ',259.
Finally, there was a concerted view that the cotton's quality was far too excessive 
for domestic spinning. Wakefield for one, was of the opinion th a t" the cotton is 
too good for the spinning of 12's to 24's yarn "26°. Pearse also said the " cotton 
of the country is too good for spinning such low counts as 12's "261. And, British 
Consul Garrett indicated that " Colombian long staple cotton is too good for 
spinning such low counts as 12's "262.
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Wakefield further informed that the country's " spinner is at present using 
American cotton and it would appear that in view of the shortage of long staple 
cotton, the Colombian government could export the native cotton realising a 
higher price, and the Colombian spinner could use in its place American cotton 
more suitable for his present requirements n263.
According to Pearse it w o u ld " certainly pay the cotton mills of Colombia, that are 
importing now almost one-half of their requirements in raw  cotton from United 
States to import the whole, once the country has settled dow n to the production 
of the better class cottons without intermixture of the short and coarse fibres 
"264. Then, as British Consul Garnett-Lomax confirmed later it would " pay the 
country as a whole to export almost the entire crop ,,26S.
In don Pedro Obregon's view, in the NAC region " each cultivator planted 
whatever seed he fancied, precisely of different types "266. He added that 
although the " perennial type grew far too much affecting the picking of the fibre 
and its production decreased after five years, it released a very long ( 1 1 / 4  inch) 
and m uch better fibre "267 . However, don Pedro argued that " despite being 
perhaps wrong for export purposes, perennial gave the Fabrica de Textiles 
Obregon more efficiency "268. So, in the end, perennial cotton was wrong for 
export but right for domestic consumption of cloth.
The NAC region therefore showed that the results of an antiquated hacienda 
system, small-scale cotton cultivation and labour scarcity (which encouraged high 
wages) brought consequential deficiencies in cotton cultivation criteria. Despite 
limited acreage, cotton cultivation showed high yields. Albeit high production 
costs profits were high as well, due to upsurges in domestic consumption and 
consequent payment of import prices by the domestic, not the international 
market. Deficiencies in techniques and the lack of fixing types and varieties of 
cotton rendered a mixed fibre as a result. This turned out to be poor for export.
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CHAPTER IX
STAGNATION OF THE COTTON TEXTILE INDUSTRY
The second economic alternative (in relation to cotton) that the NAC region faced 
was spinning and weaving for domestic consumption. According to Levine, owing 
to its " influence on home and foreign commerce, the textile industry [was] 
probably the most important in all the manufacturing class Ml. Spinning and 
weaving were indeed " very ancient indigenous arts ... having been used by 
Indians long prior to the Spanish Conquest "2.
As an alternative, spinning and weaving was central as the first step in the
direction of industrialisation is textile production at factory level. Cotton 
cultivation in the NAC region was relevant only to show that raw  material was 
available locally. Despite it being of a high quality, the economic linkage between 
cotton cultivation and the textile industry was a problem.
This was so because the wrong input was being utilised for the demanded final 
output. High quality cotton was being made part of domestic intermixed inputs 
for low quality cloth. Nevertheless, domestic demand for low quality (coarse) 
textile was such that what was a negative factor for the export of raw  cotton 
became a positive one for domestic consumption of textile. That is, spinners and 
weavers did not need to discriminate intermixtures of counts, staples or varieties 
of cotton.
In the preceding chapter we mentioned the deficient technical aspects of
production which hindered real prospects of cotton cultivation for export
purposes. They also affected full supply of raw  material to the domestic textile 
industry. Inability to meet domestic cotton demand by the domestic textile 
industry in the NAC region also originated in the aforementioned historical 
consequences of the hacienda system. Equally, the fall in international market 
cotton prices in the thirties3, further affected supply.
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But, as no link between export of raw cotton and spinning and weaving for 
domestic consumption is needed (especially if the cotton is of the wrong variety), 
yarn could and was imported of the suitably short count for coarse doth. 
However, domestic supply of the fibre lagged heavily. Henceforth, some evidence 
is presented which supports the case for the alternative of spinning and weaving 
for domestic demand of textile in the NAC region.
As argued in an earlier chapter, it suggests that, aside from alternative or 
complementary explanations such as (i) increased competition from the interior 
with the arising improvements in transportation connections; (ii) the relative 
dynamism of coffee when compared with bananas, its better stand to the 
depression; and (iii) the failure to introduce technological change, and the 
prevailing level of high wages as logical explanations for the decline of industries 
other than banana in the NAC region. Spinning and weaving had good prospects 
for expansion as an industry in the region, but suffered decline and then 
stagnated.
Im ported cotton represented a higher relative cost of production (reflected by 
transport costs, protectionist measures, tariffs, devaluation, price sustainment and 
obligatory factory cotton quota policies) for the domestic cotton textile industry4, 
in general (interior and NAC). Compensation within the structure of production 
costs was low wages in the interior but not in the NAC region. Low wages 
probably explained lower domestic textile relative prices if compared with those 
of imports5, but only in the interior. In the NAC region, the opposite took place, 
which remains the plainest reason for the decline of its cotton textile industry.
As regional production of raw cotton proved insufficient for the demands of the 
domestic textile industry, our starting point in this section needs to be imports of 
the raw  material. Although in the middle of the second decade an optimistic 
United States Consul Guyant stated that domestic production of cotton would " 
increasingly cut into the market for imported cotton and yarns '* (despite the fact 
that for example, cotton waste was being imported by the United States that
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following year7) imports did become necessary.
Yam for the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon would be " produced later in 
Barranquilla "8 but i t " was to be imported initially from England "9. Levine in 
fact indicated that in Barranquilla, in " the Obregon cotton mill imported British 
grey and coloured yarns are used and worked up into grey domestics and coarse 
coloured drills, about 10,000 yards being finished per day ’'10. Likewise, in 
Cartagena, although coarse yarns for grey drilling were spun from native cotton, 
a certain amount were imported11. According to British Consul Bowles, by 1914, 
about " 1,200,000 lbs. of yam  [was] imported from the United Kingdom "12.
Information published in 1922-23 in Colombia suggests that the Fabrica de Tejidos 
Obregon's yarn section produced " 100 % of the yarn, which has redeemed it 
completely from the importation of that article "13. This however seems debatable 
because also in 1922, Lieutenant-Colonel Rhys-Jenkins reported that the " 
Barranquilla mill imports about two-fifths of its yarn "14.
According to the United States Department of Commerce in 1923, the " market in 
Colombia for textiles was extremely dull owing to high prices and it is to be 
expected that this market will continue inactive for the greater part of 1924 "1S. 
However, that latter year " large quantities [had] to be im ported 1,16 because, as 
" Colombia does not export cotton and large quantities have to be imported, the 
entire production [was] being used by the factories and domestic industries "17. 
Local textile mills in Colombia supplied a large part of the dem and for cheap, 
coarse cotton goods. Those mills however, looked to the United States for yams. 
According to Duvac, United States exports " of cotton yarns to Colombia in 1924 
were about 1,000,000 pounds ”18. In 1925 $ 332,116 worth of raw  cotton was 
imported by the nation19.
In 1926 cotton imports were " occasionally considerable and the whole is utilised 
in the factories and domestic industries l,2°. The rapid growth of the textile 
manufacturing industry was chiefly the reason for a " steady increase in imports
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"21. Indeed, consistency in imports of cotton to meet domestic demand in 
Colombia were due to the fact that the country did not export cotton regularly22. 
According to Garnett, in 1926 imports increased considerably to 2,309,000 lbs. 
(1,049,545 kgrs.) while exports were declining vehemently and stagnating23. If the 
cotton was to be used for domestic consumption, then of course, the government 
had the " means of increasing the import duties on raw cotton "24.
The consequences of protection for domestic consumers would be that they would 
" pay dearer for their goods ',25. From the twenties on to the forties, according 
to Montenegro, consumption of raw cotton in Colombia grew significantly above 
production, with imports growing at an approximate annual average rate of over 
20 per cent26. Table 35 below shows some cotton lint import performance in the 
third decade of the century.
TABLE 35:
COLOMBIAN LINT IMPORTS: 1922 - 1930 
(000’s tonnes)
1922 1.6
1923 62.0
1924 405.0
1925 628.0
1926 1,049.0
1927 1,551.0
1928 6.0
1929 468.0
1930 196.0
Sources: (i) Montenegro, S., " El Surgimiento de la Industria Textil en Colombia, 1900-1945 ” in Ocampo, J., A. y Montenegro, S., in Crisis Mundial, Proteccion e 
Industrializacion (Ensayos de Historia Economica Colombiana), (Bogota, 1984), p.212; and (ii) for 1922, figure is from Garnett-Lomax, J., Economic Conditions of 
Colombia, (London, 1929), p.47.
Figure 45 shows the bar graph which 
illustrates the data.
Raw cotton imports into the NAC 
region however, began to decline by 
1931. This was reflected in the 
In te rn a tio n a l C o tton  B ulle tin  
information that the cotton mill at 
Barranquilla " which has been operating at a curtailed schedule for the last six
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months, was reported to have imported some 200 tons during March ',27. This 
low figure for cotton imports of course serves only as an isolated minor example 
to illustrate the final decline of the NAC region's textile industry. Spinning and 
weaving in the region however, need not have met this fate. Certainly, some 
researched qualitative data which follows suggest that prospects were reasonably 
good.
Originally, demand for textiles in Colombia had been m et by foreign industry, 
particularly British, and artisan manufactures from the interior's departm ent of 
Santander. Only small factories both in Samaca (in the interior's departm ent of 
Boyaca) and in Cartagena (in the NAC region) serviced its exclusive local 
demand. Around 1875, textile output was insufficient to meet the larger western 
interior market28.
The early potential for a direct economic linkage between the cultivation of cotton 
and cotton textile production in the NAC region emerged as a result of the 
processing of the fibre in the late 19th century. This was ascertained by 
MacGregor who in 1896, ascertained the earlier venture in cotton textiles in the 
NAC region, reporting that in Cartagena a " factory of cotton goods has been 
erected and is in operation at the present time rt29. The goods were " 
manufactured entirely from native cotton ,,3°. He added that the goods were 
produced in the " style of American cotton drills of various classes "31.
MacGregor said that the " owners of the manufactory expressed themselves as 
well pleased with the financial result and [were] making efforts to erect a similar 
factory in Barranquilla "32. He himself had earlier forwarded material to his 
government (who in turn forwarded it to the Manchester Chamber of Commerce). 
In his correspondence, he annexed " a sample of the heavier drills m33.
Despite little production, the good inherent quality of the raw  material was not 
a major concern for the domestic market. The majority of the Colombian 
population had a low purchasing power. They were " poor, and it is probable 
that 90% of them have no reserve fund with which to provide for their wants 
,l34. The rate of wages was " generally very low, and the people therefore live 
from hand to mouth; consequently the demand for cotton fabrics is almost
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entirely for cheap goods "35.
Coarse quality fabric was what the domestic market demanded. This reflected the 
low level of quality consumption in the patterns of dem and for cloth of the mass 
of consumers in the nation. The Colombian manufacturers therefore " set 
themselves thoroughly to understand the conditions of the market and, by 
keeping their looms running on certain classes of goods ... succeeded in 
supplanting the trade in many of the staple lines which were formerly the 
principal export of the United Kingdom firms ',36.
The potential for a direct economic linkage was there. W hat would eventually not 
work as a sustainable raw material standard for export, would do so for the 
domestic textile industry. In 1904 the industry in the NAC region pushed forward. 
According to British Consul Gillies, in Barranquilla " two new establishments for 
ginning and packing cotton have recently been erected here "37. Quality seems 
to have improved likewise during that year. As Gillies pointed out, new ginners 
were " turning out much clearer cotton than the old gins ,,3S. The cotton was 
produced principally in the department of Bolivar (NAC region). The price paid 
by the factory was, as he reported ," 2 and a half to 4 cents per pound delivered, 
for the unginned cotton, which makes the cost about 12 cents American gold per 
pound for the ginned cotton "39.
The NAC region's cotton mills had more significance than those of other regions. 
Dickson indicated in 1904," that at Carthagena it is the most im portan t,l40. And 
indeed, the initial stage of industrial spinning and weaving in the NAC region 
proper, probably began with the cotton goods factory mentioned earlier in this 
chapter, operating in Cartagena41 in 1892.
This seems to be confirmed by Ospina-Vasquez. He pointed out th a t" only very 
much later, already in the nineties, a modern type textile factory, that of Merlano, 
is installed in Cartagena, which achieved a long life despite adverse circumstances 
throughout several reorganisations n42. This was confirmed by Levine in 1914. He 
noted that in Cartagena " a large spinning and weaving steam driven mill is 
owned by the Banco Union, and has been run for about a quarter of a century 
... the [cottonjseed being exported. There are 105 looms, attended by 160 women
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and boys ',43.
But this initial spurt of the cotton textile industry in the NAC region experienced 
difficulties. In fact, MacGregor's " Cartagena factory H could well have been the 
" Merlano " factory which Ospina-Vasquez mentions, and to which he assigns 
1892 as its date of initiation of operations. This relationship emerges when he 
states t h a t " in Cartagena, the textile enterprise established by Merlano and Co. 
in 1892, was handed over to the Banco Union in the first years of this century. It 
was not progressing. Its production was small "44.
Nevertheless, a contract was signed between the Ministry of Public Works and 
Senor H. de la Espriella, the owner of the textile factory in Cartagena in 1906, 
by which the latter agreed to set up new machinery predominantly M for the 
manufacture of lace "45. This was confirmed later by the Brussels 'Bulletin 
Com erdale' which reported that the Colombian government had " entered a 
contract for the establishment of a spinning and weaving factory in Colombia 
(with) the equipment purchased abroad "46.
The NAC region was by now attracting considerable domestic in terest As 
Petre-Loraine pointed o u t ," cottons and other dry goods are but little imported, 
as it is found more advantageous to draw them from Barranquilla, w ith which 
the communications is for 23 miles by the railway, and for the remaining fifty by 
small steamer plying on the lagoon leading to Barranquilla "47. It would be even 
more advantageous seventeen years later. As Montenegro has indicated," in 1931, 
the kilogram of cotton brought from Suaita, Santander [in the interior] cost the 
Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos de Samaca [in the interior] more than that brought 
from the [North] Atlantic Coast "48.
In spite of the war, gross inflation and economic chaos, the cotton-textile industry 
of the NAC region pulled through at the turn of the century. As Ospina-Vasquez 
put it, in Cartagena " in those years, knitted fabric factories were set up  (de la 
Espriella, 1907; Visbal, 1909) "49. Although the Compania Colombiana de Tejidos 
de Medellin (in the interior) was organised " in the year 1907 "50, it employed just 
under 60 % of what Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon in Barranquilla initiated its 
activities with51. (The former " employed 250 workers in the factory m52).
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United States Consul Demers reported in 1907 that there were only " five gins in 
this city [Barranquilla], all American n53. He added that there was only " one 
cotton mill, a small one, in this consular district (Barranquilla), the underwear 
factory of A., A., Aycardi and Company of this d ty  ',54. Demers said the mill's 
total equipment consisted of " one spinning machine, fifteen looms and thirty 
sewing machines "55. He also reported that production at the mill was " thirty six 
dozen undervests per day m56.
The prospects of a market for the manufactures of gins seemed optimistic. 
According to Demers " more and more appliances will be needed as the industry 
assumes larger and larger proportions ,l57. Pepper also seems to suggest that 
there was a good local market in the NAC region for a " small mill at Cartagena 
[which] turns out a rough article ',58. In fact, British Consul Gillies indicated that 
in Cartagena, in 1908, " besides the old established cotton-mills ... the 
manufacture of hoisery has been undertaken ... working with twenty knitting and 
other machines producing 30 dozen well-finished cotton hose daily "59. He also 
informed th a t" cotton undershirts are already manufactured by a native who has 
started his mill with four knitting machines besides winders, etc., all imported 
from the United States and one collaring machine, of German make, which, it 
appears, does not give full satisfaction ,,6°. According to Gillies, the " average 
production is thirty dozens "61.
Gillies was probably making reference to the Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos de 
Cartagena. Although no source other than Demers reported production in this 
area before January 1908, according to senor de la Espriella, " the Fabrica de 
Hilados y Tejidos Cartagena, that belongs to the Banco Union ... was founded in 
1904, and it was from 1908 that its regular operation dated62. He indicated that 
its organisation was based on the principle of a chartered company, which is the 
one its owner has who, as I have already said, is the Banco Union, w ith which its 
national character is established ',63. De la Espriella further informed that the 
factory's " invested capital is of $200,000, American gold ,l64.
This is compatible with United States Consul M anning's reports. In fact, he 
suggested that, in Cartagena, in 1908, under the protective duty  of 34 cents 
American gold per kilo (two and one fifth lbs.) on cotton goods of the type
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manufactured by the Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos de C artagena," the factory 
seems to be prospering m65. The factory was of some importance to the NAC 
region. Manning estimated that the plant occupied " a ground space of 58,126 
square feet, the factory being one story, and gives employment generally to 160 
employees, all natives of this country, including the superintendent and chief 
engineer ',66.
De la Espriella was adamant that this should not be mistaken for foreign 
enterprise. He pointed to an early cause for restraint on the export effort:" as the 
cotton that is consumed is of national production, the development of the cotton 
industry follows, which favours itself with high prices competing with exports 
”67. He added th a t" when -like the current year- the product's price is depressed 
in Europe, a premium price is paid for the factory's supply over what could be 
obtained by ex p o rt,l68.
United States Consul Manning seems to confirm the idea that the factory's 
local-regional cotton input established economic linkage effects as consumption 
was only of domestic co tton ," its present output is 1,000 pieces (40 yards each) 
per m onth of cotton drill "69. Although it was in conditions of " producing cloth 
of any kind, production at the Fabrica de Hilados y Tejidos Cartagena was 
especially coarse cloth, for it being what is most convenient at the moment ,,7°. 
According to Manning, the factory consumed " about 80,000 kilos of ginned cotton 
per annum "71.
Manning, however, maintained that no exports of cloth were to be expected as 
do th  was " sold entirely in Colombia. The drill selling for an average of 9 cents 
per yard, which means a total output of $ 40,000 to $ 45,000 per annum  ',72. He 
further reported that the factory was also prepared to turn out " shirtings, 
muslims (unbleached) and other cotton goods of this character, but it finds the 
drill the most profitable ',73.
De la Espriella informed that prices of the do th  were " of $1 less below its 
similars overseas in each forty yard piece of five kilograms weight "74. 
Furthermore, he reported that employment creation at the Fabrica was o f " some 
two hundred people, all nationals, made up of men, women and children ”75.
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The Fabrica's total daily capacity according to Manning, was of " 2,000 yards, 
although it never runs to its full capacity, closing down at night "76. Manufacture 
of cloth throughout the country was therefore increased. This would " soon give 
employment to many more laborers and prevent the exportation of much gold, 
destined for the payment for imports of manufactured stuffs of this class h77.
There was a reasonable amount of momentum gained by the alternative of 
spinning and weaving for domestic consumption of cloth. For example, by 1909 
mills were u s in g " native raw cotton, which is of excellent quality and an impetus 
has been given to the industry in all its branches enabling the mills to employ a 
considerable number of persons in the manufacture of cotton fabrics m78.
Nevertheless, according to United States Special Agent Graham-Clarke cotton 
mills in Colombia were " small and scattered v79. In Barranquilla, a German 
(Henry J. Helm) started an knitting factory that year. The factory produced " 
daily, with cotton yam, sixty dozen undershirts, thirty of socks and stockings and 
ten of underpants of different classes that are sold in all commercial locations of 
the Republic at prices that due to their inexpensiveness have succeeded over 
foreign manufactured articles ,,8°. Helm's factory permanently employed ” sixty 
women and eight men "81. Helm also underlined the non-foreign nature of his 
investment, claiming that the factory was begun with " capital acquired in the 
country "82.
Graham-Clarke equally pointed out in 1910 the significance of the NAC region's 
status in the national economy: " the Cartagena cotton mill with 6,200 spindles 
and 105 looms, claims to be the largest in the country. The mill spins 9s to 12s 
and makes narrow gray sheeting u83. At this time half the undershirt mills in 
Colombia were in the NAC region. Graham-Clarke also reported that there were 
" four undershirt mills - one in Cartagena, another in Barranquilla and two in 
Medellin l,S4. There was also a " hoisery machine in Cartagena "85. The 
undershirt factory at Cartagena had a production " capacity o f ... 30 dozen shirts 
a day, and as shirts that bring in $ 1.90 in the United States sell in Cartagena for 
$ 4, good money is made in this line n86.
Spinning and weaving of course became the stalwart of the interior's
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manufacturing industry. But despite having to bear with market imperfections 
and a prevailing high level of wages, most significant initial thrust to 
entrepreneurship in the textile industry emerged in Barranquilla, in the NAC 
region. United States Trade Commissioner Bell would eventually note that the " 
largest cotton mill is the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon of Barranquilla, capitalised 
at 1,000,000 Colombian dollars (1 dollar = $ 0.9733 United States currency) "87. 
It certainly paved the way for a strong regional economic linkage between cotton 
cultivation and cotton textile production.
This dynamic was confirmed by United States Consul Burnell in 1910 who 
reported that " Obregon and Co. have about completed their textile plant in 
Barranquilla for the manufacture of cotton drills. An English family of skilled 
weavers will give instruction in the art of weaving to 100 Colombian women 
employees. Construction of the plant begun last January and the production of 
goods in September. Only 72 looms will be employed ’,88. Although it was 
intended to " increase during the next two years to 300 looms ',89, by 1914 the 
Obregon cotton mill was reported to contain " over 200 electrically driven British 
looms "90. Burnell added that " electric motive power is also owned and 
operated by E. Obregon and company "91.
Don Pedro Obregon confirmed this by commenting that his Fabrica caused " the 
foundation, in parallel way, of the Compania de Electriddad de Barranquilla in 
1909 or 1910 which initiated activities with two Beilis and Morgan units (one of 
60 and another of 90 kilowatts) and Bradcock and Wilcox boilers. A year later a 
150 kilowatt unit of triple expansion was installed. Three years later we doubled 
again and placed a 300 kilowatt unit. But do not forget that we started off with 
a 90 kilowatt u n i t ,l92.
The Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon of Evaristo Obregon y Compania was indeed the most 
significant example of the textile industry in the NAC region - and of course one 
of the few in the nation. Colombian government sources noted in 1912 that the 
factory " currently mobilises in this enterprise alone a capital of $ 300,000 dollars 
... and daily producing 15,000 yards of drill as well as diagonals, coarse and 
coloured that are sold in all of the Republic's markets, selling 15 to 20 per cent 
cheaper than their foreign similars ... employing four hundred and twenty seven
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people including employees, engineers, motorists, electricians, weavers, packers, 
e tc . ,l93.
Don Pedro Obregon, further stated that the Fabrica's market w a s" all of the nation 
,r94. He also said th a t" the reason for the creation of Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon 
was to substitute imported textiles from Manchester for Colombian produce "95. 
He added th a t" The Fabrica employed approximately 1,000 people ,m.
Despite targeting the whole nation as its market the Fabrica Obregon certainly 
witnessed a strong regional potential market. In 1911 for example, US Consul 
Burnell stated that Barranquilla, with a n " estimated population of 40,000, was the 
leading commercial city of Colombia ... [and] rapidly becoming an important 
centre for the production and distribution of manufactured products for the 
Colombian trade ',97. He further added that a " knitting mill for the manufacture 
of underwear and stockings began operating ;... a factory for the manufacture 
of cotton textiles was opened in 1910 employing 72 looms, the number to be 
increased to 168 looms la te r;... [and] another such mill has been operating here 
for the past five years "98.
It m ust be borne in mind that during 1911, serious industrial expansion took place 
in the NAC region. It was informed that " several new factories have been 
opened at Barranquilla, among them being two match factories, a glass factory, 
a shoe factory ... and an ice factory. Many of the factories already established 
m ade additions and improvements, and the electric light company prepared to 
supply electric power to many of them In the same year the cotton textile 
industry opened " a cotton-goods factory ... [and] ... a cotton-gin "10°.
During this time the NAC region's cotton textile industry was expanding. Indeed, 
it was reported th a t" a new factory for the manufacture of cotton fabrics is to be 
installed in Barranquilla. The factory will be equipped with the latest improved 
machinery and will be up to date in every respect "101. L ikew ise," a sawmill, a 
coffee roaster, a chocolate factory, two additional shoe factories and a factory to 
make jute bags and baggings, as well as " a third factory for the manufacture of 
gray cottons "102 were under construction in Barranquilla that same year.
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United States sources indicated that by mid 1912" a new factory for manufacture 
of cotton fabrics is to be installed in Barranquilla. The factory will be equipped 
w ith the latest improved machinery and will be up to date in every respec tHl03. 
United States Consul Manning equally reported that there was " under 
construction a third factory for the manufacture of gray cottons, etc."104 due to 
be opened in 1912. Many other sorts of industrial factories were opened and 
m any of the established factories made additions and improvements. Manning 
stated th a t " the greatest industrial development was at Barranquilla "10S.
The full impact of spinning and weaving on the NAC region was summed up by 
Bowles: " at Barranquilla there are two mills employing 500 hands and working 
325 looms but no spindles. Three underwear factories, one recently established, 
are in operation and give employment to 430 workpeople. A spinning mill is 
shortly to be erected in the town, but the above mentioned, w ith the exception of 
the one at Cartagena are the only mills of importance in Colombia "106.
According to Levine, at this time in Barranquilla and Cartagena, " textile factories 
for cotton and wool of considerable importance "107 were run. United States 
Special Agent Wilson on the other hand, estimated that in Barranquilla, " one 
large mill with British machinery turns out 16,000 to 20,000 yards of cotton goods 
daily and exports to double this by an addition to its plant "108. He also 
confirmed the existence of direct economic linkage between cotton cultivation and 
cotton textile production by stating th a t" some long fibre ... is used to a certain 
extent in the native mills and in weaving on hand looms. There are gins in 
Barranquilla and Cartagena fitted with American machinery "109.
Although United States Vice-Consul Blake-Modica only reported " two 
cotton-mills in the district "uo for 1915, British Vice-Consul Bowles noted that 
" under the protection of a high tariff several cotton mills have come into 
existence during the past ten years, and are now firmly established in the local 
trade "m . In fact, such was the potential of the NAC region's cotton textile 
industry, that industry abroad was forced to compete hard for the market. 
Complaints were " frequently made by American yam  manufacturers that they 
are not getting the trade of cotton - weaving mills of Barranquilla "112.
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There were several reasons for this problem. It appears to have been according 
to United States Consul Manning, a question of " credits, unwillingness of 
American manufacturers to put the yarn up as required and invariably a higher 
price in the United States than in Manchester, when the credit period and 
everything else is taken into consideration. Otherwise, business will continue to 
go to Manchester or Germany "113.
By 1917, construction in the NAC region was on the upsurge particularly in the 
textile industry. In Cartagena, another textile factory (other than de la Espriella's) 
was reported by United States Consul Lespinasse, which was endowed " with $
200.000 capital (was) producing bleached and unbleached cotton goods, drills, 
yarns, linens, etc. for domestic consumption "114. He noted that de la Espriella 
was doing well with " with $ 60,000 capital, 100 employees and a daily output 
of 100 dozen cotton and woolen undershirts "11S.
In Barranquilla, the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon was investing in plant extension. 
United States Special Agent Ewing reported th a t" during the past year there have 
been constructed one three - story reinforced concrete building, 49 by 105 feet by 
62 feet high containing approximately 322,000 cubic feet and costing $ 44,000, an 
extension to the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon, amounting to approximately $
300.000 and a number of less important improvements, all of which used certain 
amounts of foreign hardware, steel and cements products "116.
Ewing also reported that the business of Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon in Barranquilla 
was " sufficiently prosperous to warrant the construction of further extensions 
to the amount of $ 1,000,000 to $ 1,500,000 including equipment "117. He was 
convinced th a t" the owners would be willing to consider the engagement of the 
necessary capital to prosecute the extensions at an early date ,l118.
After 1917 a definite upward movement in population took place. The nation, as 
United States Trade Commissioner Macgowan explained, w ith " its population of 
8,000,000 offers an excellent market "119. The NAC region was an important 
market by now. Amid all market districts Barranquilla was the " most important 
in Colombia if we measure by physical distribution of merchandise .... from the 
point of view of sales it is nearly as important as the Bogota District and it
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probably has a population of about 2,000,000 "120. Amongst the most important
secondary centers, with a population of 22,067 was the city of Santa Marta121
and Cartagena was a district with a " consumer population of about 1,000,000 
••122
As United States Consul Guyant reported, the growth of the industry was of 
course " helped by high prices of imported cloth "123 which undoubtedly proved 
to be " a great stimulus to the cotton-growing industry during 1917 "124. 
Machinery was ordered from abroad in 1917 for the " equipment of a factory for 
the manufacture of cotton thread ... arrived at Barranquilla and will soon be 
installed. Another factory for the manufacture of woolen yam  is soon to be put 
into operation at Barranquilla "125. Guyant also noted that " the largest single 
item of manufacture however is textiles, principally cheap and medium-grade 
sheetings, drills, denims and cheap hard-woven cotton for suitings "126.
United States Consul Guyant identified 1918 as another im portant year for the 
textile industry in the NAC. He reported that cotton had been " steadily growing 
in importance for the last several years as the demands of domestic textile plants 
increased and facilities for spinning were added "127. Spinning and weaving 
(namely the Fabrica Obregon) had stimulated raw  cotton production. As Guyant 
noted, the ” growing interest in cotton locally was due to the establishment of a 
new spinning mill in Barranquilla at the cost of $ 500,000 and the addition of a 
spinning department costing $ 200,000 to the largest cotton mill already 
established "128. The International High Commission later confirmed this in their 
study on the country129.
United States Trade Commissioner Bell noted th a t" m any of the larger mills are 
installing dyeing plants, and two or three yam-spinning mills are being erected 
or planned for the near future to use the native cotton "130. But protected textile 
industry produced high domestic prices which was reflected in profitable business 
for factories. According to Bell, these high prices and " large profits obtained in 
1919 have had the effect of attracting additional native capital to the cotton 
industry and new mills are either being planned or actually under way Ml31.
There were however, deficits in production. Despite " domestic industry having
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m ade considerable progress during those last 15 years, domestic production did 
not supply more than one-tenth of the demand "132. The consequent imports of 
raw  cotton showed spinning and weaving in the NAC region had encouraging 
prospects. Bell confirms this: " of the four [Colombian] knitting mills making 
cheap cotton undershirts for men's wear, the largest of these being the Fabrica 
N adonal de Tejidos of Barranquilla and the plant of Espriella Hermanos of 
Cartagena -the latter factory also making cotton socks and stockings "133.
United States Consul Guyant additionally reported that "there were established 
in Barranquilla two spinning plants of 2,500 spindles each"134. NAC region 
prospects for the alternative of spinning and weaving showed a momentum which 
seems to have definitively set the export alternative back. Guyant to surmise that 
there would be "no cotton for export from Colombia for m any years "13S.
The NAC spinning and weaving industry showed signs of regional economic 
linkage by absorbing local output of raw  cotton. As United States Trade 
Commissioner Bell pointed out, the Fabrica de Tejidos Obregon had " recently 
installed a spinning mill and a dyeing plant and is beginning to use native raw 
cotton which is also ginned at the plant and dyed there "136.
The alternative of spinning and weaving with both domestic raw  cotton and 
imported yam  for domestic consumption certainly established itself. There were 
however, deficiencies in quality and productivity. But this seems to have taken 
place in w hat Clark would describe as the " earlier processes of opening the 
cotton, carding it, and drawing it into loose ropes "137, not to the manufacturing 
level proper. After all, carding was just a preparatory process138. Some 
deficiencies in quality were due for example, to management's cutting out in 1910 
of the " intermediate fly frames ... to save expense "139.
This is hardly surprising. If one considers low labour productivity emerging from 
expensive labour time, spent on fly frames in the textile industry years later. 
Clark's evidence of 1948 British mill operatives operating 1915 machinery who " 
spent from 2.1 percent of their time repairing breakages in carding to 6.7 percent 
of their time on the fly frames "14° illustrates this. This emphasizes our point 
made earlier on matters of inefficiency in the NAC region textile industry.
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Spindle and loom efficiency was defined as the " percentage of a machine's 
theoretical production, determined by the speed the machine was run at, which 
was actually achieved "141. Clark has illustrated how in 1910 " low-waged 
countries were not getting greater utilisation of their capital except through 
running longer hours "142. But data such as machines speeds, output per 
machine and its technical description in weight and dimensions of counts of yam  
per h o u r , spinning hours, and control of fineness of yam s is not available for the 
NAC cotton textile industry.
It is not possible therefore to point out spindle and loom percentage efficiencies. 
But they m ust have been low. Clark notes that in 1910 " low-waged countries 
were generally getting lower output per machine than countries with high wages 
"143. Despite the high wages in the NAC region, due to inefficiency, output must 
have been low as well. In fact, according to Graham-Clarke, it was the " 
inefficiency of the weavers which accounted for low loom speeds "144.
As far as spinning and weaving's creation of urban employment was concerned, 
it boded well. It was apparently " plentiful in Barranquilla ... w ith about 3,000 
factory employees, mostly women and girls ... who work in the cotton mills 
"14S. This was at the expense of the rural areas. According to United States Trade 
Commissioner Bell, plentiful it was n o t " in the cotton district in the interior of 
Atlantico [department in the NAC region of which Barranquilla is the capital]
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Spinning and weaving proved to be a strong, significant and profitable industry. 
The making of cotton yam  and of cotton cloth became the " chief manufacturing 
industries of Barranquilla "147. They promised to " become increasingly 
important in the near future "148. Additionally, Trade Commissioner Bell noted 
that the textile m ills" earned large profits during the war and this prosperity has 
resulted in an increase in the capitalisation of some of the companies in new 
equipment and in the establishment of one large new yam  mill ”149.
British Lieutenent-Colonel Rhys-Jenkins reported that of th e " three well-equipped 
cotton mills in the country, the larger Barranquilla mill is a modern and 
well-equipped establishment owned by a family of Colombians who have had
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much experience in the Lancashire trade "150. Furthermore, he noted that there 
were in addition to th e " three weaving establishments, three mills in the country 
making cotton hoisery [and] a small plant in Barranquilla for the spinning of 
yarns for hoisery purposes "151.
Direct economic linkage between cotton cultivation and the cotton textile industry 
still showed good potential. This was emphasised by Rhys-Jenkins' observation 
th a t" the lower Magdalena valley provides the cotton used by the spinning mills 
and none is imported. On the contrary, during heavy crops, a small quantity of 
cotton has been exported to Spain and the United States "152. Equally, change 
of technology contributed to a better product. According to Wakefield, a cotton 
mill manager, deficiently ginned cloth h a d " greatly improved since 1918-1919 and 
if roller gins were introduced to take the place of saw gins the improvement 
would be more pronounced, in a more even staple and a cleaner production "153.
It was the development in the number of cotton spindles which indicated in the 
first place the (inter-nation) geographical shift of the cotton industry from 
Lancashire to the United States154. At first instance, such a detailed development 
in Colombia and in the NAC region in particular does not seem warranted given 
the the very small numbers involved. With the entire nation having anywhere 
between fifty two155 and 58.9 thousand156 spindles in 1926, according to Pearse, 
that was " hardly as much as one single average mill in Lancashire "157. 
Additionally, however optimistic the interior's textile ambitions could escalate, 
this w ould only bring Pearse to comment th a t" Medellin [interior region] is called 
at times the Manchester of Colombia, but this is an exaggeration, seeing that not 
more than 22,000 spindles are located there "158.
Nevertheless, it is interesting to note the development of the num ber of spindles
simply to further expand comprehension on the decline of the NAC region's
cotton textile industry. Anyway, it was extraordinarily difficult to obtain statistics
as to the capacity of cotton mills159. During the first decade, despite the fact that
in 1902 the Empresa de Tejidos de Bello [in the interior region] had 5,328
spindles160, British Consul Gillies in 1908 for example, indicated that in
Cartagena [NAC region], the cotton-mills had " 105 looms and 8,000 spindles 
••161
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Furthermore, according to United States Consul Manning, just the Fabrica de 
Hilados y Tejidos Cartagena factory had " 6,116 spindles and 104 looms "162. 
And Wakefield pointed out in 1922 that there was a projection for erecting later 
" a further 7,468 spindles "163 in Colombia. Table 36 below shows this was not 
the case.
The major peak in the cotton textile industry was in 1926. There were 38 cotton 
mills164 in the country, 8 of which165 were in the NAC region. These were: a- 
Barranquilla: (i) Compania Industrial de Tejidos; (ii) Empresa de Hilados y 
Cultivo de Algodon; (iii) Empresa de Tejidos La "Nacionar'; (iv) Fabrica de 
Tejidos Echevarria; (v) Fabrica de Tejidos 'Obregon'; (vi) Genaro Salazar and 
(vii) M anufacturer de Barranquilla; and b- Cartagena: (viii) Fabrica de Tejidos 
de la Espriella y Cia.166.
Two years later the national number of mills was at 16 (cut by just over 42 % as 
of 1926), the number of spindles was at 39,640 (cut by just over 76 % as of 52,000 
spindles)167. However, by 1942 it was to 210,000 that the num ber of spindles had 
risen168. Although British Consul Garnett-Lomax stated that there were " 60,000 
spindles existing in the country "169 by 1929, according to the Colombian Trade 
Review the NAC region seems to have had just under 41% of the total spindles 
in the nation by that year (see Table 36 below). By 1949, according to Wythe, the 
nation was still a " fairly large market for coarse cotton cloth -the chief necessity 
for clothing a large proportion of population "17°.
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TABLE 36:
COLOMBIA AND NAC ESTIMATED SPINDLES AND LOOMS
(000’s)
year
i
spindles
Colombia
looms spindles
NAC
looms
1908 8.0, 0.1,
1910. 20.0 0 .2 . 6.2 a 0.3 M
1913 b 20.0
1914, 20.0
1916 0 .3 ,
1917 5.0 d
1918 5.0 „
1922, 31.5
1924, 30.5 1.94 f
1926 f 52.0 1.98.
1926; 58.9 1.77; 23.3, 0.575;
1928 t 39.6 1.93 t
1929 h 58.9 24.1 „
1929 , 60.0
1930 b 44.4
1933 b 44.4
1942. 210.0
Sources: a) Graham-Clark, W., A., “ Cotton Goods in Latin America, Part II, Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela ", Special Agents Series, No. 36, (Washington, 1910), 
p.86; b) International Cotton Bulletin, Volume XI, No. 43, April, 1933, p401; c) Montenegro, S., “ La Industria Textil en Colombia: 1900-1945 ", Cuadro No. 1, 
Principal es Gmpresas Textiles, Desairollo y Sociedad, No. 8, May, (Bogota, 1982), p. 125; d) Guy ant, C., E., United States Consul at Barranquilla, Supplement to 
Commerce Reports, Daily Consular and Trade Reports, Annual Series No. 45a, May 27, 1920 (Washington, 1920), p.7; e) Wythe, G., Industry in Latin America, (New 
York, 1949), p.256; f) Wakefield, S .," Cotton in Colombia ", International Cotton Bulletin, No. 1, September, (Manchester, 1922),p.l04; g) Yearbook of the National 
Association of Cotton Manufacturers, Yearbook Manual 1924, (Boston, 1924), p.158; Idem., Yearbook Manual 1926, (Boston, 1926), p.158; Idem., Yearbook Manual 
1926, Op. Cit., p .168; Idem., Yearbook Manual 1927, (Boston, 1927), p.168; Idem., Yearbook Manual 1928, (Boston, 1928), p.264; Idem., Yearbook Manual 1929, 
(Boston, 1929), p.264; h) The Colombian Trade Review, Vol. Vm, No. 12, January issue, (1929), p .244; i) Pearse, A., Colombia, With Special Reference to Cotton, 
(London, 1926), p.100-102; j) Gillies, J., British Consul at Cartagena, " Report on the Year 1908 on the Trade and Commerce of Cartagena " Diplomatic and Consular 
Reports, Annual Series No. 4400, (London, 1910), p.3; k) Manning, L, A., United States Consul of Cartagena, Monthly Consular and Trade Reports, February 1908, 
Serial 5330, No. 329, (Washington, 1908), p.180 and Monthly Bulletin of the International Bureau of the American Republicans, Volume 26, No. 1, January, 1908, 
Whole No. 172, (Washington, 1908), p.62; I) Gamett-Lomax, J., Economic Conditions of Colombia, (London, 1929), p.47; Notes: Some figures will only reflect the 
number of spindles in one or several mills but not necessarily reflect all.
Figure 46 shows the bar graph which 
illustrates the data on spindles.
The same situation that was observed 
by the development of the number of 
spindles can be seen in the 
development of looms.
Figure 46
Colombia and NAC Region Estimated 
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The national estimate in 1924 of the number of looms in operation was " 
approximately 1,600 with an average production of about 36,000 yards daily
itl71
In 1926 the number of looms reached 1,980 and 5,000 hands were employed172. 
From 1926 to 1928 employment of hands by the industry fell by just over 34 % (5 
to 3.285 thousand)173. Figure 47 illustrates the data on looms.
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Nevertheless, consumption of raw 
cotton showed marked increases of 
300 % (3 to 12 thousand bales) from 
1924 to 1926 and from 1926 to 1928, of 
442 % (12 to 65 thousand bales)174.
Calculating the cotton requirements 
for that number of spindles Wakefield 
thought that " on an average of 41bs. 
per spindle per 60 hours producing 12's we obtain a total yarn production of 
6,305,600 lbs. per year of 50 weeks ”175. However, he commented that with a " 
working loss of 82 1/2 per cent demand for lint cotton am ounted] to 7,193,800 
lbs. ... of seed cotton requiring roughly 100,000 hectares (250,000 acres) at the 
present rate of production "176.
By the thirties' decade the NAC region's (with Fabrica Obregon as its forebearer) 
spinning and weaving for domestic consumption went into decline and stagnation 
if contrasted with the interior. Although as mentioned earlier, Fabrica Obregon was 
a modem and well-equipped establishment in the second decade, one aspect of 
this decline was the failure (as opposed to the interior textile industry) to 
introduce (necessary but not sufficient) technological change in the early 
twenties177. But, the pricing-out effect of wages was an important economic 
cause of the Fabrica's fading away178. The interior (particularly the department 
of Antioquia) was the " heart of the coffee economy of the western part of the 
country, therefore, the place where the best rewards from the processes and 
dynamics that coffee expansion guaranteed "179. Bar the exceptions mentioned 
before, it was also where low wages ruled.
A complete discourse on the details of government subsidy for cotton cultivation 
is unwarranted here. It simply did not show priority over that for the cotton 
textile industry because there was lack of knowledge of international textile 
quality standards. As remarked earlier, demand was domestic -not international- 
and for coarse cloth. It is only when it was seen that raw cotton for export was 
a viable economic alternative that some government subsidy -especially in quality
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seed- materialised. The essence of this subsidy has been covered earlier in this 
chapter.
The government's interest in providing better quality seed was mainly to find a 
different source of foreign exchange earnings other than coffee. This is why the 
end of the first decade of the present century witnessed " energetic propaganda 
m ade by the government concerning the planting and cultivation of cotton "18°.
The main consequence of government subsidy in quality seeds for production of 
raw  cotton that could qualify for international standards was that in promoting 
the alternative of cotton cultivation for export, government subsidy changed the 
variety of cotton grown. The change in variety was not decided to make it suitable 
for domestic textile production but for export. In the process, it made it unsuitable 
for domestic textile production.
The other consequence of government subsidy was that it made it a compulsory 
(subject to legal penalization) input for the textile industry. In doing so a superior 
variety of cotton became the wrong input for a final output which was inferior 
quality textile or coarse cloth. This increased textile production costs. It especially 
became instrumental in installing apparent business complacency amongst cotton 
cultivators' production targets. As they seemingly reaped adequate profits with 
low acreage and production they therefore saw no need in meeting the textile 
industry 's rising demand of the fibre.
The crux of government 'subsidy7 was really for the cotton textile industry. But 
throughout the process of government assistance to the cotton textile industry, its 
change of variety determined an paradoxical and irreversible cycle. This was that 
an appropriate variety was perhaps right for export (only to be deteriorated by 
technical deficiencies unacceptable in the international market) but wrong as an 
input for the textile industry.
The more the government subsidised variety, the less it would be exported, the 
more it would be used as an input for textile production and the more production 
costs would rise. If to this, higher wages were added, the NAC region textile 
industry could have no hope of surviving. The interior of course did survive
380
because of the low wages it could pay, absorbing the high production costs 
generated by compulsory use of the changed variety.
Support for the textile industry probably stemmed from the fact that President 
Rafael N unez -the pioneer in government attention to the textile industry- not 
only was from the NAC region, but its more relevant political leader. Indeed, 
N unez made it clear in 1883 that in order to " make possible the introduction in 
the state of Bolivar [in the NAC region] of industry for the production of cotton 
fabric, the assembly at this moment, has had to issue a law whereby it is declared 
that the said industry shall be a financial adjudication during 25 years "181.
He decreed the " concession of fiscal privilege, by means of certain conditions, to 
a chartered company of our entrepreneuring city of Barranquilla; company already 
-may it be said- organised with a capital that shall not go below (as thus as the 
law decrees) $ 250,000 "182.
There can be little doubt that the government subsidy to the textile industry in 
Barranquilla was a major stimulus designed to revive a presumably dying state 
of affairs. Nevertheless, despite protectionism, both quantity and quality suffered. 
Witness Wheeler's view in 1888 that it was a " small quantity of woolen and 
cotton fabrics of a very coarse quality with hand looms of an antiquated fashion, 
but the industry is insignificant... and amply protected by the import duties "183.
One would have expected the industry to have been hit harder by the outbreak 
of the W ar of a Thousand Days. Nonetheless, a government subsidy was decreed 
in 1899. In order that the cotton textile industry could take root in the department 
of Bolivar, the Colombian Chancellor of the Exchequer pu t forward a proposal 
that called fo r" the establishment of ten textile factories, subsidising each one with
300,000 pesos "184.
Policies in 1909, according to Jalhay, called for " l'etablissements de fabriques de 
tissues de cotton, pres de la capitale et dans les departments de Barranquilla et de 
Santa Marta, le gouvernement, garantit, pendant 10 ans, un interet de 7 % sur le 
capital, la franchise des droits sur les machines et les matieres premieres, 
1'exemption de tout impot national departamental ou municipal "18S.
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He further noted that the governm ent" s'engage, pendant la duree du contrat, a 
ne pas reduire les droits d'entree sur les tissues de coton et autres fibres textiles 
a plus de 50 % des droits actuels. Par contre, les articles fabriques devront etre 
vendus avec une reduction de 8 a 12 % sur les articles du  meme genre importees 
de l'etrangere ”186.
This led British cotton expert Pearse state in 1926 th a t" the manufacture of cotton 
and other goods succeeds solely on account of high protective duties ,fl87. United 
States Trade Commissioner Bell noted this fact on more than one occasion. He 
said for example, that the " industry is protected by a high tariff on imported 
goods and prices are determined by the high cost of the imported articles ”188. 
Later he mentioned that " the native industry is protected by a high tariff on 
textiles and the prices obtained for the local output are based upon textile prices 
in foreign markets plus the import duties and inland freights Ml89.
Beneficial effects of the role of government therefore, were particularly for the 
cotton textile industry, not for cotton cultivation. They were mainly those of 
protection. Financial support, fiscal privilege and protective tariffs were significant 
for all regions. Tariffs undoubtedly benefited cotton mills which " made large 
profits in spite of the the fact that all yarns and a considerable amount of raw 
cloth have to be imported "19°.
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CONCLUSIONS
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In this thesis we have tried to report —not prove— on some salient economic facts 
during a particular period, of the some of the major events in the economy of a 
particular area in Colombia: the NAC region. In doing so, we hope we have 
contributed - in  a very minor scale- to the understanding of economic 
development.
The period between nineteen hundred and nineteen hundred and thirty in the 
economic history of Colombia revealed a strong 'regional' characteristic: a 
successful coffee economy in the interior. This has invited much of the testing of 
economic and historical thought. Although work was certainly accomplished, we 
argue here that no one attributed the factor of regional diversity the importance 
it merited.
This is w hy this thesis had to propose a theoretical framework that emphasized 
the 'regional' element in Colombian economic developm ent A series of 
imperfections in its factor markets characterized this element in the NAC region.
This theoretical framework of imperfections intertwined the idea of structural 
rigidity with the notions of 'growth pole' and 'staple growth'. Its essence resulted 
in a particular approach to economic development and history. It was built upon 
the antithesis of the notion of 'linkage' (e.g. the notion of leakage'). It was 
accompanied by the structural element included in the analysis of the nature of 
the labour market. We suggest this paved the way for an approximation of an 
explanation of economic stagnation. That is, the reduction of labour mobility by 
factor market imperfections.
It seems the nature of the NAC region's labour force was such, that at its best 
(from the employers' point of view) was only a small semi-proletariat population. 
At its worse, the region's labour market comprised a major imperfection: the 
reluctance of its labour force, to fully integrate into the monetary economy. This
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imperfection in the factor market seems to have resulted in labour shortage, 
pushing regional wage levels upwards.
Because of these reasons, this thesis suggests the size of the banana labour force 
was not an example of unlimited supply of labour. Due to this factor, its 
organization was equally prone to manipulation from intermediaries, as well as 
the UFC's efforts to disregard payment of legal benefits and thus reduce its wage 
costs.
The thesis reveals that the UFC was the local monopsonist. This comprised 
another major imperfection. Indeed, Kepner pointed out that "near United's 
banana centres ... there is no other large-scale employer" *. It seems to us, 
therefore, that the UFC's position as a monopsony, provided it with the muscle 
it needed, to pay the low wages it could optimally pay.
The UFC was equally a world monopoly in the producer market. For this reason, 
we suggest wages paid, were higher than what a competitive wage would have 
been in the NAC region. We equally suggest this power m eant the UFC met the 
resulting wage levels generated by labour shortage in the region. We also suggest 
this m eant that it set a regional price for wages which other employers had no 
recourse, but to accept.
A supplementary imperfection in the NAC region's labour market was the 
strategy of the UFC to internally segment its labour force. This appears to have 
been done in a way in which it could produce several noncompetitive 
(segmented) labour markets within the company; and suggests it lowered its wage 
costs this way.
This seems to have induced internal labour market segmentation within the NAC 
region. And apparently influenced the economic development process in it, by 
setting a higher wage level, than what competition for scarce labour could afford 
to offer.
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The UFC —therefore— seems to have generated an attractive alternative labour 
market in the region. It appears to have been sufficiently important, to further 
differentiate rural and (already differentiated) urban wages. This seems to have 
operated by exercising rising price pressure on the market. The result seems to 
have been distortion and destabilization of labour price levels. And we insinuate 
it contributed to the overall general result of the operation of these forces: regional 
economic stagnation.
W ith the banana export sector's UFC setting the high level of wages (in about 
1906), it seems likely that expensive labour - a t  least by Colombian standards- 
-exercised a negative influence on the NAC region's economy.
This was despite (i) the fact that both the NAC and the interior regions were 
dom inated by low-wage economies by the end of the 19th and the beginning of 
the 20th century; (ii) the sporadic and dramatic upsurge in wages (due to Civil 
War) at the turn of the century, which the interior coffee sector experienced, and; 
(iii) a brief period of low wages due to a).- inflation created in the national 
economy by the surplus monies originating in the United States indemnity 
paym ent (and private credit that came along with it) to the nation for the loss of 
the Colombian province of Panama and b).- the effects of the Depression on 
foreign investments in the region.
Generally speaking, wages in real terms in the NAC region were higher than in 
the interior. In a general sense, NAC region banana sector real wages were higher 
than the interior manufacturing real wages. In a particular sense (excluding non­
m onetary components), they were higher than interior coffee wages including 
non-pecuniary elements.
It materialised that higher wages in the banana export sector were set not only as 
a result of labour shortage but of good market reasons as well. The nature of the 
product (banana) was of a highly perishable and seasonal foodstuff which 
dem anded immediate, albeit seasonal, labour for its shipping.
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The thesis' findings suggest intra and interregional wage differentiation existed 
within the NAC region, i.e. between it and the interior of the country. The heavily 
wage differentiated labour market in the NAC region, for example, had much 
higher price limits than its interior counterpart. And it w ould appear, 
consequently, that -alongside natural protection— the low-wage female labour 
force, became a major factor for the interior's economic growth and development 
(namely the textile industry) over and at the demise of that of the NAC region.
Except for the banana sector in the region, it seems unlikely that the rest of the 
regional export sectors could afford the payment of high levels of wages. The 
sector's large-scale corporate unit (the UFC) grew, but was —apparently— 
instrumental, in the economic stagnation of the region.
This revealed an extraordinary paradox whereby economic stagnation took place 
with a prevailing high level of wages. That is, the hindrances to economic 
development and the effects of the slagging dow n of economic growth in the 
NAC region, were taking place despite the ruling of a high wage economy. In 
fact, the effect of stagnation " was felt more than elsewhere in Santa Marta, 
Barranquilla and Cartagena [major cities of NAC region]"2.
The most significant example of this was that of the NAC region's cotton 
cultivation destined for export. It was costed in the international market. Exposed 
to some similar predicaments, serious backwash effects swept the regional cotton 
textile industry for domestic consumption.
However, there were other alternate or complementary reasons for this: one was 
competition from and protection for, the industry of the interior of Colombia, as 
transportation improved. Another was the relative dynamism of the coffee 
economy of the interior, and its better resistence to the Depression, compared with 
bananas in the NAC region.
We suggest this was even more indicative, because of the linkage potential that
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cotton had for the regional economy. Although not touching on the subject of 
wages, Helmsing3 has recently, eloquently shown that this potential was 
undoubtedly, historically true. He said that cotton, although constituting " only 
a small fraction of domestic demand ... in the early 1950s [sic]... by the late 1960s 
and early 1970s [it] became one of Colombia's most im portant nontraditional 
export products."4
Indeed, he discussed some of the main impacts within the NAC region of cotton 
production, showing that i t " triggered a number of developments including the 
creation of a new departmental government [Cesar], government, commerce, 
personal services and industry ...."5 He finally argued th a t" these indirect effects, 
rather than the more regressively distributed direct effects, provide the key to 
understanding this case of regional change."6
High wages nevertheless, were also masks for bad contractual conditions —from 
which private contractors and the UFC benefited. The former as intermediaries 
earning commission. The latter, by not paying fringe benefits ruled by law  —major 
leakages by any measure.
Thus, the banana export sector generated another significant paradox. Parallel to 
the prevailing level of wages it set, the UFC strongly influenced collective 
bargaining. It also solidified workers' legal labour rights and prom pted striking 
action to achieve them. It also generated internecine political violence. Despite dire 
contractual conditions and the other aforementioned factors, wage levels were still 
much higher in the NAC than in the interior.
The thesis suggests that structural constraint of labour market imperfections which 
created labour shortage and resulted in high wages, contribute to the explanation 
of economic stagnation in the NAC region. The nature of the product 
complements the explanation of the region's stagnation. The scales of raw  cotton 
exploitation and the technical quality of the fibre for international competition, 
were two elements within the nature of the product that played relevant roles.
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The scale was small and revealed constraints --such as the historical ones of the 
'hacienda' system and labour shortage.
There were several consequences of these constraints. One was low output of raw 
material at high uncompetitive prices (although large-scale cultivation was 
dropped because of lack of appropriate fibre variety). A revealing one was 
deficiency in cultivation techniques that made the product inadequate for export. 
The crucial higher level of wages destabilized the potential position for more 
income distribution because high wages discouraged hiring of labour and quality 
control of picking.
Nevertheless, despite low acreage for example, high yields were accomplished. 
Although cultivation costs (other than wages) were high, the NAC region was the 
major source of cotton supply in the country. More surprisingly however, was 
that cotton proved even to be profitable (at least in the m id twenties). Profitability 
however, came from the fibre's 'variety7 or quality of the product, paid at import 
price premiums.
It was a domestic sellers market. Even by supplying anywhere between 75 and 
90 per cent of Colombian produced cotton, the NAC region could not meet the 
country's total demand for fibre. This was due to the upsurge in national 
consumption that took place between 1922 and 1927.
Raw cotton cultivation was relevant, for it showed that raw  material was available 
locally. It revealed particular problems it posed as an export. It also revealed that 
w hat was wrong for export was acceptable for domestic economic linkage. Mixed 
fibre resulted suitable for the type of coarse cloth that the domestic market 
demanded. Except for the inability to withstand payment of high wages that the 
banana export sector was able to set, our evidence suggests spinning and weaving 
for domestic consumption were therefore likely to have been a definitive economic 
alternative for the economic development of the NAC region.
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But failure of the NAC region textile industry to introduce technological changes 
after 1926, was also an important explanation for its decline. It may be argued that 
as the peak of the textile industry in the region was in 1926 and wages plummet 
everywhere from 1930 onwards, it seems inadequately proved, that high wages 
caused decline in the NAC textile industry.
This should be viewed from the wider context of the several peaks reached by the 
num ber of spindles in the Colombian textile industry. Equally, during the 1926 
and 1929 peaks, the interior witnessed a high level of government labour wages, 
due to public works schemes. And thirdly, despite having the largest scale 
corporate unit in the nation (Obregdn), the NAC region's textile region, only had 
between 31 and 42 per cent of the nation's spindles between 1910 and 1929.
Two major lessons may be drawn from the results of this thesis. The first is what 
not to do. There is no need to appeal to national explanations for regional 
economic development problems. Here we hope to have counterbalanced the 
excessive emphasis on coffee in the literature on economic development and 
economic history of Colombia. Most important, this thesis disproves the usual 
assumption about the lack o f information on wages.
The second is an offshoot of the first: to persevere in research of economic data 
that usually seem to avoid us. This is especially so, because in this thesis we do 
confirm -within the context of economic development and history in general- that 
despite the painstaking and often rewardless search for primary economic data, 
once found, wage rates are definitely among the most cardinal economic statistics. 
By presenting real and nominal wages for labour in the NAC region of Colombia 
we expect to change the traditional pattern of thought about the region that ittle 
research and analysis of its economic history had managed to establish.
This is so because it is from these wage rates that we have can show and conclude 
for the first time in the analysis of the economic history of Colombia that there 
existed a high-wage economy in the NAC region. There was already a low-wage
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interior existent at the turn of the century. Indeed, its coffee sector portion largely 
benefited from non-pecuniary income during the first three decades of the present 
century. But the NAC region urban government wage level was already relatively 
high; and railways in the region showed an initial isolated high level as well.
The region's wages initiated a pattern that upset the economic development 
process of the region, wage-eamers abruptly enjoying high pay. It was the 
banana export sector that initiated the suddenness of paym ent of relatively higher 
wages and allowed the sector to be param ount in breaking wage patterns in the 
region and the nation.
Equally, with the help of wage evidence we can suggest not only tha t labour 
m arket segmentation did exist, but tha t i t  was an important m arket imperfection. 
A t  the least, i t  helped understand and explain w hy the paradox o f  a high wage 
economy and economic stagnation persisted. But, the higher the degree of 
corporativeness, the more high wages could be afforded and the greater the 
application of segmentation. Thus, it was in the NAC region, that the presence of 
the major foreign capital investment, the UFC, introduced a systematic 
segmentation strategy with vehement effects on the regional economy.
W ith its introduction of controlled segmentation by means of a new system of 
control in the regional labour process, the banana export sector consolidated its 
corresponding regional labour market structures in its economic area of influence. 
It also significantly contributed to the decline of economic growth and 
development in the NAC region.
The system allowed more control, differentiation between workers' tasks and 
greater fragmentation of informal work groups. It structured, but also 
destructured the regional labour market. Internal and external destructure of the 
labour market took place along with the effort to maintain a wage high enough 
to retain labour within each economic sector until it was not feasible to be 
competitive with the wage levels the UFC set.
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This happened when the UFC cut its own wage rates from high to lower ones at 
the end of the third decade of this century. By means of segmentation a 
destructured labour force emerged, the banana sector therefore witnessing heavy 
unemployment. The process showed a dynamic effect with the presence of 
straightforward differentiation due to experience on the job and fragmented 
informal work segmentation.
Brown has pointed out that " formal staple theory can contribute little to the 
analysis o f ... political and economic complexities,"7 such as " [sic] foreign capital 
investment's strength derived from immunity to domestic ... politics"8. But the 
nature of the production function —that is, the nature of how the staple is 
produced— was one param ount to the understanding of the operational presence 
of segmentation as an imperfection.
The banana staple (produced by international monopoly capital and under 
monopsonic conditions), the cotton staple (produced under a m yriad of 
deficiencies) and the economic historic reality of labour shortage and the 
particular character of the region's labour force that it enhanced, provide more 
than incidental weight to how a staple is produced.
The nature of the production function is in itself theoretically inherent to the 
useful ideas of 'growth pole' and 'staple growth'. This, we suggest, reconciles our 
initial query. It contributes to the weight of the utility of a theoretical framework 
of imperfection. Without it reconciliation would have been not only difficult but 
impossible.
As an imperfection, a good market reason such as the nature of the product, 
serves as an additional explanation for high wages. The seasonal and perishable 
nature of the banana as a foodstuff, made wages rise above average.
Cotton cultivation seems to have been severely affected by the high wages set by 
the banana sector. Rural labour wage rates in the cotton cultivating areas of the
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NAC region were at the level at which immigrant labour was being enticed but 
never materialised as a solution. Although common sense may suggest deflation 
was a problem, according to our evidence, cotton cultivation massively increased 
its level of wages 431.6 % in five years (from 1905 to 1910). By 1924, levels had 
dropped just under 9 % .
One should be careful, however, to bear in mind that common sense equally 
suggests that interior real coffee wage levels —which included the non-monetary 
element and were demonstrably lower than real NAC cotton cultivation wage 
levels in 1905 and 1910— were equally subject to the problem of deflation.
The price pressure set by the banana sector in the region also forced general 
agricultural labour to place higher wage demands, particularly coffee sector 
labour. The cotton textile industry however, held out not only paying relatively 
high wages, but high wages in relation to low productivity , until it was 
out-priced.
Neither cotton nor coffee (except in 1927) were likely to raise wages further in 
order to compete with those set by the fruit staple, once wage rates were cut 
down in the thirties by the banana sector. But another suggestion here is that, 
informalisation  of the labour force in the region, may have been shaped.
Real wage range levels in the NAC cotton textile industry in 1908 were similar to 
some of the banana sector's urban wage range levels. The region's textile industry 
wages surprisingly reached a high level in 1911. We suggest it is likely that it 
strove at least until 1921, to maintain wage levels at relatively high levels. But it 
is also plausible that cotton cultivation and the cotton textile industry began to be 
priced out by banana wage range levels somewhere between 1911 and 1912.
The coffee sector (and to some extent, urban industry in general) tried to hold out 
in face of the rise in wages. Its wage level was still high -even higher than the 
urban cotton textile industry wage level. But, although low compared to banana
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sector wage levels, those of the cotton textile industry showed relative consistency 
between the end of the first and the beginning of the third decade of this century.
After 1931, the banana sector's UFC, began to decrease wages by gradually 
lowering the reproduction cost of labour as the prospects for survival of the 
banana export sector-led high-wage economy began to waver. The NAC region's 
urban industry was critically attempting to match the high wages the banana 
export sector set, but failed to do so. It seems plausible that this forced the 
redundant labour force -positioned at the lower end of the segmented rural 
banana sector and priced-out export sectors into the urban area— to become 
'informalised'. Much of it was likely to be an already differentiated contingent. 
This was done
Therefore, the NAC region, with a high-wage economy pricing out other sectors, 
such as cotton cultivation and textile production (where more solid economic 
linkages could have prevailed), was ill-matched facing interior produced goods. 
Interior 'linkage-creating' textile industry wages were not low enough to compete 
with foreign produce. The NAC region's industry could scarcely do better to meet 
those competitive prices. So, the interior economy could survive at the expense 
of and stagnation of its internal competition, namely the other regions, of which 
one was the NAC.
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APPENDIX 1 :
NAC REGION AGRICULTURAL DAILY NOMINAL WAGE RATES AND RANGES*
1904-1933
Banana Cotton Coffee General
1904 2 .(0 * 2 .(0 *
1905 US$0.16 (8d.Xfemale]
1906 US$0.50
1907 US$0.50
US$030 (ii)*[B/quilla]
1908 CGPS0.65
[general ‘field’ labour]
1909 CGP$0.64 [‘desmonte’][StaJvlaita] 
CGP$0.99 [‘cutters’][Sta31arta]
1910 CGP$0.75 (iiO* 
[‘pickers’/Atlantico (B/quilla)]
(4s - 5s)[agriculturul
labour]
CGP$1.20 [foreman] 
OGPSlJO (usl labourer]
1911 (3. 6d - 4s)[Sta. Marta]
1912
CGP$0.78
003(050-QjfflXgenenl 
agricultural labour]
1913 CGP$1.00
CGP$053
1914 CGP$(0.60 - 1.00) 
CGP$1.00
CGP$1.28
1916 CGP$0.60
CGP$0.62
1917 CGPS0.80
CGP$0.68
1918 US$0.78 [StaJrfaita]
CGP$2
CGP$0.69
1919
CGP$0S0
OGFS135 [prani hixxr]
1920 CGP$150
CGP$(030 • 1.20) 
[agriculbaal labour]
1921 GGP30.60 [common
labour]
CGP$150
CGP$0.99
1922 CGP$140
CGP$0.95
1923 CGP$150
1924 CGP$1.30
CGP$1.00
1925 CGP$2
1926 CGP$0.65
CGP$0.85
CGP$1.01
CGP$1.26
CGP$2
1927 CGP$1.17/CGP$2 
CGP$(1.30 - 3.00) [male/female] 
CGPS0.75 [child/labour]
1928 CGP$1.67
1929 CGP$1.07 
CGP$2 
6s 6d
1930 CGP$(1.00 - 1.25) 
CGP$2
CGP$(1.00 - 1.65) 
CGP$(1.00 - 1.50) 
CGP$(1.20 - 2.00) 
CGP$1.50
1931 CGP$(1.00 - 1.50)
1932 CGPS0.80
1933 CGP$0.60
CGP$049
Source: Chapter V; * : in Colombian United States and British cunency; (i) $1 = 20 shillings, thus, 2 s. = 2 /  20 = $ 0.10 ; (ii) 0.4 -t- 0.6 = 1 / 2  = 0.50 ; (iii) 
3 arrobas per day @ Colombian Peso 25 per arroba = Colombian Gold Peso 0.75 per day.
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APPENDIX 2:
NAC REGION AGRICULTURAL DAILY REAL 
WAGE RATES AND RANGES : 1904-1930 
(CGP$s)
General Agriculture
1904 0.66
1910 1.33 - 1.68
1912 0.56 - 0.69
1919 0.30
1920 0.62 - 0.92
1921 0.53
Cotton Cultivation
1905 0.19
1910 1.01
1924 0.92
Coffee
1911 1.23 - 1.41
1912 0.90
1913 0.88
1914 1.36
1916 0.85
1917 0.81
1918 0.72
1920 0.66
1921 0.88
1922 0.88
1927 1.20- 2.78
1930 1.18- 1.47
Source: Chapter V.
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APPENDIX 3:
NAC REGION AGRICULTURAL DAILY REAL 
WAGE RATES AND RANGES : 1906-1933 
(CGP$s)
Banana
1906 0.69
1907 0.84
1908 0.87
1909 0.78/1.21
1910 1.49/1.62
1912 1.15
1913 0.94
1914 0.64 - 1.06
1916 0.82
1917 0.95
1918 0.76 - 2.08
1919 0.78
1920 1.15
1921 1.33
1922 1.30
1923 1.32
1924 1.19
1925 1.79
1926 0.80
1927 1.08 - 1.85
1928 1.42
1929 1.03/1.57/1.92
1930 1.18-1.94/1.181-1.77/1.41-2.35
Source: Chapter V.
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APPENDIX 4:
FRENCH IMPORTS OF ‘NOIX DE COROZO’: 1900 - 1927
Quantity Values
imported Francs
quintal
(000’s) (000’s)
1900 11.2 370
1901 11.3 282
1902 7.9 197
1903 14.2 354
1904 21.5 753
1906 16.8 847
1907 20.0 1302
1908 11.1 665
1909 6.7 667
1910 18.2 1634
1911 19.1 1435
1912 20.5 1746
1913 39.6 2973
1915 8.7 741
1916 12.4 1177
1917 19.9 1989
1919 11.5 1442
1920 16.0 4792
1921 6.8 887
1922 3.0 324
1923 0.8 95
1924 5.6 1300
1925 4.3 1632
1926 2.7 1068
1927 0.5 131
Source: Tableau Generale du Commerce et de la Navigation, (Paris, France, years 1900 to 1930).
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APPENDIX 5:
FRENCH DIYIDIVI IMPORTS: 1901 -1925 
(000’s Francs)
quintaux
metriques Value
1901 2245 45
1906 3631 91
1907 2680 67
1910 1865 301
1911 3422 474
1913 2122 102
1915 468 315
1917 229 1031
1918 32 134
1919 183 824
1925 737 118
Source: Tableau Generale du Commerce et de la Navigation, (Paris, France, years 1900 to 1930); Note: (*) = French imports of 
'teintures preparees' and/or 'teintures et tannins' have been taken as proxy values for abscence of 'dividivi' values for years 1910, 
1911,1913,1915,1917,1918,1919, and 1925.
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APPENDIX 6:
GERMAN DIYIDIVI IMPORTS FROM NAC REGION: 1896 - 1930
Value Volume Total Value
1896 179 9410 248.3
1898 386 20315 475.6
1899 473 24904 477.0
1900 211 8112 211.8
1901 283 12879 480.7
1902 496 20650 654.5
1903 266 12080 501.8
1904 110 4982 114.6
1905 274 12455 552.9
1906 111 10853 319.2
1907 501 22771 617.0
1908 551 28982 655.5
1909 903 41043 1054.81
1910 442 21007 634.84
1911 379 19885 540.77
1912 291 14550 544.08
1913 190 9507 199.07
1914 73 3643 144.20
1921 861 1625 1076.30
1922 2841 692 13308.00
1923 5 229 524.70
1924 5 251 573.90
1925 6 220 573.60
1926 40 1672 684.90
1927 221 8970 1687.30
1928 60 2151 1001.80
1929 78 3130 890.30
1930 142 6878 401.20
Sources: (i) years 1908-1912: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 261. XX. Per Auswartiger Handel im Fahre 1912, Per Verkehr mit den 
einzelnen Landem, (Berlin, 1913), p. 22,23 (Columbien) and p. 149 (Venezuela); (ii) yean 1913 and 1922-1924: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, 
Band 319. II. Per Auswartiger Handel in den Jahren 1923 und 1922 verglichen mit den Jahren 1913 und 1922. (Berlin, 1925), p. 11.108 
(Columbien) and p. Venezuela) and Statistik des Deutschen Reich, Band 317. Per Auswartiger Handel in den Jahren 1923 und 1924 verglichen 
mit den Jahren 1913 und 1922: (iii) years 1925-1929: Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 329. Per Auswartiger Handel, im Jahre 1925 
verglichen mit den Jahren 1913 und 1924; Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 339, Per Auswartiger Handel im Jahre 1926 verglichen mit den 
Jahren 1913 und 1925; Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Band 35 1 ,1, Per Auswartiger Handel im Jahren 1927 verglichen mit den Jaahren 1925 
und 1926. Statistik des Deutschen Reichs. Band 366,1. Per Auswartiger Handel im Jahre 1928. verglichen mit den Jahren 1926 und 1927, Statistik 
des Deutschen Reichs, Band 383, Per Auswartiger Handel im Jahre 1929; (iv) years 1896-1907, 1914, 1921 and 1930:Monaltiche Nachweise 
uber den Auswartigen Handel Deutschlands (Berlin, 1896-1930); Notes: (i) volume represents quantity in dz (dopplecentner) = 100 kgrs.;(ii) Value 
in 1000 Dollar US Gold; (iii) 1906 volume and value only represent March-December figures; 1907 volume and value only represent Jan. - 
September figures; 1921 volume and value only represent July -December figures; (vi) 1896-1907, 1914, 1921 and 1922 volume and value 
are ‘SpecialHandel’, not ‘GesamteigenHandel’; (vii) 1921 values are only for South America. Thus, we assign 50 % to Venezuela and 50 % to 
Colombia, Price is taken from total German import volume and value; (viii) 1922 Colombian volume is from Statistik des Deutschen Reichs , 
Band 319, II (quoted below). Price and thus value is taken from total German import value divided by its volume. Venezuelan 25 % is taken from 
the 50 % of the total South America value. Both the German and Venezuelan figures come from Monatliche Nachweise uber den Auswartiger 
Handel Deutschlands (Berlin, 1922); (ix) years 1913 and 1922-1930 reflect Colombian and Venezuelan values for Algarobilla, Bablah, Dividivi, 
u.smsL, an.g., and Gerbstoffe Kino, not for Dividivi alone; (x) years 1908-1913 , corresponding values for Venezuela reflect Algarobilla, Bablah, 
Dividivi, u.smsL, an.g., and Gerbstoffe Kino, not for Dividivi alone; (xi) exchange rates used come from Bidwell, R., L., Currency Conversion 
Tables (A Hundred Years of Change), (London, 1970), p. 22-23; (xii) figures for years 1915-1920 are not available (‘Dieser Abschnitt ift im 
voriiegenden Jarbuch nicht behandelt')in Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche Reich (Berlin. 1915-1920).
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APPENDIX 7:
NAC REGION URBAN DAILY NOMINAL WAGE 
RATES AND RANGES * : 1901-1929 
(CGP$s)
y e a r  j o b  d e s c r i p t i o n  wage l e v e l s  /  ran ges
190 1 p o r t e r 0 . 6 6
g u a r d 1 . 0 0
c o n c ie r g e 1 . 0 0
190 2 r a i lw a y  la b o u r 0 . 8 0  [ B / q . ]
1903 r a i lw a y  la b o u r 0 . 5 5
common la b o u r 0 . 3 3
d a ir y  la b o u r 0 . 4 4
b r ic k m a k e r 0 . 3 3
s t r e e t c a r  la b o u r 0 . 6 6
s te a m b o a t  e n g in e e r s 1 . 0 9  [ B / q . ]
19 0 6 b r i c k  in d u s t r y  la b o u r 0 . 6 3  [ B / q . ]
1907 b r i c k  in d u s t r y  la b o u r ( 0 . 4 0  -  1 . 3 0 ) [ C/ g a ]
19 0 8 t e x t i l e  f e m a le  la b o u r ( 0 . 4 0  -  0 . 5 0 )  [C /ga]
s h o e  in d u s t r y  la b o u r ( 0 . 8 0  -  1 . 4 9 )  [C /ga]
s h o e  in d u s t r y  a p p r e n t i c e 0 . 5 0
1909 b a n a n a  i n d u s t r y : [ a l l  S t . M]
m a i l  c l e r k 0 . 1 0
m e s s e n g e r 0 . 1 3
c o o k 0 . 4 0
s e r v a n t 0 . 5 0
s ta b le m a n 0 . 5 7
s h i p  * c a r g a d o r ' 0 . 6 0 +
s h i p  ' a r r u m a d o r ' 0 . 9 0 +
fo rem a n  on  s h o r e 0 . 6 7
c h e c k e r 0 . 7 5
t e le p h o n e  c l e r k 0 . 8 0
a g e n t 0 . 8 3
p o r t e r 0 . 9 0
o f f i c e  boy 1 . 0 0
191 0 g i r l  w e a v e r s 0 . 6 0  [C /g a ]
b o y  s p in n e r s ( 0 . 3 5  -  0 . 4 0 )  [C /ga ]
r a i lw a y  la b o u r ( 0 . 9 9  -  1 . 2 4 ) [ St . M]
1 9 1 1 f l o u r  in d u s t r y  la b o u r ( 0 . 7 0  -  0 . 8 0 )  [ B / q . ]
s o a p  in d u s t r y  [ I ] ( 0 . 5 0  -  3 . 0 0 ) [ B / q . ]
s o a p i n d u s t r y [ I I ] 0 . 7 0 [ B / q . ]
t e x t i l e  in d u s t r y ( 0 . 5 0  -  1 . 5 0 )  [ B / q . ]
1912 t e x t i l e  i n d u s t r y 0 . 4 0
r a i lw a y  n a v v y ( 0 . 7 0  -  0 . 8 0 ) [ B / q . ]
1913 g e n e r a l  la b o u r 0 . 5 0
191 4 f a c t o r y  la b o u r ( 0 . 5 0  -  1 . 5 0 )
1 9 1 5 f a c t o r y  la b o u r  m a le ( 0 . 5 0  -  1 . 0 0 )
f a c t o r y  la b o u r  f e m a le ( 0 . 2 5  -  0 . 3 5 )
191 6 c o n s t r u c t i o n  la b o u r ( 1 . 5 0  -  3 . 0 0 )
1920 d o c k  & r a i lw a y  la b o u r ( 1 . 0 0  -  3 . 0 0 )
1 9 2 1 c a r g o e  la b o u r 1 . 2 0
c a r g o e  la b o u r ( 0 . 8 0  -  1 . 2 0 )
r a i lw a y  la b o u r 1 . 2 0
c o t t o n  t e x t i l e  la b o u r ( 0 . 3 0  -  0 . 8 0 )
192 2 b a n a n a  i n d u s t r y : [ a l l  S t . M]
c h e c k e r s 0 . 5 5
r e c t i f i c a d o r e s 0 . 6 4
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c a r g a d o r e s  0 . 6 6
f o r k l i f t  o p e r a t o r s  0 . 6 9
m a ch in ery m en  0 . 7 0
a r r u m a d o r e s  0 . 9 1
192 4  common la b o u r  1 . 2 0
g a r d e n e r  1 . 2 5
m a n u fa c tu r in g  la b o u r  ( 0 . 6 0  -  1 . 5 0 )
c a r p e n t e r ' s  h e l p e r  1 . 5 0 [ S t . M]
m a c h in i s t  2 . 0 0 [ S t . M]
m e c h a n ic  2 . 0 0 [ S t . M]
c a r p e n t e r s  ( 2 . 0 0  -  2 . 2 5 ) [ St . M]
1927 a d u l t  la b o u r e r  ( 0 . 5 0  -  1 . 0 0 )
c h i l d  la b o u r e r  ( 0 . 5 5  -  0 . 9 0 )
1929  r a i lw a y  la b o u r  ( 1 . 8 8  -  2)
b a n a n a  i n d u s t r y : [ a l l  S t . M]  
c h e c k e r s  3 . 0 0
fo rem a n  1 . 8 5
la b o u r e r  1 . 7 0
Source: Chapter V; Note: [B/q.] = Barranquilla; [C/ga] = Cartagena; [StM] = Sta. Marta
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APPENDIX 8:
NAC REGION URBAN DAILY REAL WAGE 
RATES AND RANGES : 1908-1924 
(CGP$s)
Cotton Textile Industry
1908 (053 - 0.71)
1910 (0.81)1(0.47-0.54)
1911 (0.71 - 2.14)
1912 0.46
1921 (027-0 .71)
Brick Industry
1903 033
1907 (0.64 - 1.89)
Shoe Industry
1908 (0.67)1(1.05 -1.97)
Flour Industry
1911 (1 -1.14)
Soap Industry
1911 (1)1(0.71 -429 )
General Industry Labour 
1924 (055 -136)
Source: Chapter V.
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APPENDIX 9 :
NAC REGION OTHER URBAN DAILY REAL 
WAGE RATES AND RANGES : 1902-1922 
(CGP$s)
D o c k /R a ilw a y
1902  3 .1  
1 9 0 3 ( 0 . 8 0 ) / ( 0 . 9 6 ) / ( 1 . 5 8 )  
1 9 1 0 ( 1 . 3 4  -  1 . 6 8 )  
1 9 1 2 ( 1 . 8 1  -  0 . 9 2 )  
1 9 2 0 ( 0 . 7 7  -  2 . 3 1 )  
1 9 2 1  1 . 0 6  
1 9 2 9 ( 1 . 3 1  -  1 . 4 1 )
G e n e r a l/C o m m o n /U n s k il le d
1903 ( 0 . 4 7 ) / ( 0 . 63)
1913 0 . 4 7  
1 9 1 4 ( 0 . 5 3  -  1 . 6 0 )  
1 9 1 5 ( 0 . 5 9  -  1 . 7 6 ) / ( 0 . 2 9  -  0 . 4 1 )  
1 92 4  1 . 0 9
S k i l l e d
1 9 1 6 ( 2 . 0 5  -  4 . 1 1 )
1 9 2 4 ( 1 . 1 4 ) / ( 1 . 3 6 ) / ( 1 . 8 2 ) / ( 1 . 82 -  2 . 0 5 )
B anana I n d u s t r y
1 9 0 9 ( 0 . 1 2 ) / ( 0 . 1 6  -  0 . 2 4 ) / ( 0 . 4 9 ) / ( 0 . 6 1 )  
( 0 . 7 0 ) / ( 0 . 7 3 ) / ( 0 . 8 2 ) / ( 0 . 9 2 ) / ( 0 . 9 8 )
( 1 . 0 1 ) / ( 1 . 1 0 ) / ( 1 . 2 2 )
1 9 2 1 ( 0 . 7 1  -  1 . 0 6 )
1922  ( 0 . 5 1 ) / ( 0 . 5 9 ) / ( 0 . 6 1 ) / ( 0 . 6 4 ) / ( 0 . 6 5 ) / ( 0 . 8 4 )
Source: Chapter V
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APPENDIX 10:
INTERIOR REGION DAILY REAL WAGE LEVELS AND RANGES:
1900 - 1930 
(CGP$s)
Rural Agriculture
General: 1900 0.10 - 0.15
1907 0.31
1911 0.21 - 0.50
1913 0.35
1924 0.91
1926 0.32
1927 (0.66)/(0.42)/(0.37)
Coffee: 1903 9.49 [war wages]
1927 (0.19 - 0.37)/(0.19 - 0.28)/(0.09 - 0.19)
1930 1.09
Rural Mining: 1909 0.33 - 0.62
Urban Industry
Cotton Textile: 1911 0.57
1921 (0.31 - 0.42)
1927 (1.58)[male]/(0.69)[female]/(0.46)[child]
1928 (1.48) [male]/(0.60)/ (0.41)
Railway: 1912 0.63
House servants 1900 (0.001 - 0.15)
Source: Chapter VI
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APPENDIX 11:
DAILY REAL WAGES IN INTERIOR 
COFFEE HACIENDAS: 1900 - 1930 
(CGP$’s)
/ II
1900 0.01 0.004
1901 0.01 0.004
1902 0.27 0.024
1903 0.24 0.017
1904 0.29 0.21
1905 0.22 0.18
1906 0.27 0.20
1907 0.29 0.21
1908 0.29 0.21
1909 0.24 0.20
1910 0.31 0.21
1911 0.33 0.22
1912 0.34 0.20
1913 0.24 0.17
1914 0.25 0.18
1915 0.26 0.20
1916 0.39 0.28
1917 0.38 0.25
1918 0.22
1919 0.43
1920 0.44
1921 0.30
1922 0.43
1923 0.82
1924 1.08
1925 1.20
1926 0.86
1927 0.99
1928 1.24
1929 0.86
1930 0.87
Source: (i) Data in Columns I (1900 - 1917) and II (1900 -1918) was taken from ' Table 17. Hadenda Jonas. Employment Wages* 
and Trends in the fanily money income of the 'agregados', 1896 - 1918 (in paper pesos), p.107 while data in Column II (1919* 
- 1932) was taken from Appendix 2. Piece-rate wages in two coffee hadendas, 1879 - 1933, p. 260 both in Palados, M., Coffee 
in Colombia, 1875 -1980, (Cambridge, 1980), p. 107; Notes: (i) Column I denotes 'agregados' at Hadenda Jonas; and (ii) Column 
II denotes 'chapoleros' (coffee harvesters) daily wages at Hadenda Jonas; (iii) Pricers deflated by Bogota price index in Appendix: 
12.
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APPENDIX 12:
INTERIOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY UNSKILLED LABOUR WAGES 
DAILY AVERAGE REAL WAGE LEVELS: 1905 - 1930
(CGP$’s)
1905 0.26
1906 0.34
1907 0.40
1908 0.35
1909 0.28
1910 0.39
1911 0.41
1912 0.33
1913 0.28
1914 0.38
1915 0.40
1916 0.47
1917 0.43
1918 0.39
1919 0.42
1920 0.45
1921 0.67
1922 0.72
1923 0.80
1924 0.81
1925 0.77
1926 0.58
1927 0.74
1928 0.88
1929 0.68
1930 0.88
Source: 'Cuadro No. 6, Sal an os Sector Privado Indus tria Fenicia; Trabajadores No Calificados; Salario Diario Promedio de 
Cargos',in Urrutia-Montoya and Arrubla, M., Compendio de Estadisticas Historicas Colombianas, (Bogota, 1970), taken from 
the Anuario Estadistico del Munidpio de Medellin, or from private records of the industries mentioned. Note: Prices deflated 
by Bogota price index in Appendix 24.
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APPENDIX 13:
INTERIOR INDUSTRIAL FEMALE LABOUR DAILY 
REAL WAGE AVERAGES: 1916 -1930 
(CGP$s)
1916 0.40
1917 0.36
1918 0.31
1920 0.41
1921 0.38
1922 0.40
1924 0.46
1925 0.52
1926 0.40
1927 0.57
1928 0.67
1929 0.53
1930 0.63
Source: Ospina-Vasquez, L., Industrla J  Protection en Colombia, 1810 • 1930, (Medellin, 1979), p. 444; Notes: (i) Averages are for 
Medellin industry conglomerate; (ii) Prices deflated by Bogota food price indexes in Appendix 24.
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APPENDIX 14:
INTERIOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRY AVERAGE REAL WAGE LEVELS: 1922
(CGP$’S)
Textile
Males Wages Females Wages
60 1.48 240 0.53
15 1.39 30 0.56
70 0.93 180 0.42
20 1.20 110 0.56
x = 1.20 x = 0.50
Cigars & Cigarettes
Males Wages Females Wages
113 1.46 277 0.84
11 0.88 33 0.88
10 1.11 50 0.65
2 0.46 35 0.46
x = 1.38 x = 0.79
Matches
Males Wages Females Wages
11 0.65 43 0.56
Beer & Soft Drinks
Males Wages Females Wages
90 0.88 21 0.88
25 0.83 11 0.37
112 0.56 106 0.56
x = 0.71 x = 0.59
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Coffee Grinders
Males Wages Females Wages
5 0.83 80 0.46
6 1.02 250 0.46
14 0.83 200 0.32
8 1.02 104 0.37
6 0.46 160 0.37
6 1.02 71 0.65
10 0.93 300 0.32
10 0.93 100 0.46
4 1.39 160 0.46
x = 0.92 x = 0.41
Source: Anuario Estadistico del Municipio de Medellin, Entrega VIII, 1922. Notes: Wages deflated by 1922 food price index in Appendix 24.
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APPENDIX 15:
MALE, FEMALE AND CHILD LABOUR 
REAL WAGE RATE AVERAGES 
(CGP$s)
Male Labour
Year No. Employed
1926 969 1.22
1927 945 1.46
1928 1,168 1.42
1929 986 1.66
1930 1,063 1.71
x = CGP$ 1.30
Female Labour
Year No. Employed
1926 1,906 0.56
1927 2,072 0.63
1928 2,134 0.67
1929 1,943 0.69
1930 1,742 0.77
x = CGP$ 0.66
Minors Labour
Year No. Employed
1926 179 0.39
1927 268 0.42
1928 279 0.40
1929 189 0.44
1930 201 0.60
x = CGP$ 0.45
Source: Republic of Colombia, Resumenes Generales Referentes a la Industria de Hilados y Tejidos de Algodon. Boletin del Ministerio de 
Industrias, No. 34 - 42, Abril - Diciembre, 1933), p. 352. Deflation by price indexes in Appendix 24.
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APPENDIX 16:
AGRICULTURAL (BANANA) DAILY NOMINAL WAGES: 1909
(CGP$s)
Type of Quantity Price paid Total Price
work of work per month paid per month
l. Limpieza y
Desmonte* 77 carr.* 0.28 21.56
2. ■ 44 0 0.22 9.68
3. ■ 33 0 0.28 9.24
4. ■ 69 0 0.24 16.56
5. ■ 41 0 0.28 11.48
6. ■ 25 0 0.25 6.25
7. Desmonte 309 0 0.05 15.45
8. m 473 0 0.05 23.65
9. * 73 ■ 0 0.06 4.38
10. * 30 • 0 0.07 2.10
11. * 190 hrs. * 0 0.08 15.20
12. Corte de
Guineos 3123 racimos* 0 0.02 c/u 62.46
13. Desmonte 215 carr. 0 0.05 10.75
14. ■ 252 0 0.05 12.60
15. ■ 60 ■ 0 0.05 3.00
16. [ill.] 180 braz * 0 0.05 9.00
17. ■ 170 ■ 0 0.05 8.50
18. • 130 ■ 0 0.05 6.50
19. Corte de
Guineos 781 racimos* 0 0.02 c/u 15.62
20. Limpieza y
Desmonte 160 carr.* 0 0.20 32.10
21. ■ 210 ■ 0 0.21 44.10
22.
Corte de
225 0 0.22 49.50
Guineos 1978 racimos* 0 0.02 c/u 39.56
Source: United Fruit Company private document. Santa Marta Division. Planilla de Trabajadores por Contrato y Ajuste. Sheet No. and Register 
No. illegible. Semana que termina el 3 de Julio de 1909; Notes: A.- On the week ending 3rd July, 1909, the United Fruit Company was paying 
the wages mentioned above to individual persons -by contract and/or task presumably- on just two of its working districts -the Tablazo and 
Guamacho districts; B.- (*): (i) ‘limpieza y desmonte’ is translated as ‘cleaning and clearing’ [the hinterland]; (ii) ‘carr.’ is assumed to mean the 
abbreviation for either the word ‘carreta’ or ‘carreteada’,that is, a loadful of hinterland (bush, grass and twigs) clearing; (iii) 190 hrs. @ $0.08 
is a relevant figure for hourly pay on piece task work basis for the year; (iv) corte de guineos, that is, cutting of bananas, is labour being paid 
by the ‘racimo’, i.e., by the bunch; (v) *braz.’ is assumed to mean ‘brazos’, i.e., ‘arms’, literally, but it really means one individual person 
labouring. Therefore, 180 braz. is assumed to be 180 ‘hands’, i.e., 180 labourers; (vi) [ilL] = illegible handwriting on original document
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APPENDIX 17:
URBAN (BANANA SIHPLOADING) DAILY 
NOMINAL WAGES: 1909 
CGP$s
Type of 
work
Ship
‘A*
Ship
‘B ’
Fine Fondo 
Union
Total Paid 
per month
1. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
2. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
3. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
4. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
5. 1.82 2.47 0.10 4.19
6. * 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
7. * 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
8. * 1.22 1.47 0.10 2.59
9. * 1.72 1.47 0.10 4.09
10. * 1.72 1.47 0.10 4.09
11. 1.72 1.47 0.10 4.09
12. • 1.72 1.47 0.10 4.09
13. * 1.72 1.47 0.10 4.09
14. ■ 1.72 1.47 0.10 3.59
15. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
16. ■ 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
17. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
18. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
19. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
19. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
20. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
21. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
22. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
23. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
24. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
25. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
26. ■ 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
27. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
28. • 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
29. • 1.82 2.47 0.10 4.19
30. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
31. * ■ • *
32. ■ ■ • ■
33. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
34. ■ • ■ •
35. ■ • ■ ■
36. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
37. ■ • * * m
38. ■ • ■ ■ ■
39. ■ ■ • •
40. ■ ■ ■ ■
41. ■ ■ ■ •
42. ■ ■ ■ ■
43. ■ 0.50 1.00 0.10 4.09
44. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
45. ■ ■ ■ •
46. ■ ■ • •
47. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
48. ■ ■ ■ «
49. ■ ■ • ■
50. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
51. Cargador 1.72 2.47 0.10 4.09
52. ■ 1.22 1.47 0.10 2.89
53. Arrumador 2.62 3.37 0.10 5.89
Observaciones: (a) 
vapor 'Alleghany'.
Tiempo trabajado por el peonaje en el embarque 659,
Septiembre 23. El 
De 5 p.m. - 12 a.m
dia @ 
. = 7 hrs £ $ 0.75 ..
Pasan......
Vienen.....
. 0.525
$ 0.60
.... $ 1.125
--- $ 1.125
Septiembre 24. De 12 a.m. a 6 a.m.
seis (6) horas 0 $ 10................................ $ 0.60
$ ' 1 . 7 2 5
Para Arrumadores  ........     0.90
T 2.625
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(b) Tiempo trabajado por el peonaje en el embarque: 
vapor 'Chimilpo'.-
Septiembre 24. El dia 0 $ 0.60...............  $ 0.60
De 5 p.m. a 12 m.; 7 hrs. 0 $ 0.075........  $ 0.525
Septiembre 25.
De 12 m. a 6 a.m.; 6 hs. 0 $ 0.10 .......... $ 0.60
Septiembre 25. El dia 9  $ 0.60 .............  0.60
Pasan  $ 2.3251
Vienen  $ 2.325
Septiembre 25.
De 5 p.m. a 9 p.m.; 2 hrs. 0 $ 0.075...... $ 0.15
Para los Arrumadores............     0.90
Source: same as in Appendix 1; Notes: A.- On the week ending 26th September, 1909, the United Fruit Company was paying the wages 
mentioned above to ‘Picking-up’ gangs, on an individual person basis; B.- Ship ‘A’ was the Alleghany while Ship ‘B’ was the ChimOpo.
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APPENDIX 18:
BANANA SECTOR SEGMENTATION: 1909 
(CGP$s)
wage occupation
00.10 mail clerk
00.13 Sevilla messenger
00.20 RioFrio messanger
00.40 cook
00.50 servant
00.57 stableman
00.67 foreman on shore
00.75 checker on board
00.80 telephone clerk
00.83 Cienaga agent
00.90 porter
01.00 office boy
01.06 superintendent
01.13 assistant receiver
01.27 classifier
01.33 paymaster, dep. clerk, 
assistant chief receiver
01.39 salesman Santa Marta
01.67 foreman on board
02.00 assistant stevedor, 
wharf superintendent, 
assistant Sevilla 
superintendent, 
assistant Tablazo 
superintendent, 
assistant Rio 
Frio superintendent
02.08 clerk & typist
02.33 assistant inspector
02.67 clerk
02.78 Bogota agent
02.81 receiver
02.92 book-keeper
03.06 assist, cashier
03.33 assist, chief receiver
04.00 Sevilla superintendent
04.16 inspector
04.17 physician
05.33 chief stevedor
05.83 RioFrio superintendent
06.00 chief receiver
07.50 auditor
08.67 cashier
13.87 manager
Source: United Fruit Company. Private Archives. Santa Marta Division. Planilla de Empleados y  M ozos. General Office Account. 
Sheet 1-2, Register N o. 47, September 30, 1909.
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APPENDIX 19:
LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA SECTOR 
DAILY WAGE RATES: 1926 
(CGP$s)
Wage Rate Type of Job Total Sub-Total Source
1) 0 . 3 3 laundress 2 1 11
1 28
servant 3 1 11
l 15
l 17
2) 0 . 4 0 cook 1 1 1
3) 0 . 5 0 cook 4 1 1
i 11
i 17
i 28
servant 15 2 1
6 11
2 14
3 15
2 28
laundress 3 1 3
1 11
1 21
helper 1 4 7
clearing woman 3 3 27
4) 0 . 6 7 cook 1 1 1
laundress 3 1 1
1 16
1 21
assistant operation
room attendant 1 1 14
servant 2 1 14
1 21
seamstress 2 2 15
maid 4 4 15
clerk 1 1 22
5) 0 . 7 5 office boy 1 1 4
helper 2 1 6
1
7
water boy 2 1 9
1 10
messenger 1 1 12
6) 0 . 8 3 cook 5 1 1
1 3
1 11
1 21
1 26
servant 2 1 11
1 21
maid 1 1 15
orderly 9 7 15
2 16
yardman 3 3 16
cartman 1 1 16
assistant gardener 1 1 16
waiter 1 1 16
pantry man 1 1 16
office boy 1 1 16
house girl 1 1 24
7) 1 . 0 0 servant 4 2 1
2 26
helper 3 1 1
1 10
1 13
messenger 2 2 5
labourer 1 1 9
porter 2 2 14
assistant to
operation room
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16
attendant
maid
orderly
2nd Cook assist.
dishwasher
waiter
chief gardner 
yardman 
watchman 
clerk
2
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
14
15
15
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
16 
22
8) 1 . 1 7 porter 2 2 14
2nd assist.
to laboratory
attendant 1 1 14
maid 1 1 15
orderly 1 1 15
pantry man 1 1 16
3rd cook 1 1 16
servant 2 2 21
clerk 2 2 22
In Charge Warehouse 1 1 22
9) 1 . 2 0 waterman 1 1 1
10) 1 . 2 5 helper 4 1 1
1 6
2 7
patio cleaner 3 3 1
11) 1 . 3 3 porter 2 1
14
1 15
2nd assist.
to 1st cook 1 1 16
clerk 1 1 24
messenger 1 1 24
laundress 1 1 26
servant 1 1 26
12) 1 . 4 0 helper 1 1 6
13) 1 . 4 7 laundress 1 1 26
14) 1 . 5 0 watchman 3 1 1
1 13
1 26
helper 12 1 1
2 6
6 7
2 8
1 12
golf link
caretaker 1 1 5
labourers 55 3 7
12
8
13 9
4 10
17 12
6 25
motorboy 5 5 8
cartman 7 6 9
1 10
dispenser 1 1 14
1st assist.
laboratory attendant 1 1 14
police guard 2 16
butler 1 1 21
clerk 7 1 22
1 23
1 24
2 24
2 25
porter 2 1 24
1 25
cashier 1 1 24
patio cleaner 1 1 26
grass cultivator 1 1 26
b a m  assistant 2 2 26
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milkman
cook
servant
2
2
1 1
2
2
26
26
26
14) 1 . 5 0 office cleaner 1 1 26
15) 1 . 6 0 fence repairer 1 1 2
helper 2 1 7
1 8
motor boy 1 1 8
cultivator 1 1 26
16) 1 . 6 6 servant 2 2
25
laundress 1 1 25
cook 1 1 25
17) 1 . 6 7 stableman 1 1 1
cowhand 1 1 2
orderly 3 3 15
washer 1 1 21
hospital chaplain 1 1 21
house girl 1 1 21
clerk 4 2
22
1 23
1
24
In Charge Warehouse 1 1 23
packer/utility man 1 1 24
porter 1 1 27
18) 1 . 7 0 motorboy 1 1 7
19) 1 . 7 5 motorist 3 3 1
motor boy 5 1 4
1 7
3 8
watchman 1 1 4
helper 10 8 4
2 6
painter 2 2 4
janitor 1 1 5
gardener 6 4 8
2 26
labourer 15 1 8
10 9
3 12
1 13
coalburner 1 1 9
cartman checker 1 1 9
20) 1 . 8 0 motorboy 1 1 7
21) 1 . 8 3 laundry engineer 1 1 16
watchman/cook 1 1 18
foreman 1 1 25
maestre estibador 1 1 28
22) 2 . 0 0 carpenter 2 2 1
blacksmith 1 1 1
motorist 1 1 1
22) 2 . 0 0 painter 1 1 4
helper 4 4 4
watchman 23 12 5
8 6
1 12
2 26
cabinet maker 1 1 6
mechanic 1 1 6
fireman 1 1 7
plumber 2 2 7
motor boy 4 2 7
2 8
chaffeur 2 1 8
1 17
electrician 1 1 8
assist, foreman 2 1 8
1 12
gardener 2 1 8
1 26
labourer 2 2 9
wagon driver 2 2 9
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stableman 2 2 9
despatcher 2 2 12
clerk 4 1 13
1 21
1 22
1 25
dispenser 1 1 14
nurse 5 5 14
orderly 2 2 15
assist.fruit
estimator 2 2 17
relator embarque 2 2 17
assist, cashier 1 1 21
servant 1 1 21
In Charge Warehouse 5 4 22
1 25
motorist 2 2 26
23) 2 . 1 6 messenger 1 1 17
radio engineer 2 2 27
24) 2 . 1 7 foreman 1 1 22
assistant clerk 1 1 21
motor boy 1 1 22
In Charge Warehouse 4 2 22
1 23
1 24
25) 2 . 2 0 watchman 1 1 12
26) 2 . 2 5 toolkeeper 1 1 5
clerk 2 1
5
1 25
watchman 7 7 5
fireman 1 1 7
26) 2 . 2 5 plumber 1 1 7
chaffeur 4 3 7
1 8
despatcher 1 1 12
motor boy 1 1 22
foreman 1 1 26
27) 2 . 3 3 helper 2 1 18
1 19
In Charge Warehouse 5 3 22
1 23
1 24
clerk checker 1 1 24
28) 2 . 5 0 motor boy 1 1 3
painter 2 2 4
clerk 4 2 5
2 24
t imekeeper 1 1 5
toolkeeper 1 1 5
watchman 1 1 5
cabinet maker 2 1 6
1 8
blacksmith 1 1 6
mechanic 2 1 6
1 8
foreman 2 1 7
1 12
plumber 3 3 7
harness repairer 1 1 9
operations room
attendant 1 1 14
dispenser 1 1 14
helper 7 4 17
1 18
2 19
clerk/messenger 1 1 21
As s i s t.In Charge
Warehouse 1 1 25
barber 1 1 26
29) 2 . 6 7 dispenser 1 1 14
helper 8 5 17
3 19
In Charge Warehouse 2 1 22
1 23
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foreman 
rectificador
1
1 1
1
28
28
30) 2 . 7 5 carpenter 4 1 1
3 4
clerk 1 1 5
material checker 2 2 6
cabinet maker 3 3 6
motor boy 3 1 7
30) 2 . 7 5 2 8
chaff eur 1 1
7
mechanic 1 1 7
foreman 1 1 10
despatcher 3 3 12
31) 2 . 8 0 assistant elevator
chief 1 1 28
32) 2 . 8 3 pumpman 1 1 5
chaff eur 1 1 5
dispenser 1 1 14
clerk 1 1 17
typist 1 1 21
cargoe checker 1 1 21
stock bookeeper 1 1 25
watchman/telephonist 1 1 28
33) 2 . 9 3 land foreman 1 1 28
34) 3 . 0 0 carpenter 3 3 4
mason 2 2 4
draftsman 1 1 5
cabinet maker 5 5 6
blacksmith 3 3 6
mechanic 4 3 6
1 7
caretaker 1 1 9
watchman 1 1 12
1st cook 1 1 16
clerk 3 1 17
1 19
1 28
recibidor 5 5 17
In Charge Warehouse 1 1 22
rectificador 3 3 28
35) 3 . 1 6 ship foreman 1 1 28
36) 3 . 1 7 clerk 1 1 17
37) 3 . 2 5 warehouse man 1 1 5
mechanic 2 2 6
cabinet maker 2 2 6
38) 3 . 3 3 assist.matron 1 1 14
nurse 2 2 14
laboratory attendant 1 1 14
recibidor 1 1 17
clerk 2 1 21
1 25
foreman 1 1 28
rectificador 3 3 28
39) 3 . 5 0 foreman 3 2 4
1 9
39) 3 . 5 0 t imekeeper 1 1 5
cabinet maker 1 1 6
head plumber 1 1 7
recibidor 5 4 17
1 18
clerk 1 1 21
assist.paymaster 1 1 21
rectificador 1 1 28
40) 3 . 6 6 cashier's clerk 1 1 21
41) 3 . 6 7 garage foreman 1 1 5
ship foreman 2 2 28
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42) 3 . 7 5 timekeeper 
head electrician 
head motorist
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
8
8
43) 3 . 8 3 recibidor 11 7 17
clerk 1 1 25
operator 1 1 27
rectificador 3 28
44) 3 . 9 7 forklift truck chief 1 1 28
45) 4 . 0 0 furniture inspector 1 1 5
mechanic 2 1 6
head blacksmith 1 1 6
dispenser/clerk 1 1 21
watchman 1 1 26
clerk 1 1 28
46) 4 . 1 7 inspector embarques . 2 17
inspector 1 1 18
clerk 3 24
1 18
In Charge Warehouse 1 1 25
47) 4 . 5 0 fruit estimator 1 1 17
assist, commissary
inspector 1 1 22
48) 4 . 6 7 assist.chief
reception 1 1 17
hospital clerk 1 1 14
stenographer 1 1 24
49) 4 . 8 3 cashier's clerk 1 1 21
50) 5 . 0 0 cabinet maker 2 5
d.m.o.Aracataca 1 1 14
overseer El Tigre 1 1 21
clerk 1 1 24
inventory inspector 1 1 24
general timekeeper 1 1 28
51) 5 . 3 3 cashier 1 1 21
In Charge Warehouse 1 1 25
52) 5 . 5 0 foreman 1 1 4
supply chief 1 1 18
53) 5 . 6 7 assist.chief operator 2 2 28
54) 5 . 8 3 chief clerk 1 1 3
physician assist. 1 1 14
assist.house physician 1 1 14
d.m.o.Cienaga 1 1 14
matron 2 14
55) 6 . 2 3 chief clerk 1 1 23
56) 6 . 2 5 supply chief 1 1 18
57) 6 . 6 7 entomologist 1 1 3
assist.attorney 1 1 21
supervisor 1 1 24
assist.superintendent 1 1 28
58) 7 . 0 7 commissary inspector 1 1 22
59) 7 . 5 0 chief clerk 1 1 24
utility and duties
special officer 1 1 24
chief operator 1 1 27
60) 8 . 0 0 wharf chief 1 1 28
61) 8 . 3 3 house physician 1 1 14
62) 9 . 1 7 bacteriologist 1 1 14
63) 1 0 . 0 0 special duty officer 1 1 20
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assist.superintendent 
lawyer
1
1
1
1
3
21
64)
17
1 1 . 6 7 superintendent 
assist.superintendent
1
2 2
1
14
65) 1 2 . 5 0 port superintendent 1 1 20
66) 1 3 . 8 9 lawyer
superintendent
1
1
1
1
29
23
67) 1 6 . 6 7 superintendent 
legal representative 
at Bogota 
attorney
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
20
21
68) 1 8 . 0 6 division accountant 1 1 20
69) 1 8 . 8 3 superintendent 1 1 3
70) 2 0 . 8 3 manager 1 1 20
71) 4 1 . 6 7 special duty officer 1 1 20
Source: United Fruit Company Private Archives.
1 . A c c o u n t a n t ' s N o. S h e e t No • P a y r o l l f o r M i s c e l la n e o u s
2 .
3 .
A c c o u n t a n t ' s  
A c c o u n t a n t ' s
N o .
N o. 1 0 8
S h e e t
S h e e t
No
No
. 2
(F in c a  R i o F r i o ) .
P a y r o l l  f o r
P a y r o l l  f o r  A g r i c u l t u r e  D ep a rtm en t
4 . A c c o u n t a n t ' s N o. 3 8 S h e e t No . 1 P a y r o l l
a
f o r C o n s t r u c t io n .
5 . a a 5 5 a a 1 a a
7 . a a a a a 3 a a a
8 . N a a a a 4 a a a
9 . H a a a a 5 a a a
1 0 . M a a a a 6 a a a
1 1 . II H 1 0 6 a a 3 a a G e n e r a l O f f i c e
1 2 . N a a a 1 a a M a t e r i a l s  an d  S u p p ly
1 3 . A c c o u n t a n t ' s N o. 4 7 S h e e t No . 2 P a y r o l l f o r
D e p a r tm e n t .
M a t e r i a l s  an d  S u p p ly
1 4 . A c c o u n t a n t ' s N o. 1 1 7 S h e e t No . 1 P a y r o l l f o r
D e p a r tm e n t . 
M e d ic a l  D e p t .
1 5 . N a a a a 2 a a a a
1 6 . N a a a a 3 a a a a
1 7 . N a 1 2 2 a a 1 a a E x p o r t a c io n
1 8 . N a a a a 2 a a a
1 9 . N a a a a 3 a a a
2 0 . N a 1 0 6 a a 1 a a G e n e r a l O f f i c e
2 1 . a a a a a 2 a a a a
2 2 . a a 1 1 9 a a 1 a a M e r c h a n d is e  D e p t .
2 3 . a a a a a 2 a a a a
2 4 . a a 1 2 0 a a 1 a a a a
2 5 . a a a a a 2 a a a a
2 6 . a a 3 9 a a 1 a a M i s c e l la n e o u s
2 7 . a a 1 2 5 a a 1 a a
( S e v i l l a )  
R a d io  D e p t .
2 8 . a a 1 2 7 a a 1 a a W harf D e p t .
Notes: (i) all wage rates are from month of January, 1926; (ii) daily wage calculations are based on a 30 day basis; (iii) *?’ represents no data 
on the original document.
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APPENDIX 20:
LARGE-SCALE CORPORATE BANANA SECTOR SEGMENTATION 
AND OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION: 1926 
(CGP$s)
Of a total o f 29 persons
Maid
% earned a daily wage rate of
4 1 3 . 8 0 . 6 7
1 3 . 5 0 . 8 3
1 3 . 5 1 . 0 0
1 3 . 5 1 . 1 7
12 4 1 . 4 2 . 5 0
9 3 1 . 0 2 . 6 7
1 3 . 5 2 . 8 3
Of a total o f 11 persons
Laundress
% earned a daily wage rate of
2 1 8 . 2 0 . 3 3
3 2 7 . 3 0 . 5 0
3 2 7 . 3 0 . 6 7
1 9 . 1 1 . 3 3
1 9 . 1 1 . 4 7
1 9 . 1 1 . 6 6
Of a total o f 26 persons
Clerk
% earned a daily wage rate o f
1 3 .8 0 . 6 7
2 7 . 7 1 . 0 0
2 7 . 7 1 . 1 7
1 3 . 8 1 . 3 3
4 1 5 . 4 1 . 6 7
4 1 5 . 4 2 . 0 0
2 7 . 7 2 . 2 5
1 3 . 8 2 . 3 3
4 1 5 . 4 2 . 5 0
1 3 . 8 2 . 6 7
1 3 . 8 2 . 8 3
3 1 1 . 5 3 . 0 0
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Of a total of 33 persons
Servant
% earned a daily wage rate o f
3 9 .1 0 . 3 3
15 4 5 . 5 0 . 5 0
2 6 . 1 0 . 6 7
2 6 . 1 0 . 8 3
4 12 . 1 1 . 0 0
2 6 . 1 1 . 1 7
1 3 . 0 1 . 3 3
1 3 . 0 1 . 5 0
2 6 . 1 1 . 6 6
1 3 . 0 2 . 5 0
Of a total o f 20 persons
Orderly
% earned a daily wage rate of
9 4 5 . 0 0 . 8 3
5 2 5 . 0 1 . 0 0
1 5 . 0 1 . 1 7
3 1 5 . 0 1 . 6 7
2 1 0 . 0 2 . 0 0
Cook
(including a 2nd cook assistant a 
3rd cook a 2nd assistant to the 1st cook and a 1st cook)
Of a total of 18 persons % earned a daily wage rate o f
1 5 .6 0 . 4 0
4 2 2 . 2 0 . 5 0
1 5 . 6 0 . 6 7
5 2 7 . 8 0 . 8 3
1 5 . 6 1 . 0 0
1 5 . 6 1 . 1 7
1 5 . 6 1 . 3 3
1 5 . 6 1 . 5 0
2 1 1 . 1 1 . 6 6
1 5 . 6 2 . 5 0
1 5 . 6 3 . 0 0
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Of a total of 46 persons
Helper
% earned a daily wage rate of
1 2 .2 0 . 5 0
2 4 . 3 0 . 7 5
3 6 . 5 1 . 0 0
4 8 . 7 1 . 2 5
1 2 . 2 1 . 4 0
12 2 6 . 0 1 . 5 0
2 4 . 3 1 . 6 0
4 8 . 7 2 . 0 0
2 4 . 3 2 . 3 3
7 1 5 . 2 2 . 5 0
8 1 7 . 4 2 . 6 7
Of a total of 73 persons
Labourer
% earned a daily wage rate of
1 1 .4 1 . 0 0
55 7 5 . 3 1 . 5 0
15 2 0 . 5 1 . 7 5
2 2 . 7 2 . 0 0
Sources: Same as Appendix
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APPENDIX 21:
COTTON PRODUCTION IN COLOMBIA: 1906 - 1930
(000’s lbs.)
1906 302
1907 603
1909/10* 2628
1915 7598
1917 2200
1917 3000
1918 1847
1918 4310
1919 2200
1919 1478
1920 4400
1920 2957
1922/23** 2390
1923 16097
1923/24 1836
1923/24* 2000
1923/24** 2390
1924 16000
1924 6250
1924/25 3585
1924/25 3585
1924/25* 4000
1924/25** 3824
1925/26** 3824
1926 11250
1927/28** 4780
1928/29** 4780
1929/30** 4780
1930*** 2625
1931*** 1653
Sources: (i) Chapter IX; (ii) * = The International Institute of Agriculture, Rome, The Cotton Growing Countries, (London, 1926), p. 
258; (iii) ** = Estimated Cotton Production of Minor Producing Areas, Yearbook of the Cotton Association Manufacturers, (Boston, 
1932). For years 1922-25,1926 yearbook, p. 30; 1925-26,1927 yearbook, p. 31; 1926-27,1928 yearbook, p. 32; 1927-28,1929 yearbook, 
p. 20; 1928-29,1930 yearbook, p. 9; 1929-30, 1931 yearbook, p. 9; (iv) *** = NAC region only.
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APPENDIX 22:
COTTON PRODUCTION IN NAC REGION: 1906 - 1931
(Tons)
1906 100
1907 200
1909/10* 868
1915 2508
1917 858
1918 1016
1919 690
1920 1380
1923 2093
1924 2328
1926 3204
1927 1793
1928 1793
1929 1793
1930 1313
1931 827
Sources: Appendix IX; Notes: (i) 2000 lbs. = 1 ton; (ii) 1917 - 1926 figures are unweighted averages of the different figures from the 
different sources unearthed and showed in Chapter IX; (iii) figures for 1906 - 1918 are 66 % of the total Colombian production; 
figures for 1919 - 1925 are 75 % of same; figures for 1926 are 85 % (average of 90 % for 1925 and 80 % for 1926 of total Colombian 
production).
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APPENDIX 23:
BOGOTA FOOD PRICES: 1900 - 1930
1900 1132.13
1901 3241.11
1902 13538.23
1903 36386.40
1904 41531.26
1905 48770.89
1906 38443.64
1907 33437.80
1908 39714.17
1909 431.96
1910 388.02
1911 368.61
1912 5.60
1913 6.80
1914 6.08
1915 447.96
1916 385.65
1917 440.73
1918 507.55
1919 615.82
1920 683.91
1921 594.80
1922 568.15
1923 526.74
1924 577.69
1925 538.87
1926 749.75
1927 635.72
1928 624.17
1929 752.64
1930 555.46
Sources: Pardo-Parra, A., Geografia Economica y Humana de Colombia, (Bogota, 1979), pps. 191-197, based on primary evidence 
from the 'Beneficienda de Cundinamarca' archives in Bogota, Colombia. As pointed out in Chapter IV of this thesis, this appendix 
is consistent with Appendix 24 which follows, because price indexes for 1900 to 1930 appearing in the first column of Appendix 24, 
use the Colombian Departamento Administrative Nadonal de Estadisdca (DANE) base which is 1923 = 100, with a food price basket 
for the same year of $526.74, appearing in this appendix, and taken from the Benefidenda archives by Pardo-Parra. However, for 
years 1912 to 1914, by Pardo-Parra's own admission, food prices (taken from military food radons) and corresponding indexes are 
dubious, until new evidence on food prices is unearthed.
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APPENDIX 24:
AVERAGE FOOD PRICE INDEXES: 1900 - 1930
/ II III IV V VI VII VIII
1900 215 na na na na na na na
1901 616 na na na na na na na
1902 2570 na na na na na na na
1903 6907 na na na na na na na
1904 7884 na na na na na na na
1905 9259 na na na na na na na
1906 7298 na na na na na na na
1907 6348 na na na na na na na
1908 7539 na na na na na na na
1909 82 na na na na na na na
1910 74 na na na na na na na
1911 70 na na na na na na na
1912 87 na na na na na na na
1913 106 na na na na na na na
1914 94 na na na na na na na
1915 85 na na na na na na na
1916 73 na na na na na na na
1917 84 na na na na na na na
1918 96 na na na na na na na
1919 117 na na na na na na na
1920 130 na na na na na na na
1921 113 na na na na na na na
1922 108 na na na na na na na
1923 100 100 99 114 96 126 95 121
1924 110 100 100 109 103 120 90 116
1925 102 105 105 112 97 122 102 112
1926 142 120 109 127 114 136 115 129
1927 121 116 108 108 100 116 98 111
1928 118 121 114 118 106 129 91 133
1929 143 113 114 104 93 119 79 115
1930 105 87 78 85 70 93 67 95
Sources: (i) Column I, Pardo-Parra, A., Geografia Economica y Humana de Colombia, (Bogota, 1979), pps. 191-197, based on primary 
evidence from the /Beneficiencia de Cundinamarca' archives in Bogota, Colombia; (ii) Columns II, III and V, " Indice del Promedio 
del Costo de la Vida en el Pais de Algunos Articulos Alimenticios ", Revista del Banco de la Republica, Bogota, Colombia, Vol. IV, 
No. 40, (Bogota, ), p. 72; and Columns IV, VI, VII and VIII, Boletin Mensual de Estadistica del Departamento Administrativo 
Nadonal de Estadistica, (DANE), No. 300, (Bogota, 1976), pps. 202-204; Notes: Column nomenclature is as follows: I = Bogota; II = 
Nation (average of nation's cities' indexes); III=Interior (average of Interior's cities' indexes); IV = NAC (average of NAC region's 
cities' indexes); V=Medellin; VI=Barranquilla; VII=Cartagena; VIII=Santa Marta.
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APPENDIX 25:
EXCHANGE RATES: 1900 - 1930
1870s - 1890s
Ruling average exchange rates of the Colombian Peso (CP$) : (i) 1870 - 1879 , CP$ 5.23 = 1 
; (ii) 1880 - 1889 , CP$ 7.30 = 1 ; (iii) 1890 - 1899 , CP$ 13.84 = 1 ; Averages are taken from 
" Appendix 4. - Foreign Exchange Rates in Colombia, 1870 - 1970 in Palacios, M., Coffee in 
Colombia. 1850 - 1977. (Cambridge, 1982), p. 262. The Bogota and the Medellin exchange rates 
are averaged as one exchange rate. Thereafter, averages per decades of these figures are taken; 
d) 1874 - 1914 , US$ 4.867 = 1. Figures from Bidwell, R., C, Currency Conversion Tables. A 
Hundred Years of Change. (London, 1970), p. 1. This means CP$ l.oo equalled US$ 0.93, US$ 
0.67 and US$ 0.35 respectively for the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s respectively; e) for 1900, CP$1 
equalled US$ 0.10 as quoted in Braupre1.
1902 - 1913
For pratical purposes, we assume (i) 1 Colombian Gold Peso (CGP$) = 100 Colombian Paper 
Pesos (CPP$’s) despite future legislation ruling this exchange rate in 1903; and the US Gold 
Dollar at par with the Colombian Gold Peso.
Colombian Paper Pesos $ Sterling
1902 417.500 1
1903 531.250 1
1904 5.185 1
1905 5.210 1
1906 5.125 1
1907 4.815 1
1908 4.805 1
1909 4.860 1
1910 4.945 1
1911 4.930 1
1912 4.930 1
1913 4.990 1
Source: 'Appendix 4, Foreign Exchange Rates in Colombia, 1870-1970', in Palacios, M., Coffee in Colombia, 1870-1970, (Bogota, 1980), 
p. 262-263. Figures are averages of the Bogota and the Medellin Exchange rates and divided by two, except in years 1911,1912 and 
1913, where only the Medellin Exchange Rates are available. Palacios notes that figures from 1904 onwards are Gold Pesos.
1 Beaupre
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1903 - 1930
1 Colombian Gold Peso (CGP$) = 100 Colombian Paper Pesos (CPP$’s) according to McQueen 
who noted that " ... since 1903 ... the rate of 100 paper pesos to one gold peso, the latter 
equivalent to 1/5 of a Sterling ... and confirmed by the Monthly Bulletin of the International 
Bureau of American Republics who reported that " ... a paper peso which consists of 100 
centavos, the present rate of exchange between this currency and United States gold is 10,000 
%, so that 1 peso is equivalent to 1 cent in United States money ".
Ley 33 of 1903 and Ley 18 of 1904 were the laws which established " the right of individuals 
to stipulate any type of currency in their contracts; but the state currency retained its character 
of forced acceptance of paper money, redeemable at the exchange rate ruling on the day of 
payment ". This was confirmed by Ley 59 de 1905 which " declared the monetary unit and 
accounting currency of the Republic would be the gold peso, divided into 100 centavos. This in 
turn was re-confirmed by Ley 69 de 1909 which indicated that the " exchange of notes, at the 
official rate of one hundred pesos ($ 100) in paper for one ($ 1) in gold " would have to be 
honoured.
Sources: McQueen , C., Colombian Public Finance, (Washington, 1926), p. 20; the Monthly Bulletin of the International Bureau of 
American Republics, whole 123, Volume XV, Number 6, (Washington, 1903), p. 1549; and Banco de la Republica, Informe al Senado 
por la Comision de Hacienda y Tesoro sobre el Proyecto de Ley Organica del mismo Banco, (Bogota, 1923), pps. 11 and 12.
1902 - 1914
US Dollar $ 4.867 = Sterling 1.00
Source: Bildwell, R., C., Currency Conversion Tables: A Hundred Years of Change, (London, 1970), p. 1 and 2.
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1915 -1930
US Dollar $ Sterling
1915 4.86 1.00
1916 4.77 1.00
1918 4.76 1.00
1919 4.425 1.00
1921 3.80 1.00
1926 4.85 1.00
1927 4.85 1.00
1928 4.87 1.00
1929 4.85 1.00
1930 4.87 1.00
Source: Bildwell, R., G, Currency Conversion Tables:A Hundred Years of Change, (London, 1970), p. 1 and 2.
1914 -1930
Colombian Gold Peso $ US Dol.$
1914 1.0400 1.00
1915 1.0800 1.00
1916 1.0400 1.00
1918 0.9369 1.00
1919 0.9287 1.00
1921 1.1696 1.00
1926 1.0170 1.00
1927 1.0242 1.00
1928 1.0218 1.00
1929 1.0334 1.00
1930 1.0350 1.00
Source: Banco de la Republica/Cotizadones (Venta) del Dolar Ofidal y el Certificado de Cambio en el Pais. Promedios Anuales de 
Pesos por US $. Cuadro 82 ', Infonne Anual del Gerente a la Tunta Directiva, 1960 -1962, Volumen II, Numeros XXXVIII y XXXIX, 
(Bogota, 1962), p .143.
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